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Chapter I 
THE ORIGINS OF THE BORDER INDUSTRIES IDEA. 
Political, sociological and economic objectives inevitably 
impinge upon one another, so that economic proposals cannot be made 
without taking into account their non-economic implications. It is, 
therefore, an untenable claim for the economist that once 'he has shown 
that a particular course of action is to be recommended, for economic 
reasons, he has done his job. ' 1 Hutchison makes a point which, as 
he remarks, is perhaps rather platitudinous, but nevertheless, is often 
neglected: 'Only advice and policy which is based on an estimate of the 
political, sociological and economic effects together of a policy or 
measure can be sensibly acted on'. 2 
Governments, naturally, pursue social and political as welt 
as economic objectives. The degree to which economic and non-economic 
objectives harmonise with one another without government interference, 
however. obviously varies a good deal according to time and place. For 
instance in the nineteenth century, the priorities of British governments 
made possible a high degree of individual freedom in the economic 
sphere. This century, however, as Robbins suggests, has seen a 
great extension of state activity in the economic sphere, 3 for both economic 
and non-economic reasons. This tendency, then, is not peculiar to 
South Africa, but the border industries policy, largely because of its 
ideological associations and the degree of intervention which it seems to 
imply, is a particularly controversial example. 
1. J. R. Hicks, Essays in World Economics, 1959, p. x. Hicks, in fact. 
goes on to say "that i£ he linits his function in that manner, he does 
not rise to his responsibilities. tt 
2. T. W. Hutchison, The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic 
theory, 1938, p. 165. 
3. Lionel Robbins, The Economist in the Twentieth Century, Macmillan, 
London, (1956), p. 4. 
... 
2 
If ~1Jor·.! of one policy objt!Cti.ve can be obtaitl(.:od without even 
pa.rtly giving up .:mother, then no policy issue d.rises, since the objectives 
are "free Joods". f.ut thie is not usually tbe case, aud it has, untonu-
mtely, become somethi.ng of a tradition in certain circles, whenever 
official interver.tion conflicts with economic objectives. to assuulf: auto-
.ua.tic:Jlly that gover.11r.:1ents are irrational, incompetent or even downright 
wick<.~. The .behaviour of governn.~.ents, however, is seldom em:irely 
whimsical , a.nd ther e are thus important tasks for the economist to per-
iorm. one of -~~tich is to elucidate the ends of policy. The latter are 
not elw~ys dearly l'oxmubted. since schemes are often launched without 
any precise tdea of the objectives ther.useh·"~s~ let .1lone ..t ca.:refut assess-
ment oi their proJJ>.:ili!t? co:useqce~~s. 
eluci.datlon of tht: opponur.t.ity cosbs of alternative policies • 
. ~n attempt to state more explicitly both the cqiectlves (}..Ud 
implie;!.don.s of poHc.es ma.y, therefore. provide a n..crc solid b.isis fo.r 
realistic policy decisions. "P " Po "' • 'd • · rogress r as pper .uaS S..•l , lests · ... 
wlth the cktrity of our. com:eption '.l! our end~. and .. ·iit..~ the :r:;<;tUsm of 
their choice . ,l 1\: is with these tb.o~·lus in rulnd that we approach our 
problem. 
n1e border hrlust.des policy does not r~presellt a radical 
departure fron. the a.pproac~ of earlier South z:'Jtican governments to the 
problerus associated with the J:.n.asetng o.f Bantu workers and their fawiHes 
in the country's ln(:tro:x>Utan. <..treiils. C~ the COnt:rai'y it illll.St he &-en d.S 
the currer..t: phase in u continuous process of evolution in the country's 
tiliu.king on r~ciul poHcy. 
unfJJldiug .io6ic \\.-nic.:L &ppears tc anoeriy tile country•~> political history. 
The N;:.tlves Land ;1Ct of 1913 ~t aside <1reas, knowu ~s 
---------------~-------- -----------
p.28J. 
.. 
3 
'scheduled areas', which were to be reserved exclusively for occupation 
by ,\f.ricans, and at the same time stipulated that no African might acquire 
land in freehold outside of these areas. In so far as lt prevented further 
acquisition by Buropeans of land occupied by Africans, the latter welcomed 
the measure . But the rights of Africans were diminished in that they 
had hitherto been free to purchase land anywhere in the Cape and Natal, 
though not in the Transva.U or Orange Free State. It was felt strongly 
at the time that the area set a.side 1 was inadequate in relation to the size 
of the .\frJcan population2 and a commission was set up in 1916 to study 
the problem. Only insignificant additions were ILade, however, until 
the Nitive Trust and Land .~ct of 1936, which enlarged the Native reserves 
of 1913 by ad<lir..g to them certain districts? then in the possession of 
~uropeans, which would gradually be transferred to .\frican ownership. 
The Native Trust was established in tern1s of the \ct to purch.:.tse this 
land, known as 'rehased areas'4 for .Urican occupdtion. Tile 1936 "~ct 
thus brought the total area reserved for Mrican occupation to approxin1ately 
12.4 per cent of the country's total land area. and it was envisaged that 
no further additions would be made.~ 
The p<Wel.ty of the Native «eserves has ooen a matter of concern 
and the subject of study by numerous Government col.Omissions and other 
official bodies throughout this century. This poverty has for long been 
seen as lying at the heart of political, social and economic ills afft..>eting 
white and black alike. :i.s far back as 1932 the Native Ecvnomic Commission 
1. About 10~ million n~orgen or 7. 3 per cent of the country's total land area. 
2 . ·which in 1911 comprised 7~. J per cent of i:he country's total population. 
3. Measuring about 7 nlillion iuorgen. 
4. i.e . rele..1sed fron1 the provisions of the Natives Land i\ct of 1913. 
5. Subsequent dev~lopments are mentioned in Chapter 2 below. 
4 
emphasised 'the desirability and necessity in the interest of the country, 
European and Native alike, of placing a well planned scheme of improve-
rrent and developrrent (of the Reserves) in the forefront of the national 
objectives. 11 This Commission saw the 'outstanding feature of the 
Native Reserves, corrnx>n to all of them in varying degr ees' as lying 
in 'overstocking'.; and, in so far as it can be said to have laid down a 
prograrnne of development, this consisted chiefly in stressing the need 
for ' educat ion, in the broadest sense of the word', apparently with a view 
to coni>atting the ' overstocking evil'. 2 They believed that the problem of 
relieving the poverty of Natives in urban as well as the rural areas nust 
be tackled in the Reserves. 3 No mention was made of any need for 
industr ialisation, but this is hardly surprising considering t he early stage 
of industrial development of the country as a whole at the time. 
The Mine Wages Commission of 1944 also drew attention to the 
'overstocked and overpopulated' condition of the Native Reserves and 
emphasi sed the social and econonic evils of the migratory labour system 
under which 'a considerable percentage of the Reserve Natives have to 
work for hire alrrost continuously, with relatively short breaks, to earn 
a living'. 4 Another official report published in 1946 points out the inter-
relations between the migratory labour system and low agricultural yields 
in the Reserves: ' No plan for the rehabilitatio11 of the Reserves can fail 
to take into account the fact that a considerable proportion of the adult 
rm.le working force is absent at any one time. Few Native. :"louseholds 
in the Reserves depend solely on agriculture for their means of livelihood. 
1. Report of the Native Economic Commission 1930-32, U . G. 2Z of 1932, 
The Gover nment Printer, Pret oria, pp. 47-48. 
2. ibid. , p. 48. 
3. For an excellent cornnentar y on this Connission' s proposal that 'a wise 
courageous, forward policy of development of the R eserves' be adopted 
seeN. N. Franklin, Econonic Welfare and the Development of the Native 
Reserves, S. A . J. E ., Vol. 10, No. 1, March 1942. 
4. U. G. 21 of 1944, para. 207. 
Yields from crops and animals are so low that supplememary income 
l:"ollowti\:S an atialysis of the 
~I..WpHcationa and consequeoces of the m~ratory labour system this report 
!"€.-commends dlaf. "the elimination as far as posoible of the mi,P"atory labour 
system must be the goal of policy, .a.nd must ~ pnxeeded wf.th ~.s fast as 
con<ltttons aHow. &ubj~et t<; the nt!..ed Gf oot di~locating ecooomk: life. The 
t11'~t .itm ILust be to cuiJft.ne it to ilkiustlies wilicb, like the ruinin_s iodustty, 
It is indeed probable 
that it will becon e less tmpo1.ttn.t. as· legisla.tt.~n c.wnot col'.tinually p:rt:vail 
aga.in.st the ru.ral .. urhcii.l drifi.: ~a:sio!k..-d by ecom-•u.:;c l4!ld other iorces. 
Such <.:il..illges must ua. ve t:t 111ajor eifect on the Reserves as w~ll liS on 
Ihe only complete solutiOn is to 
eff~ <4 ~ imp.:t"<'ve~nt in .Re~:n~ eonditf.on"' <ind to i.""l.tte pt·cnht~ f-or a 
2 pc-nl~t',.~mt 1-.b ur forC<.' 
'The Socia! ar.'rl rlco:ncmJc P1annir.g ("..our.cH '.i.'hiL de~(•ting most 
aU:entiu.u to the formulation oi an agricultu.ral po!lcy o! tJle ~se~ves differs 
.hr~en we economic base oi' the ~serv-es~ •Th(lugh. the ecouomi.~ develop-
ment ¢f tltP. .RP~rve$ will for a 1£>~ thne be s.uociat~ with th~ diversifi• 
cation an-1 iucx.ea.se of n&rlC:tJltu_tal outt'Ut• labour ~vill remain fur ~me time 
It would be Wl.'Ollg. however, to regard this 48 all 
t:bat is required for Reser.r~ l;lros,:~rit:\t. 
J.~Licc are iar~iy th~ result of sborta&te of laud aDd increased contact with 
western civilisation. so that the development ot other ec-..ooomic ~ctivities 
on we~rttlir>.e9 is bf.C"".On'ing esse::&bl i.u C!<d~r t~ iu~reuse the total a 1:•ailable 
irte~l~tt~ . ~3 In S!lppc;;,t of thif:; ;.~ur;,te:uti.on ili::y n;.:.:ution Co.iin CL, .rk. 's attempt 
-----
------~---~ .. ----···----· --~·-_. ______ _ 
1. Soci.~l a.nd ~~•·<mile PJ..vmi::.to" CotmCil, Too Native .a.l.ese.rvew ai.sd t.oeir Place 
i:u the .&.:oCOOOu"'y of tbe Unionoi South .;-Uric.!~" U.G.S2 nf 1946.~ p.4l.para.l7J 
2- -~ · p.4ts 
s. ibid., p. ~<> .. ~.t-~-:iv. 
to show a direct relation between the de<1ree of indttstrkllisatlon .md 
income per capita. of diiferent cowitrics. 
6 
It is interestiD.J to observe, too, that the Council discusses 
the very problem that caus3d the gre.1test dissention among members of 
tne Tomlinson Commission several years later, viz. the freedom of white 
entrepreneurs to invest in the Resel-ves: 
' .~ the n~omcnt there is little alternative to migration and as 
a result the majority of the n:ost progressive members of the commu..Tlity 
..u:-e lost to the .t\eserves. · ~~rlculture r arely provides a sufficient 
income. Raserve .1 venues of enrployn'!Cnt are extremcly limited. 
there in fact any alterru.tive while the Reserves are looked upon ;1lmost 
solely as reservoirs of n:ci~rant labour? Outside interests. with the 
exc e ptions provided by Szctions H~(~) and 24(1) of ... ct No.!& of 1936 
cannot interest ttleL 4-:l>d v~s fimncia.lly in these a reas. Yet population is 
press~ on the means of subsistence. State enterprise and investment 
uone. can achieve this .1t present. Tbe altern • .ttive is th.a ..... toJific...ttion 
of ~le;;erve policy to ..tllow of p.d vate investment, thoUu'"h even in tl1is 
inst.lnc J considerabl~ invcstluent in improved men.ns of COl4n1mnicu.tlcn and 
power would probably be necessary initially. A\.re these implications 
fully r ealised. and ls the estil.blishn.ent of ~t te...-ttile i.1ctory .J.t Kinv"\villiams· 
1 town on Trust Land a herald of the sh...tpe of tllir16S to come?" 
The Tomlinson Commlssio.n Repo.rt, published in 1956. intro-
duced a note oi heighten~ u.r.5.ency into the question of the development 
of tha iieserves. Lnlike the earlier reports quoted above, the reasons 
advanced for emh.!.rkill6 upon a larJe scale prog.r:J.nJil.e i.n the Reserves. 
w~re wore blatantly politic...tl. The CoL1mission saw tile survival of White 
1. ibid., pp.58-59. para.241 
civilisation as being the prinary objective of State policy in South 
.. :\.!rica.. aDd it believed that the only me..ms of achieving this was a 
territorial division of tlte country into black and white areas. The 
reasoning which led the Commission to co.DClude that territorial 
separation was necessary ls contained in essence in the passages 
below: 
'On the part of the xsurope.m there is an unshakeable 
.resolve to maintain their right of self determination as .1 
national and racial entity while on thP. part of the Bantu there 
ts a growing conviction t.llat they are entitled to. and ther~ is 
an ever increasin.:J demand for the fruits of i.nte$ration.. including 
an even ~s·r\.!a.ter share in the control ci the country. 
"SeeiiJ6 that t peaceful evolutior.a.ry rLOVement towards 
n COLl';mon society is out of the question, the policy of i.ute-
,Jl'i:i.tiOn C01.tld le ld to prcblcma and u..,n,gc.rs of the gravest 
~ntenslty . 
'h is cl~r that a contl:.M~ticn of the ;x>licJ of intCJ"".l.-ltion 
would illteil.t;\fy racial friction and animosit) ... and t.hat t.~e only 
real alternative is to promote the est.'lbUstme-"~t of se{Xlrate 
communltl~s in their own aepa.rate territories where each would 
bave tile fullest opportunity of self-expresslon ar!!Ci deYclopluent. •1 
7 
The Tomlinson Commission laid great stress on the need for 
industrialisation to absorb the unetuployed or undere.LUployed JlOI".Jlatiou of 
It esti~ted that at Ute tin.e o( its i.nve&lJ.ltiCJn the 
C..l.rrymg ca.r.ucity o.( t1.te n..2se~ vea Vt"..t:; :~. \) wlllion bt:t tli.tt this could .be 
.raised to 111 n4i'lion over a 2~> ye..1r pe.rie>U, including ll.iJ..C . .ll.it .vorkers 
;il\d tLeir depePdem:s. Economic activit-y t1 th,; Rcscr'lcs thor.oselves. it 
1. Swnmary of tbe £le[.)Ort of the Commisaion for the Socio-..;:.cuuvnile 
.:Jevelop1neut of the &ntu ~ lre.is \rlthiu the Union of Sout!1 linea. U.G. 
Gl o£ 1%5. pp.l04-L1~ (.1.'omlln:sou Report) . 
said, would be able to vrovide a livi~ for 8 million people. 1 The 
Commission stated that, ~1ccording to its estimates. this objective 
implied that an average of 50, 000 opportunities of employment would 
have to be created in the Ba..otu 01.rcas ailiU.Ully, thoujh the actual 
number would mturally be smaller in the ea.rly stages. From the 
point of view of this study, however, it is especially noteworthy that 
the Coh)wission rockon...r.od tllat employme.w: would have to be provided 
for 23, )J) Bantu .a.nnu~ll}" in secondary industry alone. 2 Tbe economic 
acttvity arising from tllis it w~s a;;rced, would, according to expect.:ltion, 
stimulate tertiary activities to such an extent that th~ rem ... ining 31), 000 
.rorkers would he eruployed in the latter. 
8 
If these ..:>-oals were met, then it would ru possible to accommo-
date (j.J per cent o! t!le country's Baatu pop;;l..ltion in the .Keserves by 198L 
and 7.) per cent by the end of the century. 
by the Comn,ission was not tackled, then uo iac:red.se in the carryin_" 
c..tpacity of the LteserV\!S could be ~xpected, aLd any increase in popula-
tion would sh.lply spill over into oth~r }.lUrts of the country. so thd.t by 
the end of the century t..'sc ~ntu are..ts would ..~.cconu:r~odate only <Jbout 
a quart~r of the Ba11tu population. 
1. 11w Commission's method in urriVil\J ..1t this c:stim:.tte. howev~r, was of .:t 
somewhat questionable sort. It fi:rstof ~lll d.ssumed that plarmin~~ in the pri.llld.ry 
sector would l< • .lke possible a collectlvt= Cllrryil\£ capacity of 2.14 1rrillion persons, 
and th~n asserted without .my obvious justification, that it was not unreason..ilile 
to expect that in a period of 2v to :n yrurs the ~-teservcs \VOuld achieve an 
econo1nic structure similar to th . ..1t of Call..Ld-:l in 1941 , when about 7{) r};:!r cent 
of t!l,e !JO.f.J..ll..ttion wa.s ew!,)loyed outside of ·.t._:·.dcultul'e . 
2. Including the construction industry. 
The question -Nilether industriallSoltion should take placa in the 
Bantu areas themselves or in the so-called "border areas• was one of the 
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most contentious isauas raised in the Tomlinson Report! and one imt-K>rtant 
respect in wllicll the Government. in a. lhite Paper on the repol"t= differed 
from the ruajorlty view of the Commission. The Commission defined a 
border area as 'one tNbere developrnent takes place in a c.uropean area 
situated so closely to the Bantu Areas. that families of Bantu employees 
eng~ed in that development, can be established in the Bantu areas in such 
a way that the elllployees can lead a full family ltte• ~ k was envisaged 
that such 'uuro~n' areas would be situated so close to the Reserves that 
Bantu work.e.La -R<>uld be able to travel home to their families inside the 
aeserves everyday, or at least at very frequent intervals. say, weekly. 
The o"\erridil'\S con&:ideration in the Government's decision to 
reject the uujority recoturuendution of the Conunission t:L.at in<h.«rt:rlal 
0 development be cncdntrnted mainly inside the Bantu ~reas, was essentially 
~ . 
political. The objections put by t l.e two disse.ntiDJ commissioners were 
that 'tite grtmt~ of concessions to ~uropcans to establish industries and 
to acquire other rights anciHai.y thereto would open the door to c1 state 
of affairs whicb would be tantaiu.ount to the creation of additiorul 'white 
spots' in the Ba.r..tu areas, and that duriDJ the course of time any such 
concessiv:lB would 1·esult in tht: concession.u-ies cla iming rights and privi-
leges. vested aild otherwise. which in their opinion, would be contrary 
to tbe concepts of the separate development of tOO B:lntu ~l-rels and the 
principles of their reserv.1tion for the Bantu' . 4 But from u strictly 
I. Tomlinson, pp.l4V-143 
2. Government Decisions on the tteeommewJatlons of the Commission for tbe 
.Socio-uconowic Development of the Bantu Areas within the &public of Soutn 
\fricas W .P.F. -'56. 
iS. Tomlinson, p.140, pa.ra. 4. 
4. Tomlinson. p.142, p.ua.29 
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econo...nic point of view also there is one extren;ely fo.r.ceful ar6ument for 
concentrallsi.og on the development of the border areas retther than tbe Bantu 
.ueas themselves. The forr.Jer a re at present much more developed from 
the point of view oi social overhead capital, and contain se"-,ral towns of 
fairly sjgniflcant size. Thus the iuiti.U capital investment required in the 
bordar areas is probably smaller than would be the Cd.Se in the &ntu areas .. 
In .1dditlo. it will prob..i..bly be much easie.t to a1ract entrt:;preneus:s and tech· 
nici.uts to borde.r• are..~.s . In sum, then. the initial costs of industrialisation 
will proba.bly be lower in the border ar<.~as than In the Bantu i.reas. 
~-!bile admitting that border areas dev~lopment would b1Cre.1se the 
carrying capacity of the .tteserves. the majority report cf the Commission 
favoured the establishment of industries inside the Reser .res si~e. it reasoned, 
despite initial dis~vantages. illdustries inside tbe rteserves ~ould result in 
dev~lopn1ent to t:hc nnx.iJlJUJ.. extent . The princip.:1l objection of the Commission 
tc .>Order i.4re.!l s <.:~velopnieut was thci.t $lt mli o.aiy particLlly remove tile 'ceiltn_.:• 
for the Bantu • . . . . the lh.:itations in the i.ndustri..tl sph ~re. which a.pply to 
then h1 1.ll other .lre:1::~. will :.llso be in force here, aml under such circun.-
stari.Ces it will be particularly difficult to creat-<a. class oi skilled rorkers o1nd 
entrepreneurs amon~ tlte B:ultn. •1 The second principal objection was that 
border areas development would CllUBe a tendency for the population to concen-
tr.J.te on t!u:! J<>unda.ries of the t{ese.r.ves near the bol'dl...r .:t..re...s. ,1Itd tlut the 
Ba.nt;,~ will feel til..J.t t>ley are .u.er~ly an appendc ~c of the .i::.urop· Atil community. 
Internal developu.1ent on th:-: other h.1..1.d would give r.sc to ..1 sowrler p.l.ttem 
of porub.tion distribution, :.md would rot C"lUSe it to shift '"'radua.lly to the boxde:rs. 
Thirdly, they considered thrtt tl-te ~ocial probJ~n.s of tl~e reserves coHid be 
better tleJ.lt with by me..t.ns of inten.al devolop1...er.t. Fourthly, they J.rgued 
th'1t it ·..vo•tJd provide a bott'1r b.1.si.s for the eventual independe~x:e of the Bantu 
arcus. Th ?re can ~ little doubt that any degree of political independence 
1. Ton.:Jinso.1.1. p. l41. 
given to the Bantu areas can provide very little real independence whilst 
the bulk of their people earn their livin,.: outside those areas. 
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Desplte the n1ajority report's recommendation that the 1naxir..1um 
results ln terllis of the tenitorial division of the country on racial lines 
would be achieved by establililhing industries inside the l{eserves. the Govern· 
.ment, in the White Paper referred to. made it clear that it would not counte· 
nance such a policy. The border industries policy is thus an attempt to 
coru.promise between internal industrial development of the .Reserves and the 
continuation of the rapid J.-ural-urhln movement 'Of -~ricans especially to jobs 
in $CCOndary industry in the major industrial centres. with its abtmdant social 
and politiCal implications. which was (and still ls}taking place . It is the 
logical outcome of a political view which has led to a system of laws which 
prohibits the exploitation of the resources of the Reserves by private white 
enterprise, and at the same time seeks to reduce to the mlnimuru the move· 
ment of ,1frtcans to the 'white ' d.re.1s, e&~""Cially to the metropolitan areas . 
lt was in the \ lhite Paper of !9;,6, tben. that the Government first publicly 
declared itself to be in favour of indue~ industrial development in the border 
areas . Since that time, as we shall see below. 1 the Government's commit· 
ment to this policy bas become much firmer. and the policy a.ud the measures 
to be adopted in otrler to implement it have been moxe clearly formulated. 
Oespite the latter .. however~ there are, d.S we &hctll also see. numerous 
important issues ralcttiiJg to the border industries policy which need to be 
clarified. and it is l..t.r;;ely to thls t.lsk of clurification tllat tbe present study 
is devoted. 
• • 
1 • Chapter 7 . 
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''lndustrial __ R~en~ralisatio_!l_:_ ~- "Border ..:1reas Industrialisation ... 
1.t this staJe it eeems desirable to touch upon an im~runt 
distinction. n~n.ely, between ·indnstrla! decentralisation' and 'border areas 
indust.tialisation' . 'TI)C l"VI/O terms have tt-nded to be r2garded as virtually 
sy110nyllious. but the forxr;er clearly s~ests a broader scope in geographical 
terma than the latter. It aleo suggests .wore stro1Jcily that its adoption as 
c:1 Go\lernment policy is depelld~nt for its justification upon econon,ic. socw!. 
strate6lc .-1nd siruilar factors. resultill;! from excessive concentration oi 
econoruic activities in .:l f~\V larJe centre i)er se, and not so much dependent 
on Ii.!Cial pollcy. In short the t.erm 'h1dcstriai decentralisation' is u 
polltic..!lly 1uore neutral one than 'border areas i11dustrwlisation' . Further-
more the use oi tile foncer at::t a syoor:.yiL1 for ti'l\! latter i~.plics that ..1 case 
of~ ~tate induced indust:rialiSc.ttion in presently relatively unindustrialised u.reas 
exists ind~pez1dently of the policy u: sem.cat~ dev~lopL.lent~ and th .... t therefore 
the border industl'i~::J r:.olicy .lflv re:sts to so;.! ? :.x.t~nt (usu.1lly it is ur.plied 
to a l~r ;c ex.,ent) upo:n siwilct.r i.J.·:to1:s. 
difficult t•) e:tplain the intensity ~lith ui~icl1 the Go\·..:'r41r.:.cnt ~1);~<.i.r<:> to Jcsire 
border ..tre~1b ilidu:;tl:i uls.::tJo.a. 
r'rom a strictly ecouo~·.ic i)()int of view it is clear chat :s:iven the goal 
of diverti.f16 industries irou.: the few rdativciy lle..tvily industrialised areas to 
ot:her less industrW.lised centres. that border areas are .at least fror~. the point 
of view or initi..t1 social over~1ead iilvcstil~ preferablr.! to th~ Bantu areas 
tilenH:>el ves - Howeve1:, tllc question rt;ust be .rJ.is-,d whether there .ue not 
ethel a.1.e""s .tP<il't frO.!• tl.~ i:Jo .. cde.c art! s whict. u.>i.,;ht be considered us 11-ore 
or cq_.mily :-Juit.J.ule &ite-!> fo.r b.ldustry. if tl.~e ail_, of the policy ~ere ~imply 
that of dispersiu.; iooustLie~ !row con,~ested :!reas so as to eas~ th~ problerus 
of la.1·ge urhle con.ce.atr.Ltio>-V. There a.ce in fact several centres well equipped 
with social overhe<1d capital ;..nd ot~r facilities for industrial developn.cnt and 
their/ 
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their neglect by comparison with border areas bas been the cause of 
complaint from interests in these other areas. This neglect is to some 
extent a reflection of the political bias of this policy, and the obvious 
fact that the aim of the policy is not simply that of eliminating the social 
problems of overcrowded areas. On the other hand, it is true that the 
population density of the Bantu areas is far greater than that of other 
rural areas, 1 so that the need for non-agricultural employment is 
greater, and that the Border areas include a large proportion of those 
relatively unde1reloped areas in South Africa which are favourably placed 
for development. The Viljoen Commission pointed out that ' as the im· 
portant industrial areas that can be developed in this country lie in the 
area between the eastern escarpment and the sea, and therefore in the 
immediate vicinity of the Native reserves, the policy a£ encouraging the 
decentralisation of industry conforms broadly with Jtbe policy of the 
) 
Government of developing industries near the Reserves. •- Nevertheless, 
the policies are not identical and the border areas exclude a number of 
important centres which might well be included in a broader policy of 
decentralisation . 3 
1. 
•) 
.. 
3. 
Population per square mile in the Natal reserves and the Transkei in 
1951 was 82, and in the Ciskei, 79; the average. density for all Bantu 
areas being 63. The Transkei was more than twice as densely pop-
ulated as the Western Province. 
-Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Policy Relating to the 
Protection of Industries, The Government Printer, Pretoria, 
U. G. No. 36/1958, para. 453, p. 55. 
In recognition of this, the Government in March 1965 broadened the 
scope of ito- programme to include certain areas h1 which unemploy-
ment amongst Coloureds or Indians was thought to be excessive. 
'The accent, however, still falls on border areas, on account of the 
supply of labour from the Bantu homelands. the limited opportunities 
in relation to the population in the areas concerned, and the social 
policy of the country. ' Permanent Committee for the Location of 
Industry and the Development of Border Areas, Report of Activities 
for the Period 1st January, 1966 to 31st Decetnber, 1966, pp. 2 -3. 
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The Major Questions. 
Once this distinction is made the obvious question is whether in 
fact there is a oound case for industrial decentralisation apart from a 
Government preference, motivated by considerations of race nolitics as 
such. The aim of this study is not primarily to question the desirability 
of the latter goal on moral or political grounds. Its task is to answer 
two questions: (i) If the Government does ·tnduce industrialisation in the 
border areas by means of subsidisation and other measures, what will be 
the economic consequences, and bow will these consequences vary with 
the rate at which border industries are induced? (ii) Given the desire on 
th-e part of the Government to establish secondary industry in the border 
areas, what is the most eHicient (least costly) way in which it can achieve 
this (i.e. what specific instruments should it use, what specific industries 
should be encouraged, etc. ) ·? 
•But', as J oh;ansen points out. 'it is possible to go further and 
consider the public sector in another way. One then tries to explain the 
actions of the public authorities as determined by, for instance, such 
things as the various influences of social classes and pressure groups, 
the social mechanism of selection of leaders of state and municipal 
institutions, their lmowlcdge or lack of knowledge when taking decisions, 
etc. This will be a theory about politics'. 1 In a later chapter this 
approach wlll be adopted since it is necessary in order to explain the 
factors which enter into the Government's decision as to how much industry 
is to be subsidised in the border areas. and to show in a more rigorous 
way how the Governmentt,& political ,objectives are subject in this case to 
economic constraints. Some recent writings have demonstrated that 
decisions of this sort, even though they involve non-economic goals, can 
be handled within an analytical framework familiar to economists. 
1. Johansen, L. Public Economics, North-Holland Publishing Company, 
(Amsterdam, 1965), pp. 6-7. 
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The Majo't" part of the study, however, i s concerned with 
answering the two questions involved L~ the first approach :r:ncntio ted 
above. Our reasons for doing .so are well expr2ssed in Johansm& 1G words: 
'This is without doubt the sin1plest: it ma..~es possible a r~lativcly 
technical analysis of the problems witi1.in pul.>lic economics . 'Ih-:- second 
view rcq.uires a far greater elen'lent of l:)olitical and sociological tLcory'. 1 
tn addition to being simpler, however, it is believed by the presen t 
writer that an analysis of the economic const1quences of the bor d("r 
i:n.dustries policy will enable both the Govermnent and the public to 
:m;:;.ke a more rational assessment of t he policy and of the most 
efficient means o:! implementing it. 
1. Johansen, L. on. cit. p . 7 
Chapter 2 16 
DUALISM IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
"Two Nations: The R i ch and the Poor" 
There is a sense in which the South African econony rr.e.y be said 
to be "dualisticu. In this respect South Africa is like Italy~ to which 
the following definition of dualism was particularly intended to apply: 
"· •• two aec tors have conE to co-exist: an advanced sector, where 
the degree of industrialisation is high, factors of growth are in op· 
eration, productivity and wages increase, and per capita incon:es 
are high, or at least well above a certain ninimum; and a backward 
sector, where inco~ per capita is well below that mininum, pro-
ductivity is low and stagnant, techniques of production are very 
prinitive, and where unemployment and underemployment are persis-
tent features" .· 1 
This definition lays stress on differences between regions. In 
addition to these there are of course striking inequalities in South Africa' 
between the living standards of Whites and Africans within all regions. 
It'is this which has led Horwood, who uses the terms "subsistence'' and 
"nnderntt for the two econonic poles inplicit in the idea of dualism to 
say that "the subsistence economy of South Africa is not as is often 
averred, confined to the Native territories, but • • • extends appreciably 
into the modern sector as well. And any proposals for raising the living 
standards of all sections of the population must take cognizance of that 
fact". 2 But this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that in resped 
of their nnterial wealth, the inhabitants of the Bantu Areas are much 
worse of£ than the urban Africanso· Whil e the White-African income 
l. Luigi Spaventa, Dualism in £cononic Growth, Banca. Nazionale del 
Lavor<lj,- QR. . 'RE:VIIl'vo./ , y o.L. . 1-;1., , p~::c:. e.,...,~e~ , '1S&f · I"· '2>8b , 
2. 0 . P. F. Horwood, 11The Social Frarrework of E conorric Devel op:rnant in 
a Dual Society: the Case of South Mrica". in J. Hollennn et al. (Ed. ), 
Problems o£ Transition (Natal University Press. P ietermaritzburg, 1964) 
p . 178. 
inequality is undoubtedly inportant both politically and econorrically, 
so iar as the actual implementation of the policy of separate develop· 
trent is concerned, it is the disparity between the living standards 
of Africans in the advanced and backward parts of the country which is 
of prinary significance. 
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Actual conditions in the Bantu Areas and the fundamental causes 
of these conditions. are discussed in detail in nuroorous worl(s 1 and it is 
unnecessary to deal with them fllrther, although they rrust be taken as 
an eosential background to the pr,blems of industrial development with 
which this work is concerned. Our attention is for the present directed 
towards so:r:re of the n:ore significant manifestations of these underlying 
conditions. 
1. For example, W. M. MacMillan. Conplex South Africa, (London, 1930); 
Native Econonic Commission, U. G. 22/1932; Witwatersrand Mi!:-.e 
Natives' Wages Cornnission (Lansdown), report U. G. Zl , 1944. 
Social and Econonic P lanning Council1 Report No 9, The Native Re--· 
serves and their P l a ce in the J.~conof!l¥ of t he Union o£ South Africa, 
U. G. 32, 1946; D. Hobart Houghton and Edith }VI_.. Walton, ~ 
Economy of a Native Reserve. being Volu:rre II o£ the Kebkammaho(!k 
Rural Survey. Shuter and. Shooter, Pieternnritzburg, 195?.; Socio-
J-:conomic Development of the Bantu Aree.s within the Union of South 
Africa (Torriinson Corrniaeion report sumrmry), 'U . G. 61, 1955. 
1 The Bantu Areas of South Africa comprise some 13 per cent 
of the country's land area and in 1960 contained approximately 27 per 
2 
cent of the total population. They are thus nearly two and one half 
1. The actual area has been estimated at 16, 760, 415 morgen made up 
as follows: 
Scheduled areas (as at 31 Decerrber, 1964·) 
Land acqui red by Mricans 1913 to 1936 and 
still in their possession as at 31 Decenber, 1964 
Acquired by the N ative trust 1936 to September, 
1966. 
Acquired by Africans 1936 to September, 1966. 
9. 745, 341 
1, 416, 400 
5, 154, 852 
443,822 
16,760,415 
Source: A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1966, compiled 
by Muriel Horrell. 
2. S. Enke, 11South African Growth: A lVlacro-Economic Analysis!!, 
S . A. J. E., h/.arch 1962, p. 41, takes a Bantu Areas de facto pop-
ulation of 4. 3 million which he attributes to r'inior:rred opinion11 • 
The country's total population in 1960 was 15, 994, 181. (Statistica l 
Year Book 1966). 
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L'l'l 1951 the Bantu areas population excluding those temporarily absent 
was 3. 633 million or 28. 7 per cent of the total population of 10, 908, 000. 
It is noteworthy too that in 1951 42. 6 per cent of the total African pop-
-alation was :resident in the Bantu Areas. (Torrlinson Commissiotl 
sunnary, p • .. ·3) whereas if Enke 1s source is reliable, in 1960 the 
corresponding figure for 1960 was about 39. 0 per cent. 
1 tirres as densely populated as the rest of the country. The greater 
population density of the Bantu Areas is by no means conpensated for 
by superior quality of agricultural land or other factors, such as 
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mineral deposits, processable raw materials, or a favourable geograph-
ical situation in relation to markets, so that we should expect per capita 
production in these areas to be very much lower than elsewhere. When, 
in addition to this. account is taken of the fact that existing methods of 
production in agriculture, the rrajor economic activity of the areas, 
are extremely ruditnmtary compared with methods in the advanced sector, 
that soil erosion has proceeded at an alarming rate for some time, that 
there is acute overstocking, and that a large proportion of the males of 
working age is always absent, it is hardly surprising that 11in 1950-51 
the Bantu Areas provided only 3. 7 per cent of the total geographic income 
('adjusted') of the Union"2 and that "their 12er capita production of (R 25. 8) 
contrasted with (Rl98. 8) for the Union as a wholen. 3 
The share of the Bantu Areas in the country's national in come 
was sorrewhat larger than their proportionate contribution to production, 
nainly because of the remittances of rrigratory workers. The T oniinson 
1. In 1951, according to the Toniinson Cor.m:ission (Surnnary, p. 49) 
the Baatu Areas carried a population of 3. 6 rrillion on 58, 000 square 
niles, or an average of 63 persons per square mile, conpare d to 
27 per square nile for South Africa as a whole. The addition of 
migra:t'lts, tempora rily absent from the areas1 obviously accentuated 
these differences. 
2. Tomlinson (Surrn:ary), p . 99. 
3. ~ 
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Comnission found that the average income for a family of six persons 
living in the Bantu Areas under traditional connunal tenure was R85. 90 
per annum in 1952, slightly more than half of which was derived from 
farrring, the rest being non-farm income, tminly renittances from 
migrant workers. 1 The proportion of the national income accruing 
. h 2 to the Bantu areas appears to ave been about 7 per cent. 
1. 
Income from farming 
P roduced and consumed by the farrily 
Produce sold 
Total from farming 
Non-farning income 
Wages (mainly renittances from emigrant 
workers) 
W..i.scellaneouG 
Family Income in 
R 's p . a . 
34. 26 
9.50 
43. 76 
37.82 
4. 32 
42. 14 
Total fanily income 85. 90 
Source: Tomlinson Report (full), Table 1, p. 16, Ch. 24, Vol. 10. 
2. It is of some interest to compare this with the following e"-'tract :from 
the 1?65 issue of the South Mrican Inetitute of Race Relations' a~JAual 
Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, p. 204: 
"According to the issue of Bantu for March, Professor H. J. J. 
Reynders of the lJniversity of Pretoria a.nd D . 11. van den Bergh 
of the Econonic Advisory Council h a d calculated that the net nat~ 
ional income of Mricans in 1961 was R984·, 000, 000 or 23 p er cent 
of the official national incorre. Their purcha sing power (i.e. less 
payments in kind) was R 788. 000, 000. The governing comnittee 
of the Bantu Investrrent Corporation, it was stated, estimated that 
urban Africans conrnanded fifty per cent of this purchasing power; 
those in the homelands 28 per cent, and those on White -o,.v-n.ed farm; 
22 per cent". The purchasing power, as defined above. of Africans 
in the Bantu Areas thus appears to have been about 6. 4· per cent of 
the national incorre in 1965. 
For a number of obvious reasons it is not very meaningful to 
conpare these figures with the incorres of other racial groups in an 
attempt to assess their relative economic welfare. 1 Even comparis-
ons of incoJn3S of Africans inside and outside the Bantu Areas present 
difficulties but these are less serious, and, as we errphasised earlier, 
it is the disparity between African living standards in the advanced and 
backward sectors of the economy that is of n:nst relevance to this study. 
2 Truly reliable statistics on this are not available. F. P. Spooner, 
however, has put the average family income of the Bantu Areas in 
1953-54 at Rl94, that of Africans on White-owned farms at R240, and 
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of urban Africans at R426. According to this estimate then, the aver'l.ge 
family income of urban Mricans was rrore than twice as great as that of 
those in the Bantu .:. reaa. Calculations3 based on the Tomlinson figures 
1. See Tordinson (Summary), pp. 99-100. 
2. South African Predicam:mt, (London, Jonathan Cape 1960), p.l74. 
3. According to the estimate by Reynders and Van den Bergh published 
in I .arch, 1965 (see footnote ."!, p. 20 above) all Africans togetho:Jr 
received 23.0 per cent of the national income. Assume that thi& 
percentage also held in 1950-51, when, a ccording to the Toniinson 
CorrJ"nission (Surnrary, p. 99) Africans in the Bantu areas received 
about 7 per cent of the national income. Africans outside the .6antu 
areas thus received about 16 per cent of the national incorr:e. As 
&hown above the population of the Bantu areas was about 4(!. 6 per 
cent of the total Mrica.a population. Thus the ratio of non-reserve 
to reserve incomes was about 1. 54 i.e. the former were about 5.d per 
cent greater than the latter. 
Applying a sunilar zrethod to Reynders and Van den Bergh's 
figures 1 purchasing power per head was about 130 per cent greater 
for no.n.-reeerve than for reserve Mricans. This is reasonable given 
the fact that inco:rres of the latter include a greater proportion of 
income in kind. 
and certain estimates by Reynders and Van den Bergh, suggest that 
Spooner's estimate gives a fair reflection of the incoill!!s of Africans 
in the advanced relative to those in the backward sector of the economy. 
Not only is population density high and per capita output low but 
the former is increasing and it appears that the per capita output may 
very well be falling. This i s so despite a significa.L"&t !"ate of outlnigra-
tion fromthe Bantu Areas to the advanced sector in response to a rapid 
rate of growth in the latter, and, despite the Governmentt s efforts to 
increase agl"icultural productivity. For instance, the possibility of 
a declining rrarginal and average product in the Bantu Areas is suggested 
by Leistner in his study of labour nigration in the Northern Transvaal. 
He compares population density in the Northern Transvaal reserves in 
1951 and 1961 and concludes that over this period it i.Ilcreased from63. 4 
to 81 . 2 per square nile or by 28. 1 per cent. His final view of the matter 
is that: 
there is no evidence indicating that the outflow of the surplus 
workers from the Bantu areas has raised significantly the marginal 
product of those remaining behind and, consequently, wage rates in 
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the developed sector. The reverse seems to be true. Population 
growth and dininishing carrying capacity of the land have increased 
rather than decreased the ratio of labour to land, and only a continuous 
outflow of population has prevented narginal product in the subsistence 
1 
sector from falling to levels even lower than at present." 
If this is so, and there is no evidence to the contrary, attempts on 
the part of the government to improve agricultural In:lthods in the re sC!rves 
a re not proving sufficiently successful to pr~vide for a larger population 
_____ , ____________________________________________________________________ __ 
l. G . 1-1. r:. Leistner, Fconomic Aspects of Bantu 1.1igrant Labou!', 
(Unpublished Ph. D. thesi$, University of Stellenbosch, 1963) p. 22 1. 
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at a constant or rising standard of living. Given the present state of 
technology (which includes social organislltion), therefore, the reserves 
are overpopulated and failing a radical change in iarrring technology, 
or a considerable increase in non-agricultural employment, they nust 
continue to depend on nigration to prevent a further decline in living 
standards, let alone an inprovement. 
Enke 1 assumes a narginal product of labour in the Bantu areas 
equal to 0, 8 of the marginal product. With a 1. 6 per cent2 per annum 
increase in the population of the Bantu areas this in:plies a 1. 28 per 
cent increase in the output of the rese·rves. uPer capita output in the 
reserves will then decrease and per capita consunption will only be 
naintained through the remittances from relatives working in the rrodern 
sector. " Enke is in effect postulating that in the face of a growing 
Bantu areas population, technical progress in the Bantu areas is not 
taking place sufficiently rapidly to prevent a fall in output per head. 
This has not been established with any degree of certainty but in view 
of Leistner's findings, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out for the Bantu areas as a whole. 
While output per head in the Bantu areas shows few signs of 
improvement, earnings in the advanced sector are, by all accounts, 
rising steadily if slowly. Steenkamp3 writing in mid-1962 sutrl'llU'ises 
the statistics as follows: ''In private Jn:Ulufacturing and construction 
1. Stephen Enke, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
2. Estimated by J. L. Sadie, nThe Social Anthropology of Econonic 
Underdevelopmentu, Econonic Journal, June 1960. 
3. W. F . J. Steenkarrp, "Bantu Wages in South Africa", S. A. J. E . 
June, 1962. 
24 
there was 11a sharp rise of over 50 per cent in the real average income 
of the Bantu worker during the war years, but practically no increase 
between 1945-46 and 1957-58. Since 1958-59 and in particular 1959-60, 
however, a rapid annual rise has tal<:en place". 1 Between 1935-36 
and 1960-61 real average inco.rres of Bantu rose by 82. 5 per cent, and 
of Europeans by 77. 6 per cent. Real wages in mining have rermined 
substantially unchanged over a long period while Ureal wages in metro-
politan commerce have shown creditable increases over the last twenty 
years. Here too
1
however, the post-war era witnessed a tendency 
towards stagnation , real wages actually declining between 1953 and 
1960 in all area s except the Western Cape and Johannesburg. In 1961, 
however, they were sharply raised in most areas. " 2 
Steenkalll>'s figures must be illterpreted with care, however, 
since they reflect average earnings of workers in all grades of skill so 
that it is not cl ear to what extent the increases nEntioned are due to an 
upgrading of the labour force as distinct from rising wb.ges for each par-
ticular grade. There seetns to be little doubt, however, that the potential 
earnings of migrants have been increasing. 
In view of the rapid rate of growth of the Bantu population, and the 
low productivity of labour in the Bantu areas which has given rise to 
large scale n:igration to the urban areas, it is understandable that wage 
1. W. F. J. Steenkamp, op. cit., P• 95. He warns, however, that these 
figures may overstate the real increases since their calculation in-
volved a deflator based on European family budgets, in which food· 
stuffs, the prices of which have risen rmre sharply since 1938 than 
other consurrers' goods, figure less prominently than they do in 
Bantu household budgets, and that no account is taken of the increase 
in transport costs that Bruttu employees have had to bear in conse-
quence of their rehousing. 
2. ~ P• 98. 
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levels were static for a long period. 1 Sorre writers, in fact, advocate 
that as a matter of policy wages should be kept as low as possible in 
order to encourage labour intensive production and absorb the maximum . 
n.urrber of people into wage employment. 2 "In countries such as India", 
writes Walter Birningham "where there is a serious land shortage in the 
subsistence sector. rraximum wage-errployment seems to be the right 
poiicy". 3 It is not irrplied that a deliberate attempt should be made to 
depress wages in the advanced sector, and it is highly inprobable that 
euch a policy would aucceed if other forces were tending to raise wages. 
At the sazre time a policy of deliberately boosting advanced sector 
earnings relative to earnings in the backward sector, either by statutory wage 
fixing, or indirectly via influx control, thus artificially limiting the pace 
at which wage employment in the modern sector can grow, is also not to 
1. It is interesting to compare this with Ghanaian experience. See 
Walter Birmingham, "The Econonic Developn:ent of Ghana, in 
W. Birmingham and A. G. Ford (editors) Planning and Growth in 
Rich and Poor Countries) (Allen and Unwin, London, 1966), p. 184. 
where it is shown that " the unskilled labourer ' s standard of living 
was virtually the same in 1962 aa it had been in 1939". 
l. See for example W. A. Lewis, 'Economic Developrrent with Unlimited 
Supplies of Labour," The Manchester School, May 1954, reprinted 
in A. N.· Agarwala .and S . P . Si.,,gh (editors), The Economics of 
llnderdevelopment; Stephen Enke, "Econotric Development with 
Limited and Unlinited Supplies of Labour, 11 Oxford Econoni.c Papers, 
-June, 1962; and J. C. H. Fei and G. Ranis, Development of the Labour 
Surplus Economy, (Homewood, Illinois, 1964). 
3. .Birningham. op. cit., P• 183. 
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1 be recorr.rrended. Steenkamp's assertion that "until recently, nearly 
all substantial advances in the annual rate of increase in Bantu wageE! 
in manufacturing and construcUQn were associated with governin:!ntal 
action112 is. therefore, of considerable interest and importance~ This 
raises son:e interesting questions: Would African wages have risen more 
slowly in the absence of statutory wage fixing? What part, if any, has 
influx control played in raising advanced sector wages? Have conditions 
of labour supply excluding influx control been changing in such a way as 
to raise wages? Has the dernmd for labour been increasing relative to 
labour supply recently so that the supply of labout:ilo longer appears to 
be perfectly elastic and wages are consequently at a point where they 
will begin to rise more rapidly than in the past? 3 What will happen to 
wage rates in the advanced sector if influx control is applied as severely 
as the Governn::ent intends applying it in the Western Cape and what will 
!v See Vera Lutz. Italx: A Study in Economic Development (Oxford 
University Press. London, 196Z) where the persistence oi the 
phenomenon of dualism in Italy is expained in terms of trade w1.ion 
activities which raise wages in the advanced sector. 
:?.. op. cit. , p. 95. 
3. It should be noted that more or less constant wage levels over a long 
period do not necessarily mean :hat the supply of labour has been 
perfectly elastic in the sense of static analysis. That is the :nn.r-
ginal productivity of labour in the Bantu Areas :r.r:a.y in fact be neg· 
ative sloping at each point of ti~ and yet population growth i."'l the 
Bantu Areas. may result in an apparently unlinited supply of labour 
at a constant wage rate. It is, therefore, unnecessary t o invoke 
the concepts of disguised unemployment, work sharing, crop sharing, 
an excess of the conventional ninimum income over the marginal produce 
etc. , as is done by Enke and by Fei and Ranis, in order to explain the 
constancy of wage rates in the advanced sector. 
happen to the disparity in incomes between the advanced and backward 
sectors? 
.tyiigration: Causes, E:ffects and Control. 
As is typical of countries in a similar· stage of development, 
urbanisation of all racial groups in South Africa has taken place at a 
rapid rate throughout this century. The rural white population actually 
1 decreased by 8. 5 per cent between 1951 and 1960. ln the same period, 
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despite influx control, the proportion of the Bantu population in the urban 
areas increased from 27. 9 to 31. 8 per cent, and the proportion of Bantu 
in the total urban population also increased considerably. 2 
The urbanisation of whites and Africans alike. was fundamentally 
due to the rural-urban income differentials created by the development of 
mining and manufacturing activity. Closely related to the process of 
urbanisation is the strong flow of migrants from the Bantu Areas to the 
advanced sector of the economy, though this has partly taken the form of 
movements to white farms. As a result of migration to both rural and 
urban areas in the advanced sector, the proportion of the country's total 
African population resident in the Bantu Areas declined from 42. 6 per 
cent in 1951 to about 39.0 per cent in 1960. 3 This was simply a contin-
uation of the trend which has bean in evidence for several decades. 
Consequently, the population of the Bantu Areas has grown at a 
considerably slower rate than the African population of the country as a 
1. The Statistical Year Book for 1966 gives white urban population in 
1951 and 1960 as 553.000 and 506, 000 respectively. 
2. The number of urban Bantu in 1951 was 2, 390. 586 compared with 
3, 471, 233 in 1960. 
3. See footnote 2 p. 18 above. 
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whole. Migrants may be roughly classified into two broad categories: 
permanent and temporary. B ecause of the territorial expansion of certain 
of the Ba.11.tu Areas, it is difficult to obtain a really reliable estimate of 
the magnitude of permanent migration for all of the reserves together. 
But the Tomlinson Commission estimated that '1Natal, the Ciskei and 
the Trauskei, where the additions made to the areas reserved for the 
Bantu, were smail, lost on an average 20, 800 inhabitants annually by 
permanent migration during the decade following 1936. This average 
rose to nearly 50, 000 a year between 1946 and 1951 ". 1 
Between 1951 and 1960, according to the P opulation Census, 
the population of the Transkei, the largest of the Bantu Areas, in-
creased by 11 per cent compared with an increase in the country's total 
? 
population of 27. 7 per cent,"' 
1. Toni.inson (Summary), p . 53. 
2. According to the 1960 F'opulation Census, Vol. 1 the population of 
the Transkei in 1951 and 1960 respectively was 1, 269, 277 and 
1, 407, 815 and the corresponding figures for the country's total 
Bantu population were 8, 560, 083 and 10, 927, 922. This n:arked 
discrepancy in rates of increase cannot be expained by an increase 
in the number of foreign Ba.ll.tu since these numbered 603. 598 in 
1951 and 586. 595 in 1960 (latter figures from Statistical Year Book 
1966 - p. A-32). Nor is there any reason, so far as the writer 
knows, to believe that the natural rate of growth was significantly 
sl'l'8ller for the T ranskei than for the country as a whole. 
Had the Transkei 's population increased at the Sanl! rate as the total, it 
would have been in the vicinity of L 62 million instead of the actually re-
corded 1. 41 million in 1960. S ince as we shall see below, the increase 
in the number of terrporary migrants was relatively slight in this period, 
it appears that over the 9. 3 intercensal years sorrething like 20, 000 
persons n:ust have migrated on a long term basis from the Transkei to 
other areas. 
The significance of permanent migration in reducing the rate of 
population increase of the Bantu Areas, is also reflected in the changing 
conJ>osition of the urban population. Indicative of the increasingly 
settled character of the Bantu population is the decline in its :rmsculinity 
ratio from 1. 83 in 1936 to l. 61 in 1951 and still further to 1. 40 in 1960. 
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In his study of Pretoria, Leistner shows that nthe age and sex distribution 
of the city's Bantu population pointed towards 58.9 per cent of the pop-
ulation being 'settled' in 1946 as against 80. 2 per cent in 1960, there-
mainder being ten:porary residents11 • 1 He adds that the term 'settled' 
:rray be taken to mean "more or less permanently committed to an ex-
istence based on wage earning". 
Temporary rrigration. too, takes place on a large scale, but 
the available evidence suggests that the number of temporary a bsentees 
is not increasing significantly. The Tomlinson Cornnission put the 
nu:rrber of temporary absentees from all Bantu Areas together in 1951 
? 
at 569, 000 corrpared with 447, 000 in 1936, .... and, as we noted above, 
"inforrred opinion"3 was that the number of temporary absentees in 
the early 1960's lay between 400.000 and 500,000, which suggests a11 
absolute decline in the inportance of temporary migration during the 
1. G. M. E. Leistner, E conomic Aspects of Bantu Migrant L a bour 
(Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Stellenbosch 1963, p. 207). 
2. op. cit., p . 53. 
3. S. E nke, "South African Growth: A Macro-E conomic Analysisu, 
S. A. J. E . , l\l~rch 1962, p. 37. 
4. op. cit. 
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1950's. Two other pieces of evidence, however, conflict with this. 
According to the Tomlinson Connission there were about 194, 045 1 
temporary absentees from the Transkei in 1951, whereas fairly recently 
the Transkeian Department of the Interior estimated the nun:ber at 
z 21 3, 000. This represents a relatively slight increase over a period 
of a little m:>re than a decade. For the Northern Transvaal, Leistner 
finds "only a srrall increase in the number of temporarily absent men and 
even • • • a decrease of about 1, 000 temporarily absent £err:alesn. 3 
In view of these two estimates, and the fact that the Transkei is large 
in relation to other areas, it seems safe to say that if the total number 
of tenporary rrigrants has, indeed, increased this increase has been 
insignificant compared with permanent n:igration. The latter, it must 
be noted, has taken place in the face of an increasingly severe application 
of influx control ~asure s. 
Those who emphasise the political dangers of a growing settled 
urban Bantu population, tend to favour the so~what disapproving conno ... 
tation of terrnl like "rural-urban drift', for the process of permanent 
nigration whose Iragi1.itude we have outlined. It may, however, also 
be seen as a reflection of ulabour rmbility11• a condition which eco11orrists. 
rightly or wrongly, have tl"aditionally regarded in a favourable light. 
The textbook ca.se for the n:ovement of factors of production fromplaces 
of low to places of high return within a country is well known and does 
not bear repeating in detail. Suffice it to say that it benefits both the 
factor owners and the economic growth of the country as a whole: 
without it the population of the Bantu areas today would be very much 
poorer than it is and the large concentrations of :mining, n:anufacturing 
and co!l"Uercial activity in the Witwatersrand and other centres would 
lo op. cit. 
29 See the 1965 issue of the S. A. Institute of Race Relations, Survey 
of Race Relations in South Mrica, p. 12 7. 
3. op. cit. , p. 2.07. 
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have been impossible. 
This is not to say that there can never be a sound economic, 
as well as a social, case for the control of migration. Firstly, it 
is possible that without control the rate of migration may exceed the 
capacity of the urban areas to provide employment. This problem is 
not confined to South Mrica. as Walter Brimingham's remarks show: 
"The rapid urbanisation now occurring in Ghana suggests that 
migrants are willing to settle permanently in new places and jobs, 
indeed want to abandon the traditional life for the attractions of 
town and city. This adds to the growth potential but imposes on 
planners the task of absorbing the migrant labour rather more 
rapidly than the achieved growth rate has hitherto allowed. 
"That this is likely to be a problem in Ghana as it is in many 
countries in the early stages of their economic awakening is in-
dicated by the extent of unemployment discovered by the 1960 
Censustt. 1 
In view of this state of affairs, Birmingham argues that "there 
is much to be said for leaving the population undisturbed in the trad-
itional economy until the modernising sector can absorb them". 2 
Whether or not uncontrolled migration would lead to excessive 
migration, in the above sense, in South Africa, and hence to the urban 
chaos that some fear, there is no evidence that the scale of migration 
experienced inthe past has exceeded the ability of the advanced sector 
to absorb workers. In fact1 there is a strong possibility that the 
advanced sector could have absorbed migrants at an even more rapid 
rate than it has done, without adverse effects on the urban wage level. 
1. Birmingham, op. cit. , pp. 181-182. 
2. ~· p. 183. 
J. De V. Graaff, 1 on the basis of statistical estirm.tes made 
by Stephen Enke.2 suggests that "if we assume that influx control op-
erates in such a way that the real wage of non- Europeans remains 
constant, this entails a faster rate of migration from the subsistence 
sector •• • the non-European population of the rmdern sector should be 
permitted to grow at 4 per cent a year - that is at about double the 
natural rate of increasett. 
The influx control rra.chinery is, in any case, obviously not 
designed solely to regulate the inflow of migrants in such a way as to 
prevent excessive urban· unenployment • Nowhere is this to be rmre 
clearly seen than in the Western Cape where, since the niddle-fifties, 
influx control tneasures have been increasingly severely applied, 
culminating in the announcement at the end of 1966 of a sche~ to bring 
about an absolute reduction in the nurrber of Bantu workers in the area. 
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To the extent that this political factor has ope1·ated throughout the country, 
the actual volume of permanent nigration will have been unnecessarily 
srrall in relation to the ability of the urba..""'l areas to employ newcomers. 
In view of these considerations and in the absence of any evidence to 
the contrary, there seems to be little doubt that the scale of nigration 
in the past, has been beneficial to both migrants and the country as a 
whole, at least from an eco:..'loni.c point of view. 
Secondly, so far as the economic case for influx control is con-
cerned, it is possible that govern:rllant intervention to curb the expansion 
of the metropolitan areas can be justified in terms of ~xternal economies 
and diseconomies. This possibility iB discussed in soma detail in 
Chapter 5 of this study. but two issues touched on there seem to be par-
ticularly relevant in the present context: Even if an economic case for 
government intervention can be sustained on the basis of external effects, 
.l. J. de V. Graaff, '~ternative :W.10dels of South African Growth, 11 
S.A. J. E. March 1962, p. 45. 
2. op .cit. 
I 
(a) it may be that the significance of the latter is only n'l:lrginal in 
relation to the actual scale of permanent nigration (b) it nay be 
that influx control is not the appropriate means of correcting for the 
external effects in question. if, indeed, correction is called for. 
While permanent nigration is generally regarded in a favour-
able light from an econonic point of view, it has becor.re something of 
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a tradition to condemn the system of ten:porary migration as a moral, 
social and economic evil. 1 The case against temporary nigration on 
:m)l•al and social grounds seems to rest on the age and sex selective 
nature of the phenomenon . According to the Tordinson Connission, male 
migrant workers totalling 503,000 in 1951 represented about 40 per 
. 2 
cent of the males of the Bantu Areas between the ages of 15 and 65, 
and in addition there were estilnlted to be some 420,000 migrant work-
ers from adjacent territories working in the Republic in 1951. 3 The 
social objections to this are surnnt.rised as follows in a study published 
in 1946: 
"It cannot be right to force the separation of the workers from 
his family for rnmy rmnths on end. The migratory system is 
resulting in the breakdown of Native life. Widespread proa-
titution and marital inetability, adult crir.re and juvenile delin-
quency, venereal disease and sexual perversions, are among 
its effects, which are aggravated by the abnorrral sex ratios in 
urban and rural areas". 4 
That the nigrant labour system is a highly in-perfect social 
arrangement seerm to be undeniable. The real issue, therefore, is 
whether there is a better alternative available, not whether the sy.atem 
is perfect. If, indeed, the system is an econorric evil as well, the 
1. See for instance: Social and Econon:ic Planning Council, Report No 9, 
The Native Reserves and the ir place in the Econony of the Union of 
South Africa, p. 47; D. Hobart Houghtonll The South African Economy, 
Second Edition, Chap. 4. 
2 . Tordinson (SunTnary), p. 53. 
3. J:!ilik, p . 40. 
4 . Social and Economic Planning Council, op. cit. e p. 47. 
case against it seems to be complete since this would inply that the 
alleged moral and social evils are not even partly offset by economic 
advantages. Let us, thereforet examine the economic aspects of 
tenporary migration. 
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It is generally acknowledged that reni.ttances from rngrant 
workers are of the greatest inportance for living standards in the Bant-.1 
Areas. For instance, Hobart Houghton and Walton in their study of the 
Keioka.rrrnilioek District reported that "over two fifths of the families 
draw the greater part of their inco:rre from remittances by nigrant 
workers", and that the people of the district were "dependent upon the 
earnings of migrants for their ·very existence, and it is poverty which 
forces them out to work". 1 In the light of this and evidence provided by 
other studies2 there is prima facie. so~thing parado,Ucal about the view 
that labour nigration is economically inefficient and wasteful. 
In arguing against the nigrant labour system on economic grounds 
the following points have been IXllde: 
(a) There is a huge wastage of n:anpower due to time opent on 
travel; in periods of rest or unemployment and in the relatively unproduc-
tive time spent in the reserves. The Tomlinson Conmiseion calculated that 
there are on average 600, 000 man years of labour available which are 
not economically applied. 3 
(b) "from its very nature the rri.grant system tends to inhibit the 
<.(quisition of skills and tends to condemn the workers to being in perpetuity 
nerely undifferentiated units of unskilled labour114 
1. D - Hobart Houghton and Edith M. Walton, The Economy Df a 1\lative 
Reserve, Keiskarrrnahoek Rural Survey, Vol 11 (Pieterrraritzburg, 
1952) P- 112. 
2. e . g. Tomlinson (Sun:ma:ry), p. 98; S. A . Institute of Race Relations, 
A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1965, p . 127; Social and 
~conomic Planning Council. op. cit •• pp. 41-42; Leistner, op. cit., 
pp. 17 3- 17 4. 
... 
.;,_ 
4. 
D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Econony, p. 87. (~nd l:O:dition) • 
~. p.88. 
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(c) it is "indirectly the cause of nuch labour instability among 
both the urban and the migrant workersu 1 ior three reasons. First, it 
has set a pattern of internittent employment which influences the 
behaviour of the younger members of the pern:anently urbanised corrnunity. 
Second. it causes labour instability because of its disrupting effect on social 
an d social and family life. Third, the quality of labour rranagement in 
the urban areas is poor because the majority of employers have co~ to 
regard the African worker ~s not worth taking the trouble over since they 
corre and go and when one leaves there is another to talce his place. 
(d) Tenpornry migration is "a potent cause of the perpetuation 
of poverty at home, for the abaence of so ma>"l.Y in the prime of life in-
hibits econorric progress and certainly accounts in no small measure 
for the low agricultural produc~ivity of the district • • • Prirm. f acie 
it night be supposed that large enigration from the Reserve ~vould be of 
benefit in easing the pressure of population; the errigrants, however, are 
not a c r oss section of the conr.runity but consist mostly of the active and 
able bodied members; while those who rerr.ain are the infirm, the aged and 
the children".2 
These argmnmts however, are by no means conclusive proof of 
the economic inefficiency of the nigrant system, and on a certain scale 
it nay well be the best arrangermnt from an economic point of view. 
Let us look at the matter from the point of view of the individual n:i.g1•ant. 
The fact that he doe s not expend as rruch time in work either in the urban 
nrea.s or in the reserve as he seems to be physically capable of doing, 
does not necessarily inply waste. The econonically best solution does 
not require that the rrigrant spend all his time in either the advanced sector 
1. ibid •• p. 90. 
2. Hobart Houghton and Walton, op. cit., pp. 112-113. 
or the Bantu areas, or that the individual exert himself fully in 
"productive" activity in the rural homestead, when he is there, fol" 
eight or any other specific number of hours per day. Work and 
the development of the reserves are not ends in the:rn:Jelves, and the 
economically best solution only requires that he allocate his time be-
tween the advanced and backward sectors, and between agricultural 
labour and apparent idleness when at home, in a way which is optimal 
in terms of the pre:er~uces of himself and his family for income as 
against leisure and other "non-economic" benefits. It would, of 
course be foolish to assume that the migrant workers invariably n:ake 
nice rational calculations and that the very existence of the migrant 
system is in itself proof of economic desirability. But it can be shown, 
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provided it does not result from legislative restrictions, that the migrant 
l a bour system, given the country's existing resources, is perfectly 
consistent with the maxinisation of the real income of the Bantu farrily, 
a.nd indeed, of the country aB a whole. Efficiency, of course, is a 
relative matter so that if the charge of inefficiency laid against the 
nigrant labour system is to be sustained it must be shown that under 
present conditions (not in some ideal and practically unattainable 
situation) either permanent urbanisation or. full time farning are always 
econonically superior from the point of view of the rrigrant and the 
economy as a whole. 
As is generally conceded, workers migrate to the advanced 
sector primarily because of their low productivity in the Bantu Areas, 
and evidently they actually succeed in making a significant contribution 
to the economic well being of their families in this way. 1.-iigration 
enables the family to obtain the goods and services which it desires at 
the lowest real cost in terms of labour effort, since the real return to 
labour in the advanced sector is so much greater than in the Bantu areas, 
at least during the period when they are away. In most Mricau viDage 
conrrunities the absence of able bodied rrales does have an adverse 
effect on agricultural output, since contrary to an all too co:rrrnotl. belief, 
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men still do perform certain vital farming functions and the marginal 
1 product of labour i s probably not zero even in the most densely populated areas. 
But the amount of agricultural output foregone depends very much on the 
tirre of the year and the length of the nigrants' absence. 2 
The gains to the village cornnunity are most obvious in the case 
of seasonal nigration. If the seasonal demand for nigrant labour 
coincides with the cff- season in the village economy. so that the loss 
of agricultural output in the latter falls short of the wages earned, but 
during the height of the season in the village economy the na.rginal 
product exceeds the wage obtainable outside, the output of goods and 
services i s obviously maximised by alternating between the village and 
outside economies. Since this also increases the supply of labour to other 
sectors, the latter. and hence the econony as a whole benefit from 
terq>orary nigration. In these circurn;tances both pernnnent migration 
and full time farming in the rrigrant' s home village, are economically 
less efficient than tenporary migration. With reference to West Mrica, 
Berg argues convincingly as follows: 
"In seasonal migrations the benefits far outweigh the costs. This 
imbalance is true for the individual migrants; their net gains are 
equal to their earnings in paid enployment minus transport costs, 
their cost of subsistence while in paid employment, and their fore-
gone production in the village econony. which is likely t o be negli-
gible. At the same tirre, the incone (or real consumpti on} per head 
of those who remain at horne is also likely to be higher with rri.gration 
than without it. " 3 
1. See Hobart Houghton and Walton, op. cit., pp. 141-143, where the 
shortage of labour in the Keiskammahoek district during the ploughing 
season is described. 
2 . See for instance: W. J. Barber, The Econony of British Centrcl .Africa, 
(London) 1961, pp. 180-183; William Watson, Tribal Cohesion it;. a 
~r.oney e conomy; A Study of the lv'..ambwe P eople of .Northern lthodesia, 
(Manchester) 1958. 
3. E lliot J. Berg, The Fconomics o£ the Migrant Labour System, in Hilda 
.l(uper (E ditor), Urbanisation and Migration in West Africa (l...niversity 
of California !Jress, 1965,} p. 166. 
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In other cases it is possible that wage earnings are greater than the 
rmrginal product of labour in subsistence agriculture even during the height 
of the ploughing and harvesting seasons, but that the agricultural output 
foregone exceeds wage earnings if the nigrant' s absence is longer than 
so:rre critical period. 1 In such cases the male migrant would tend to be 
absent longer than in the case of purely seasonal migration, but it would 
be necessary to return ho:rre from time to ti~ in order to rn\Xirri.se his 
contribution to the farrily~s real income, expressed in terms of their 
conmand over goods and services. 
Where, as in the South African reserves, the :rmrginal product 
of labour in reserve agriculture is very low. however, due to a shortage 
of land, the contribution of the male rri.grant to his family's income would 
be tn:•.ximised by continuous enployment in the advanced sector. But it is 
not sinply the individual rri.grant' s own contribution which decides whether 
family migration takes place. When terrporary nigration is undertaken 
the fanily's total income is equal to (a) the migrant's earnings in inter-
nittent wage employr:rent plus (b) the :rrigrant's contribution to agricultural 
output when he is at home plus (c) the agricultural output produced by bis 
wife and other members of the farrily :rrinus (d) the cost of travelling to 
and from the place of paid employment. Corrpared with this, permanent 
migration increases (a) the migrant's individual wage earnings, but eli-
mitlates total agricultural output (b) plus (c) and travelling costs (d). 
It rm.y, however, be possible for the migrants wife and perhaps other 
members of the family as well to obtain wage enployment. So, i~l 
general, for fanily nigration to nuxinise the fanily's real income of 
goods and services, therefore, the increase in the wage earnings of 
the rrigrant, plus those of other rrerrilers of the fanily, must exceed the 
sumo£ items (b), (c) and (d). Thus we :rm.y say that the greater the u:rban 
1. Barber, op. cit., Watson, op. cit. 
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wage rate (hence the greater the increase in wage earnings from full tinE 
compared with intermittent wage enployn:ent), the better the opportunities 
of wage errployrrent for other :tn!rrhers of the fanily, the lower the :rri-
grants rm.rginal product in reserve agriculture, the lower the agricultural 
output of his wife and children, and the greater the cost of travel (which 
depends largely on the distance of the urban area from the rural home-
stead), the nnre attractive does fanily migration become !elative to 
temporary migration and full titn! farrri.ng. Other things being the sane, 
then, permanent urbanisation is stimulated by rising urbattZvage rates and 
I 
declining productivity of land in the reserves. 
It should be noted. however, that for full time farning to yield 
a larger real income than terrporary migration it is necessary that 
item (b) above exceed the sum of (a) and (d). That is, the male nigrants 
rmrginal product in subsistence agriculture must exceed his urban wage 
earnings minus travelling costs. In view of this, those who are at 
present temporary migrants, are nnch rmre likely, under existinf con-
ditions, to want to switch to full tin:e wage enployment than to full time 
farming. 
The formula, stated above, for determining whether permanent 
rrigration gives the fanily a greater real income than tenporary r.:igration 
or vice versa, tl'1'lst be slightly modified to take into account two other 
economic factors. The first is simply that the cost of housing the family 
in the country is usually negligible compared with the town. Thus the 
excoss of wage income over the combined fanily income from subsistence 
agriculture and tenporary migration, needs to be corrected for such 
differences in the cost of living. Secondly, the retentbn of rights in. 
rural land provides the nigrnnt with a certain rreasure of security in old 
uge, in case of sickness, unemployment, or any other misfortune in 
1 tm'm. The inability to ')btain security of tenure a..Tld the possibility 
1. See P . 1\.1a.yer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, (Cape Town, 1961), pp. J30-232; 
and Monica Wilson, :Effects on the Xhosa and :r,;yakyusa of Scarcity of 
Land, in D. Biebuyck (.Editor), African Agrarian Sy$_!:ern~, (London, 1963), 
P• 382. 
of being "endorsed out" of urban areas, increaser the value of the 
rural homestead as an insurance agai.'tlst misfortune, but they are not 
the sole factors. The retention of land compensates in some measure 
for the lack of une:rrploy:rnmt insurance and of adequate old age pensions. 
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In order to retain rights in. the land it may not be necessary for t he migrant's 
fanily to occupy it continuously, 1 but there are distinct advantages in 
maintahling the rural ho~stead. It is clear from :tv; ayerts study that 
its rraintenance and ;mprovement is a frequently stated nntive for migration. 2 
The more successful i a the nigrant in achieving this objective, the more 
independent will he be in his old age, or in the case of any other mis-
fortune. In order to obtain the real economic advantage of greater long 
term security, which comes from maintaining the productivity of the land 
at a certain level, occupation by the fc-tmily may well be necessary. For 
this reason, apart from others, the excess referred to above. m~st be 
still g reater. This part of the excess may be seen as a sort of insuraace 
premium. 
That the factors discussed above are actually taken into at:co·.ut, 
i.A.t. deciding whether t o bring the f a mily to town or not, is evident from 
Iv.iayer's study of East London. Of the "cost of living" as a factor in the 
calculation he writes: 
"One rmn would explain that the high cost of living in town 
forced him·to leave his wife in the country, where she would cost 
nothing; a.r.~.other, that it forced him to bring her to town, where she 
cou.l d earn something". 3 
1\l:ayer, however, sees a contradiction in these views and concludes 
tha t they are, therefore, ~rely rationalisations of other un~ntioned 
reasor:.s. He seems to draw the same inference from the followiug: 
11 I~·1any School peasaJlts when questioned said that it was ecO'lomic-
ally wasteful to bring a wife and children into town, becau~e the 
whole family will have to live on the earned incor.re there, whereas 
1. ibid., p. ?.11. 
2. op. cit. , pp. 136-138. 
3. op. cit. , p • .Z 11. 
in the country 'they eat :mealies which they plough thermelves1 • 
'In the country a wife needs only matches, salt and paraffin.' 
'H 1 had no ln'!alies at ho~, 1 could not afford a family at all. ' 
But the opposite argument could also be heard: it nay seem 
more econonical to bring the wife into tovm than to keep spending 
rrnney on fares for the husband to visit her in the country home~ 
or for her tc visit him in town. n 1 
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There is, however, no real incol!Jlatibility between these reasons, 
given by different persons, and each one seems to be perfectly consis-
tent with income-rraximising behaviour. Whether it is cheaper for the 
nigrant to b!'ing his wife to town depends partly on the possibility of 
fL.-'lding her a job, and the armunt she can earn there conpa.red with 
her contribution to the fanily income while in the reserve.. \\here the 
migrant has land which his wife and children can work productively, 
conditions wil.l"be unfavourable to pernnnent migration, especially if 
it is difficult for his wife to obtain a job in town. A lack o:£ productive 
land, however, will increase the advantage of farrily nigration. espec-
ially if urban en:ployment is available for other members of the family. 
On the other ha...-ld, whether land is held or not, if the v.ri.fe cannot 
obtain a. job in toW'£, it is cheaper to keep the f amily in the country since 
there, at least, the cost of housing for the farrily will be less t han in 
town. The last point quoted from t.f.ayer, is also consistent with 
incon~ maxinisation, since "hone viviting11 by the migrant involves 
a loss of '\Va·ge earnings in addition to travelling costs. whereaE: hie 
wife 's ~rovc!'I'Ent to town rrny result in only a corrparatively s.nnll 
reduction in agricultural output which may be rmre than offset if she 
can. obtain a job in town. It is, therefore, quite u11necessary t·:> infer 
from :M.aycr' s l·ernarks that nigrants a re 11irrational'' or that their 
1. op. cit. , p.. 2.12. 
behaviour is :L."'lfluenced mainly by "cultural" factors. 
'C p to thin point. we have explained temporary migration 
exclusively in terms of the desire to rm.ximise the value of goods and 
services accruing to the family. Nevertheless we cannot rule out 
"non-economic" considerations altogether. Some Africans clearly 
do prefer life in the rural village and ma.y be prepared to forego sorre 
real income of goods and Gel"Vices for this r€ason. Labour migration 
rrakes a ponitive contribution to the rraintenance and even the im-
prove:rmnt of village life. 1 Periodical return satisfiea the desire to 
maiutain contact with the village society and has a benefici~ effect 
on fanily life. Thuc even when he could be earning wage income 
outside, the periods of comparative idleness ::ue not wasted from his 
point of view. The fact that he does not exert himself as fully in 
farning activitie s when he is at home does not irrply ln~bess or 
irrationality: the truth is that the effort cost of income earned iu 
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the reserves is greater than in wage employ~nt. In short, thep. 
while in some cases temporary migration rrny yield a lower real incoln:! 
than pcrrmnen.t urb~_nisation. it might maximise the well being of the 
family. No one maxinises real income regardless of cost: even 
11economic rmn" is only expected to rnaxinise his cornnand over goods 
and services subject to ''noneconorricu constra ints. N·everthelcss. 
this sort of conservatis m does tend t o conflict with econonic growth 
and raises the issue of "gradualism' versus an enfol"ced breakdown 
of tra,ditionalism. The taste for village life a& against incorre is 
itself ir.iluecced by econor.nic opportUflities and so subject to cha.Tlge 
over time. 3---:rolonged contact with whites has already 1·aised the 
consurrption aspirations of Africans corq>ared with the early part of 
1. This is stressed particularly by J. van Velsen, 11 I....abour Ivigration 
as a J?ositive Factor in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society", 
Economic Developm:mt and Cultural Change, V 111 (April 1968 ). 
this century. The size of the income differential needed to induce 
permanent urbanisation then, is increased to the extent that village 
life is valued for its own sake. 
How significant conservatism is in explaining the persistence 
of the rrigrant labour system, it is impossible to say, but an Inter-
national Labour Office study1 thinks it is crucial. With reference to 
Turkey, Yugoslavia and trans·Saharan Africa, it is argued that: 
"dissimilar as they are in terms of economic and social 
organisation, the root of the problem lies in the lack of 
connection between the society and the econony-, shown by 
the existence of an underprivileged group or section in the 
agricultural community which cannot integrate itself into 
urban life, and therefore returns to the village because it 
offers some security and a degree of social integration, 
either through tribal tenure, as in trans-Saharan Africa, 
or through the ownership of a srmll farm as in Turkey and 
Yugoslavia". 
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But there is evidence of people who do succes efully integrate 
themselves into urban life and who nevertheless return to their rural homes 
regularly, and eventually retire there. For instance Professor Mayer 
finds in East London that the School Xhosa "do not feel, as the Red 
person so often feels, rejected by the urban Xhosa connunity; they 
are not fish out of water; the country home is not the only place where 
•) 
they are subjectively, 'at home' "· ~ It is difficult, then, to explain 
entirely in cultural terms why some nigrate permanently while others 
return honE periodically. The greatest part of the explanation of 
temporary nigration on its present scale probably lies in the econonic 
1. Int . Labour Office, Why Labour Leaves the Land (G eneva 196 4) p. 180. 
2. ~P· cit., p. 231. 
considerations discussed above. 
Finally. let us consider Walter Elkan' s suggestion that the 
efiectiveness of higher wage rates in inducing pernanent urbanisation 
is insignificant because of the prevalence of the system of communal 
land tenure, which mUtes it inpossible for ni.grants to sell their land 
and realise the capital value of the incon:e whichi it yields. Thus, 
he says, even in areas where the output obtainable from a piece of 
land is stm.ll "people cling to their farms tenaciously because if 
they did not they would forego part of their incomen. 1 
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"If the future income of a farm. however snnll, cannot be 
capitalised the farm m1st exercise a strong pull. So long as a man 
cannot obtain compensation for vacating his land and cannot norn"Blly 
trn.intain his right to it unless he or his fanily are in actual occupation, 
he has no inducement to vacate it a..:'"ld he is therefore bound to regard 
it as in so!l'2 sense temporarytt. 2 
Elkan regards this as the rrost important single reason for 
the existence of rri.grant labour systems, but there are several diffic-
ulties in it. Firstly. in some areas like the Keiskammahoek District 
many fanilies do have freehold tenure and the right to sell their 
claim to the land. but there is nevertheless a great reluctance to part 
vlith it. Very few sales have been made in the past 100 years and 
those that have occurred have been due to rather special circum-
stances. 3 This suggests that other factors apart fromthe inability 
1. Walter Elkan, Migran~ . and Proletarians, (Oxford University f'ress 
1960), P• 135. 
2. ~·, p. 136. 
3. Monica Wilson, ttEffects on the Xhosa and Nyakyusa of Scarcity of 
Land;" in Daniel Biebuyck (Editor), .Afriran Agrarian Syste:rns, 
(London 1963), pp. 381-82. 
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to sell land account for the persistence of nigrant labour at least 
in this area. Secondly, it is difficult to see why inability to sell land 
should rmke people want to hang on to it regardless of the size of the 
income it yields. The greater is the urban wage the greater is the 
cost of periodical visits home to the family and this cost In\y, at 
sorm point, becorre sufficiently great in relation to the economic 
benefits of keeping the land to persuade the worker to take his family 
with him and forego his rural incone. Constrary to E lkan 's view, 
then, the size of the urban wage is a relevant determinant of the 
rate of permanent migration. Thirdly, the migrant may find it 
possible to make arrangements for the land to be taken care of 
during his and his family's absence without losing his right to the 
1 land. The inability to sell land, per se1 as distinct from the size 
of the incone and other benefits which it yields, therefore, does not 
provide a particularly convincing explanation of temporary nigration. 
The upshot of the above discussion is that a large proportion 
of the volume of terr.porary migration, in the past and at present, pro-
bably has a sound econonic foundation. Despite the apparent wastage 
of man hours the total real incotre of families in the Bantu areas and 
of the econony as a whole would have been lower without tenporary 
ni.gration. It is neither necessary nor plausible to explain temporary 
migration entirely, or even largely, in terms of conservatism which 
makes people cling to tribal practices, though it is true that in sone 
cases this factor may lead to a conflict between the maxinisation 
of real income and the maxinisation of welfare. The preference 
for rural life ia only one, and, apparently, a relatively insignificant 
consideration, compared with the powerful econonic factors which 
operate. N evertheless. even where it does enter into the decision 
1. Mayer. op. cit. , P• Z ll. 
to migrate temporarily rather than pernanently, terrporary ni, .. 
gration is perfectly consistent with the rmxinisation of welfare. 
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To the extent that the choice of temporary migration is fre ely 
rm.de, therefore, we cannot take it for granted that the nigrant labour 
system is wasteful, at least under present conditions. Consider the 
consequences of forcing those who at present rnaxinise their real 
incorre by temporary migration to opt either for permanent wage 
employmmt or full time farrring. In the forrmr case the nurrber of 
hours worked each year by the male migrant rm.y well increase and 
in the most favourable case it may be possible for the wife to obtain 
an urban job. But, as we saw above, real incorm will be increased 
by permment urbanisation only if the increase in the wage earnings 
of the nigrant plus those of other members of the fanily exceeds the 
sum of the terrporary migrant's contribution to subsistence farming 
plus that of his family, plus the initial travelling costs involved in 
terrporary mig!'a.tion, plus the real econorri.c benefit of maintaining 
the homestead for its security value (an activity corresponding to 
that of unenployment insurance, pension, and sickfund schemes 
in the advanced sector), plus the higher cost to the nigrant (and to 
the country) of housing in the urban area compared with the reserves. 
Thus, it appears, an increase in the number of rr.an hours put in by the 
migrant nay be accompanied by a fall in the real income of the family 
and of the economy as a whole. This einply goes to show the irrelevance 
of counting the nun:ber of hours put in by the male nigrant as an index, 
on its own, of wastage and inefficiency. 
It is equally clear that compulsory full tirm farming may 
increase the number of man hours put in each year by the male migrant, 1 
1. Since the effort price of incorre in agricultural production is greater 
than in wage en:ployment, however, the number of hours worked in 
agricultural act-ivity nay not increase signifi cantly. 
but if his labour in agriculture is sufficiently lower than in tenporary 
paid employment, the latter even though involving o.n average only, 
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say, six months a year, may well yield to him and the country a larger 
income. This illustrates the well known fact that labour effort alone 
has no l!Jpecial value, and the place and type of industry in which it 
is used is an essential part of an optimum allocation of resource~. 
It follows too, that under existing conditions the fact that the reserves 
are not as fully developed as they might be in terms of what is physi-
cally possible, and that the quality of the soil in some areas may be 
declining, does not necessarily irrply economic waste. Under existing 
conditions the rate of return on labour auL.investment by Bantu men is 
not as proauctive as it is in other areas better endowed with natural · 
resources and technological knowhow. . Indeed, e ntrepreneurs in 
the advanced sector do not rxaintain assets indefinitely if they can obtain 
a higher rate of return in another industry. Several writers, however, 
seem to believe that had it not been for the comparatively easy alternative 
of wage employrmnt in the advanced sector the population of the Bantu 
areas would have applied itself to "learning the idea of being a whole-
time farmer" 1 and that this would have nade him and the country better 
off. According to this view some temporary n:igration, though perhaps 
better econonically in the short run, is not so in the long run, and it .any 
be desirable to conpel rrigrants to otay at home. They are believed, in 
effect, to be acting contrary to the long term interests of the economy, 
and perhaps even contrary to their own. This argument implies that there 
are significant external econonies in agricultural production in the 
Bantu Areas, so that greater developn:ent of the reserves is desirable 
from a national econorric point of view. It may be, as we conceded 
earlier, that such an econonic case exists, but if so, the way to realise 
1. See for instance: HH. Gulliver, Labour Migration in a Rural Econo!!¥, 
(Kampala, 1955), p. 35, and D. Hobart Houghton, The South Mrican 
Econo:rrv, Z.nd Edition, p. 93. 
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the external econorni cs is not to compel migrants to remain behind, 
so that in effect they bear the costs of increasing the long term 
efficiency of the economy. Rather the government should, in the light 
of these external economies, change conditions in the reserves in such 
a way as to give migrants the incentive to rene.in behind. Under 
present conditi::>ns, rri.gration takes place precisely because the migrant, 
like everyone else, calculates on the basis of his own interests. It 
is highly improbable, as we shall see later in this chapter, that any 
external econoniee alone will warrant developrrent o£ the Bantu Areas 
on such a scale as to induce all tenporary ni.grants to choose full time 
farming. 
We nust add an important qualification to our conclusion 
that, imder existing conditions, (that is, with existing resources) 
temporary migration is perfectly consistent with economic efficiency. 
In eo far as temporary migration is perpetuated by economically 
unnecessary influx control and insufficient African housing in the urban 
areas, and other such factors, so that perinment rri.gration is not avail-
able as an alternative, te~rary migration ie not necessarily the 
arrangement which :tnlximises the country's output of goods and services. 
The tightening of influx control in the Western Cape since the nid-fifties, 
is reflected in a sharp rise in the masculinity ratio in Langa, the larg-
est African township in the Cape Peninsula. 1 Families have been com-
pelled to rerm.in in the reserve, and permanent urbanisation thereby 
inhibited. The uncertainty produced by the mere possibility of being 
'endorsed out 1 of an urban area,. and the inability to obtain security of 
tenure also encourage temporary migration. Some may regard the 
adverse effects on the real national product as an acc~ptable price 
for the attainment of political objectives, but it nust be noted that 
1. Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, Langa, Cape Town, 1963, p. 4. 
In the period 1954-1961 to which the authors refer the masculinity 
ratio rose due to the government's refusal to allow the building of fur-
ther houses for fanilies in Langa. In February 1961, however, it was 
announced that no additional African wonEn were being pernitted to 
enter the Western Cape. (See Muriel Horrell, A Survey of Race Re-
lations in South Mrica, 1961, p. 128. ) 
unless conditions in the reserves are changed radically it is not only 
the white electorate which will bear the cost of tighter restrictions 
on labour rrobility. 
The main conclusions of this section may be stated briefly 
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as follows: Both tenporary and permanent migration are fundarrentally 
due to the wide disparity in incon:es per head between the advanced and 
backward sectors of the economy, and have con~ributed substantially 
to the country's economic growth and to the well being of the pop-
ulation of the Bantu areas. Contrary to the impress~on sometitres 
given in w.ritings on the subject, terrporary ni.gration, though far 
from ideal, is the best available arrangement under existing circum-
stances for a large nwrller of Bantu workers. Labour migration, 
whether perm:ment or temporary, will tend to dirrinieh in inJ~ortance 
only if there is a change in the fundamental conditions which cause 
it. Rising wages in the urban areas and a deterioration in conditione 
in the Bantu areas will botb tend to stimulate permanent relative to 
terr.porary migration, whereas, other things being the sane, an im-
provement in conditions in the Bantu areas will tend to encourage full 
time farming rather than either type of migration. 
The system of tetqlorary. migi'ation, as we have noted, involves 
certain undesirable social features. But purely negative measures 
to keep Bantu pernanently in the rural village, as distinct from measures 
taken to irrprove econorri.c conditions in the reserves, contribute neither 
to the well being of the Bantu family nor to the cow1try's economic 
growth. It follows from our analysis, too, that II2aeures which restrict 
would-be permanent migrants to a pattern of short-term migration, 
either by compelling the nigrant to return to his rural village at regular 
intervals, as the 11efflux control" treasures introduced early in 1968 do, 
or by refusing permission for the migrant's :far.oily to move to town 
with him also have a detri:rrental effect on the well being of the 
inhabitants of the reserves and on the country's econony. 
The adverse effects on the reserves which would follow 
from such rreasures can be nitigated, though not avoided altogether, 
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by a governtn!ntal programme of planned development of the border and 
Bantu areas. The effects of such progra.nn1e on the country's economy 
obviously depends on its scale, and the latter in turn presurn1bly 
depends on the size of the reduction in the rate of nigration which it is 
aimed to bring about·, and on the level of per capita income in the 
reserves which is regarded as the ninimum acceptable by the Govern-
trent. In the section after the next we consider the role of agriculture 
in a progra.nne for developing the reserves, and this, together with our 
earlier discussion, provides an essential background for our analysis 
of the inplica.tions of industrialisation, which is the focus of attention 
from Chapter 3 onwards. 
An Arithtn!tical Digression. 
It nay be interesting. therefore, to digress for a mormnt in 
orcit?.r to contrast the estin:nted actual tendencies in ni.gration,described 
e.bove "•rith the goals laid down by the Tomlinson Commission sh1ce there 
is no unambiguous official statement of the governments specific ob-
jectives. It was estimated earlier that the Bantu Areas had c:.g.~ jure 
population of 4. 8 rdllion in 1960 with between 400, 00~ and 500 , 000 o£ 
these temporarily absent. This comprised so~thing like 44. 0 per 
cent of the country's total Dantu population. The Toniinson Commission, 
rather than visualiaing a net nigration to the advanced sector, air.:ed 
at a population of 8 million being dependent solely upon econonic 
activity in the Bantu Areas by 1981. In addition to this they believed 
that li· million reserve inhabitants might be supported in the reserves 
from income earned outside them, while the uumbers of nigrant la-
bourers tetqJorarU·y absent from the reserves would have been reduced 
to half a million. Thus the reserves would provide an anchorage for 
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10 million people. Despite this expected increase in the carrying cap-
acity of the reserves, 40 per cent of t~e expected total Bantu pop-
ulation of 21 nillion would still be permanently resident outside the 
reserves by the end of the century. This rreans that the proportion 
of the Bantu population still resident in the reserves will have in-
creased from 44 to 60 per cent. These figures thus indic ate an in-
crease of 1. 5 nillion to 1 million Africans in the white areas by the 
year 2000 not a decrease. In order to keep the Bantu population 
of the white areas down to this level, however, it would nevertheless 
have to grow at considerably less than its natural rate of increase. 
The reserves, therefore, by the year two thousnad WQUld be required 
to cope not only wit h their own natural increase but with net nigration 
from the modern sector as well. Even in present circumstances, 
as we have seen, output per head in the Bantu Areas shows no sign 
of improvement. 
We may continue this digression on the arithmetic of the 
Tor.alinson goals in a slightly different way, which, however, also 
illustrate~ the rmgnitudc of the changes which they envisaged. Let 
us assume that Spooner's estitnttes of family incorre of R426 for 
urban Bantu and Rl94 for the Bantu Arees in 1953-54 is reliable 
or at least that the ratio of the former to the latter was something 
like 1. 12. Assurm further that this relationspip was unchanged iu 
1960ll though it may be that it has actually increased. According 
to the Toniinoon goals the population would have been required to 
be 2. 11 times as large in 1981-86 as it was in 1960. Sir.aply in 
order to tm.intain the !960 level of income of the Bantu Areas. there-
fore, total reserve L11co~ would have to increase 2. 11 times as well, 
or by 3. !3 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1981. If per capita 
incorro. of the Bantu Areas is to be increased to the level of the :960 
urban Bantu level, and not n:erely be maintained at their own 1960 
level, however, the total income of the reserves would have to in-
crease 2. 12 tir.res between 1960 and 1981 even if there was no 
population increase. Setting as the target the 1960 urban income 
levels and taking into account the proposed population increase, the 
total income of the reserves would have to increase 4. 47 times be-
tween 19)H and 1986. Over 25 years this involves an annual per-
centage increase of 7. 7 per cent and over 30 years 6. 2 per cent. 
Both of these figures represent an extremely fornidable task for 
even the rmst dynanic econorries. At the end of it, however, it 
would still be found that living standards in the advanced sector are 
well ahead of those of the Bantu Areas. because the former will 
have experienced an unusually low rate of population growth. If 
income disparities are to be eliminated, therefore, the task grows 
larger still. 
For the purposes of this study, however, it is not nece'ssary 
at this s ta.ge to assume any target as clearly defined as that of the 
Toniinson Cornnission or of rmre recent proposals. 
The Need for Industrial Developrrent 
There are thus two major ways available for alleviating the 
problems of absolutely low living standards in the Bantu Areas and 
of the wide disparity between the incomes of Mricans in these areas 
and those in the advanced sector. They are an increased rate of 
rrigration from the Bantu Areas to the advanced sector and an. 
accelerated prograrrrne of econorric development in the border and 
Bantu Areas. policies which nay of course be used in corri>ination. 
Continued rrigration at the rate prevailing L'l the recent past, given 
the current degree of development effort in the backward areas# is, 
according to the evidence presented above, not rn:lking a significant 
sz 
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in:pression on the problem;. Given the pace of development in the 
backward areas, a faster rate of migration is n ecessary if living stand-
ards in the Bantu Areas are to rise at a satisfactory pace, and con-
tinued migration at only the present rate will need a greater utilisation 
of resources for development in the backward areas. Any reduction 
in the rate of nigration obviously requires a correspondingly more 
rapid rate of economic progress in the border and Bantu Areas, if 
conditions in the latter are to remain unchanged let alone improve. 
No nn.tter whether the problems mentioned are to be re-
solved mainly by additional employment in the advanced sector or 
in the border and Bantu Areas, it seems clear that succes s depends 
largely on the pace of development of the non-agricultural sectors, 
particularly in secondary and tertiary activities. The vast Inljority 
of those leaving the Bantu Areas are being absorbed into en:ployment 
in secondary and tertiary activities and it seems probable that this 
trend will continue. For the country as a whole a relatively snnll 
proportion of the increased labour force is likely to be dravm into 
agriculture and mining. So far as the Bantu Areas themselves are 
concerned there are severe linitations on the scope for improving 
living standards via increased agricultural errploym:mt. The 
Tomlinson Comnission estina.ted that approxilm.tely half the 1951 
population of the Bantu Areas, narrely about 300, 000 familie s 1 
1. They based this on their findings that the average incorre of fanilies 
making their full living fromfarn"i11g was Rll3. Z and concluded that 
this was a sufficiently large income to attract a Bantu fanily to 
full tirre farning in nixed farming and pastoral areas. It should 
be noted, however, that the idea that connitrrent to full time 
farming depends on the absolute level of income in farming is 
erroneous. It is the marginal product of work in agriculture 
relative to that in outside employment which is relevant, so 
that a high actual or potential total level of farning incorre is 
quite consistent with part tirre farming, though of course the 
rrore time spent farming the greater will be the income from 
this source. 
would have to be removed from the land and given employment 
outside of agriculture jf more efficient farming methods were to 
be introduced and those remaining on the land induced to farm full 
1 tine. More recently Professor D. Hobart Houghton has suggested 
that the agricultural carrying capacity of the reserves may be nearer 
one third than one half of their population. 
The nurrber of people on the land which is redundant i.1 the 
sense that their rennval is necessary to enable those retna.ining to 
earn an adequate income from farming alone. depends on the level 
at which this income is set. But given the incotre objectives of the 
Toniinson Connission, the magnitude of changes in agriculture which 
were required, rray be gauged from the fact that with little nnre than 
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half the number of people engaged in farrring in 1981 as in 1951, the 
ColJI'Xlission thought that an agricultural output at least as large as that of 
1951 was possible. 2 It is of course reasonable to expect that a snaller 
labour /land ratio will increase inco!T2 per head. But the maintenance 
of output per acre despite the rermval of half the population, implies 
a spectacular revolution in techniques,unless a considerable nurrber 
o£ people at present on the land, especially those not owning land~ 
1. The South African Econorrv, 2nd Edition. p. 76. 
2. In effect the Torriinson Connission thought it was possible to double 
output in 30 years while reducing the population by half, or nultiply 
total output five times with the same population or one growing at 
1. 6 per cent per annum 
does not contri:bute at all to agricultural output. All the evidence. 
however. is against this. 1 It is true that the rn:m who remain on 
the land will, according to this plan. be engaged full time in farnr 
ing and not at all in work outside, but women and children at 
present perform a great deal of the farm work and this will be con-
siderably reduced if the population on the land is cut by half. It 
is by no rneans certain that a technological revolution on the scale 
inplied by the Tomlinson eetirmtes can be achieved, so that given 
their farm income objectives the proportion of the population for 
which non-agricultural employrnent rrust be found may well be larger 
than they calculated. 
55 
A basic assumption underlying the Tomlinson proposals was 
that the creation of full economic units is a necessary condition for a 
significant rate of increase in agricultural productivity. If this is 
so
2 then the prospects of agriculture in the Bantu Areas making a 
major contribution to the alleviation of poverty is bleaker still. 
ror even if size is of the essence of the problem, it seems that 
agricultural inprovements will for a long time to come have to be 
1. See for instance D. Hobart Houghton and Edith Walton, op. cit., pp. 141-
144. For general treatment of this question see P . F.!V ... :W..cLoughlin, 
"The Need for a 'Full Enploytnmt ' and Not a 'Disguised Unemployment' 
Assumption in Mrican Development Theorizing," Zeitschrift Ftir 
National-okonomie, December, 196Z and T. W. Schultz:., Transforming 
T r aditional Agriculture (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964). 
2 . The significance of economies of scale and the effect of size on 
technological progress in Mrican agriculture co:rrpared with other 
obstacles to improvernant (e. g. social a rrangenEnts) are matters 
about which we know little at present. Recent studies for other 
countries, however, suggest that there may have been a tendency 
to exaggerate the importance of the scale of farming operations as an 
in"pediment to agricultural progress. See, for exanple, T. W. Schultz, 
Transforrring Traditional Agriculture, (Yale University Press). 
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brought about, if they are t~ be brought about at all, on farms which 
are smaller than "full econonic units", since present experience shows 
that it is inpossible to give any but a very small proportion of farmers 
"full economic units". 
The cornerstone of agricultural policy in the Bantu Areas 
today, as in the Tomlinson proposals a decade ago, is the betternent 
areas sche.rre, the object of which is firstly to halt deterioration in 
the quality of the land. Considerable progress has been rrade with 
this prcgramn-e of rehabilitation and, whereas in 1952 only 6. 0 per 
cent o£ the Transkei had been stabilised by 1963 the proportion was 
23. 0 per cent. Rehabilitation involves first the division of rural 
locations into arable, grazing and residential areas. It is then 
calculated for each area the size of an arable plot and the nurrber of 
cattle units each rm.n should own if economic farming is to be achieved. 
But because of the large number of people trying to live off the land 
very few are at present able to have econonic units in the dry land 
areas. 
The holders of arable plots are to be granted certificates of 
occupation with clauses relating to the beneficial use of lcu1d. If a man 
fails to corrply with stated conditions he will lose his plot, but if he 
succeeds his eldest son will be able to inherit. 1 There has been nuch· 
1. It is worthwhile noting that this condition may have the effect of 
forcing a man to choose between full time farming and full time non-
agricultural, since part time farning interrupted by tertporary ab-
sences in the advanced sector rray cause him to lose his plot. Thus 
his choice of alternatives is restricted and in so far as tenpurary 
nigration Imximises his real incone, the strict application of this 
clause may :trRke individual farmers worse off. It is possible, too. 
that a far~r whose output is lower than that of another, both pro-
ducing under the scune conditions, may actually be the nnre capable 
of the taw, and have a lower agricultural productivity because of 
this fact. 
opposition to the rehabilitation prograrrme on the part of Bantu 
because of fencing and the reduction in the nunher of cattle which 
often goes with it in areas that are over stocked. Apart from the 
oft-mentioned sociological causes of overstocking. this problem 
probably has a strong econonic cause. The fundamental difficulty 
arises from the fact that there is a divergence between social and 
private cost in. comnunal grazing, since the cost to the individual 
of putting one nnre anizml on the land is nuch smaller than the cost 
to the village community. Fencing of arable lnnd also involves 
a loss to ownere of stock since it deprives them of grazing which 
is traditionally theirs. Thus, though these innovations probably 
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result in a better allocation of resources, it is understandable that 
there should be opposition to them. But the opposition has been 
politically inspired as well. In addition to the replanning of rural 
locations the Soil Conservation Board is undertaking the construction 
of retaining and contour banks. grass stripe, grassed waterways, dam 
walls,. and soil and veld conservation fencing~ 
In the past fears had often been expressed that productivity 
was being still further reduced by a decline in the quality of the soil. 
It seems that this decline and the failure to introduce rrore efficient 
ID::thods nay be the result of either or both of two things: 
(a) A voluntary and c·alculated decision on the part of land~ 
holders to allow this productive asset, land, to wear away, becauae 
of the low return obtainl'lble on it. This is intensified by increasing 
population and consequent subdivision of farll'6. In so far as this 
was a deliberate choice originally, it is probable that nigrancy in-
creased the real incotre of the reserve fanily. In short it is suggested 
aa a po:ssibility that even if they possessed the technical knowledge to 
stop soil depletion they rray :1ot want to do so, in view of the attractions 
outside. In other words the opportunity cost of soil reclamation is too 
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great even if they possess adequate technical knowledge to achieve i t . 
(b) Ignorance of more efficient farni.ng nethods and soil 
conservation techniques. The Toniinson Commission il1. fact believed that 
it was due in the part 11to prevailing lack of knowledge in coP..nectiou 
with soil conservation work'' not only on the part of Bantu but on the 
part of the governrrent agricult"~ral extension officers as well. It 
has been pointed out that even on white farms husbandry was poor, 
and burning of the veld, overstocking and soil erosion were wide-
spread until recently. Professor Hobart Houghton suggests, howe ver, 
tha t there were other irrportant factors besides this: Ukulobolo, 
customary division of labour between the sexes; the system of l and 
tenure, perhaps the rrost significant factor; and comnunal ele~nts 
and tradition which were inimical to innovation and initiative. He 
suggests that agricultural practices :may have been satisfactory as long 
as there was an abundant supply of land, but that once this ceased to 
be the case the inadequacy of the traditional methods became very 
apparent. In -.:>ther words, the declining productivity of the soil i s 
the result of a failure to adapt. 
The government thul) is involved in a significant progranrre 
designed to transform agriculture in the Bantu Areas. ilut how 
effective is this betterr:rent scheme proving in eour&teracting the ur~.­
favourable tendencies mentioned and in raising agricultural output? 
Can it be expected to produce the dran:a.tic results necessary if 
progressive farning is to make a rmjor contribution to the problem 
of rural poverty and underemploynent? Tl1e writer is unawa re of 
any systerratic study of this problem, without which little can be 
said about past achievements and future prospects. Professor 
Hobart Houghton states that "officials of the Bantu Affairs Department 
find their experience supports this (the Tomlinson) view. Indeed a 
senior official went further and is reported in 1958 as saying 0 I think 
this is · an understaterrent. The basis of calculation, i.e. £ 1. 15. 0. 
per b3g of grain with a yield of 3. 5 bags per morgen, plus £ Z. 10. u 
per cattle unit, provides for a fourfold or even fivefold h1crea.se 
with the adoption o£ hq>roved methods of mmagement. Sorre of our 
rrore progressive dairy men are obtaining £4 and rmre per nx>n.th 
per cow from nilk and cream sale. For ny part 1 ceased to think 
of an economic unit on the nininum basis of £60 and adopt the nnre 
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realistic viewpoint that such a unit should earn £250-£300 per year'. 11 
Is this agricultural officer referring to exceptional cases or is this 
likely to be the actual effect of rehabilitation and agricultural extension 
work? 
The rate of agricultural development actually achieved will 
obviously depend largely on the amount spent in the !orm of soil 
conservation schemes, irrigation works, fencing, the provision of 
implements, seeds, fertilisers, breeding stock, the training and 
payment of demonstrators, the training of farn:ers, etc. But the 
effectiveness of this expenditure, equally obviously, also depends on 
how nuch success is achieved in gaining the co-operation of Bantu 
farmers. There is strong resistance to change in the context of the 
? 
African rural village~ and it may be easier for an Mrican to acquire new 
habits in an urban environrr:ent while in industrial enployment than in 
the Bantu Areas. McLaughlin, an econonist_ with considerable ex-
perience as an agricultural officer in Africa says: "Adninistrators com-
plain that though new tools are provided, people often refuse to utilize 
them for social. religious, or other reasons. Surely the key to a 
theory o£ econo:ni.c development is placing nnre tools effccH·,~ly -
1. D Hobart Houghton, 11Land Reform in the Bantu Areas and its Effects 
Upon Urban Labour", S . A. J. E ., September 1961, pp .. 167-168. 
2. ·For an outline of some of the sociological difficulties in South 
Africa's Bnntu Areas see J. L. Sadie, "The Social Anthropology of 
Econorric Underdeveloprrent, n Econorric Journal, June 1960. 
that is. so as to scuttle historical resistances quickly. Rapid 
destruction rrea.t1.S less long-run social darrage to fewer people. n 1 
Whether this attitude is the right one or not it seems that for political 
reasons the government would probably be unwilling to disrupt the 
social structure of the Bantu Areas, so that the chances of really 
rapid agricultural development nre considerably reduced, and 
dependence on non-agricultural activites correspondingly increased. 
A proposal by the Tomlinson Comnission which would have led to 
weeping social change was that the present cy.stem of land tenure 
be gradually replaced by individual freehold tenure and that the sale 
of land should be subject to the condition that such land rights are 
used to good purpose. These recommendations. however, were 
subsequently rejected by the Governirent. 
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One possible way of transforming the .agriculture of the 
Bantu Areas i s to introduce some profitable cash c.rop which is sold 
outside the territories. Clearly an energiser such as cocoa in Ghana; 
gold in South Africa. wool in Australia, and siL'k in the early days of 
Japanese econonic modernisation would be an. enormous stimulus. 
Such a cash crop is essential if reserve agriculture is t o rr.ake really 
rapid progress since very little can be expected from a system in 
which the main far~rs produce primarily for their own consunption .. 
Cash crop production in the reserves at present is insignificant. 
However, in an article in which she co!qlares the response of the 
Nyakyusa of Tanganyika and the Xhosa to increasiu.g land scarcity 
1. P . F.lvl. lv~Loughlin, The Economist and African .Econorrie 
Developrrent, Institute of Industrial Relations, Reprint No. J 39, 
University of California,. Los Angeles, 1964. 
Professor 1\.bnica W:Uson asks why it is that the :xhosa have not taken 
to cash cropp-oduction whereas the Nyalcyusa have. She suggests the 
following answer: "The cause lies partly in the difference in econorric 
tradition: the Nya..~usa were skilled cultivators before the whites 
came. whereas the Xhosa were prin13.rily pastor~lists. But there is 
another factor which I believe to be inportant - the competition fo!' 
xmrkets between white and black in Southern Africa. The Xhosa h ave 
had almost no encourage~nt to produce for a :market and become 
full-time farmers, whereas. in the early 1930's , the Nyakyusa were 
persuaded to start coffee and the Agricultural Department unde rtook 
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the marketing of it. Subsistence cultivation offers n o attraction to ram 
who can earn considerably rrnre than the value of the crops they g row 
at hone, by working in tovm; farning ·will only attract the efficient 
when they grow a. cash crop. as well as feeding themselves. In 
South Africa, a.s soon as it is suggested tha t pineapples, or Sl..tgar, or 
oranges might be grown in the Reserves, there are protests from 
white farmers, who say that already there is overproduction in these 
profitable crops. " 1 
E ssentially this means that given their cost structure, th e 
L-~.hosa cannot compete with white farmers in the open rmrket. This 
is an extremely plausible explanation . It is strengthened by the f a ct 
that, even in respect of their s t aple crops such a s mealies, wheat, 
vegetables, etc. the R eserves are net irrporters. It indic'ites that 
Reserve Bantu believe they can obtain their food requiren1e nts rror e 
cheaply by going out into the modern sector to work for them A 
factor which Inly reinforce this is that at the present volume of pro-
duction, the marketing channels in the B antu Areas for mealies , 
for example, are inadequate, private sto rage is expensive and traders 
1. !V'..onica Wilson, 11The Effects of L and Scarcity on the Xho s a a .. ld 
Nyakysa," op. cit., p. 379. 
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have become increasingly reluctant to perform this storage function, . 
A larger quantity oi staple foods could obviously be produced if rmre 
nigrants stayed behind either voluntarily, or because of influx control. 
But this would reduce the living standards of Transkeians unless 
ainultaneously a drastic change were brought about in farming rrethods. 
Given the present greater return to wage errployment in the white 
areas, the real marginal cost of food produced in the reserves is 
greater than that obtained with the money earned by nigration. If 
F f W ·1 , · . . h f such Jro essor 1 son s tnterpretatlon 1s correct t ep. o course. 
obstacles rrust be removed1 if rapid agricultural development ic 
to be achieved. 
The Tomlinson Commissio11 also proposed the establishzrent 
of towns and rural villages to house the population rennved fr01nthe 
land. They observed that nigratory labour may serve as an irrportant 
basis for the estabi.ishment of townships, a.,d ought in fact to do so 
in the initial stages, but that besides this there nust also be other 
permanent bases on which villages and towns can be developed in Bantu 
..\reas. Sine~ the Tomlinson report a nurrbe:r of these rur<?~ villa ges 
have been established. Professor Hobart houghton has carried out 
':l study of Kayaletu, 2 a village at the foot of the Hogsback. He reports 
that no compulsion was used to induce the people to move to : ;::ayoletu 
and that the1·e was a waiting list of would-be villagers. 
The rate of return on investment in the agricultul."al dev~lop­
ment of the reserves is, therefore, likely to be low relative to the 
return on LTl.vestment in better endowed parts of the country, and in 
other fields. Nevertheless there is a strong case, on econonic 
apart from other grou.."lds, for a government e'::penditure on the 
1. op. ci~. , p. 379. 
~. D. Hob~1·t Houghton, Land Reform, [.;.A. J. E. Septerr.ber, 1961. 
agricultural developrnmt of the Bantu Areas. The case rests on 
external econonies, and in so far as the developrnmt progra~ 
consisted exclusively of projects fulfilling these conditions it would 
sinultaneously tend to irrprove the living conditions of the reserves, 
further the political aims of the present Govern~nt, and increase the 
economic efficiency of the country. The major instance of such 
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elrternal economies arises from the· fact that Europeans are debarred 
from purchasing or hiring land or setting up industries in the reserves. 
On account of ignorance and for other reasons Bantu do not have 
--- - - -----
access to long term capital markets, and are in any case for the most 
part unable to provide security for loans. These facts constitute a 
form of imperfect ion in the capital market such that private enterprise 
cannot undertake investrtEnts which they might otherwise, even if 
due allowance were made for risk. This artificial obstacle to the 
rmbility of capital, therefore, reduces the profitability of invest-
ments in various projects in the reserves which would be profitable 
if the obstacles did not exist. Thus the Government has itself 
created a divergence between social and private costs. Many laws 
do this, but this one discrininates against a whole class of people, 
the poorest in the country. Therefore, provided it does so only to 
the extent necessary to compensate for this obstacle, properly 
selected Government enterprises undertaken in the reserves can 
increase the country's economic efficiency. External econonies 
warranting governrrent activity arise in other connections too. 
Soil conservation schemes or irrigation works rn:1y not be profitable 
investments if undertaken by single investors or small groups of 
·nvestors,. but they may nevertheless yield a rate of return consider-
ably greater than the prevailing cost of capital. 
The above does not mean that all possible investrnmt in 
agricultural developrmnt can be justified on the basis of external 
economies, and~even after taking them into account the scope for 
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truly economic agricultural development is severely United. The 
difficulties in the way of an agrarian revolution in the reserves are 
thus formidable, including such factors as ignorance, social traditions, 
the system of land tenure, lack of capital, COJll>etition with white 
farmers and, of great significance if the Torriinson Commission's 
view is correct, uneconomic ally srnil.l land holdings. The problem of 
small plots, however, can only be overcorn:l if alternatives are found 
for those deprived of their land holdings, so that the opening up of 
opportunities for eJll>loyment in non-agricultural a ctivities is essential. 
The Choice of Location. 
As we showed earlier, the present rate of agricultural 
il'q)rovement in the reserves is such that output per head in those 
territories is probably falling, despite a continuing rapid rate of 
migration to the advanced sector. In the light of the obstacles to 
development which we discussed in the last section there is little 
prospect, even with considerably intensified government efforts to 
iiqlrove agriculture, that this sector will be able to absorb a signifi-
cant part of the natural increase in the population of the Bantu areas, 
except perhaps at very low rates of pay. Indeed, as we have already 
noted, the Torriinson Commission believed that a marked reduction 
in the number on the land is necessary if a level of incorre sufficient 
to make full time farming a feasible proposition is to be obtained. 
Any schetna for bringing about a faster rate of increase in the pop-
ulation of the Bantu areas must therefore depend heavily on a pro-
grarnne of planned industrialisation in the reserves and border areas. 
In the country as a whole the rate of increase in demand for 
labour by secondary industry is expected to be substantially greater 
than in a g riculture 1• Th~re rcnuins the question, however, of where 
this additional industrial employtnent will occur - in the advanced 
1. E cononic Developrrent !Jrogrann1e for the R epublic of South 
Africa 1966-71, pp. 28- 29 and Table C. The latter shows an 
-
expected increase in secondary industry of 228. 1 thousand be-
tween 1966 and 1971 coJll>a red with 176. 0 thousand in agriculture. 
sector or in the border and Bantu Areas. This is the aspect of the 
problem with which we are primarily concerned in this study. The 
policy issue for the Government is to decide how and to what extent 
it should attempt to influence the location of industry, by diverting 
industrialists from the sites which they would have chosen without 
intervention to sites which the Government, for one reason or 
another, prefers. 
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Chapter 3 
THE LOCATION OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA TO 1960 
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As we noted above. 1 it was in the White Paper of 1956 that the 
Government first publicly proclaimed itself in favour of a systematic pro-
gramme of industrial development in the border areas. Administrative 
machinery designed specifically for the task of implementing border industries 
policy, however, was only created in mid-1960, 2 when the establishment of 
the Permanent Co1nmittee for the Location of Industry and the Development of 
Border Areas was announced. The activities of this committee and the re-
sults achieved in manufacturing industry in the border areas in the first six 
and a half years of its life are described in chapter 9. In an attempt to 
understand the position confronting the Permanent Committee (as we shall 
refer to it in the future) at its inception, we shall in this and the next chapter 
\Uldertake a description of major trends in the location of industry up to 1960. 
Industrial Expansion in Broad Outline 
In the first fifty years after Union , radical changes occurred in 
the structure of the South African economy. Despite steady progress in the 
produc tion of primary products and in other sectors, such enormous strides 
were made in industrial production that the contribution of private manufactur-
ing industry to the country's net national income increased from 7 per cent in 
1912 to over 23 per cent in 1960, as Table 1 shows. By 1912, manufacturing 
industry was still completely overshadowed by mining (particularly gold) and 
agriculture, whose respective shares of the national income were 27 and 17 
per cent. While gold mining did, indeed, greatly increase the demand for 
manufactured goods, it also, by exerting a considerable strain on the available 
supplies of manpower and other resources, ensured that the bulk of these 
1. Chapter 1, p. 11. 
2. Statement by the Prime Minister on the establishment of industries in the 
border areas issued on June 2, 1967 • 
. , 
TABLE 1 
Percent!&e Contributions of Major Economic Sectors to the Net Domestic Pro~uct 
Year Agriculture, Public Net Domestic ended Porestry & K:1ning Manu!acturin« eo-rce Transport Authorities other Product June Fiehin« 
% ~ % ~ ~ % % R milliona 
1912 17.4 27.1 6.7 13.5 35.3 265.8 
1920 20.9 21.3 10.7 16.8 30.3 487.0 
1925 21.6 16.9 11.9 15.4 34.2 470.4 
1930 13.9 17.3 15.4 14.5 38.9 506.4 
1935 13.5 21.0 15.2 13.7 36.6 602.0 
1940 11.8 22.8 17.5 14.3 33.6 862.6 
1945 12.3 14.4 19.9 14.1 39.3 1,332.6 
1950 13.1 13.8 22.1 15.0 8.7 10.3 17.0 2,042.0 
1955 13.7 11.7 23.7 14.2 8.8 9.3 20.6 3,363.0 
1960 11.0 14.0 23.3 12.7 8.1 10.3 20.6 4,510.0 
1964* 9.2 12.5 27.9 12.9 7.7 10.3 19.5 6,096.0 
* Provisional figures ~ 
-.J 
Sources: Union Statistics for Fiftz Years, table S-3 up to 1945, thereafter Statistical Year Book 1965 table U-4. 
68 
manufactured requirements would be imported, and industrial progress in the 
pre- Union period was, consequently, extremely slow. 
As is well known, the first big leap forward in South African 
manufacturing was made during the First World War, largely owing to ship-
ping difficulties and the inflated production costs of European suppliers. The 
natural protection provided by these factors was reinforced to some extent by 
tariffs imposed in terms of the Union Customs Tariff Act of 1914. 
'With the return of keer! foreign competition after the War the pace 
of industrialisation slackened. But higher tariff walls after 1925, 1 the es-
tablishment of the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa in 1928, and a 
higher gold price, together contributed to further rapid expansion in manu-
facturing activity in the latter half of the twenties and the post-depression 
thirties. Between 1924-25 and 1938-39, as Table 2 shows, the number of 
workers of all races in manufac turing industry more than doubled, increasing 
from 115 to 236 thousand, and by the latter year secondary industry already 
provided 18 per cent of the national income. The average annual rate of 
increase of manufacturing employment was higher in the period 1933-39 than 
during any period of similar length either before or since. 
It was during the Second World War that the manufacturing sector 
for the first time exceeded the share of mining in the national income (having 
overtaken agriculture in the 'thirties) and growth proceeded at a fast pace until 
the early 'fifties. Though not as spectacular as in the period 1933 to 1939, 
the average annual increase in employment in manufacturing industry was 
maintained at a high level throughout the period 1939-1955, but a sharp fall 
off in the rate of growth was experienced after 1955 and lasted until 1963. 
Nevertheless by 1960 manufacturing employment, on the basis of the .Bureau 
of Statistics new census classification, had reached 637 thousand, n early three 
times the level of 236 thousand in 1939, and some thirteen per cent of the 
country's labour force was employed in industry. 
Despite the generally sluggish conditions which persisted till 1963, 
remarkable industrial progress was made between 1960 and 1965. Manufactur-
1. Customs Tariff and Excise Duties Amendment Act, :No. 36 of 1925. 
1924-25 
1929-30 
1934-35 
1939-40 
1944-45 
1949-50 
1954-55 
1959-60 
1964-65 
Source: 
Note 
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TABLE 2 
Growth of Employment in Manufacturing Industry 
Employment Percentage Increase 
Preceding Five Years 
114.876 
141,616 23. 3 
181,755 28. 3 
245,457 35.0 
361,004 47. 1 
497,887 37. 9 
652,635 31. 1 
636,530 
929.50() 46.0 
Union Statistics for Fifty Years, p. L-3 for years 
up to 1954-55, thereafter Statistical Year Book 1966, 
pp. H -33 and H-38. 
Figures for 1959-60 and 1964-65 are not strictly 
comparable with those for earlier years. Up to and 
including 1958-59 the figures refer to the average 
number of employees engaged in industry throughout 
the financial year. As from 1959-60 the employees 
are shown as at the last pay day of September in the 
financial years concerned viz. for 1959-60 in September 
1959 etc. (See Statistical Year Book 1966, p . 89.) 
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ing employment increased from 637 to 930 thousand, 1 that is, by as much as 
2 48. 8 thousand per annutn. The country's dependence on industrial expan-
sion for additional employment opportunities, which we emphasised in Chapter 
2, is indicated by the fact that, as a percentage of the combined employment 
in mining, manufacturing, corltruction, transport and communication, the 
share due to manufacturing increased from 39. 2 per cent to 46 . 4 per cent. 
between 1960-61 and 1964-65. The result of this renewed burst of manu-
facturing growth was that the proportionate contribution of secondary industry 
to the net national income reached 28 per cent in 1964. T h is increasin g pre-
dominance of manufacturing industry bea rs out the need for industrial develop-
ment in the border and Bantu areas, if a significantly greater proportion of 
the country's African labour force is to be employed in those areas . 
The Emergence of Regional Concentration. 
The regional distribution of the increases in manufacturing industry 
which we h ave described has been extremely uneven. In 1960,as Table 3 
shows, the country's four principal industrial areas3 together produced some 
81. 3 per cent of gross manufacturing output and employed 78. 5 per cent of 
the industrial labour force . What is striking too is that despite radical 
changes in the composition of South Africa's industrial activity, these propor-
1. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March 1967, p . 20. 
2. See G. Marais, "The Development of the Manufacturing Industry Since 
1960", Statistical Year Book 1966, (Compiled by the Bureau of Statistics), 
p. 15. 
3. The Southern Transvaal (including the magisterial districts of Benoni, 
Boksburg, Brakpan, Germi ston, Kempton Park, Krugersdorp, P retoria, 
Randfontein, Roodepoort, Springs, Vanderbijl Park and Vereeniging), the 
Western Cape (including the magisterial districts of Bellville, Cape Town, 
Hopefield, Malmesbury, P aarl, Simonstown, Somerset West, Stellenbosch, 
Wellington, Wynberg), and the Durban-Pinetown and P ort Elizabeth-
Uitenhage magisterial districts. 
• 1924- 25 
• 1934- 35 
* 1939-40 
* 1940- 41 
• 1941-42 
* 1942-43 
* 1943-44 
*1949- 50 
*1950-51 
*1953-54 
**1956-57 
+1956- 57 
**1959- 60 
+1959-60 
Cape Western Port 
Elizabeth/ 
Uitenhage 
R'OOO R'OOO % 
29,470 21.1 6,830 4.9 
39,446 17.0 17,772 7. 6 
63,992 16.5 33,434 8.6 
74,516 16. 7 34,994 7.8 
86, 238 17.4 29,186 5.9 
91,492 17.4 26,398 5.0 
102,810 17.1 30,390 5.1 
115,270 16.9 34,354 5.0 
220,278 16. 0 113,396 8.2 
269, 498 15.1 152, 578 8.6 
333,052 14 . 6 178,842 7.8 
378, 068 15 . 2 119,895 4.8 
345,860 15 .4 109, 114 4. 9 
439,216 15.4 130, 144 4.5 
404,700 1?.7 117,870 4.5 
Table 3: Regional Distribution of Gross Output in Private Secondary Industry 
East London Rest of Cape 
H'OOO R'OOO 
Durban/ 
Pinetown 
Rest of Natal 
R' OOO % 1! 1000 _, jO 
17, 514 12. 5 8 . 9 
2, 934 1.3 12,646 5. 4 27, 198 11.7 17,658 7.6 
Southern 
Transvaal 
R' OOO ~ 
Pretoria 
R' OOO jb 
48,774 34.9 Included in 
S, Tvl. 
99,514 42,8 
4,690 1.2 20,438 5. 3 47,468 12. 3 27,764 7.2 164,860 42.6 
55,884 12.5 19';,464 43.8 
62,350 12. 6 220, 784 44.6 " 
66, 363 12.6 231, 590 44.1 
80, 370 13.4 267,674 44.5 
8 , 552 1.3 39,492 5.8 91,868 13.5 42,280 6.2 303, 522 44.5 
- 173, 200 12.5 546,350 39.6 61,466 4.5 
'lest of 
Transvaal 
R'OOO 'f, 
O.l'.S. 
R'OOO % 
Republic Cape Western 
Port Elizabeth 
Uitenhage, 
Durban, Pine-
town , S. Tvl. 
Pretoria 
R'OOO R'OOO 
5,416 3.9 5, 728 4.1 139,952 102,588 73.3 
9,298 4.0 6 , 598 2.8 232,534 183, 930 79.1 
13,812 3. 6 ]0,750 2.8 387,210 309, 754 80.0 
446,748 360, 858 80.8 
494,576 398, 558 80.6 
525 ,020 415, 843 79. 2 
601 ,468 481, 244 80.0 
27,636 4.0 19,354 2.8 682 , 320 545,014 7~ . 9 
51, 374 3. 7 1,380,244 1,114, 690 80.3 
26 ,180 1. 5 90,520 5. 1 227,872 12.8 83,876 4.7 728,980 40.9 73,578 4.1 63, 770 3.6 63, 662 3.6 1,781,516 1, 452, 506 81. ? 
33, 234 1.5 125,196 5.5 195,752 13.0 125,052 5.5 902,078 39.4 103,604 4. 5 99,448 4.4 85, 640 3.8 2, 281,898 1,813 , 328 79.4 
31,999 l. 3 369,791 14.9 1, 031,861 41.6 118,635 4.8 2,481,220 2, 018, 250 81. 3 
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Border and 
Bantu areas 
(including 
East London) 
R' OOO 
·~ 
29,614 1.3 - 344, 632 15.4 133,160 5. 9 931,056 41.5 93, 005 4. 1 2, 241,202 1,823, 667 81.4 223,812 10. 0 
33,328 1.1 - 404,734 14.2 1 ,147, 510 40.3 143, 028 5.0 
29,355 1.1 - 378,001 14. 7 1,042,280 40.4 115,794 4.5 
* 21 Classes of manufacturing industry plus construction and electricity, gas and steam. 
** 21 Classes of manufacturing industry (excluding the motor vehicle industry) plus construction. 
+ 21 Classes of manufacturing industry (excluding the motor vehicle industry). 
Source: Published Industri al Census reports supplement ed by unpublished information 
kindly supplied by the Bureau of Statistics. 
2,844 , 042 2, 264, 632 79.6 
2,575,552 2,057, 945 80.o 272,300 10. 6 
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tions have remained more or less consta..l'lt over a long period of time. Bet ween 
1934-35, by which time this marked degree of regional concentration was al-
ready established, and 1959-60, there was no sign of a long run tendency for 
the forces giving rise to this locational pattern to either increase or diminish. 1 
In the early years of the century, however, and even up to 192.4-25 
when 73. 3 per cent of gross manufacturing output was produced in the four 
large industrial areas, the degree of concentration was much smaller. The 
early predominance of the Western Cape in ~ufacturing industry was due 
mainly to the fact that it was the first area settled by Whites and, consequently, 
agriculture in the area was vasUy more developed than that of other parts of 
the country. After 1867, diamond mining at Kimberley, together with customs 
tariffs imposed at the time, provided an additional stimulus to manufacturing 
industry in the area. The availability of Coloured labour at the Cape no doubt 
als facilitated industrial activity. 2 Such manufacturing as there was at the 
Cape even in 1872 was of only the most rudimentary sort but in other parts of 
the country factory production was still virtually non-existent. 3 
The lead of the Cape was. therefore, overwhelming at this time, and 
even after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886, industrial pro-
gress in the Transvaal, as in the country as a whole, compared wit...h subse-
quent periods, was extremely slow. In Natal, though considerable development 
was experienced in port activity after the discovery of diamonds, 4 i~ was, in 
de Kock's words, "only after 1898, when Natal for the first time entered a 
1. Between 1934-35 and 1959-60 the proportionate contribution of the four 
areas mentioned was never less than 79. 1 per cent (in 1934-35) or more 
t han 81. 5 per cent (1950-51). Difficulty in determining the trend in this 
proportion is increased by a discontinuity in the statistics between 1953-54 
and 1956-57, the motor vehicle industry being included in the former year 
but omitted from the latter. 
2. D. M. Goodfellow, A Modern E conomic History of South Africa , London, 
1931, p. 179. 
3. M. H. de Kock, Economic History of South Africa. Juta 1924:, p. 2.83. 
4. C. W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa - Social and Economic, 
(Oxford University Press, 1941), p . 97. 
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customs union with the Cape and adopted somewhat higher customs duties, 
that manufacturing began to make substantial progress. " 1 
Thus we find in 1891 something like 18,000 persons employed in 
2, 000 establishments in the Cape Colony, 2 and relatively little manufacturing 
industry elsewhere. Between 1886 and 1899, however, the Transvaal govern-
ment showed interest in fostering manufactures, and in the 1890's important 
pioneering steps were taken towards the development of an explosives industry 
which has since come to play such a vital role in the industrialisation of South 
Africa. Sufficient progress was made in the Transvaal m· this period, and 
especially during the South African War, !or the position to have changed 
quite substantially by 1904 compared with that of 1886. In 1904, according to 
de Kock, the gross value of manufacturing output was distributed in the follow• 
ing proportions3: Cape 46. 3, Transvaal 33. 1, Natal 18. 1, the Orange Free 
State 2. 5. The Transvaal then was beginning to emerge as a serious challenge 
to the Cape. 
As was noted in the previous section, the general pace of industrial 
development in the country was slow until just before the First World War, but 
the tendency for the Transvaal as a whole to increase its proportionate con-
tribution persisted and was greatly accelerated during the War, when, for the 
first time, the Cape Province lost its lead in this field. By 1934-35 the 
Transvaal contributed 46. 6 per cent of gross output, the Cape 31. 3, Natal 
19. 3, and the Orange Free State 2. 8 per cent. 
The information in the preceding two paragraphs relates to 
provincial totals, but as would be expected, in view of their predominance, 
corresponding changes in relative importance are evident for the major 
industrial areas within each province. Since reaching 42. 8 per cent in 1934-
35, however, the proportionate contribution of the Southern Transvaal to gross 
manufacturing output, has remained fairly constant at about 44 per cent. The 
1. .22· ill·. pp. 285-286. 
2. De Kock, ~· .£!.!: , p . 285. 
3. Based on figures presented by de Kock in a table on p 288. 
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most striking change in the relative size of t h e four main industrial areas, 
as Table 3 shows~ is the apparent long term decline of the Western Cape's 
percentage contribution from 17.0 in 1934-35 to 14.6 in 1953-54. 
It appears, then, that the increasing tendency towards the concen-
tration of indusrty in the four largest areas, on which we remarked at the 
beginning of this section, was due to the phenomenal rate of industrialisation 
of the Southern 'I'ransvaal. The gold mines generated a rapidly increasing 
demand both for consumers goods and intermediate goods, and given this 
demand, the geographical position of the Southern Transvaal was extremely 
favourable to industrialisation. The cost of transportation from the coast 
provided natural protection against competition from imported goods and from 
producers situated at the coast. This factor is still an important influence 
on the industrial development of the Southern Transvaal and hence of the 
country as a whole. Despite the concentration of industry to which it con-
tributed, and which so many regret now, the insulation of the Witwatersrand 
from outside competition has probably had a most beneficial effect on the pace 
of industrial growth in South Mrica. It also, by stimulating the construction 
of railways, roads etc. to the Witwatersrand, has facilitated subsequent 
development in other sectors, such as agriculture. 
Gold mining on a large scale within a single fairly compact area, 
provided a concentrated market for agricultural and manufactured products . 
This to a considerable extent offset the disadvantages arising from the limited 
size of the country's total market at that stage, and the generally low popula-
tion density. In effect the concentration of demand cut transport costs per 
unit of output, and generated greater economies of agglomeration and internal 
economies of scale, than would have arisen had the total market been more 
evenly distributed. 
It is worth noting that today, countries in the early stages of 
industrialisation are invariably advised to concentrate their efforts in a few 
carefully selected centres, if possible, so as to take maximum advantage of 
both internal and external economies. In South Africa this occurred quite 
spontaneously. The present degree of regional concentration, which goes 
back to the early thirties, and which was basically due to a highly concentrated 
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demand, has, therefore, almost certainly been favourable to the country's 
economic growth. In the late twenties and the th irties, in view of the vast 
number of Africans seeking alternatives to the overcrowded Reserves. and 
eap ecially in view of the large ntunber of poverty stricken "'\\ hitea who were 
leaving the land and drifting into towns, economic growth was at a prem.ium. 
It was under those conditions politically unthinkable for any government to 
risk jeopardising the rate of economic growth through any serious attempt to 
decentralise industry on a large scale. It may be significant that the Native 
Economic Commisflion of 1932, one of whoae main concerns was the social 
problems arising !rom the simultaneous inflow into the towns of both poor 
Whites and poor blacks, while recommending that development be undertaken 
in the R eserves, made no mention of any scheme for industrialisation. 
Whether for economic, political or other reasons, it appears that by 1956 at 
least the position in this regard had changed substantially. Perhaps, with 
the poor White problem very largely solved, and after substantial industrial 
progreas. governments are now in a better position to trade economic growth 
for political ideology. 
The above broad outline of the cauaes of t he present degree of 
conc entration is fully e.ndoraed by the following remarks taken from the report 
of the Schumann Committee: 
uThe reuon• for this concentration are obvious . In the case of 
the Southel"ll Tranavaal it was basically the discovery of gold and the develop ... 
ment of the mining industry that attracted people in great numbers m1d directly 
resulted in the establishment of industries manu£ Clriug final products. In 
the ca•e of other regions, the concentration occ urred at the ports ~ the gate• 
ways for import and export trade11 • 1 
As this passage and our earlier analysis imply. the predominant 
influence on the pattern of industri llocation hae been demand, that is, the 
z 
market. Orientation to raw materials is the decishre consideration in the 
case of another, smaller, group of activities. In such industries a factory 
l. Report of the ~ommittee on Railway Rating Policy and Industrial Location 
in South Africa, Johannesburg, April 1964, p. 60. 
2. See also D. J . MeWhirter, Inciustry in Greater Durban, p . 62. 
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will normally be situated at the source of raw materials closest to the market 
which it is established to serve. When. as happened to be the case in a 
number of industries (e . g . iron and steel) in the Southern Transvaal, the raw 
materials source and the market roughly coincide, the attraction of the 
larger centres becomes still more irresistable . 1 As the Schumann Commit-
tee points out, 2 this also applies to the large coastal cities in the case of 
. d . l 3 1mporte raw mater1a s. 
Location and the Composition of Industrial Production 
At a statistical level, the central fact which emerges so far in 
this chapter, is the remarkable constancy in the degree of regional concen-
tration between 1934-35 and 1959-60. By contrast with this aggregative 
constant, however, there have been radical changes in the structure of the 
country's manufacturing industry and in the regional distribution of individual 
industrial categories. On the face of it the stability observed is, at least 
from a statistical viewpoint, due to a coincidence of offsetting movements 
in the relative size and geographical distribution of the 21 main industrial 
classes. 
As Table 4 shows, the most striking change in the structure of 
manufacturing output is a sharp reversal in the relative positions of the two 
largest industrial groups. namely the food, beverages and tobacco group and 
the metals and engineering group. In 1924-25 the former employed 28. 3 per 
cent of the industrial labour force and the latter 10. 7 per cent, but by 1959-60 
the corresponding proportions were 17. 4 and 24. 4 per cent respectively. 
In view of the size of these two groups, which overshadow all 
1. The story of the early development of the explosives industry also pro-
vides an interesting insight into the forces underlying ~e concentration 
of manufacturing in the Southern Transvaal. See H. Scbauder, 11The 
Chemical Industry in South Africa Before Union", S. A. J. E., December, 
1946. 
2. 2)2; £ll. • p. 70. 
3. See also McWhirter, .21?.·.£!!· , p . 62, 
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TABLE 4 
Percentage Contribution of Major Industrial Classes to Total Manufacturing Employment 1924- 25 to 1962-63 
1924 - 22 % 122~ - 22 % 19H - ~2 192~ - 5~ 1924 - 5~lf 1959 - 60 1962 - 63 rf' % ,. 
1. (Food, 26,621 (23 .2 32,594 17.9 60,702 16.8 92,614 14.2 91,825 14.9 95,996 (14.4 103,668 (13 .5 
2. (Beverages, 3,126 28 .3( 2.7 3,980 2.2 8,162 2.3 11,454 1.8 11,454 1.9 14,394 17.4( 2.2 15 , 915 16 . 2( 2.1 
3. (Tobacco 2,706 ( 2.4 2,298 1.3 4,834 1.3 6,870 1.1 6,870 1.1 5,522 ( 0.8 4,236 ( 0 . 6 
4. Textiles 1,660 1.4 4,078 2.2 7,343 2.0 32,945 5.0 32,945 5.3 36,353 5.5 49,610 6.4 
5. Wearin~~; apparel, etc. 11,188 9.7 29, 462 16 .2 48,825 13.5 76 '347 11.7 76,347 12.4 77 , 345 11.7 90,572 11 .8 
6. Wood and wood products 4,050 3.5 6,302 3.5 22,615 6.3 30,927 4.7 30,715 5.0 32,138 4.8 36,738 4.8 
7. Furniture 4,900 4. 3 6,519 3. 6 11,273 3.1 20,754 3.2 20,754 3.4 17,632 2.6 19,404 2.5 
8. Paper and paper products 504 0.4 1,532 0 .8 4,216 1.2 14,029 2.1 14,029 2.3 19,448 2.9 22,998 3.0 
9. Printi ng and publishing 6,878 6.0 8 , 873 4.9 10,869 3.0 17,397 2 .7 17,397 2. 8 20,060 3.0 23,048 3.0 
10. Leather and leather products 2,699 2.3 2,711 1.5 5,902 1.6 5,415 0.8 5,415 0 .9 4,651 0.7 5,300 0 . 7 
11. Rubber products 393 0.3 1,184 0 .7 4,986 1.4 10,932 1.7 10 ,932 1.8 11,275 1.7 13,629 1.8 
12. Chemicals and chemical products 9,080 7.9 10,393 5.7 23,206 6.4 33,815 5. 2 33,815 5.5 42,065 6.3 45, 857 6.0 
13. Products of petroleum and coal 734 0.6 1,036 0.6 3,378 0 . 9 8,857 1.4 8 ,857 1.4 7,077 1.06 8 ,590 1.1 
14. Non-metallic mineral products 13,972 12.2 22,958 12.6 34,092 9.4 60,695 9.3 60,695 9.9 59,196 8.9 62,508 8.1 
15. (Basic metal industries, 7,733 ( 6. 7 20,084 (11.1 59,0'75 16.4 29,490 4.5 29,490 4. 8 39,117 ( 5.9 50,110 ( 6.5 
16. (Metal products, 3,534 ( 3.1 5,164 ( 2.8 9,399 2;6 65,232 10.0 64,757 10.5 68,478 (10.3 81,073 (10 . 5 
17. (Machinery, 68 10.7( 0.1 104 15. 0( 319 28 ,473 4.4 26,638 4.3 28,787 24.4( 4.3 36,134 25.2 ( 4. 7 
18. (Electrical Machinery 975 ( 0.8 2,027 ( 1.1 7,697 2.1 23,149 3.5 22,166 3.6 25,736 ( 3.9 26,736 ( 3.5 
19 . Transport equipment 8,810 7.7 13,434 7.4 20,640 5.7 56,476 8.7 25,807 4.2 29,779 4.5 37,443 4.9 
20. Laundries etc. 2,759 2 • .( 2,908 1.6 7,627 2. 1 14,679 2.2 14,679 2 .4 16,420 2.5 17,114 2.2 
21. Miscellaneous 2,486 2.2 3,114 1.7 5,844 1.6 12,085 1.9 10,505 1.7 13,309 2.0 18,499 2.4 
Total Groupe 1 to 21 114,876 100.0 181,755 100.0 361,004 652,635 100.0 616,092 100.0 666,035 100.0 769,173 100.0 
~ TWo seta of figures are given for 1954-55 to indicate change in scope of the Census, mainly involving omission of certain branches of transport equipment sectors. 
Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, pp. L-6 to L-26 for 1924-25 1 1934-35 and 1944-45 figures; Statistical Year Book 19641 pp. M-16 to M-26 f or 1954-55 figures; 
and Statistical Year Book 1966; for 1959-60 and 1962-63 figures. 
78 
others, their rates of growth and distribution have had an importa·nt bearing 
on industrial location The food, bev erages and tobacco sector which was 
the largest until the eve of the Second World War, is located outside the four 
largest industrial areas to a relatively greater extent than are other indus-
trial classes. In 1959-60, as Table 5 shows, 42 6 per cent of the gross 
output of the food sector was situated in the less industrialised areas, and 
more than half of the output oft hese areas consisted of food products. By 
contrast, in 1959-60 more than ninety per cent of the output of the predomi-
nant sector, metals and engineering, was produced in the four major indus-
trial areas. These facts, together with the relative declin e in food, 
beverages and tobacco and the remarkable growth of metals and engineering, 
help us to understand why the degree of industrial concentra tion has become 
so great. 
In view of its large market for metal and engineering products. 
and the presence nearby of the major raw materials for iron and steel ma nu-
facture, the Southern Transvaal has completely dominated this industrial 
sector . The rate of growth of the metals and engineering industries has 
been particularly rapid since the establishment of the South African Iron and 
Steel Corporation at P retoria in 1928. Any location outside the Southern 
Transvaal for the ISCOR plant and for the bulk of engineering establishments, 
would have been extremely uneconomical at that time. 
After the two groups already d ; scussed, the largest is the 
textiles, clothing and footwear group, which employed 18 4 per cent of the 
industriallabo ur force in 1934-35 and 18. 2 per cent in 1959-60. Clothing 
and footwear firms comprise the bulk of this, but, in relation to total manu-
facturing output, they have declined in importance from 16 2 per cent in 
1934-35 to 11. 7 per cent in 1959-60 Though very heavily concentrated in 
the main industrial areas, there was a slight tendency towards decentralisa-
tion of clothing and footwear production in the 'fifties . 
The textiles industry which was slightly less than half the size 
of the clothing and footwear sector in 1959-60, developed rather later in the 
industrialisation process in South Africa than in most other countries. Since 
the Second World War, however, the rate of growth has been extremely rapid, 
output having multiplie d seven times between 1944-45 and 1959-60. The less 
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TABLE 5 
Contribution of Four Major Industrial Areas to Grose Output in Each Class of Secondary Indust;y 
1950/51 1959/60 
Western Cape, Port Western Cape, Port Western Cape, Por t Wes ter n Cape, P~rt 
Elizabeth-Uitenhage, Elizabeth-Uitenhage, Elizabeth-Uitenhage, Elizabeth- Uitenhage, 
Durban-Pinetown, Republic Durban- Pinetown Republic Durban-Pinetown, Republic Durban- Pinetown , Republic 
Southern Transvaal Southern Transvaal Southern Transvaal Southern Transvaal 
_lincludirut Pretoria (includii::Ul Pretoria\ (includirut Pretoria ( including Pre toria \ 
Gross output % Gross output Gross output % ross output Gross output % prose output Gross output '!t ,ross 'lutput R'OOO R'OOO R1000 R1 000 R1 000 R'OOO R' OOO R'')I)O 
1. Food 200,566 60 .0 334,210 257,850 58.1 443,428 300, 774 59 . 3 507,262 332,774 57.4 579,722 
2. Beverae;ea 25,590 66.0 38,760 28,814 66 .3 43,428 51,296 78.4 65,450 63,682 76 . 1 87 ,730 
3. Tobacco 21,938 85.1 25,776 27,016 84.8 31,864 28,200 75.9 37,132 31 ,552 80 .8 39, 028 
4. Textiles 43,316 79.2 54,660 60,878 73.9 82,432 81,240 77.8 104,382 94, 852 76 .6 1?3,820 
5. Footwear,other wearing apparel etc. 144,298 92.1 156,602 174,748 91.4 191,194 182,478 90 .6 201,496 191,186 90 .0 ?1?,324 
6. Wood and cork, except furniture 25,880 70.3 36,826 29,480 60 .9 48,394 35,350 64.2 55,044 35, 036 64.6 54,270 
7. Furniture 36,258 97.6 37,158 45,442 93·3 48,694 46,364 94.1 49,266 . 48,252 94 . 7 50.938 
8. Paper and paper products 36,470 99.7 36,598 45,814 97.0 47,224 61,768 82.1 75,258 74 ,168 79.3 93 ,472 
9. Printing and allied industries 34,944 86.0 40 ,636 46,558 87.1 53,470 60,318 88 .2 68,392 68 ,368 37 .8 77 ,840 
10. Leather and leather products 
(excluding footwear) 15,402 78.7 19,562 12,892 74.9 17,202 13,056 73.7 17' 722 17,076 83 . 1 ?0,552 
11. Rubber products 47,300 90.7 52,154 45,276 86.6 52,276 
- -
11,860 
- - 13Jl24 
12. Chemicals and chemical products 132,004 90.5 145,848 148,522 87.7 169,448 195,584 90 .6 215,952 216,892 89.3 242 ' 942 
13. Products of petroleum and coal 9,830 87.2 11,270 28,652 90.5 31,676 44,142 82.5 53,510 53 ,840 72 .8 73.924 
14. Non-metallic mineral products 42 ,458 71.0 ·59 , 788 62,780 72.7 86,398 83 ,954 73.6 114,126 96,340 71.8 134 .122 
15. Basic metal industries 53,710 95.5 56,212 100,838 94.5 106 , 686 156, 796 93 .6 167,604 187,174 91.7 204,208 
16. Metal products 144,018 88.6 162,608 198,282 90.6 218,764 200,208 95.7 209,258 228,302 95 . 3 239,490 
17. Machinery,except electrical machinery 47,608 93.2 51,060 72,508 95.1 76,262 90,992 95.1 95,648 104,744 93 . 5 112, 032 
18. Electrical machinery etc. 47,274 95.6 49,450 65,640 91.3 71,916 88,136 92.5 95,248 102,324 92 .1 111,148 
19. Transport equipment 104,112 82.1 126,746 148,052 80.5 183,630 31 , 214 94.6 32 '992 28,230 94.8 29. 786 
20. Miscellaneous industries 108,238 98.3 110,224 36,294 94.4 38,460 46 , 396 96.0 48,324 58,422 95.5 . 61,206 
21. Construction 99,210 75.1 132,126 134,572 75.9 177,194 196,966 82.1 240, 018 206,586 76 .9 268 ,490 
22. Personal services 9,316 86.3 10,794 12,014 84.4 14,242 12,324 80.7 15,276 14, 290 79.8 17, 905 
Residual unallocated 
- - - - - -
13,208 
- -
11 132 
- -
TOTAL 1 , 429,846 81.7 1,751,068 1,776,730 79.5 2,234,288 2 ,020, 762 81.4 2, 481, 220 2,265,220 79.6 2,844,044 
Source: Compiled from data kindly made available by the Bureau of Statistics. 
~: Owing to the regulation that figures for leas than four establishments may not be disclosed separately, and the fact that statistics for 1956-7 have a l ready been 
published on a magisterial district basis, it has been necessary in the case of some industrial classes to exclude t he output of a number of establishments from 
the class total for the f our main industrial regions. These establishments are combined in the xow ' residual unallocated', Thus the share of the four main 
centres in certain cases is understated. Generally this dose not distort the true situation seriously. The share of the f our main regions in the total output 
for all 22 classes included above is of course not affected by this diffioult,y. The establishments omitted from the class totals f or the four main centres in 
1956-7 are distributed as follows (the class number is given and then the number of establishments is shown in parenthesis): 2(4), 3(2), 4(3), 5(3), 8 (5), 9(4), 
10(8), 11(4), 12(1), 13(5), 14(4), 15(6), 16(1), 18(3), 19(4), 20(1), 22(3). The establishments omitted for similar reasons from the 1959-60 f igures are: 
3(2), 4(3), 12(1), 14(1), 15(3), 20(3), 22(1), 11 (all eatablishmants). 
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industrialised parts of the country show a slight degree of specialisation in 
this sector, and there were signs of a contin.uing tendency towards decentra-
lisation. As in the case of clothing, textiles manufacture is relatively highly 
labour intensive, especially in non- \~'hite labour, and the materials used are 
relatively light, so that any tendency for wage costs to rise in the larger 
centres compared with the border areas will be favourable to decentralisation. 
The no11-metallic mineral products group, consisting mainly of 
bricks and tiles, cement and glass C"n that order), e1nployed 8. 9 per cent of 
the industrial labour force i11. 1959-60.. It has grown at about the same rate 
as manufacturing industry as a whole in. the post-war years, and the proportion 
of output produced in the less industrialised areas remained virtually un-
changed in the 'fifties. Thus its overall effect on the degree of concentration 
has been neutral. Very largely the raw materials used in this sector, are 
fairly ubiquitous and are heavy relative to value so that production tends to be 
strongly oriented to local markets . Since producers of these products are, 
therefore, more evenly distributed throughout the country, in accordance with 
the distribution of total demand, than are other manufacturing sectors, the 
rural areas show a fairly high degree of specialisation in this group. It is 
the third largest component of manufacturing industry, next to food and metals 
and engineering, outside of the four main industrial areas. 
Employment provided by manufacturers of chemical products, 
which make up the fifth largest industrial class, showed a slight decline in 
relative importance between 1934-35 and 1954-55. In the latter half of the 
fifties, however, the rate of gro~1:h of this sector accelerated considerably, 
so that its contribution to total employment increased from 5 . 6 per cent in 
1954-55 to 6. 3 per cent in 1959-60. There were sig:.-1s* then, that the chemi-
cal industry was becoming one of the main growth sectors of the economy and 
significant expansion was expected in the 1960ts, especially in view of 
developments at Sasolburg. In the past, chemicals production had been 
heavily concentrated in the four largest areas, especially in the Durban-
Pinetown area and the Southern TransvaaL Despite the establishment of 
some significant individual plants in less industrialised parts of the country, 
there was apparently no significan t reduction in the degree of concentration 
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in the larger centres. Developments at Sasolburg1, it was expected, would 
change this, but since this centre is in effect part of the Southern Transvaal 
complex, there was not any real promise of "decentralisation 11 , in the 
accepted South African sense of that word. 
A closely related development, with which it is convenient to deal 
here, is that of the products of petroleum and coal sector. Next to the pulp 
and paper industry, discussed below, the fall in the degree of concentration 
from 87. 2 per cent in 1950-51 to 12. 8 per cent in 1959-60, was more marked 
than in any other sector. This, however, was also due primarily to the 
establishment and expansion of S . A. S . 0. L. 
After chemical products, the wood and wood products sector makes 
the largest contribution to total manufacturing sector. A large proportion 
(35. 4 per cel'lt) of the gross output of this sector was produced outside the 
four la:rgest areas in 1959-60, and it was the second largest contributor to 
the industrial output of the rural areas . It is, therefore, essentially a rural 
industry, and indeed, in the 1950's the re was a considerable increase in the 
proportion of this industry which was found in the rural areas 
Of the industries included in Tables 4 and 5, the last which merits 
special comment, is the paper and paper products sector. Though still 
relatively small, it has made rapid strides in recent years and by 1959-60 
employed 2. 9 per cent of the industrial labour force., compared with only 
1. 2 per cent at the time of the Second World War. Employment in the paper 
industry increased four and a half times between 1944-45 and 1959-60. The 
most dynamic sub-group was pulp and paper as distinct from paper products. 
A large proportion of the additional capacity in pulp production was sited in 
the rural areas, two of the largest new mills being at Felixton and Mandini 
in Zulula1-d. South Africa's paper industry has come to use an increasing 
proportion of locally manufactured pulp. In view of this, and the advantages, 
in terms of internal economies, of operating integrated pulp-paper mills, 
1. See P . E . Rousseau, 71The New Industrial Complex at Sasolburg", 
Optima, Jrme 1965, pp. 63-71. 
) 
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the tendency for the location of the paper industry to be determined by supplies 
of timber and water has been strong. The propo1:tion of the total labour force 
of the paper and paper products sector employed in the four largest industrial 
areas, thus fell from 99. 7 per cent in 1950-51 to 79 3 per cent in 1959-60. 
The potential for expansion of this industry in the rural areas thus seemed to 
be very promising. 
Finally. an extremely important industry. not listed in our 
statistical tables, is the manufacture and assembly of motor vehicles which 
is overwhelmingly concentrated in the Port Elizabeth- Uitenhage area. In-
creasingly, locally produced raw materials are being used in this industry 
and, since these, especially steel, are derived from inland sources, there has 
been a tendency for coastal sites to become relatively less favourable than they 
were when the proportion of imported materials was greater. The heavy 
capital investment which the largest ma11ufacturers of motor vehicles, and 
their suppliers have undertaken in thelr present sites. however, makes it 
unlikely that they will seriously contemplate moving. Due largely to the 
incentive provided by the Government's scheme for increasing the local content 
of South African produced motor vehicles, it was expected that the motor 
vehicle components sector would experience extremely rapid growth. There 
are significant advantages to both component manufacturers and motor vehicle 
producers themselves of being close to one another~ one of the most important 
of which is savings in inventory costs. The chances, therefore, are that the 
bulk of the additional capacity in this industry will be situated in the Port 
Elizabeth-Uitenhage area and on the Witwatersrand. 
The findings of this section may be summarised as follows: 
The proportion of total capacity located in the four major industrial areas 
was declining in three fast growing sectors, namely, textiles, pulp and paper. 
and products of petroleum and coal. In addition, the rest of South Africa 
shows a certain degree of specialisation in all three of these sectors . Trends 
in the location of these industries, therefore, were favourable to a reduction 
in the degree of concentration, but developments in the products of petroleum 
and coal industry, centred as they were on Sasolburg, did not represent 
decentralisation in any relevant sense of the word. 
In three other fast growing industries, namely, motor vehicles. 
chemicals, and metals and engineering, however, there was no significant 
( 
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tendency. if any, for a relative shift towards the less industrialised areas, 
and the latter were markedly underspecialised in their production. Develop-
ments in these sectors, especially in view of their size as well as their rate 
of growth, therefore, worked against any possibility of an overall decentrali .. 
sation of industry. 
The less industrialised areas are highly specialised in the pro-
duction of non-metallic mineral products and of wood products, but the rate 
of growth of both these sectors was almost exactly the same as that of manu-
facturing industry as a whole. As a result of this, and the fact that the degree 
of concentration in the non-metallic mineral products sector remained vir-
tually unchanged during the 1950's, the effect of this industry on the overall 
locational pattern was neutral. In the wood products sector, however, there 
has been certain degree towards decentralisation, so that, though it grew at 
only an average rate~ it has tended to reduce industrial concentration. 
Two major sectors, food and clothing, grew at exceptionally slow 
rates between 1944-45 and 1959-60. Slow growth together with the fact that 
the rural areas are highly specialised in food production meant that develop-
ments in this sector also militated againGt an overall decentralisation. But 
in the clothing industry, in view of the fact that it is strongly located in the 
large centres, slow growth has tended to favour industrial decentralisation. 
This was reinforced by the slight relative shift of clothing manufacture towards ~ ----
rural areas. 
In the main, then, it was developments in the textiles. paper and 
paper products, petroleum and coal, wood products, and clothing sectors 
which helped the less industrialised areas to maintain a relatively constant 
proportion of total employment and output in South African manufacturing 
industry. The major obstacles to an increasing proportion were develop-
ments in motor vehicles, chemicals, metals and engineering, and the food 
products sectors. 
Materials and the Location of Industry. 
Earlier in this chapter we argued that the market has been the 
predominant influence on the location of manufacturing industry as a whole 
in South Africa. This factor, however, appears to have been rather more 
significant in the four main industrial areas than in the rest of the country, 
and, in general, industry in the latter has been much more heavily dependent 
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on primary raw materials aa inputs. 
Each of the approximately 120 manufacturing sub-groups has been 
classified, according to the type of material inputs used, 1 into one of three 
categories viz., first stage resource users, second stage resource users, 
and third stage resource users, the latter industries in which being natural 
resources are of indirect consequence only. A brief description of these 
categories follows: 
(1) First stage. resource users. These are sectors which have a high 
proportion of primary inputs relative to total material inputs. 
(2) Second stage resource users. TL.is group consists of : 
(a) industries which obtained a large proportion of their material 
inputs from the first stage resource users~ and include, for 
example, bakeries purchasing flour from grain mills, confec-
tioners purchasing sugar from sugar mills, and furn.iture 
manufacturers obtaining wood from sawmills. 
(b) some Llldustries which used a significant proportion of primary 
inputs even if the bulk of their manufactured inputs were not 
obtained from first stage resource users, e. g. iron and steel, 
textiles, basic industrial chemicals, and pulp and paper. 
(3) Third stage resource users. These industries are ovel'whelmingly 
dependent on inputs !rom industries other than the first stage resource 
users. 
Broadly speaking, therefore. first stage resource users rely 
heavily on primary raw materials; the second stage resource users are lese 
heavily dependent on primary raw materials, but nevertheless, in some 
cases use a significant proportion of primary inputs, or inputs from first 
stage resource users. As we move from the first to the third stage of 
1. See Appendix A of this study in which details of the method of classifica-
tion and the specific sub-groups contained in each category is given. The 
classification used in this section is an adaptation of a similar analysis 
employed in 0 . D. Duncan~~·, Metropolis Qnd Kegion, Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1960. 
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production~ therefore, we find industries becoming increasingly dependent 
on manufactured intermediate goods, and less dependent on primary material 
inputs. 
Table 6 shows that in the major industrial areas the third category 
provided employment for 48. 0 per cent of industrial workers in those areas, 
the second employed 26. 7 per cent, and the third 25. 3 per cent. In the rest 
of South Africa, however, the order of importance was just the reverse of 
this with 60. 1 per cent being employed in the first category, 25. 3 per cent 
in the second and H. 7 per cent in the third. 
Primary raw materials are. in general,. subject to a greater degree 
of weight loss in the course of processing, than are semi-processed materials, 
the latter being proportionately more important in the second stage resource 
user category, and still more so in the case of third stage :resource, than in 
the first stage resource user category. The greater is the degree of weight 
loss, the greater is the tendency for an activity to be situated at the source 
of raw materials. First stage resource users, therefore, tend to be more 
strongly oriented to materials in their selection of location than are second 
or third stage resource users. It appear~ then, that a greater proportion 
of manufacturing industry in the rest of South Africa 1 is materials oriented. 
than is the case in the four major industrial regions. This is not surprising 
since the largest market areas will tend to attract the largest p1·oportion of 
market oriented industries. 
Not all first stage resource users are materials oriented in their 
., 
location, howevers and several of them tend to be widely dispersed-' in accor-
dance with scattered supplies of the raw material and local markets. If both 
the markets and the materials are widespread and the materials are heavy 
relative to value the industry will tend to be dispersed. Examples of this 
1. This is shown in more detail in the following chapter where the structure 
of manufacturing in the border areas is examined. 
Z. See chapter 8 where the localisation coefficient of each sub-group is 
given. 
TABLE 6 
* Analyeis of Manufacturing Employment Accordine to staae of Production 195Q-60 
** Major Industrial Areas Best of South Africa Re;eublic 
Number (1/ 
-2.- Number ..1_ Number e.' ..../.;/.... 
lst stage resource ueera 118,693 25 . 3 85,909 60. 1 193,602 32. 6 
2nd 
3rd 
* 
** 
otago resource ueere 125,312 26. 7 31,544 25. 3 156,856 26.4 
atage resource uaers 225,195 48.0 18,305 14.7 243,400 41. 0 
T o t a 1 469,200 100.0 124,758 100.0 59:5,958 100.0 
The figures do not include the motor vehicle industry, construction or electricity. For detailed 
list ot industries included in the above categories see Appendix A 
Western Cape, Port FJ.izabeth and Ui tenha&e, Durban and Pinetown, and the Southern Transvaal , 
Source: Baaed on unpublished information kindly made available by the Bureau of Statistics. 
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are flour a n d grain mills, ba lanced animal feeds, sawmills, bricks and tiles. 
and crushed stone In other cases. however, e ven where the materials are 
h e avy, subject to we ight loss, and widely dispersed, if internal economies of 
scale are significant, as in cement manufacture, there will tend to oo sm.alle r 
number of plants, each strategically placed to serve a particular region al 
market. In general, however, the importance of first stage rasou:rce users 
L'1 the less industrialised areas, suggests that they contain a relatively large 
proportion of materials oriented industry, and industries which, in view of 
the ubiquity and weight of their t'aw materials, are oriented to local markets. 
Third stage resource u.sers on the other hand, which are predominantly 
located in the m a jor industr>al areas, are much freer to site the n1selves 
close to their large st market, regardless of whether their source of material 
inputs happens to coincide with the market area Second stage resource 
users are, by an large, in an intermediate position. 
Some General tendencies affecting location. 
The above four sections of th:s chapter describe t.l).e evolution of 
the locational pattern up to 1960, and suggests the predominant locational 
forces, operating in both the major industrial areas and the less industrial-
ised parts of the country, which had brought it about. Though, as we have 
found, there was no discernible tendency for the overall degree of concentra-
tion to alter over a long period of time, there is obviously nothing immutable 
about this state of affairs, even in the absence of gove rnment intervention. 
It may be useful, therefore, to ask what effect the major loca-
tional forces operating on the distribution of manufacturing activity were 
tending to have by 1960. We have shown above that, in terms of such factors 
as their relative rates of growth, the trend in the location of their capacity, 
and the degree of specialisation of various areas in their production, develop-
ments in certain sectors were tending to work in favour of industrial decent-
ralisation. The question is whether there was any reason to believe that 
the number and significance of such industries might become great enough to 
dominate forces working in the other direction. 
The Schumann Committee poses the question:"P..ow will the 
location pattern develop in the future, and what can be done to influence it? ,.l 
1. ..2l?.·..£ll· , p . 73. 
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It a n swers the first part of the question by saying : '· 'It is practically certain 
t~1at due to t'he agglomeration. advant.a.ges of the existing in dustrial areas, the 
present tendency to centralise will continue unless positive steps are take11 
to promote sound, economic decentralisation. 111 It appears, th en, that the 
Scl•uma nn Committee did uot believe that the rnarket mec'1anism alor.e, re-
flt:ctiu.g, i n ter alia, changes in the propot·tionate contributions of different 
1nauufacturing sectors, that is, differences h. their rates of growth, changes 
in technology, and n-tovements in the relative prices of factors of production 
as between regions, would provide the incentives for a greater decentralisa-
tion of industry. 
The reasoning which l eads the Committee to this cor.clusion is, 
unfortunately, not spelled out At the level of explicit e xplanation they seem 
1 
to rely entirely upon the asserti011 that the ten de_tcy to centr alisation will 
continue " due to the agglomeration advantages of the existing ir~dustrial areas. tt 
It might be n oted in passing that supporting arguments for the latter view, 
which implies that the agglomeration economies of the metropolitan areas 
are the major obstacle to decentralisation. taking place without government 
intervention, is totally lacking. Indeed, it conflicts with their earlier re-
mark that : 11Without any doubt the most important of these (locational) 
factors is the market" 2 Agglomeration economies, and the market, as 
such, are logically distinct forces a n d it is not possible to reconcile the 
Committee's two, apparently contradictory, viewpoints by arguing that firms 
are drawn to markets only because large market areas enjoy significant 
external economies . This issue, relating to the nature and effect of agglo-
meration economies has important policy implications which are touched on 
in chapter 5. 
The Schumann Committee •s view that a contin uance of the existing 
degree of concentration was "practically certain11 without State intervention, 
comes after an analysis of industrial development in terms of a model involv-
1. <!E,: .£ll., p. 171 . 
2. cze.: ill . p. 69 . 
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ing the classification of industries according to the nature of the materials 
and the market of manufacturing industries . 1 Their analysis shows that 
since the Second World War the manufacture of semi-processed goods for 
further use by secondary industry has assumed increasing significance 
relative to industrial output as a whole. The structural change which has 
taken place is reflected by the fact that the gross value of such intermediate 
goods production increased from 14. 2 per cent of the total gross output of all 
industries in 1938-39 to 36. 7 per cent in 1956-57 and that, in the same period, 
the proportion of industrial output sold to other secondary industries increas-
ed from 10 per cent to 39. 3 per cent. Z Events since 1960 suggest that the 
tendency for the proportion contributed by intermediate products to increase 
. t• . 3 1s con mwng. 
What are the implications of this structural change for trends 
in the pattern of industrial location, in particular for the regional concen-
tration of manufacturing activity? The Sc humann Committee infers from the 
increasing importance of intermediate goods producers that "any policy of 
decentralisation will have to be aimed at these industries". It is, indeed, 
obvious that if one significant group of industries is growing considerably 
faster than industry as a whole. success in achieving substantial decentrali-
1. The Schumann Committee's system of materials classification is not the 
same as that which we employed earlier in this chapter, and in addition 
they take into account the type of market. It is most unfortunate that the 
Schumann Committee neither gives an exhaustive list of the item.s in-
cluded in each of its categories, nor a precise and rigorous statement 
of the criteria used by them in classifying industries according to type 
of materials and market. 
2. Schumann Committee, p . 69. 
3. See G. Marais, ·The Development of Manufacturing Industry Since 1960," 
Statistical Year Book, 1966 (Compiled by the Bureau of Statistics), 
pp. 15-ZO. 
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sation of industry depends a good deal on whether producers in this group 
can be persuaded to establish in the locations preferred by the Government. 
What is more interesting perhaps, is whether this structural change, as 
l 
such, tends to favour greater decentralisation without Government intervention. 
The Schumann Committee did not expressly deal with this question but the 
remark from their report, mentioned at the beginning of the preceding 
paragraph, implies that they did not think so. 
It may, however, be worth while investigating the implications 
of the growth of intermediate goods production a little further. At the 
beginning of the period of rapid progress in this category South African 
manufacturing consisted very largely of consumer goods production based on 
South African primary products and imported semi-processed goods, and 
such non-consumer goods output as there was, was mainly directed towards 
the needs of mining and agriculture, the two most notable examples being 
explosives and fertilizers. The location of manufacturing in general was 
strongly oriented to either primary raw materials in the case of markedly 
weight losing materials, or to final consumer markets, or to imported semi-
processed goods. The market, however, was the predominant influence 
and consequently manufacturing industry became concentrated in the large 
urban areas where the demand for consumers goods was greatest. 
The size of the country's market for many intermediate goods is 
not large enough at th e start to justify their production domestically, but as 
the country develops a process involving forward and backward linkage, such 
as that described by Hirschman, 1 leads to the production of manufactured 
intermediates. This may account for the particularly rapid rate of growth 
of the intermediates goods sector in South Africa in recent years. Import 
replacement was the major force behind the economic growth of South Africa 
in the period 1947-1957. 
1. A. 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, 
Yale University Press.) 1960, pp. 103-104. 
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With the exception of explosives and fertilizers which developed 
to meet the requirements of mining and agriculture respectively, other non• 
consumers goods production developed rather late. For instance, the iron 
and steel industry made significant progress only after the middle thirties; 
textiles grew most rapidly in the immediate post-war years; other basic 
industrial chemicals (apart from explosives and fertilizers) in the late 
'fifties; and pulp, paper and paperboard in the early 'fifties. In the early 
stages of some of these (e. g. textiles, paper and chemicals), the proportion 
of imported materials was high but is gradually being replaced by local 
materials. Furthermore, an increasing proportion of South Africa's re-
quirements from these sectors is being produced locally. 
What effect on the geographical distribution can we expect these 
developments to have? It is evident that by 1959-60 at least they had not 
induced any significant change in the overall degree of concentration, though 
there are signs1 that the proportionate contribution of the border areas may 
have increased slightly between 1956-57 and 1959-60. 
Intermediate goods producers may be divided, following the 
Schumann Committee's procedure, 2 into two broad categories depending 
on the type of materials used: (a) basic raw material (i.e . primary product) 
processors (b) intermediate (i.e. semi-processed) raw material processors. 
Like all users of primary products, we should expect the production of inter-
mediate goods of the first type to be more closely tied to sources of mater-
ials than firms using semi-processed inputs. There are two principal 
reasons for this : 
(i) Primary resource inputs tend to be more heavily weight losing than 
intermediate manufactured goods in the process of production. 
(ii) Firms processhtg primary inputs tend to have a smaller range of 
inputs than those using manufactured intermediates . 
1. Mentioned in the next chapter. 
2. .2.1?.· £!!. , p. 68. 
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With reference to the United States in the early 'forties, it was said that 
"only 20 per cent of the industries covered by the Census of manufacturers 
are direct processors of basic raw materials", but the same study1 adds 
that since most of these use mainly one or two materials, the locational 
pull towards sources of the predominant materials in this group is on the 
whole especially powerful when weight loss is involved. 
The smaller is the weight loss, the stronger is the pull of the 
market. If the market is point-form (i . e. spatially concentrated) the 
attraction of the market is greater than if it is multi-form. Since the 
market is not generally located in the less developed areas, however, if 
intermediate goods producers do choose locations in such areas, it will be 
because they are materials oriented. It is evident already that the develop-
ment of certain sectors like pulp and paper, basic metals and chemicals i s 
resulting in significant growth outside of the main industrial areas.. But 
this is due solely to the fact that economically exploitable supplies of the 
required raw materials are available in the rural areas, and that significant 
parts of these industries tend to be materials oriented. There is nothing 
in the nature of intermediate goods based on primary raw materials, which 
indicates that their production will necessarily be more dispel'sed than that of 
other manufactured goods, and the prospects for such industries in the less 
developed areas depend mainly on whether the required materials are present 
there. It may be, however, that since potentially exploitable natural re-
sources do tend to be more widely dispersed than markets, the rural 
areas will tend to expe:!."ience more rapid industrial growth if the pro-
duction of manufactured goods based on domestically produced raw 
materials increases as a proportion of total manufacturing output. As was 
noted above, however, relatively few intermediate goods producers are 
direct processors of raw materials. 
1. National Resources P lanning Board, Industrial Location and 
National Resources, December, 1942. Washington. United States 
Government Printing Office, 1943. 
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Production of the second class of intermediates, those using 
mainly other semi-processed goods, on the other hand, tends to be much 
more strongly oriented to markets. In the first place, as we have noted, . 
the proportionate weight loss of the material inputs is much smaller. 
Secondly, as one writer points out, nindustries using partly manufactured 
goods tend to use many different materials . Industries of this type are 
therefore rarely located with special reference to any particular material; 
i£ the supply of such goods is secured largely from a single area the industry 
may be attracted there. These industries therefore tend to settle in large 
industrial centres which offer advantages both for the assembly of the raw 
materials and the distribution of the product. When the product is more 
bulky than the materials from which it is made. the pull on the industry of 
the market ie likely to be especially strong. The greater the number of 
materials used. the greater is the likelihood that the point of minimum trans-
port coste will be close to the market or at some intermediate point between 
materials and markets rather than adjacent to any particular materials ... 1 
In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, at the end of 1960 
there were very few firms in the border areas oriented to supplies of semi-
processed materials. The expansion of intermediate goods output based on 
semi-processed materials, thus, tends to reinforce the tendency towards 
regional co11centration. Intermediate goods production also strengthens the 
linkage effects between industries a~td so increases the advantages of cluster• 
in g. 
Certain producers of intermediates may well become oriented to 
supplies of semi-processed goods available in the rural areas, but these 
are in the main likely to be in industries in which it is difficult, for either 
technical reasons or because of economies of integration and scale, to 
separate one stage of production from another. For instance, the manufact-
ure of paper from pulp, and of steel from pig-iron, is usually carried on in 
1. National Resources Planning Board, Industrial Location and National 
Resources, December 1942 Washington, United States Government 
1 
Printing Office, 1943. 
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the same plant becu~e of economies of scale and integration; and a number of 
producers of chemical products are tied to the SASOL plant at Sasolburg for 
technical reasons , But the scope for the economical location of inter-
mediate goods producers in rural areas depends, even in these cases, on the 
availability of primary product inputs . 1 
This state of affairs, however, may change as the size of markets 
in other parts of the country expands, and perhaps also as the proportion of 
manufactures exported increases. Once the size of the rn.~rket reaches a 
certain critical level, it will become increasingly possible for market 
oriented firms of sufficient size to overcome technical indivisibility and 
other disadvantages of small size and so develop in significant numbers 
outside the main industrial areas, Perloff aeks: "!s it not possible, for 
example, that California's dramatic showing is partly accounted for by the 
fact that it had arrived at a point in its development where important inter-
mediate supply and market functions make some operations feasible which 
were formerly not economic". 2 
The mai11 conclusion of this section so far iB that there is nothing 
in the nature of intermediate goods, as such, which enables us to say with 
any degree of confidence that, as a result of the structural change taking 
place, the overall location pattern is likely to change in one particular way 
rather than another. In particular, there are no grounds for believing that 
the country was about to witness a spontaneoua and significant decentralisaM 
tion of industry.· Indeed, since the rural areas were so highly speciali sed 
1. Orientation to semi-processed raw materials by satellite industries 
presupposes that a master industry using primary inputs and producing 
the semi-processed materials is already established, See Hirschman, 
2E.. ..£.!!_, p 102. for discussion of the conditions necessary for creation 
of a satellite industry through forward and backward linkage. 
2 H. S. Perloff, E . S . Dunn, E . E . Lampard and R . F. Muth, Regions 
Resources and Economic Growth, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 
1960, p. 396. Perloff's concept of a threshold is reminiscent of 
Hirschman's discussion .21>· .£!!.;. 102-103. 
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in the food products sector, the continuing decline in the latter is an impor-
tant factor in the perpetuation of regional concentration. 
We have referred in this section only to materials and market 
oriented producers of semi .. processed goods. Some of these industries, 
like textiles, however, are strongly influenced by labour costs, and since 
the latter tend to be lower in the rural areas than in the larger cities, a 
rapid rate of growth in the production of goods of this sort tends to favour 
decentralisation. The influence of the materials source is alight in such 
industries since weight loss is negligible, and its value high in relation to 
weight. It should be noted, how ever, that it is the labour intensity of such 
industries and the lightness of their materials, rather than the fact, as such, 
that they produce semi ... processed goods, which favours their establishment 
in the less industrialised areas. 
While. as was pointed out above, the Schumann Committee was 
pessimistic about the prospects of industrial decentralisation taking place 
without government intervention, it appears that they were very hopeful that 
the growing importance of intermediate goods production would increase the 
susceptibility of private locational decisions to official inducements. In 
particular, they discuss the effects of manipulating the railway rating 
structure. 
The Committee, on the basis of a questionnaire survey and a cost 
analysis which it carried out concludes that "the industries which could 
possibly be affected by the railway rates structure as far as the location of 
industries is conce:L"ned, are confined to the manufacturers of basic and 
intermediary r.aw materials, with the exception of the so-called footloose 
industries. n 1 The significance of the apparent decisiveness of the rating 
structure in these basic and intermediary raw material processors, is that, 
since they were expected to contribute a large proportion of additional 
manufacturing output, .,The railway rates structure will in time to come 
probably play a more important part in industrial location than in the past". 2 
1. ClE· cit., pp. 83-84. 
2. ~-' p. 84. 
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It goes without saying that the locational decisions of a very 
considerable proportion of manufacturing concerns could be influenced by 
appropriate changes in the rating structure, provided these were sufficiently 
large. The implication of the Committee's conclusion, therefore, is 
presumably that at least part of the intermediate goods industries are fairly 
sensitive to changes in the rating structure, so that relatively moderate 
manipulations of the structure, as it applies to them, would have a (favour-
able) decisive effect on their choice of location. The growing relative 
importance of the intermediate goods industries implies, according to the 
Schumann Committee's reasoning, then, that manufacturing in the aggregate 
is tending to become more easily 'divertible', and that the authorities would 
be advised to concentrate on these industries in their efforts to decentralise 
industry. This issue is taken up again later in this study. In the present 
context, it is sufficient to note that the ability to divert an industry does not 
imply that these industries would have become 'decentralised' without inter-
vention, nor that such diversion, if carried out, would necessarily be con-
ducive to economic efficiency. The discussion of the present and preceding 
paragraphs, therefore, does not provide any clear indication that the growth 
of intermediate goods industries was tending through market forces alone, to 
favour industrial decentralisation. 
In conclusion, three other trends which have some interest for 
the location of industry warrant mention. The first concerns the long term 
decline in the ratio of imported material inputs to the total value of materials 
used by South Mrican manufacturing industry. As Table 7 shows, the 
South African proportion of industrial raw materials rose from 4 9 . Z per 
cent in 1924-25 to 66. 4 per cent in 1955-56. This percen tage rose sharply 
during the Second World War, but dropped equally sharply immediately 
afterwards when the supply position returned to something closer to normal. 
From 1948-49, however. the proportion of raw materials obtained from 
domestic sources increased steadily from 55. 5 per cent to 66. 4 per cent in 
1 1955-56. As one might have expected, t he South African con tent of raw 
1. The last year for which the writer has been able to obtain comparable 
statistics. 
I 
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TABLE 7 
Source ot Raw ~terials Used in :t:.anufacturi!lg Industry 
All Imported South African 
""tate rial a Materials :::a terials 
R'OOO 
..:£. R'OOO L R'OOO ~ ....!..-
1924- 25 71,756 100.0 36,466 50. 8 35,466 49.2 
1934-35 119,732 100.0 53,944 45. 1 65,788 54. 9 
1939- 40 202,364 100.0 91,176 45.1 lll,l88 54. 9 
1944-45 ~49,684 100.0 122,659 35.1 233,836 64.9 
1948-49 662,712 100.0 294,950 44·5 367,762 55. 5 
1953-54 1,226,314 100.0 443,314 35. 5 783,000 62. 6 
1954-55 1,359,346 100.0 473,264 34.8 908,2~2 65. 2 
1955- 56 1,432,614 100.0 482,002 33.6 950,610 66.4 
Source: Compiled from information kindly made available by the 
Bureau o! Statistics. 
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materials was somewhat higher at the ports, which have attracted a large 
proportion of the industries based on imported materials, than in the interior. 
In 1953-4 the percentage of total materials used which was obtained from 
South African sources was as follows: Southern Transvaal 55. 4, Durban-
Pinetown 47. 4, and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage 36. 4. 
This process, of course, reflects very largely the substitution 
of South African rnade for imported semi-processed goods. Ita effect is to 
1 
reduce the attractiveness of the ports as sites for the production of a wide 
range of goods, and to favour inland locations, especially the Southern Trans-
vaal which now supplies the bulk of the country's steel requirements . 2 In 
so far as import substitution results from the use of raw materials in the 
smaller centres the latter will also continue to expand their manufacturing 
activity, though this will not necessarily be accompanied by a lessening of 
the deg.ree of regional concentration. 
There has been a tendency for manufacturing industry to contri• 
bute an increasingly large percentage of South Africa's exports . This 
tendency has been especially marked since the late 1930's, and manufactured 
exports, increased from 3. 2 per cent of total exports, including gold, in 
1936-37 to 18. 0 per cent in 1956-57. 
1. See for instance the discussion of certain firms in East London in the 
following chapter. 
2. The story of the early development of the explosives industry provides 
a particularly interesting insight into the process, and of why the 
Southern Transvaal now dominates s. A. industry. See H. Schauder, 
"The Chemical Industry in South Africa Before Union*', S. A . J. E., 
December 1946. 
99 
TABLE 8 
South African exports by main categories 
Products of Minerals and 
agriculture, metals Gold Manufac-forestry and excluding tured goods 
fishing gold 
R . m. o/ of R . m. cr., of R . m. tr.-. of R . rn. o/~ of 
total total total total 
1936- 7 47.8 (20. 1) 16. 6 (7. 0) 165. 6 {69. 7) 7.6 (3. 2) 
1952-3 207.0 (23. 4) 21 0.6 (23. 8) 282.2 (31.9) 184.8 (20. 9) 
1954-5 239.4 (25. 2) 192. 8 (20. 3) 333.4 (35. 1) 184.2 (19. 4) 
1956-7 295.0 (24. 7) 286.6 (24. 0) 397.4 (33. 3) 215 0 ( 18. 0) 
Source: to the P rotection of 
The growing percentage contribution of manufa ctur ing industry 
to total exports is due in part to the fact that output in the manufacturing 
sector is developing more rapidly than in other sectors of the economy. 
But it is also due to the fact that an increasing proportion of the gros s 
output of manufacturing industry- is being exported, this p r oportion having 
increased from 4. 7 per cent in 1938- 39 to 11.8 per cent in 1956- 57. 1 
The effect on location of this l atter t r end is partly in the oppooite direction 
from that as s ociated with the increas ing irnpo:r:tance of South African 
source raw materials. But in so far a s a cons iderable part of the 
increase in manufactured exports has gone to Rhodesia and other 
countr ies in Southern Africa, the increas e in the exported ~n·oportion 
of the output of manufacturing industry has not worked altogether to the 
dis advantage of the Southern T r a nsvaal. 
goods to the United 
1. ~chumann Committee, p. n9. 
T he expans ion of manufactured 
. . . /Stat es 
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States, Europe and the Far East, however, will no doubt provide some 
incentive to production at sites, including border areas, well placed from 
the point of view of raw materials, in Natal and the Transvaal. The 
development of Richard's Bay as a harbour will probably also tend to re-
inforce this process. 
On the basis of a different classification, namely, the Internation-
al Standard Industrial Classification, manufactured exports as a proportion 
of total exports, including gold, declined from 28. 1 per cent in 1957 to 27. 3 
per cent in 1964. 1 This appears to have been the result of a fairly rapid 
increase in gold exports from 425 million in 1957 to 731 million in 1964, for 
the proportionate contribution manufactured products to non-gold exports 
increased slightly during this seven year period. It is expected, however, 
that the production of gold will increase by only 7. 1 per cent in the six years 
1965-1971.2 Thus we should expect the proportionate contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to national income and employment and also to total 
exports, including gold, to increase in future. The decline of the gold 
mining industry which is inevitable unless there is a significant increase 
in the price of gold, should produce conditions more favourable to a spon-
taneous decentralisation of industry, for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
should reduce the rate of growth demand in the Southern Transvaal area. 
Secondly, unless the ratio of exports to national income is to fall signifi-
cantly, there will have to be a steady increase in the proportion of manu-
factured output which is exported. () 
Finally, it is clear that if manufacturing wage rates for Bantu .:: 
""~!':! · I tfi 
rise more rapidly in the main industrial areas than in the rural areas. this 
l. Statistical Year Book 1966, Q-4 and Q 11. 
2. Economic Development Programme for the Republic of South Africa, 
1966-71, p. 20. 
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will tend to favour decentralisation 1 even without governmen t assistance. 
Data presented later in this study suggests that this had not happened to 
any significant extent up to 1960. Influx control measures if applied more 
severely than in the past. and changes in wage fixing methods, perhaps 
together with independent market forces, may very well increase the ratio 
of urban to rural wages in future . The general level of wages also has a 
bearing on the location of industry, in that if it rises more rapidly than 
other costs such as transport, the ratio of the wage bill to net output tends 
to increase, and the incentive to move to cheap labour areas is intensified, 
that is, the higher is the ratio of wages to total costs, the larger is the 
percentage reduction in total costs which results from a given percentage 
difference in wage rates between high and low wage areas. The subject 
of labour and border areas industrialisation is reserved for chapter 7. 
In the above analysis, the measure of regional concentration 
has been the proportion of output generated in the four major industrial 
areas. Areas outside the latter have been lumped together as the 'rest 
of South Africa ' or the 'less industrialised areas' or even on occasion as 
the 'rural areas' . But as should be clear from our discussion in chapters 
1 and 2, the focus of decentralisation policy in the South African context is 
on the Bantu areas and cen tres; on their periphery, the so-called border 
areas. Though the analysis so far provides an essential background, the 
really significant aspect of the locational pattern is, therefore, not the 
rel ative distribution of manufacturing capacity between the main industrial 
areas and the rest of the country, but the proportion of the national total 
situated in the border and Bantu areas. In the next chapter, theGo we shall 
consider this aspec t of industrial location, and the structure of border areas 
manufacturing industry, in some detail. 
1. Note that an increasing ratio of urban to rural wages, as a factor 
affecting location is distinct from the possibility of labour oriented 
industries as a proportion of total industry increasing as a result of 
a change in the structure of manufacturing industry. 
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Chapter 4 
Jl'-TDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE BORDER A~EAS TO 1960 
Defining the Region 
An analysis of the relative importance and the structure of 
manufacturing industry in the border areas to 1960 would be much 
simplified if an exhaustive official list of places falling in this c ategory 
were available. The Government~ however, appears to have deliberately 
avoided committing itself in this way. Some general guidance is pro-
vided, however, in a statement issued by the I"rime Minister on June 
2# 1960. He said: 
'By the concept of "border areas" is meant those localities or 
regions near the Bantu areas, in which industrial development 
takes place, through European initiative and control, but which 
are so situated that the Bantu workers can maintain their residences 
and family lives in the Bantu areas and move regularly to their 
places of employment. Since labour is not the only factor deter-
mining indu6trialloc ation, however, and since the availability of 
other location{ll fac ilities, such as basic services, is indispensible, 
it will be necessary to include in the concept of border areas 
ce;·tain centres where additional provision would have to be made 
for the temporary housing of workers on a weekly basis. 
Consequently those regions whithin approximately 30 miles of the 
Bantu areas may be regarded as border areas.' 
In addition to this broad definition, specific centrets are named 
as border areas in Schedule I of the ~rime Minister's statement. 
A further indication of the centres regarded as border areas is given 
by the annual progress reports of the P ermanent Corn.mittee, which 
suggest that since its inception it has paid special attention to certain 
' growth points' on the periphery of the Bantu areas. Some of the more 
notable of these are Rosslyn (12 miles north of P retoria and three miles 
from a Bantu area); T'haloborwa in the Eastern Transvaal; the Natal 
area along the railway line and main road from Durban to Johannesburg, 
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including centres like Pietermaritzburg, Howick, Mooiriver, Estcourt, 
Ladysmith, Klipriver and Newcastle; Hammarsdale, situated about 
30 miles from Durban; and, in the Eastern Cape, the Ciskei area in 
which the pdncipal centres are East London, King William' s Town and 
Oueenstown. In addition there are centree like Rustenburg, Pieters-
burg. Waterberg, Waterpoort and Tzaneen in the Transvaal, Vryburg 
in the Cape and several smaller centres in Natal which appear to be 
regarded by the P ermanent Committee as minor growth points. 
It is noteworthy that substantial parts of the magisterial dis-
tricts in which these centres lie are Bantu areas proper, and, since 
magisterial districts are the smallest regional units for which infor-
mation is available from the Bureau of Statistics, it is not possible 
to separate the statistic s for border areas manufacturing industry from 
those for the Bantu areas. It has been decided, therefore, to combine 
the statistics for border and Bantu in the ensuing analysis. Since one 
of the principal aims of industrial decentralisation policy in South 
Afric a is the containment of the Bantu population within the border and 
Bantu areas, this procedure seems to be particularly appropriate. 
In any case, manufacturing industry in the Bantu areas is insignificant, 
so that in effect thie technical difficulty is negligible. Bearing in 
mind the definition given by the P rime Minister in 1960, and the areas 
well known to have been treated as border areas by the :Oermanent Com-
mittee, a list has been compiled of the magisterial districts which will 
be regarded as constituting the border and Bantu areas for the purposes 
of this study. 1 
The Contribution of Border and Bantu Areas to Manufacturing 
According to the st.atistic s discussed in the previous chapter, 
areas other than the four main industrial areas contributed 18. 6 per 
cent of gross manufacturing output in 1956-57 and 20 per cent in 1959-
60. 
1. See Ap">endi:x B of this study. 
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Since the corresponding figures for the border and Bantu areas, 1 
given in table 9 below, were 10. 0 and 10. 6 per cent respectively, it 
appears that these areas produced slightly over half of the gross output 
generated outside of the four main industrial areas. Though statistics 
2 
based on a mere three year period should be treated with caution, it 
also appears that the rates of growth in the border areas, between 
1956-57 and 19 59-60, of employment (5. 5 l>er cent), gross output (21. 7 
per cent) and net output (2l. 7 per cent) were rather higher than in the 
country as a whole (for which the corresponding figures were, 1, 5, 
12. 9 and 14. 9 per cent), Thus, as table 9 shows the border areas 
increased their proportionate contribution to the national total both in 
terms of employment and output. 
The structure of manufacturing in the border areas will be 
examined in more detail in the following sections, but four features, 
emerging from the 1956-57 figures in table 9, may be noted here: 
(a) The average size of industrial establishments, measured 
in terms of net output per establishment, in the border areas, was 
smaller (R 70. 2 thousand) than in the main industrial (R 112. 8 thousand). 
(b) Net output per employee in the border areas (Rll54. 2) was 
also lower than in the major industrial areas. 
(c) The border areas produced a larger proportion of total 
gross output than of net output. This is due to the well known tenden-
cy for indirect inputs (labour, profits, depreciation etc.) to be a smaller 
proportion of gross output in primary raw materials processing industries 
which are dominant in the border areas, than in the higher stages of 
production. 
1. In future when referring to the statistics based on both border and 
Bantu areas, we shall speak only of "border areas", since the Bantu 
areas contain a negligible proportion of industry in relation to border 
areas. 
2. Separate industrial statistics for the border and Bantu areas can be 
compiled from Bureau of Statistics data only for the years 1956-57 
and 1959-60. 
Border and Tlantu Areas 
Four main industrial regions* 
Republic of South Africa 
Border and Bantu Areas 
Four main industrial regions* 
Republic of South Africa 
TABLE 9 
Manufacturing Industry in the Border and Bantu Areas Compared with 
Major Industrial Areas: Princip~ Statistics 1956-57 and 1959-60 
1956-57 
No. of Total Gross output Net output 
.A % R' OOO , , R'OOO < establishments employment i<-
1,211 12.6 73,714 11.7 223,808 10.0 135,080 9.4 
6,630 69.0 491,181 77.8 1 ,823 ,796 81.4 752,824 83.0 
9,611 100.0 630,991 100.0 2,241,202 100.0 906,658 100.0 
1959-60 
1 ,344 12.6 77,736 12.2 272,294 10.6 104,358 9.9 
7,392 •69.4 498,531 78.5 2,058,672 79. 9 864,956 81.8 
10,656 100.0 635,431 100.0 2,575,556 100.0 1,057,474 100.0 
*Western Cape, Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage 1 Durba~Pinetown, Southern Transvaal (including Pretoria) 
Source : Compiled from unpublished information kindly made available by the Bureau of Statistics. 
Salaries .~ wages 
R' OCO .. '· ,. 
32 , 796 7.3 
372,776 83 . 5 
446 , 208 100.0 
37 , 672 7.5 
430,428 
504,626 100.0 
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(d) The ratio of salaries and wages to net output was only 38. 5 
per cent in the border areas compared with 49. 5 per cent in the 
metropolitan areas. This does not necessarily mean that in(terms 
of physical output the manufacturing industry in the border areas is 
less labour intensive than in the main industrial areas. It is true, 
as we shall see later in this study, 1 that the idea that low Bantu labour 
costs tend to produce a manufacturing structure in which industries 
using relatively large amounts of Bantu labour, and adopting Bantu 
labour intensive techniques, are proportionately more significant than 
in areas where the costs of Bantu labour are higher, is probably 
exaggerated. 2 The availability of natural resources and geographical 
situation are probably more important influences than labour costs, 
on the location of industry. 3 Nevertheless, the lower salary and 
wage bill in relation to net output is, in large measure, probably 
due s imply to lower wage rates and not to the use of less intensive 
use of labour in the border areas. 
1. Chapter 8. 
2. See for instance D. Hobart Houghton (Editor), E conomic Develop-
ment in a P lural Society, Cape Town, 1960, p. 140: "· .. East 
London industry was becoming more c apital-intensive and less 
labour-intensive than it had been. This is of interest since one of 
the alleged advantages of East London as a site for industry is that. 
situated as it is, close to Native reserves, it enjoys abundant 
supplies of cheap l'i!ative labour". See also our discussion of 
East London in this chapter. 
3. As is shown in Chapter 8. 
P roportionate Contribution to Bord.er Areas Industrial Activity by 
P rovince 
As table 10 shows, Natal contributed by far the largest 
share of the total manufacturing activity of the border areas, with 
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59. 2 per cent of the gross output in 1956-57, compared with the Cape 
25.0 per cent, Transvaal _l3.4 per cent and the Orange Free State 
2. 2 per cent. It is of considerable interest, too, that the rate of 
growth of industry in the Natal border and Bantu areas was consider-
ably greater than in the other provinces, so that its percentage con-
tribution to gross output rose to 62. 8 per cent in 1959-60, whereas 
the Cape's fell to 22. 6 per cent, and the Transvaal's remained vir-
tually unchanged. 1 The percentage increases in gross output implied 
by table 10 for the period 1956-57 to 1959-60, are 28. 9 for Natal, 10. 8 
in the Cape, 23. 7 per cent in the Transvaal, and 22. 4 per cent in all 
border and Bantu areas together. 
If we consider the distribution of border areas employment 
between the provinces, Natal still emerges as predominant, but not 
to as great a degree as it was in terms of output, and the rate of growth 
between 1956-57 and 1959-60 was, as we would expect, again greater in 
Natal. Natal, the Cape and the Transvaal provided 51. .8, 25. 8 and 
20. 4 per cent of total border areas employment in 1956-57, the cor-
responding figures for 1959-60 being 54. 2, 23. 8 and 21. 3. It is note-
worthy, however, that employment in each of these areas increased 
1. According to the statistics the contribution of the Orange Free 
State fell from 2. 2 to 1. 3 per cent, but the writer suspects this is 
due to the incorrect regional classification of a textiles factory 
into the Western Cape, in the data from which he compiled this 
table. 
TABLE 10 
Border and Bantu Areas Manufacturing Industry by Province 1956-57 and 1959- 60 
GROSS OUTPUT MATERIALS USED NET OUTPUT TOTAL :EMPLOYMENT SALARIES & WAGES 
Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent 
of Border of Border of Border of Border of Border 
No . of & Bantu & Bantu & Bantu & Bantu and Bantu 
estab- areas areas areas areas areas 
lishments R' OOO total R'OOO total R' OOO total No. total R'OOO total 
1956- 57 
Cape Areas 386 55 ,874 25 .0 35,248 25. 4 20,816 24. 4 19 , 053 25. 8 907 27.6 
Natal areas 483 133,160 59. 5 81, 282 58.6 51,878 60.9 38 ,162 51.8 18,896 57. 6 
Transvaal areas 307 29,930 13.4 19,362 14.0 10 ,555 12.4 15,002 20.4 3,974 12.1 
O.F.S. areas 35 4,848 2.2 2,880 2.1 1,966 2.3 1 , 497 2.0 892 2. 7 
All Border & Bantu areas 1,211 223,812 100. 0 138 ,792 100. 0 85 ,210 100.0 73 , 714 100.0 32,796 100. 0 
1959-60 
Cape areas 423 61 ,018 22. 4 38,580 23.0 22 , 506 21.6 18,510 23.8 10,108 26. 8 
Natal areas 541 170,972 62. 8 104 , 366 62.1 66,606 63 . 8 42,105 54. 2 22,332 59. 3 
Transvaal areas 345 36,754 13· 5 22 ,916 13.6 13,836 13.3 16 , 551 21.3 4 , 948 13.1 
O.F. S. areas 33 3,556 1.3 2,150 1. 3 1,406 1.3 570 0. 7 286 o.8 
All Border & Bantu areas 1,342 272,300 100. 0 166,014 100. 0 104 ,356 100. 0 77,736 100.0 37,674 100.0 
Source: Compiled from unpublished information kindly made avail able by the Bureau of Statistics. 
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considerably more slowly1 than gross output. 
The distribution of border areas employments between provinces , 
and their relative rates of growth, are of considerable significance for bor-
der industries policy, especially in so far as the latter is motivated by the 
desire for racial separation. The proportion of total employment in 
each of the provinces, compares with the proportionate distribution of 
the border and Bantu areas African population as follows: 
Natal Transvaal 
P ercentage of bor der and Bantu 
areas employment 1959-60 
P ercentage of border and Bantu 
areas African population in 
1960.2 
54.2 
32. 5 
23. 8 21. 3 
37. 2 29.0 
While the Cape border and B antu areas had a larger Afric an 
population than the Natal areas, they provided less than half as many jobs 
in manufacturing industr y. The Transvaal border areas seem to be rather 
better off than the Cape in terms of industrial jobs r elative to African pop-
ulation, but compared with Natal, the T ransvaal is clearly in a very poor 
position. It i s highly improbable that the impression this gives of the 
economic position of the Cape and T ransv aal i s improved when account is 
taken of differences in agricultural productivity. The population density 
of the Transkei and Ciskei is as g r eat as that of the Natal Bantu areas , 
and considerably greater than that of the Transvaal. 3 
The reasons for the fas ter rate of growth of manufacturing 
employment, in the Natal border areas. seems to lie. basically, in 
1. In the C ape, there was an actual decline in employment for some reason 
which the w r iter has been unable to dis cover . 
2. B ased on 1960 P opulation C ens us. Magisterial districts included are a s 
given in Appendix B of this s tudy. 
3. See Tomlins on (Summary), p . 49. 
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their better natural resource endowment, and mo-re favourable 
geographical position. The Eastern Cape border areas on the other 
hand are very poorly endowed with processable raw materials, and 
are considerably further from the major metropolitan markets of the 
country than are either the Natal or the Transvaal areas. The low 
ratio of industrial employment to population in the Cape border areas, 
compared with Natal especially, and the poorer prospects for these 
areas, as sug~ested by the rates of growth discussed above, posed a 
serious problem for the authorities when they began in earnest to 
implement the border industries policy. The problem, in essence, 
is that, if the aim of the border industries policy is either to redis-
tribute income to the poorest section of the population or to bring about 
racial se-paration under a system of independent Bantustans, additional 
border areas manufacturing employment must be distributed between 
provinces roughly in proportion to the numbers seeking employment, 
if it is to be effective. A rapid rate of growth, and relative prosperity 
in N atal will not be of much value in furthering the aims of the policy 
in the Transkei and Ciskei border areas. 
The Composition of Total Border and Bantu Areas Manufacturing :)utput 
Tables 11 and 12 provide a breakdown of the gross output of 
manufacturing industry in the border and Bantu areas in 1956-57 and 
1959-60, together with comparable figures for the four main industrial 
al'eas, the rest of South Africa (including the border and Bantu areas), 
and the Republic as a whole. The six largest percentage contributions 
to gross output in the border and Bantu areas in 1959-60, were made 
by food (48. o), pulp, paper and paperboard (7. 0), and textiles (6. 4), 
wood and wood products (4. 9). chemicals (4. 8), and clothing (4. 6). 
These six sectors together contributed 83. 0 per cent of the border 
and Bantu areas gross manufacturing output. 
TABLE 11 111 
Gross Manufacturing Output Acco rding to Industrial Class and Region 1956-57 
Industry Baotu & border areas 1% of total %of rltest of-S.A. iocluding border & Bantu areas' Four major 'industrial regions Total Republic 
No. of Gross output output in Republic No. of Gross output % of % of No. of Gross output % of % of No. of Gross output % of 
class estabs. R'OOO Border & class estabs. R'OOO total jRepublic class estabs. R'OOO total Republic estabs. R'OOO total 
bantu areas total output total output cla~s output 
total 
l. Food 369 102,618 45.9 20. 2 928 . 206,488 49.5 40.7 552 300, 774 16.5 59.3 1, 480 . 507,262 22.6 
2. Beverages 54 4,124 1.8 6.3 157 14,154 3.4 21.6 115 51, 296 2. 8 78.4 272 65,450 2.9 
. 3. Tobacco 2 ... ... • 23 3, 932 2,1 24.1 14 28,200 1,5 75.9 37 37, 132 1.7 
4. Textiles 18 16,138 7.2 15.5 29 23,142 5.5 22.2 143 81,240 4, 5 77.8 172 104,382 4.7 
5. Footwear and clothing 104 H,506 :u 5.7 286 19, 018 4.6 9.4 1, 285 182,478 10.0 90.6 1,571 201,496 9,0 
6. Wood and cork 186 14,320 6. 4 26.0 281 19, 694 4.7 35.8 303 35,350 I. 9 64.2 584 55,044 2.5 
7. Furniture 30 1,062 0.5 2.2 87 2, 902 0.7 5. 9 375 46,364 2.5 94.1 462 49,266 2.2 
8. Pape_r and paper products 8 • • • 11 13,490 3.2 17.9 111 61, 768 3.4 82. 1 122 75,258 3.4 
9. Printing & allied industries 55 2,808 1.3 4.1 143 8, 074. 1.9 11.8 373 60,318 3.3 88.2 516 68,392 3. 1 
10. Leather & leather products 8 2,642 1.2 14.9 25 4,668 ' 1,1 26.3 62 13,054 0,7 73.7 87 17, 722 0.8 
11 . Rubber products 2 • • • 7 7,360 1.8 . 62.,1 15 4,500 0.2 37. 9. 22 11,860 0.5 
12. Chemicals 25 11,736 5.2 5.4 40 20, 368 4.9 9.4 316 195,584 10.7 90.6 356 215,952 9.6 
13. Products of petroleum & coal 6 3,202 1.4 6.0 10 9, 368 2,2' 17.5 24 44,142 2.4 82.5 34 53,510 2.4 
14. Non- metallic mineral products 99 8,236 3.7 7.2 308 30,172 7.2 26.4 407 83, 954 4.6 73.6 715 114,126 5.1 
15. Basic metal industries 5 6,990 3.1 4. 2 16 10,808 2.6 6.4 100 156,796 8.6 93.6 116 167,604 7.5 
16. Metal products 49 4,258 1.9 2.0 135. 9,050 2.2 4.3 845 200,208 11.0 95.7 980 209,258 9.3 
17. Machinery 21 2,016 0.9 2.1 65 4, 656 1.1 4. 9· 286 90,992 5,0 95.1 351 95,648 4.3 
18. Electrical machinery 47 5, 078 2.3 5.3 134 7,112 1.7 7.5 554 88,136 4.8 92.5 688 95,248 4.2 
19. Transport equipment 54 364 0.2 1.1 185 1, 778 0,4 5.4 67 31,214 1.7 94.6 252 32,992 1.5 
20. Miscellaneous industries 21 .1, 634 0.7 3.4 35 1, 928 0,5 4.0 441 46,396 2.5 96.0 476 48,324 2.2 
21. Personal services 48 1,246 0.6 ' 0.7 200 ·a. 7 80.7 8.2 118 2, 954 19.3 1~ 324 318 15,278 0.7 
Residual -unclass ified 23,830 62 8 708 0,5 
- 1, 211 223 808 100,0 10.0 1, 716 417,406 100.0 18.6 6 630 1 823, 796 100.0 81.4 19,611 I 2, 241, 202 100.0 
. 
TABLE 12 
Gross Manufacturing Output According to Indu s t rial Class and Re gion 1959 60 
l. Food 390 133,130 48.9 23.0 950 246, 928 47.8 42.6 580 332,774 16.2 57.4 . 1, 530 579, 722 22.5 
2. Beverages 58 5,639 2.1 6.7 173 20,048 3.9 23.9 120 63,682 3.1 76.1 293 83,730 3.3 
3. Tobacco 2 • • • 21 5,160 1:o 13.2 16 31,552 1.6 86.8 37 39,028 1.5 
4. Textiles 17 17,568 6.4 14.2 29 28, 362 5.5 22.9 161 94, 852 4.6 77.1 190 123,820 4.8 
· 5, Footwear and clothing 115 12,467 4. 6 5. 9 314 21,136 4.1 10.0 1, 360 191,186 9.3 90.0 1, 674 212,324 8,2 
6. Wood and cork 191 13,140 4.9 24.5 304 19,234 3,7 35.4 317 . 35, 03~ 1.7 64.6 621 -54,270 2.1 
7. Furnitur e 26 979 0 •. 4 1. 9 89 2,68~ 0.5 5.3 420 24,126 2.3 94.7 509 50,938 2.0 
B. Paper and paper products 9 • • • 12 19, 306 3.7 20.7 i22 74,168 3.6 79.3 134 93,472 3.6 
9. Printing & allied industries 63 3,642 1. 3 . 4.7 148 9,472 1.8 12.2 399 68, 368 3.3 87.8 547 77,840 3.0 
10. Leather & leather products 5 3, 335 1.2 16.2 15 3, 474 0.7 16.9 77 17,076 0.8 83,1 92 20,552 0.8 
11. Rubber products 1 • • • ' 2 6,180 1~2 47.4 31 • ~ • 33 13,024 0,5 
12. Chemicals 31 13,097 4.8 5.4 51 26,030 s.o 10,7 365 216, 892 10.5 89.3 416 242;942 9,4 
13. Products of petroleum & cool 4 • • • 7 20,086 3. 9 27.2 35 53,840 2.6 72.8 42 73,924 .2.9 
14, Non-metallic mineral products liS 9,059 3. 3 6,8 337 37,282 7.2 27.8 435 96,340 4.7 72.2 772 134, 192 5,2 
15. Basic metal industries 7 10,254 3.8 5.0 17 16,592 3. 2 8,1 105 187,174 9.1 91.9 122 204,208 7.9 
16. Metal products 61 5, 342 2.0 2.2 148 11,188 2.2 4.7 960 228,302 11. 1 95.3 1,108 239,492 9.3 
17. Machinery 28 2,468 0.9 2. 2 91 7, 290 1.4 6.~s 335 104,744 5.1 93.5 426 112,032. 4.3 
18, Electrical machinery ' 72 5,218 1. 9 4.7 183 8, ~24 1.7 7.9 647 102,832 5.0 92.1 830 111,148 4. 3 
19, Transport equipment 51 437 0.2 1.-5 169 ' . 1. 554 0.3 5.2 69 28,230 1.4 94.8 238 29,78.6 1.2 
20. Miscellaneeus industries 
' 
30 1, 8]!0 0, 7 3,0 39 2, 468 0,5 4,0 539 58,422 2.9 96 •. 0 578 61,206 2.4 
21-, Personal services 68 1,501 0.6 8, 4 165 3,584 0.7 20,0 299 ' 14,290 0,7 80.0 464 17,·906. 0.7 
Residual unclassified 31,183 11,132 
Total 1, 344 272 294 100.0 10.6 3,264 516. 884 100.0 ·20,1 7, 392 2 058 672 100.0 79.9 10 656 .z;.\575, 556 100.0 
* Denotes that figure has been includ ed ip. the 'residual u nclassified' in orde r to comply ~ith the dis closure regulations of the Bureau of Statistics . 
Source: Compiled !rom unpublished information kindly supplied by th e Bureau of Statistics. 
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Industrial classes in which the border and Bantu areas increased 
their proportionate contribution to the national totals between 1956-57 
and 1959-60 were food, basic metals, clothing, metal products and the 
very small leather goods sector, while the position in the c hemicals 
sector remained completely unchanged. In addition there are certain 
sectors for which separate figures for the border and Bantu areas 
cannot be given because of the Bureau of Statistics' disclosure regu-
lations. They are tobacco, paper and paper products, rubber products 
and products of perroleum and coal. Together their contribution to 
gross output for the country as a whole in these sectors fell from 15. 2 
to 14. 2 per cent. Within this group the percentage contribution of the 
border and Bantu areas to the paper products sector, seems to have 
risen markedly for, as is shown in tables 11 and 12, the share of the 
rest of South Africa rose from 17. 9 to 20. 7 per cent, and the 1n0st 
signific ant developments in this sec tor took place in the border areas. 
But, due to significant expansion at Sasolburg, the relative importance 
of the border a r eas in the products of petroleum and coal sector fell 
very sharply, so that the percentage contribution of the border areas 
in the four industries mentioned, taken together 1 fell. This underlines 
the fact referred to earlier, that, though development of places like 
Sasolburg tends to reduce the proportion of industry in the four main 
industrial areas, it actually militates against decentralisation, in the 
sense of an increasing proportion of industrial capacity being s ited in 
the border areas. 1 
Gross manufacturing output in the border and Bantu areas 
increased by R 48. 5 million between 1956-57 and 1959-60. The great 
bulk of this increase (62. 9 per cent) represented growth in the 
1. The fact that the proportion of the chemicals industry situated 
in the four major indus trial areas fell , while the border areas 
contribution remained unchanged is expl ained in the same way. 
production of food products, and the second largest proportionate 
contribution to this increase was made by the basic metals industry 
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(6. 7 per cent), followed by paper and paper products. 1 Of the other 
manufacturing sectors fairly significant percentage contributions to the 
total increase were made by beverages (3. 1), textiles (Z. 9), chemicals 
(2. 8) and metal products (2.. 2). 
Border and Bantu Areas Gross Output by Industrial Class and Province 
The class totals for the border areas are presented for each 
province 2 in tables 13 and 14 below. A significant proportion of the 
food output is related to ubiquitous activities 3 such as bakeries, 
dairy products, and flour and grain mills 1 producing more or less 
exclusively for regional requirements, but there is also some degree 
of specialisation in products distributed over a wider area. For 
instance, in Natal there were sugar mills at Inanda, Lower Tugela, 
Lower Umfolozi, Umzinto and Hlabisa; large milk products factories 
at Bergville, Estcourt, Klipriver , Dundee and Newcastle; and meat 
products at Mooi River and Estcourt. There were al•o confectionery 
factories of significant size at Dundee and Wasbank in Natal. In the 
Cape, significant p1~oducers of dairy products were located at Kuruma.n, 
Mafeking, and V ryburg, and one of the country's largest confectionery 
firms was in East London. 
Textiles, with about seven per cent of manufacturing output, 
compared with the almost fifty per cent contributed by food products 
firms, i s the second largest manufacturing sector in the border areas. 
The Cape border areas, largely due to plants at East London and King 
1. P ercentage not available because of the Bureau of Statistics 
disclosure regulations. 
2 . The disclosure regulations of the Bureau of Statistics make it 
neceAsary to combine the figures for the Transvaal and Orange 
Free State. 
3. See chapter 8 for fuller discussion of these proportions and their 
impo:rtance in relation to total manufacturing output. 
TABLE 13 
- -
Gross manufacturing output in the Border and Bantu areas accordi~o industrial class 1956-7 
' Cape areas Natal areas Transvaal & O.F .S. 
, _ 
All Border and Bantu areas 
Industry . No. of Gross output No. of Gross output 'No. of Gross output No. of Gross output 
estab- R estab- R estab- R estab- R 
Class lish- lish- lish- lish-
--- ments ments ments ments 
' 1 1. Food 117 27, 112, 392 ·137 60, 673,040 115 14,833,218 369 102,618,650 
2. Beverages 15 662,218 25 2,830,376 14 631,452 54 4,124,046 
3. Tobacco - - - - 2 .. 2 • 
4. Textiles 8 8, 322_, 012 5 5, 243,626 5 2, 573,050 - 18 16,138,688 
5 • . Footwear and clothing 26 3,033,168 62' 8,395, 752 16 76,504 104 11, 505, 424 
6. Wood and cork 35 904,278 72 6; 652, 772.., . 79 6,762,776 186 14, 319, '826 
7. Frlrniture 14 871,830 10 107,008 6 83,974 30 1, 062, 812 
8. Paper and,paper products 4 "' 4 • - - 8 • 
9._ Printing and allied industries 21 1,121,070 23 1,370,958 11 316,194 55 , 2,808,222 
10. Leather and leather products 4 924,270 4 1, 718, 504 
- -
. 8 . 2,642,774 
11. Rubber products . - - 2 ' 
"' -
- 2 • 
12. Chemicals 17 . 6,963,902 7 * 1 • 25 11,736,768 
13. · Products of i>etroleum & coal 1 * 5 * - - ; '6. 3,201,660 
14. Non- metallic mineral products 35 ; 1,615,042 29 4, 343,928 35 2·;278, 178 99 8, 236,148. 
15. Basic metal industries - - 5 6,989,094 - - 5 6,989,094 
16. Metal ptoducts 20 1,615, 744 17 2,354,692 12 284,634 49 4, 255, '070 
17.. Milohine~ 8 1, 059,686 4 147,048 9 808,892. 21 2,015,626 
18. Electrical machinery 18 425, 746 22 4,406,210 7 ~46,428 47 5,.078, 384 
19. Transport equipment A 18 105, 314 16 131,946 20 ' 127, 382 . $4 364,642 
20. Miscellaneous iDdustries 8 ' 200,068 - 13 1,434,390 - - 21 1,634,458 
21. Personal servic es 17 '456, 294 21 562,554 10 227,844 48 1,246,692 
Residual unclassified 479,230 ' 26,159,094 5,526,156 z'3,829;954 
Total 386 55,873,064 483 133,160,992 342 34,776,682 1, 211 223,808,938 
TABLE 14 
. Gross manufacturing; output in the Border and Bantu areas according to industrial class 19S9-60 
. . 
1. Food 128 32,962,914 149 82,027,688 113 1·8, 139, 656 390 133,130,258 
t:' Beverages ' iS 1,129,'738 25 3,384,670 18 1,124,568 58 5,638,976 
3. Tobacco ·. 2 - * 2 • - ' - - -
4. Textiles 8 9, 814,790 6 * 3 • 17 17,568,266 
5. Footwear.and clothing 
' 
31 2, 740,106 68 9,651,952 16 . 74,702 . 115 12,406, 760 
I ' 3,832,178 6. Wood and cork 37 . 1,.399, 100 75 79 7,908,936 191 13,140,214 
7. Furniture 9 820,486 -11 ' 90,466 6 67,_764 26 978,716 
8. Paper and paper· products 4 • 5 . * - - 9 • 
' 9. Printing,& ailied industries 23 1,'328, 802 24 1, 727,318 16 585,910 63 3,642,030 
10. Leatber & leather ptoducts 2 • 3 • - - 5 3, 334,534 ' 
11. · Rubber products 
- - 1 * - - 1 • 
12. CllEfmicals 17 "' 12 8',413,5l0 2 • 31 13,096,726 
13. Products of petroleum & coal 1 • 3 • - - 4 • 
14. Non-metallic minerai productd 38 1,444,144 30 3, 972,290 . 47 3~ 642,288 n5 '9, 058,722 . 
15. Basic metal industries .. - 7 10,254,198 - - 7 10,254, 198 
16. Metal products 20 1,410,950 26 3,626,952 15 304,240 61 5,342,142 
17. Machinery 
-
8 1,056,602 8 274,504 12 1,137,358 28 2,468,464 
18,. Electrical · machinery 29 589,330 31 4,318,170 12 310,676 72 5, 218, 176 
' 19. Transport equipment 16 106,608 15 155,366 20 175,492 51 437,,466 
20. Mistellaneous indu@tries 12 . ... 17 1,384,258 1 * 30 1, 829, 832 
21. Personal services 25 . 526,126 27 629,290 16 345,146 68 1,500,562 
Residual unclassified ~. 632, 382 
' 
37,278;570 6,494, 732 31, 188, 884 _\ 
Total 
' 
423 60,962,078 543 171,021,382 378 40,311,468 1, 344 272,294,926 
• Denotes that figure has been included in the 'residual unclassified' in order to comply with the disclosure regulations of the 
Bureau of Statistics. , 
Source: Info.rmahon kindly made available by the Bureau of Statistics. 
-
-tJ:l. 
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William's Town, show a fairly marked degree of specialisation in this 
secto.r. producing more than half the border areas textiles output in 
1959-60. Elsewhere, the more important border area textiles 
factories were at Estcourt, Klipriver. Ngotshe, and Pietermaritzburg 
in Natal, and Harrismith in the Orange Free State. 
In 1956-57 the bulk of chemicals output was also concentrated 
in the Cape where soaps and candles, and pharmaceuticals, mainly 
at East London, were the most important sub-groups. By 1959-60, 
however, Natal whose chemicals output consisted primarily of tanning 
extract, produced in a plant at Hanover and two plants at :Port Shep-
stone, and to a lesser extent, carbide produced at Ballengeich in the 
Newcastle district. contributed more than half the gross output of the 
border areas in this sector. 
In 1959-60 77.4 per cent of the clothing and footwear output 
of the border areas was produced in Natal which had significant clothing 
factories at Charlestown in the Newcastle district. Inanda, Klipriver, 
Harnrnersdale and a footwear factory at P ietermaritzburg. The Cape 
contributed 22. 0 per cent of the output of this sector largely from 
clothing eetablishments in East London and two footwear firms in 
T<ing William's Town, one of which, however, closed down in 1963. 
P roduction in the basic metals sector took place exclusively 
in Natal, notably at Newcastle where the Mrican Metals Corporation 
plant i e situated, and at n ietermaritzburg where there is a large 
producer of aluminium products. In the metal productB secto:r:. Natal 
centres, of which the chief were Estcourt, Newcastle and Pietermaritz-
burg, together produced 68. 0 per cent of the border and Bantu areas output 
in 1959-60, the rest coming mainly from East London. 82. 7 per cent 
of the electrical machinery s ector' s output was also produced in 
Natal , owing largely to the presence in Jtietermaritzburg of an im-
portant producer of electrical cables, the bulk of the remaining output 
in all areas being due to electrical contractors. It appears then, that 
over three quarters of the metals and engineering capacity of the 
border and Bantu areas Wa.s located in Natal. 
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Apart from a large manufacturer of glass containers at Talana 
in the Dundee magisterial district, a cement factory in the Marico 
district of the Transvaal, and a limeworks at Taung in the Cape, 
output in the non-metallic mineral products s e ctors, which also was 
greatest in Natal. was s~nead evenly and consisted mainly of brickworks. 
Wood and wood product• were produced mainly in Natal and the 
T r ansvaal, but. while in the Transvaal moat of the plants were saw-
mUla producing building timbe~, mining timber, boxwood etc .• 1\.atal 
included a large hardboard n'lallufacturer at :estcourt. In the products 
of petroleum and coal sector, coal products were produced at Vryheid 
and Dundee in tho N orthern ~atal coalfields area.. Leather products 
included tanneries at King Williamta Town and Pietermaritzburg. 
·rhe country's largest rubber produc ts plant, excepting the tyre manu-
facturers who &re excluded from the figurea, waa situated. in the 
N atal border areas at Howick. 
The above description of the contents of border areas output 
in each industrial class. suggests strongly that, apart from clothing 
and textiles, the location of mo• t plants was ba•ed upon the availability 
of processable raw materials. Firms oriented to local markt!te were 
mainly those like brickworks, electrical contractors, bakers. sawmille, 
etc. which use fairly ubiquitous raw materiala. Foc.ci wac the pre-
dominant sector in all regions and in 1959-60 contributed 54. o. 48. 0 
and 45. 1 per cent of the gross manufacturing <>utput of the Gape, :t-;atal 
and combined 'I ransvaal-Crange Free State border areas respectively. 
T hough thia was characteristic of all provinces, ther e were some 
noteworthy differences in their manufacturing. Th e six largest 
sectors in eaeh of the r e gions a re H ated in order of importance below. 
Food 
Textiles 
Chemicals 
Clothing 
N on-metallic mineral 
products 
Metal products 
1\atal 
Food 
Pulp &: paper 
Bat1ic metals 
Clothing 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
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Transvaal and Orange 
Free State 
Food 
Wood prt>ducts 
Tobacco 
l\!on-metallic mineral 
products 
Chemicals 
Machinery (mainly 
agricultural) 
The six largest sectors represented thE: following proportions 
of total gross output in each region : Cape 84. 7. Natal 79. 5, and 
T ransvaal-Crange Free State 90. 6. It appears, then that manufac-
turing was least diversified in the Tranevaal-C. F . S. • and most . 
diversified in :r-; atal. Manufacturing in the 'I ransvaal abo appears 
to have been more heavily dependent on the presence of processable 
raw materials, for the first three sectors in this provirJ.ce. food, 
wood products (mainly sa.wmille) and tobacco, all of which arc materials 
oriented, produced about three quarters of total output, with the cem~t 
factory~ included in non-metallic mineral products, contributing a 
large proportion of the remainder. Locally found raw materials also 
played an important pa1·t w 1\.atal where food, pulp and paper and 
basic metals were the IT'ost important sectors, but as in the case of 
the Gape, clothing and textiles production abo contributt.d significantly, 
so that the dependence on local raw mate·riala was considerably less 
than in the Transvaal. The main locational factors which operated 
in r a cd and the Cape are discussed in more detail in the following sec-
tion. 
Locational factors in the Border Areas 
(a) l' atal Border Areas 
In a detailed study of industrial location in the Tugela Basin 
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of Natal, which includes a large part of manufacturing activity in the 
1'7atal border areas, .J. r. N ieuwenhuysen 1 shows clearly that moat of the 
significant manufacturing establishments in that area are oriented 
to raw materials. l Below is the list of industries studied. classified 
according to whether they were found by Nicuwenhuyaen to be oriented 
to materials, ma.rkets, labour, or to miscellaneous factors . 
l:o~laterials oriented 
H ilk factories 
M.eat processing factories 
Wood and cork, except processing 
Paper and paper products 
(hardboard) 
(;hemicals (carbide, acetic acid, 
Market oriented 
M in.eral v. aters 
Brick and tile factories 
Stone masonry 
Tub axle and eup grease and calcium 
and sodium aluconate 
acetylene gas, calciwn acetate General engineering 
and slaked lime) 
l'.on-metallic mineral products 
Coal by-products 
Pig-iron 
l.. etal products (iron stoves etc.) 
l .. abour oriented 
Co11fec.tionery 
Clothing 
Viscellaneous 
Textiles (cotton spinning. we.:~.ving & 
finishing, ar.d hosie ry) 
Brass emelting 
I::lectricity 
Nieuwenbuysen abo gives figures 3 showing the rcbtive in'l-
portance of these location:1l types in the Tugcla. Basin. and thes n are 
l'epr<>duced in table 15 below_,. As the table shows, raw materials 
1. The Indu~Jtrlalisation of the Tugela Basin, unpublished report for 
the :t-!atal To\''tl and Regional Planning Commi•aion. 
2. For a further description of this area and its industrial pot-.1ntialitics 
see 0. P . F Horwood and E . Thorrin~on-Smith,'' trhe Tugela Basin 
as a Future South African W etropolia; C'ptima, Decem.ber 1<)63. Also, 
a detailed unpublished study of a special aapect of the problem of loc-
ation in !'lata! has been made by R. V. Dee, A Study of the Influence of 
the Railway Rate Structure on the Location of Industry in 1'-.tatal, with 
!'articular Reference to the Tugela B~sin. r .... eport on the .Natal Railway 
I"ating Reeearch Fellowship, June 1958-March 1963. submitted to the 
1\atal Town and I"egional Planning Commission. 
1_ on_ cit__ table 2- n- 218 
l 
TABLE 15 
Relative importance of 'locational types' in the Tugela Basin: Gross output, etc. , 1958/9 
Raw material Market oriented Labour oriented Miscellaneous Total 
oriented 
Division 
Amount (R) PeT cent Amount (R) Per cent Amount (R) Per cent Amount (R) Per cent Amount (R) Per cent., 
or No. or No. or No . o .r No . or No. 
Gross output R 26,591,860 67.4 382, 510 0.9 2,893, 784 7.2 9. 744, 572 24. 6 39,612,72 6 100 . 1 
Materials and fuel used R 14, 751, 838 68 . 8 130,424 0 . 6 1. 824, 300 8. 5 4, 720, 914 22.0 21,427,476 99.9 
Nett output R 11,840,022 65. 3 212,096 1.1 1. 069, 484 5.9 5,023,658 28.7 18, 145, 260 100.0 
No. employed 10,858 57 . 0 1, 114 5. 8 2, 252 11. 6 5, 138 26. 5 19,362 99.9 
I 
* Rounded to f irst decimal point. 
Source: J.P. Nieuwenhuysen, The Industrialisation of the Tugela Basin, unpublished report for the Natal Town and Regional Planning 
Commission, p. 218. The figures were originally obtained from the Bureau of Census and Statistics, except for the numbers 
employed which were obtained in Nieuwenhuysen's survey of the Tugela Basin, March 1959. 
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oriented induetries in 1958/9 accounted for 65. 3 per cent of total net 
output and employed 57. 0 p~~ cent of all employees in the sample 
covered by Nieuwenhuysen.. The 'Miscellaneous t group was the 
next largest followed by the 'labour oriented' and 'market oriented' 
groups of firms. 
The material s or:. ~.mted firma a.s a whol e sold a large pro-
portion of their output outside the region and may be said to have 
consituted the manufacturing 'export ba.ae' of the rea. The prin-
cipal raw materials upon which theae industries were based were 
agricultural products in the case o! milk and meat processing fac -
toriea7 timber in the case of hardboard and pulp and paper~ and 
coal in the case of carbide, coal by-products, and pig-iron. Cul y 
two of these materials oriented firms used mainly semi-processed 
material inputs. namely. a chemicals firm at Ballengeich whose 
production was based on the carbide output of another firm in the area, 
a nd the firm producing iron stoves etc. at Ne'\vcastle which used loc-
ally manufactured ?ig-lron. Cne of the tmat~rials oriented' firms, 
the glass container producer at Talana in the Dundee di$trict, which 
was originally oriented to sand supplies in the area,. now obtains ita 
sand from Pretoria, a.Y>d provides an inata.nce 'of how a circumotance 
whic!l originally prompted location in a particula1· town c an d isappear, 
leaving some doubt as to whether a similar location would b~ -chosen 
if relocation was at all ptlS Si ble 1 • 1 
The ma:rket oriettted industries all sold their output chiefly· 
in the immediate local and regional markets, an~ with the x:ception 
of one firm- selling its output of tub a.'d~ and cup grease .. calcium 
and sodium gluconate primarily to the coal min.!s of Northern ~atal, 
all were in the nature of ubiquitous activities. 2 
Th industrh.s classified as labour orie nted. clothing and 
1.. :t~ieuwenhuysen, p . 18!. 
Z. See chapter Q of this 8tudy for a list of ubiquitous and ~·idely 
disperaed industries determined by calculation of localisat ion 
coeffic ients. 
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confectionery~ also sell over a wide area. Clothing production is, 
of course. a highly labour intensive activity and since tranaport 
costs arc an extremely small proportion of total coats, wage rates 
are an important <:onsideration. 1 'Undoubtedly the principal reaoon 
which influenced these three !actoriea to locate in the Tugela Basin 
was the lack of wage regulation machinery at the time of establiahment 
for the clothing industry in parts of the region' .. Z Nieuwenhuysen 
adds that 'available information indicates that wages paid in Durban 
at the time &four survey in 1')59 were 60 per cent higher on the average 
than thoae being paid by the factories,. such ae theae in th Tugela 
Baain, which were sit din uncont,-olled wage area•. The wages in 
Durban we;re in turn lower than thoee being paid on tb.e Rand'. 3 
That low wage rates have been the main cauae of the establishmc.:nt 
of these clothing factol."ies in the l\iatal border areas is beyond dispute. 
The governing factor dictati.lli the <:boice of Natal rather than aome 
ot..l-ter cheap labour area like the East Gape border aJ'eaa, however, 
as i:n the caee o£ the confectionery factory, was probably the doa..:r 
proximity of the Natal sites to the major markets. 
The induatrie• daslii!ied as 'mis cellaneous' in.clude spinning and 
weaving of cotton-rayon yarn.s. cotton yarn spinning nd finishing 
processes, and ladies hosiery manufacture. It is rather aurprising 
that uone of theae industriea has been classified a.• 'labou1· oric.-lted' 
h .. view of the importance of labour costs in theae industries and the 
rel~tive unim.portance of transport co~,tts. This is especially so 
smce wage rates in the textiles industry in these areas are much 
lower than in Durban or Jobannesbu1·g. due: to the gr~ater supply of 
t. See H . A .. F. Barker, The t;conomics of the ~:holesal~ ~lothing 
Industry in i>outh Africa 1907-57. for a detailed analysis of location 
iu the clothing industry. 
Z. Nieuwenhuysen, p. ZOO • 
.3$ ~ Alao aee H . A. F. Barker, Ch p. lO.and Chap. 7 of tbis study 
for a fuller disc:ussioc of regional wage differcutials and their 
affect on location. 
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Bantu labour. 
r-· ieuwenhuyaen points out that in all three cases transport 
costa would have been lower if the firma bad been located in Du.~ban. 
Unfortunately we do not know how significant is the transport coat 
diaadvantage of the Tugela Basin location ao that it is not poas.ible to 
determine whether this disadvantage was ofiaot by a labour coat 
saving in the locationfr choa~a. No assessment ia available of tho 
•elative importance and variab.Uity between regiona of trau.po:rt coats 
as against labour co.ts. Of the first firm~ hieuwenhuyaen say•~ 
•The reuona fo~ the plantta establishment at Ladysmith are partly 
hiatorical and are indeed partly obacured by the time which ba. elapaed 
aince the factory's inception.. Apparently it wa. the intention of the 
manufacturers, who took over an cld munition. factory, that Lady .... 
amith would aet u a vantage point from which both ' ee£ and Du~ban 
conswn-cr• could be economically served; moreover according to the 
firma management. establiahment waa in te:rnu~ of the G.roup•a policy 
of "de-central.ieatian of ~tivities t. n 
In the ca.e of the fi~ma situated at Mooi River and Eateourt, 
1Xieuwenl1uysen seems to attach some importance to encouragement 
received from the State to locate ill thoae areaa.. For instance.. he 
saye of the firm at Mooi Rive!': 'An important consideration may have 
been tbe encouragement received from the Department oi Commerce 
and Industries~ although this took no tangible or material form. but 
~apparently in accordance with the State's deaire to see industries 
oatabliahed outaide the existing urban and industrial concentrations••. 1 
Likewise. in the case of the firm at Estcourt, Nieuwenhuyaen atatee 
that the important influence deciding the specific centre in Natal ''waa 
eneouragement received from the State to .eettle in Estcourt in terms. 
of the decentralisation policy•. l But the force of thes-e aasertlona is 
1. op .. cit., p- Z01. 
z.. op. eit., P• 209. 
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considerably weakened when h e adds that 'this encouragement did not 
take aay material form by the way of special inducements it seems. 
and itia therefore difficult to see bow purely verbal encouragement 
can influence auch a decision unless that encouragement takes the 
form of a promise to provide future protection and care for the factory'. 1 
If. indeed. two firms. aa significant aa those at Mooi RiveJ' 
and Eeteourt. were intluenced in theu choice of loe.ation simply by 
~me friendly perauasi'V'e wor<la from the Government, it would seem 
that the location of textiles firms, at leaat, ia rather more arbitrary 
than ia commonly supposed... lt would imply that in the caae of a 
fairly significant proportion of industry direct controls by the govern• 
ment would have hardly any adverse effect on efficieru:y an.t tha.t the 
actual selection from among a number of more or less equally profit• 
able locations is determined very largely by non-profit conai4eratioiUJ. 
Thlarnay, in fact, be so~ but since. a• Nieuwenhuyeen point• out. 
tranaport cost• would have been lower at Durban in the case of these 
two firma. a labour cost saving at Mooi River and E stcourt, compared 
with Durban• ia implied. Basically, the~ it must surely have been 
the lower labou"J" costs in the border a2"E:a.a which made location at 
Mooi River and EatcoUl"t possible, even i! on balance~ taking t-zansport 
coats into account. Durban or Johannesburg may have been e qually 
profitable.. It seems to giv~ a truer impres•ion, therefore. if theae 
two firms are labelled 'la'boUl" oriented1 • Nieuwonhuysen'a scepti-cism 
about the efiectivenesa of moral e-ncouragement alone seem& to be well 
justified, though we cannot discount the poasibUity that ina:ome par• 
tieular cases. the government, mer--ely by bringing to the a tt-ention of 
a f ira advantages of a certain location, which they might otherwise 
have overlooked. may influence loeational deeiaiona. 
(b) Gal!£ Border Areas 
The Cape. bo~der area.• a a we noted above contributed eome 
1. op. cit. • p. Z09. 
1Z4 
Z2. 6 per cent of the total gross output of manufacturing industry 
in the border and Bantu areas in 1959-60. The largest manufac-
turing centres 1 in. the Cape border areas were, in order o! importance, 
East Lcndon, King william•s Town, Vryburg, Que.enstown.t Mafeking 
and Mount Currie, the combined proportionate contribution of which 
was 90. 1 per cent in 1956 ... 57. The three Ciakei areas alone pl'oduced 
three quarter• of the Cape t • total. In view of the predominance of 
Ea•t London, the locatio.nal fo.-cea operating in this centre are of 
apecialintereet and will be discuaused in som.e detail below. 
It appear• that manufacturing in the Cape border area• as a 
whole was leas markedly oriented to locally obtainable .raw materiale 
than was industry in Natal or the Transva.al. This ia due mainly to 
the influence of East London and King vC. Uliam"s 'l'own where.owing 
te the lack of proccaaable raw ma.torial&, other loeational factor& 
have been much more important. 
The main components of East London manufacturing indwltry 
may be summarised as follows: Aa in all border areas <:entros, the 
food sector was easily the largeat. representing 46. 3 per cent of 
gross output in 1959-60. It includes one of the largest confectionery 
firma in South Africa. whose material inputs come primarily from 
Natal (sugar) and overaeaa, and the signilicant pineapple <:anning 
industry, which obtain• ita raw Inaterials. from the surrounding area • 
.Much of the rest of thia aector consiats of bakeries, dairy products, 
flour and grain mills, animal feeds etc.~ which are essentially orienteo 
to local and regional market&, and do not constitute part of the manu-
facturing 'export baaet of the area. The textiles and chemicals sectors, 
neither of whieh in thia area is based upon local raw ma.terlala, were 
respe-ctively second and third largest. and in 1959-60 together accounted 
for 28.7 per cent of the tatal gross output of manufacturing induetry. 
1. Which reapectively contributed 534 0, 8 . o~ 1. 1, 3 .. 6. and 3. 4 per 
cent of gross output in the Cape border areas. 
TABLE 16 
Principal statistics of manufacturing industry in East London by major group 1956/7 and 1959/60 
Industry Establishments Gross output f Net output Number employed Salaries and wages 
R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO 
-
Class 
----
1956/7 1959/ 60 1956/7 1959/60 1956[7 1959/60 1956}] 1959/60 1956/7 1959/60 
1 . Food 28 23 11,204 13,598 3,506 4,560 3,865 3, 742 1, 714 2,172 
2. Beverages 2 3 .. . . . . .. . . .. . . .. 
3. Tobacco w 
" 
.. 
w 
-
w w ~ 
- -
4. Textiles 5 5 5,500 5,878 3,070 3,528 2,097 1,934 1,224 1,270 
5. Footwear and clothing 14 18 354 458 154 110 183 199 98 108 
6. Wood and cork 12 14 586 662 198 252 184 209 126 154 
7 . F urniture 7 6 610 664 314 350 253 266 210 214 
8. Paper and paper products 3 3 .. .. .. .. . . . . .. . . 
9. Printing and allied industrie!' 5 6 522 858 550 630 224 247 330 ' 394 
10. Leather a nd leather products 2 
-
. . 
-
.. 
-
.. - .. 
-
11. Rubber products 
-
-
-
- - - - - -
-
12. Chemicals 13 12 6,324 2,550 3,208 1,202 842 592 564 424 
13. Products of petroleum and coal 1 1 .. .. .. . . . . .. . . . . 
14. Non-meta llic mineral products 15 13 602 456 360 266 515 418 210 202 
15. Basic metal industries 
- - - - - - - - - -
16. Metal products 11 11 1, 446 1,202 1,000 622 476 497 376 418 
17. Machinery 5 3 950 .. 292 .. 268 .. 184 .. 
18. Electrical machinery 9' 16 284 398 168 206 143 156 120 136 
19. Transport equipment . 2 2 .. . . .. , .. .. .. I o .. 
20. Miscellaneous industries 7 9 94 110 66 78 76 74 46 48 
21 . Personal services 7 10 300 312 246 242 333 345 140 144 
Unallocated residual 
- -
638 2,210 328 848 294 734 172 500 
Total 158 155 . 14, 707 29,356 13,460 12,894 9,753 9,413 5, 514 I ~. 184 
Source : Unpublished informatiqn kindly made available by the Bureau of Statistics. • . Denotes less t;han four firms in group, hence 
figures not publishable. 
. 
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Textiles production eonaieted to a conaiderable extent of blankets 
and women's hosiery, and chemicals of aoaps, candles, and phar ... 
maceutical•. Chemi~ab output was much higher in 1956.-7 than in 
1959-60. owing poasibly to the tr~sfer of a large producer to Durban 
following a serious fire in the fum's plant. Metal products consisted 
mainly of general and construction engineering. which are essentially 
oriented to local requirements, though windmills and farm implements 
were sold in other parts of the country. Not included in the above 
figures are a motor aeaembly plant. which used chiefly imported components, 
and one of the country' a lazgeat manufacturers of motor vehicle be.tteriea 
and other electrical storage equipmen~ both of which sell their output 
nationally. There wae also a furninue manufacturer of fairly sub-
atantial size apparently oJ"iented to local and regional marketa. 
What then are the factors which have induced firms to establish 
themselves in the area? A •tudy of the area published in 1960 eon-
tai118 the following comment: 1 
"In the ca•e of certain industries .. particularly those in Group 1 
(food) the reason why Eaet London waa chosen was the au.pply oi 
raw materials, the clearest example of this being pineapple 
canneries. Other firma stated that loc:.ation at one of the porta 
was essential, because they uaed imported raw material• or semi-
proeeaaed gooda from abroad, or becauae their machinery. which 
waa heavy and bulky, came from overseas. Pressed further for 
reasons for the aelection of Eaat Londo» in preference to one of 
the other porte they offered a variety of answers. East London 
wae held to be centrally situated with a direct line from the Orange 
Free State and the Traaavaal, and to have the advantage over 
P ort Elizabeth and Durban of being induatrially lese developed. 
1. D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Devel9pme.nt in a Plural Society, 
pp. 148 .. 9. 
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Mit was therefore easier to aeeure a factory site with satisfactory 
l"ailway aiding facilities. and other amenities. In some caaea it waa 
stated that the local authorities at East London appeared to be more 
accommodating than elsewhere. 
n The proximity to markets was the reason given for the location 
of some factories at both Eut London and King William•• Town. 
particularly where the .Bantu were large consume,.-s. The manu-
facture of blankets and oi the cheaper types of sweets a:re. instanc es 
of this. In some ca.ses the industrial development has been under• 
taken by persons with long trading connections with the 1\ative 
Territoriea:. 
'
10ther firms atated, u¥ctting the attractions of Ea&t London, 
that owing to the proximity to the Native reserves they expected a.n 
abundant supply of Native labour, but :most of those which placed 
labour among the reasons for coming to East London found their 
expectations unfulfilled, complaining not so much of the quantity 
but of the quality of the labour available". 
It is clear from this passage that the availability of raw mat• 
eriala in the immediate area was of relatively little importance ae a 
locational factor among the firm• in Ea.t London in 1959-60. Where 
the availability of matedals bad played a part. this waa u.ually be• 
cause. being a port. it was in. a convenient position for assembling 
imported raw materials or semi-prcx:essed goods from abroad or 
from other South African port•, and iu the ease of produ..:ts with a 
national market it bad been a .W.table centrally situated distribution 
point. In auch cases. however, it was diatributien. coats which had 
been the primary consideration. rather than the use of imported 
materials. since from the latter point of view any one of the other 
major ports would have been as suitable. 
It appear& from replies received in a queetionnaire survey 
carried out by the writer in 1961, and from discWJsiona with East 
London tnanufacturers, that: the replacement of imported by South 
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African made materials and aemi-procesaed goOfk is having an ad.-
verae efiect on the area. One firm stated that it bad established 
in East London becauae of easy acceas to raw materials. but added 
that 'the latter has now assumed less significance as very little i-s 
i~rtctd. s.o that the Ree£1 would be the logieal place to manufacture 
a• [a large percentage o[/ our market ie in the northff. Another 
firm r emarked that the 'original owner lived here and started a amall 
fa.ctory..... Raw tnaterials were largely imported. eo the situation 
at a port waa :favourable in thai respect. O riginally this factory 
z . 
a e rvcd cnly Border and Eaatern Cape arc-as•.. Th~ firm went on. 
however. to say that 'in present day conditions this would be better 
situat•d near its la.rgeat market viz.. • the Reef'. ln addition it is 
obvious that eurrent developments in~e motor vehicle industry, with 
the rapid development of the local manufacture of parts, mUBt be W07king 
t() the disadvantage of the motor assembly plant in East London, aince 
mo•t of the n-ew motor vehicle component manufacturet"S are beins 
established in Port E lizabeth where the biggest asae.mbly pl•nts are 
lcx:atedt or in the Southern Tranavaal. With the aubstitutjon of South 
African for imported steel, too. engineering firms established at 
East London were finding it increasingly difficult to co.mpete in inland 
markets, and ono firm in this field stated that it had originally ehoeen 
East London 'as a progressive centre from which to export finished 
products and all materials had to be imported'~ but that 'in r e cent 
y ears the poaition hac altered materially and the policy of the a uthorities 
to allow all induatry to be located in the Transvaal without any national 
planniug, baa 80 crippled industry at the coast that a company such 
a• ours ••• muat be near the market' .. 
Essentially the disadvantage of East London. which ha s been 
cau!Jed or intensified by the subatitution of local for importe d materials, 
l. A colloquialiam for W itwaterarand. 
2. The 'Border areal in this -case is the name for E ast London'• 
immediate hinterland. 
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is that vetty often materials have to be obtained from the north and 
railed back there again in the form ef finished products.. Thus there 
ia a considerable amount of 1baekhaul1 which teducee the firm's 
.competitive ability in the north, or if it abaorbs the•e tranaport 
costs, reduces its profits. The problem is intensified by the fact 
that railway ratea on finished products are considerably higher than 
on raw materials. 
A striking feature of the replies received from firms res· 
ponding to the wrlt·er's questionna.iresJ is th-e number of .firma stating 
that if it wette possible they would now establish their plants in another 
pa.rt of the country. In addition to the cases quoted above, where 
diffil::ulty aeems to have been cau•ed to some extent by the growing WJe 
of South African material inputs, another firm said: 'Choice T of 
East London I has not been justified.. It would have been better had 
the factory beim set up on the r_ee£ or in the Free State, closer to the 
raw znaterials and larger markets. As a result of the potential in-
duatries not developing in East London as had been hoped our par-
ticular induatry did not expand as ploume d. ' In this case it aeems 
that it was simply a miscalculation of the growth potential of East 
Lon~ which has frustrated the expansion plana of the firm. In 
yet another in.Btance, the location of an E ast London firm appears to 
have been unduly infiuenced by the fact that land plus a factory building 
was immediately available and that it could commence manufacture 
sooner than if located elsewhere. This plant was apparently wrongly 
located from the start and ita existence in E ast London can only be 
put down to a. locational error, since most of it& output is sold in the 
north and the bulk of its materials are obtained from the 'l"ransvaal 
and Natal. 
In two instances in particular. buaine &SdS were established 
aa nnall family eonce rne s.ome years ago. While aalea we re con-
fined to the itnmediate regional market there was of courB~ no real 
difficulty. but with the growth in the size of these plante. they have had 
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increatJingly to look to the north for market& in order to enable them 
to expand. As the proportion of aales going to the Transvaal has 
increased these firma ha'\Te found themselves to be at a disadvantage 
compared with competitors situated in the Transvaal or hatal. One 
firm said that as a reault it was considering the eatabUabment of a 
branch plant in the Southern Transvaal once its preaent plant is em-
ployed to full c•paeity, Jn order to overcome this difficulty. 
It is generally thought that one of the chief advantages of East 
London as a site for industry is that, situated as it is, doae to 
large Native reserves, it enjoys an abundant supply of cheap Native 
labour. One might., therei(Jre, expect that this would have attracted 
some firma to the area, and. in .fact,. in reply to the queationnaire, 
several firms did say that lattour had been a consideration of particular 
importance. A close examination of these individual cases. however. 
suggesu that labour bas played a relatively amall part in inducing 
firm~e establish in the area. 
One firm atatee that it came to East Landon to be nearer the 
~ative F eserves, bearing in mind the. labour troubles on the W itwaters-
.rand prior to 1919. This firm, howevar, is in an industry which, 
by the -very nature of its prod~ct must be oriented to its chief mal"ket. 
1n this case the market is primarily the Ciakei and Tranakei, which 
would have been extremely difficult to serve from any other location 
in view of the importance of transport eosts. Indeed. the firm it .. 
self mentioned as one of ita advantag~• the absence of competition 
in the al"ea and the growing importance of the Tranakei market. 
Markets therefore appear to be the primAry justification for the firm's 
continued existence in the area.. Another f'irm states that 'a.vaUabUity 
of cheap labour was estumtialr,. but in this instance too it appears that 
the central situation of East London and easy access to imported mat-
erials. was the original reason for establishing here, and that cheap 
labour ia simply an incidental advantage which, now that the area has 
becon1e lesa favourable in those respects, fortunately tenda to offset 
in part the diaadvantage it faces en account of high transport coate. 
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It is rather surprising that in the only cases in which labour 
was mentioned as the primary consideration in selecting East London, 
and in which labour does in fact appear to have been important, owing 
to the lightness of materials and product and the importance of labour 
costs, it was white female labour and not black labour that was specifi-
cally referred to. It is interesting to note that in 1960 in East London 
and King William's Town manufacturing industry together ,31. 3 per cent of 
the white employees were females whereas in P ort Elizabeth/Uitenhage 
the corresponding figure was only 2.3. 2 per cent and in Johannesburg 
1 
only 26. 3 per cent. Apart from the two firms which specifically men-
tioned white female labour as an important location factor a couple of 
other large firms also had labour forces made up to a large extent of this 
sort of labour. While this may partly be accounted for by the generally 
light nature of manufacturing activity in the area, it is noteworthy that, 
as is shown in chapter 5, the average earnings of female production work-
ers were considerably lower in East London than in other parts of the 
country, and this may possibly be due to the absence of alternative 
employment opportunities in the area. It is also interesting that in 
1960. in the age grou? 20 to 34 the male/female ratio a mongst the 
white population of East London (1.1. 89: 1) was considerably lower 
than in Port Elizabeth (0. 98:1) and lower still than in Johannesburg, 
whereas in the 0 to 19 age g:r..ou'!;) it was considerably higher, having 
been 1. 09:1 in East London compared with 1. 03:1 in :!'ort Elizabeth 
and 1. OZ: 1 in Johannesburg. A pos~ible explanation of this i s that, 
owing to the slow rate at which industry in the area is growing, white 
males upon reaching working age have tended to migrate to larger 
and more dynamic centres elsewhere in the country. 
The relative importance of the textiles sector in East 
London may seem to suggest that these firms have been attracted 
to the area by cheap labour, since wages are an especially significant 
1. .Population Census, 1960, Sample Tabulation, No. 1, pp. 8, 11, and 17. 
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factor in thi• industry. while transport costs tend to be relatively 
low and do not differ markedly between one location and another. 
Unfortunately it has not been possible to obtain adequate statistical 
information from this sector. However. it is known that blanket 
manufacture represents a large proportion of textiles output in the 
area, and, aince. in this branch of the industry there is an Industrial 
Council Agreement which has nation-wide application ,it seems unlikely 
that wage rates as such could have been the main reason for locating 
in East London. Though an East London site may poa.aibly confer 
certain labour advantages, such as greater stability, it seems more 
probable that the principal reaaon for blanket manufacturing being located 
in E ast London is the proximity of the Native Reserve•, which at one 
time, at least, absorbed a significant proportion of the output. 
Since the type of blanket sold in the Transkei is of rather low quality. 
transport costs in relation to value of product are probably heavy 
compared with other sectors of the textiles industry, and a firm 
selling largely in the Native Reserves would, therefore. tend to be 
attracted to a site like East London. 
In a branch of textiles such as women's hosiery, an important 
one in East London, transport costs are an extremely small pro-
portion of total selling price, and are an insignificant consideration 
in the choice of location. This is especially so since the market for 
this product is widely spread through the country, and the relative 
insignificance of transport costs in the industry is e mphasised by 
the extensive use made of passenger rail services and even air trans-
port. A recent Wage Board report on the industry shows that the 
wage levels in Ea.st London are virtually on a par with those in the 
V. est Cape and are considerably higher than at Estcourt or Parys. 
The report states that tin the evidence before the Board, complaints 
• 
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of unfair competition from the ru.ral factories at Estcourt and 
particulady P arys were uttered by the producers in .E.ast London 
and Cape Town. The firm in E ast London employs mainly Euro• 
peans at relatively high wages. and the factories in Gape Town 
have chiefly coloured employees~ are subject to an industrial 
council agreement based on the one for the clothing industry and 
hence also pay relatively high wages'. 1 As the Board points out 
'the· composition of the employees labour force has a marked in-
fluence on the wage differentials between occupations aa well as 
between areas'. 2 Thus differences in wage rates may, at least 
in part. be offset by differences in productivity. but it does seem 
that labour coats as such could not have been an important consider-
ation in the location of this firm in East London. 
According to this \\age Board Report the labour force of the 
East London factory in Auguat 1962 was made up as follows: whites 
228 (males 77, females 151), coloureds 34, Asiatics 14, and Natives 
34, aU employees in the latter three l'acial groups being male s. 
It is clear therefore that the abundance of l\ative Labour in the 
a. rea could not have been responsible for the !irm' s location in 
E ast London.. If labeur supply played a part at all in this. decision, 
it rnuat have been due to the avaiJability of white females, in view of 
the apparently large supply of this type of labour in the area. It 
should be noted too, that the proportion of whites in the labour force 
and especially white females was probably higher a few years ago 
than it was in 1962~ since the switch from full fashton to seamless 
stockings has involved the introduction of a different type of production 
p r ocess which requires less highly skilled labour. and as a result 
non-whites, especially coloured and Indians. have come to replace 
white females. T he c e ntral situation of the city relative to the nat-
ion~! market probably also played a part in deciding upon this location. 
I . Wage Board F.eport on the Industry for the Manufacture of Ladies 
Stockings - Certain areas, dated 21st February. 1963, p. 7. 
2. op. cit. , p. 13. 
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The hosiery industry, with ita multi-form. type of market, very 
low transport costs, and relatively high labour costs is one that 
is very free to choose among a large number of alternative locations 
provided there ia an adequate supply of labour. Theae characteristics 
together with the fact that the main raw material, nylo~ is still 
largely imported, makes it a type of industry which can very easily 
be induced to go to a location in the Cape border areas, or in any 
other border area for that matter. A centre like Eut London, 
however, may have something of an. advantage over other border 
areas in the case of an industry of this sort, aince apart from other 
advantages, it offers living conditions which appeal to white executives 
and skilled employees. 
So far as Bantu labour is concerned, it is true that there is 
an abundant supply of unskilled workers. and, in fact, that an acute 
unemployment problem exists in East London.. But, in the past, 
Bantu wages have not been significantly lower than in th~ four major 
industrial areas of the country. This fact, which is supported by 
statistics in chapter 7 , is partly due to wage determinations under 
the Wage Aet and Industrial Council Agreements which have tended 
to reduce regional wage differences below those which would have 
prevailed in the absence of statutory wage fixing. For example, 
when the industrial council for the clothing industry in the Eastern 
Cape obtained jurisdiction over the Eaat London area, a wage was 
set which was only 5 per cent lower than in PoJ't Elizabeth, and aa 
a result the East London clothing industry suffered a severe set-
back. The view was also expressed to the writer that during wage 
board investigation& into certain other industries. East London 
en1ploye:ra have often appeared to be unduly ready to accept xr..inimum 
wages virtually on a par with thoae in Port Eli~beth. Thus Eaat 
London's advantage in respect o£ unskilled labour has not been fully 
reflected in correspondingly low wages. In recent years, however. 
the Wage Board haa, as a matter of policy, tended to fix wagea in 
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East London which are relatively lower compared with the main 
industrial areas than they used to be. Wage determinations usually 
apply only to the East London municipal area, so that wage rates out· 
side this area, but nevertheless in the Ea.at London magisterial district, 
tend to be considerably lower. Thus as the statistics in chapter 7 
show, significant difference& in wage rate& may exiat between polnts 
cnly a short dista11ce apart. The view has been expressed that the 
Xho.sa of the Cis~ei and Transkei show lees aptitude for industrial 
work than Dantu in somejother parts of the country. It is known, in 
fact. that at one time an E:aat London firrn brought down a. number of 
Zulu workers from ~atal for this reason. 
A striking characteristic of the tnanufacturing structure of 
East Lotldon, was the absence of any significant linkage between firms in 
the area.. This contrasts with the close interdependence between 
motor assemblers, their suppliers and in turn the lattel"'s suppliers 
in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area, between the metals and eng• 
ineering establishments of the Southern TTa.nsvaal, and between 
various chemicals producers in Durban. The bulk of East London's 
manufacturing output was sold in consumer markets. Very little of 
this output consisted of manufa~tured inh:.rme di.ate goods, apart from 
general ongineering and maintenance services, the supply of a relative-
ly small quantity of batteries to the motor aasembly plant, and the 
production of metal containers for the canning industry. '!'here is at 
preeent no 'n1.aster industry' in East London of sufficient size to attract 
satellite suppliers. As Hirschman has shown? before the establishment 
of intermediate goods producers can be stimulated through backward 
linkage, the demand for these goods must :reach a certain critical lev~!. 1 
1. A. 0 Hirsclunan, '!tJe Strategy of E conomic Development, N ew 
Haven, Yale tmiversity F ress, 1960. 
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There is, for instance, a motor assembly plant in the area, but it is 
too small to have exercised any significant pull on suppliers of com-
ponent parts, with the result that the latter have concentrated in .Port 
Elizabeth. 
Since the area seemed unlikely to attract any large establish-
ments oriented to materials or market it was apparently becoming 
necessary to look mainly to labour oriented activities. The only 
industry which seemed capable of providing the necessary stimulus 
to development in East London was textiles, and a sufficient concen-
tration of textiles firms in the area could lead to suppliers of textile 
chemicals, synthetic fibres etc., being established. as well as textiles 
users such as knitting mills, clothing manufacturers etc. 
Furthermore, the fewer the inter-industry linkages in an area, 
the weaker is the hold of the area on any particular manufacturing 
activity, since pecuniary economies 1 a.re weak. E ven without strong 
inter-industry ties, however, a firm may find it uneconomic to change 
its location if conditions become unfavourable, since heavy past invest-
ment takes a considerable time to wear out or become obsolete, and 
in any case a firm cannot allow its plant and equipment to run down 
while it is still in operation. The Port Elizabeth motor industry is a 
case in point because, as a result of the maTkedly changed distribution 
of population and purchasing power since the major moto1· assemblers 
were established there, and the increased use of South African com-
ponents in locally assembled vehicles, the Witwaters rand would clearly 
be the area chosen if it were possible to disregard paEtt investment. 
The existence of pecuniary external economies. however. makes re-
location even more difficult. The relocation of "'"loly-Resin after the 
firm plant was destroyed by fire was made easier by the unimportance 
of paints and other chemicals producers in East London. The apparent 
1. See T. Scitovaky, "Two Concepts of External Economies", The 
Journal of ~~olitical Economy , April 1954. 
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dissatisfaction of several firms with East London as a location for 
their plants and the generally precarious hold that the area has on 
them, may in part at least be a reflection on the relative unimportance 
of linkage between manufacturing concerns in the area. 
In King "William's Town, too. the largest firms al"e not based 
on local raw materials, and textiles, shoe manufacture and tanning 
contribute a very large proportion of this centre 1 s gross manufacturing 
output. The largest firm in the area and probably one of the largest 
plants of its kind in the country, Good Hope Textiles. has a labour 
force consisting prominantly of Bantu. Since there is no wage deter-
mination or Industrial Council Agreement in this indwstry. the great 
abundance of Bantu labour in the area is reflected in low wage rates, 
and this was undoubtedly the main economic reason for the establish-
ment of the plant in King '\l illiam's Town. Good Hope Textiles was 
one of the first deliberate attempts on the part of the government, 
through the Industrial Development Corportion. to establish an ind"U.atry 
on the fringe of a Bantu area. The reasons for selecting this site are 
stated by the General Manager of the Industrial Development Corpor-
aticm as follows; 
11Cne of our principles is the encouragement of the decentralisation 
of industry. a policy which we have always actively followed. f\.n 
example is the Good Hope Textile Mill at King w illiam's Town, 
established in 1945 in collaboration with the Calico Printers 
Association. i<".ing \\ illiam's Town, •• • is a relatively small 
town situated on the border of the Ciskeian .dantu Reserve some 
~0 miles inland from the Indian Ccean. This :region was recognised 
as a particularly impoverished area with little regular employment 
for its indigenous people. It was a social experiment on a grand 
scale, aimed at providing employment for the non-white community 
in the area. We have in mind, too. that decentralisation would 
lessen the pressure for services and housing in the congested areas 
of the main urban centres. It ls an experiment which has worked. 
although the growth period has been long it has been steady and we 
now have a thriving industry employing some 3, 000 Bantu, and a 
community with a growing industrial and western background.'' 
(Industrial Development in South Africa, address given to the South 
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Africa Club at the Savoy Hotel, London, on 26th June 1962). 
The cotton textiles industry is often regarded as 'footloose', 
but when competition is keen as it is today. the industry is footloose 
only in the sense that it can choose between a number of alternative 
cheap labour areas. In a highly competitive textiles industry it is 
imperative, as is illustrated by locational tendencies in the United 
States and India, for a cheap labour area to be selected. It is true, 
however, that there may have been other cheap labour areas in the 
country which would have been preferable because of their superior 
situation inrelation to markets and coal supplies, and this is the chief 
disadvantage of the Ciskei in comparison with the Natal border areas. 
The other two most important industries in King William's 
Town were footwear and tanning. However, in 1963 one of these foot-
wear firms closed down, and it was stated in the annual report of the 
tannery that 'the geographical handicaps are great and the cost of 
railage of the company's raw material and finished product, occurring at 
about 5 per cent of the J;lnnua.l turnover, are such that tanning can never 
be as profitable in this area ae it would be at any point clos e to the Wit-
watersrand. Cape 1~own or Durban'. 1 
Concluding R emarks 
At the opening of the 1960's. when the P ermanent Committee 
for the Location of Industry and the Development of Border Areas came 
into existence, about four fifths of the country's output and employment 
in manufacturing industry was concentrated in the four major industrial 
areas. There had in fact been virtually no change in the overall degree 
of regional concentration for a period of some twenty five years. This 
was so despite marked changes in the composition of manufacturing 
output,. the rapidly increasing relative importance of intermediate goods 
1. ~oted by C. Verburgh in South African Tl"ansportation P olicy, 
(Bureau of Economic R esearch, Unive?sity of Stellenbosch, 1961), p . 87. 
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production since the Second World War, a steady proportionate decrease 
in the use o! imported materials, and the increasing contribution of 
industrial pToducts to the C()Unb·y•s total exports. Trends in certain 
industries , namely, textiles , pulp and paper, petroleum and coal products, 
wood ~roducts , and clothing had tended to reduce the proportion of industry 
in the main industrial areas, but this tendency had been offset by develop-
ments in motor vehicle manufacture, chemicals, metals and engineering 
and food. 
It a.ppears from the statistics presented above th at the borde:i' areas 
made slightly faster industrial prog:ress than the country as a whole in the 
late 'fiftieFJ . due largely to developments in pulp and paper, textiles, food, 
clothing and chemicals . Food, however, still contributed the largest 
part of the increase in border areas output. 
The distribution of border areas ovtput between provinces 
was anything but even. Natal contributed by fa:z the la1·gest share of the 
total manufacturing activity of the bordei' areas, and also achieved the 
most rapid rate of growth, with the production of pulp and paper., basic 
metals r chemicals and food p:i:'oducts playing a prominent part. The 
rate of growth in the Cape border areas was much slower aud, generally, 
the prospects for rapid growth in these areas appeared to be much less 
promising than for Natal. As our discussion of locational factors in the 
Natal and Cape border areas shows, the f'lrmer are in a considerably 
more favourable po5ition to attl·ac t industry_ both because they al·e better 
endowed with processable raw materials and because of their more ad-
vantageOl:lS position in relation to the countr y's majol" markets and export 
markets. The Tugel a Basin region of Natal in particular appears to 
have especially good long r ·un potential for industrialisation. 1 
But the general locational influences which wer e operating in 
1. See for instance, T . J.D. Fair and L . P . Green, Development of the 
"Bantu Homelands", Optima, March 1962; and C'. 71 • :F'. Horwood and E. 
Thorrington Smith "The Tugela Basin a& a Future South African 
Metropolis"s Optima, December 1963. 
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1960 did not seem to suggest any immediate prospect of significant industrial 
decentralisation in the absense of Government intervention. Indeed, as 
we have noted, the Schumann Committee 1 believed it "practically certain 
that due to the agglomeration advantages of the existing industrial areas, 
the present tendency to centralise will continue unless positive steps 
are taken to promote sound. economic decentralisation". nerhaps this 
statement is a trifle too dogmatic. There may well be certain forces 
tending to induce a larger proportion of manufacturing industry to estab-
lish itself quite spontaneously in the smaller centres. In particular, due 
to the decline of gold mining which is inevitable unless there is a marked 
increase in the price of gold, the development of the Witwatersrand may 
lose momentum and so make for a greater dispersal of industry in future. tnere 
But the fact remains that /did not seem to be any reason to expect a 
subs tantial, rapid change in the locational pattern without intervention. 
The above, then, was the situation which confronted the 
P ermanent Committee when it was establiRhed in June 1960. B asically 
its task w a s to influence indus trialists to establish their plants outside 
the largel' industrial areas , in particular in the border areas. Bearing 
in mind our findings in this and the previous chapter , we shall in the 
rest of this study focus our attention mainly on the implications of 
Government intervention in the location oi industry, whether by means 
of positive inducements or industrial licensing. 
1. op. cit. , p. 73. 
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Chapter 5 
THE ECONOMIC CASE 
FOR INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION. 
One view of schemes for State aided industrial decentralisation 
is that they can if necessary, be justified solely on economic grour1ds. 1 
This view implies that it is possible for the government, by intervening 
in the process of industrial location to iinprove upon the allocative 
efficiency of the market mechanism and increase the country's rate of 
economic growth. Others contend that, though the benefits of industl"ial 
decentralisation may in the first instance be social or political rather 
than economic, government intervention designed to secure these 
benefits will not cause any long run economic harm. 2 Yet another view 
is that the objectives of decentralisation policy are predominantly social. 
that it will be necessary to sacrifice material wealth if these are to be 
achieved, and that the country will and should accept this. 
In this chapter attention is focussed on the question whether the 
case for South Africa 1 S policy of industrial decentralisation can be 
sustained by economic considerations alone. While, as the discussion 
of chapter 1 above has already indicated, the policy's ai.-ns are evidently 
mainly political, the answer to this question is crucial if we are to throw 
light on the probable economic consequences of intervention, \Vhatever 
1. See for instance the particularly forceful statement of this position 
by W. A. Lewis, The Principles of Economic Planning, Public 
Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1951, p. 78. 
2. Sec R eport of the Commission of Inquiry into Policy Relating to the 
Protection of Industries, U. G. 36/1958, para 454. While stressing 
the social disadvantages of concentration the Commission recommends 
intervention "as long as these do not involve uneconomic considerations". 
Though the term "uneconomic" is not entirely unambiguous, the state-
ment seems to imply that a significant degree of State induced decen-
tralisation could be achieved without any adverse effect on economic 
effie iency and gt-owth. 
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the motives may be. The desirability, indeed the inevitability of 
continued industrial growth in the border areas is not in dispute. Our 
concern is with the economic consequences of the State intervening to 
divert industries from the larger industrial areas to other areas pre-
ferred by the Government, when the former would have been selected 
in the absence of Government intervention. 1 Only if these issues are 
clearly understood will it be possible to formulate a rational policy of 
industrial decentralisation. 
As 1'rofessor Arthur L ewis has observed, "the case against 
the market economy i s not that it does not tend to promote the social 
good. The dispute is whether state control could not do better, either 
as an alternative . or as a supplement". 2 It is important to note that 
this is not a matter of contrasting the results produced by "unfettered" 
free enterprise with those of a system in which the state plays a part. 
Obviously the market mechanism is always subject to the constraints 
of a particular legal and institutional framework and there is no such 
thing as a "pure" laissez faire system. In the context of this study, 
the real issue is whether the market mechanism operating within an 
institutional framework which includes special features like the P ermanent 
Committee, the P hysical P lanning and Utilization of Resources A ct, 3 
the powers associated with each and the way in which they are applied, will 
give a better allocation of resources, than a market mechanism operating 
in an institutional f r amework which is the same, except that it is devoid 
of the special featur-es mentioned. 
1. This is the sense in which the terms 'divert' and 'diversion' are 
used in the rest of this s tudy. As alternatives to the phrase 'divert 
industries to the border areas' we shall also use 'induce industrial 
production in the border areas' and similar phrases. The essence 
of industries 'diverted to' or 'induced to establish in' the border 
areas is that they would have chosen some other location in the 
absence of government intervention. 
2. op. cit. , p. 8. 
3. No. 88 of 196 7. See chapter 9. 
Lewis, for one, clearly believes that state control in the 
sphere of industrial location can improve upon the performance 
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of the market, for he says: 11 The truth is that the market mechanism, 
acting through prices, is wholly incompetent to procure the correct 
location of industry". 1 Despite its apparent forthrightness, it is not 
clear whether this statement means (l) that the market mechanism 
does not perform its functions properly or (2) that while it performs 
its functions properly the results produced by the functioning of the 
market are undesirable in themselves. 2 
The primary functions of the market are to solve all the 
economic problems of allocation of scarce means between alternative 
ends and to provide incentives to economic growth. If the market is 
functioning properly, then it tends 11to stimulate both economic efficiency 
and economic growth11 • 3 The view that the market does not perform 
its functions properly, therefore, implies that, by adding· measures 
for state control, both economic efficiency and economic growth will 
be enhanced. The other issue, namely that the results produced by a 
properly functioning market may be und~sirable in themselves, which 
stems from the fact that economic efficiency and growth are not the 
only possible objectives of a society, is the subject of chapter 6. 
What factors; then, might prevent the market from performing 
its functions properly? It seems that all such factors, following 
P rofessor Johnson's useful distinction, may be divided into !'those in 
which the market operates imperfectly, and those in which a perfectly 
functioning market would not produce the best results 11 • L.l- Essentially, 
the latter category involves external economies or differences between 
private and social cost, and owing to the great variety and complexity 
1. op. cit. , p. 7S. 
2 . See H . G. Johnson, M oney, Trade and Economic Growth , (Unwin 
University Books, Second Edition 1964), p. 157. 
3. op. cit., p. 156. 
4 . op. cit. , p. 157. 
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of the forms which this phenomenon takes, it will occupy most of the 
discussion on this chapter. First, however, we turn to apparently 
economic arguments for government intervention which do not rely on 
external economies. 
Imperfections in the Market Mechanism. 
In the absence of extern al effects, a p erfect market would 
result in an optimum allocation of economic resources. in the sense 
that it would be impossible to make even one person better off without 
making at least one other person worse off. 
optimum would be achieved. 
That is, a Pareto V'ielfare 
One of the conditions necessary for a perfect market, however, 
ia that all individuals have perfect knowledge of conditions relevant to 
th~ir decisions, or, at least, that, given the state of their knowledge of 
these conditions, individuals believe the marginal costs would exceed the 
marginal benefits of acquiring additional information .. 1 If this cm~dition 
does not hold, entrepreneurs may very well not make the right locational 
decision, due simply to ignorance .. 'Ihis might be so even if the criteria 
used by entrepreneurs in making such decisions were acceptable from 
a social point of view, since the criteria are being applied to inadequate 
information. In such cases state intervention of ont: sort or another 
which diverted firms to the optimum location could both mak~ th~ firm 
better off and improve national economic efficiency. 
This argument for state intervention, clearly presupposes that 
in som.e cases at least the government can be better informed about 
conditions in different areas. Assuming there are no external economies 
l. G. J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, Third Edition, (The Macmillan 
Company, l\ew York. 1966), pp. 2-3, makes some interesting points 
on the econon1ics of information. 
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involoved in the acquisition of market information, the argument 
also implies that the firm has neglected to gather additional infor-
mation when it might profitably have done so, and that the government 
is aware of this. It is not enough to say merely that the government 
is better informed, since it is always possible for the government to 
increase its knowledge, but the latter is seldom costless. If the argu-
ment is to be economically based, therefore, the additional benefits 
of the government's superior knowledge must not exceed the costs 
it has had to incur to obtain it. 
Even when these conditions for economic ally efficient govern-
ment a c tion are satisfied, however, it appears that the government 
really need do no more than disseminate the knowledge to businessmen. 
In fact, one of the duties with which the Permanent Committee was 
charged, was "to keep manufacturers who intend to establish factories 
fully informed of the conditions of produc tion in the various regions 
of the Union". 1 There seems to be no need for the state itself to make 
the locational decision, to induce or direct firms to the optimal location, 
unless a further factor is introduced, namely that the firm in selecting 
its location uses criteria which are unacceptable to the government. 
It seems to be sufficient, too, for the state to confine itself 
to a similar educative role in those cases where it is suspected that 
entrepreneurs choose a sub-optimal because their comparative cost 
calculations are haphazard and incorrect. If the government, indeed, 
has sufficient information to know that a wrong decision is about to be 
made because of haphazard calculations, it could presumably point this 
out to the firm and generally supervise the latter's comparative cost 
studies. 
Whether the scope for government intervention on these grounds 
1. Prime Minister's statement on the Establishment of Industries in 
the Border Areas, 2 June 1960. 
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is quantitatively significant is another matter. Lionel Needleman 1 
seems to suggest that careless locational decisions are common iB 
Britain: "Location decisions within British manufacturing industry appear 
often to be unsystematic, if not casual. In their search for sites, firms 
seldom attempt to obtain any technical advice. In general, firms do 
not seem to be looking for the best site but for a site that is satisfac-
tory. Once they have found two or three that meet their requirements. 
they stop looking for further sites, and choose from among the short 
list they have collected. Decisions to locate in one place rather than 
another seem rarely to be based on detailed calculations of the costs 
of operating at the different sites involved' '· Unfortunately, however, 
this view is not supported by convincing detailed evidence. 
Evidence for South Africa on this question is totally lacking, 
and there is no way of telling whether a significant number of plants 
are wrongly located for the reasons mentioned, or whether incorrect 
calculations have tended systematically to favour expansion in the metro-
politan areas. 2 Whatever the facts may be, it is by no means obvious, 
especially in view of the fog of uncertainty and risk in which business 
decisions are taken, 3 that the gover nment is in a position to detect 
and hence prevent such errors. In any case, as we have suggested? 
the avoidance of haphazard decisions does not seem to require direct 
governmental intervention. 
The position is rather different where the government regards 
the criteria used by firms in their locational decisions as unsatisfactory. 
1. 'What Are We to Do About the Regional Problem', Lloyd.s Bank 
Review, January 1965, p. 50. 
z. Our discussion of East London firm's in chapter 4 suggests that 
that centre may have benefitted from ill-considered locational 
decisions. 
3. See Needleman., op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
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For instance, it is a well known fact that entrepreneurs, like all 
other individuals. are not concerned solely with maximising the ir mater-
ial income at all costs, regardless of the effect on the ir private lives. 
Thus it is conceivable that some will deliberately forego the opportunity 
of greater profits for other benefits. The Chairman of the Board of 
Trade and Industries 1 has claimed that nthe development of industries 
in the decentralised areas is penalised by psychological factors - by the 
attraction exerted by the big metropolitan centr~on entrepreneurs 
and executive personn~l and even on skilled workers, and especially 
on the wives of all these people, and in spite of the improved status 
and standard of living that would be enjoyed by all of them in the decen-
tralised areas" . Needleman 2 suggests that in Britian the tendency for 
potential sites to be rejected for social reasons, even though they may 
yield greater profits, is likely to increase as the s eparation of ownership 
and management in business becomes more widespread. It is , there-
fore, conceivable that in some particular cases, if the government, by 
using positive incentives or physical controls diverts a plant from one 
location to another its profitability and the value of the country's out-
put of goods and services may very well increase. 
While there can be little doubt that tntrepreneurs prefer on e 
social atmosphere 3 to another, it is not clear whe ther this is a decisive 
factor in a significant number of cases or that it systematically militates 
against industrial development in border areas. 4 Again we know 
1. Address delivered to the Federated Chamber of Industries at the 
Wanderer's Club, Johannesburg on 5 Nov~mber 1963. 
2. op. cit. , p. SO. 
3. Schools, clubs. entertainment facilities. proximity to holiday home, 
medical facilities, legal counsel and other factors of this sort are 
probably taken "into account. 
4 . It is interesting that the horrors of life in 11congested1' metropolitan 
areas are frequently mentioned as good grounds for government 
intervention. 
little about this in South Africa. But Andrews and Brunner. 1 in 
dealing with the concept of p't·ofit maximisation . thought it was/not 
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the case that the concept of 'economic man' had been thrown out and 
that in future the steering of the economy would have to be done by . 
' r eference to psychological and sociological facts which are indepen-
dent of and so economically i 1"l"elevant to any par ticula-r ~ituation 1 • 
' . . . the location of a pa-rticular indu~try may have been p r ecisely -
. -
deter mined because it e;uited the managing- dir ectoi s de~ire fo r con-
venient access to a ce-rta.in golf cour.se o - becau~e his wife wanted 
the week-end home to be in the Lake District. The question is not 
whethel' l'luch a facto r is o1· h'~ not important in the individual cas e 
but whether anv particular factor of thiF kind has systematic effects 
upon the economic var i able s . .. ' 
'It seems in fact to make much mor e s enr>e to discur;; s location 
the -:>-ry in te-:r ms of costr- and mar ket oppo1·tunities and to t r eat othe:r 
consideration£ as ···elevant only whe r e economic criteria are not 
decisive'. 
D. E . C. Eversley supports this view, but adds that 'it is one 
thing to try to make general models of location in relation to industry 
at large, e specially when a decision has to be taken de novo, and quite 
another when we are discussing what incentives are required to make 
a firm change its location •.• ' 2 It appears, according to Eversley, 
that the real difficulty in Britain has been that psychological and 
1. :-. W. S . Andrews and E . Brunner, 'Business T" rofit and the Quiet 
L ife , ' Journal of Indu strial E conomics, 1962/b3, col. 11, pp. 72 ff, 
II 
quoted by D. E . C. Eversley, Social and n s ychological Factors in the 
" Determination of Industr ial L ocation, in Thomas Wilson (E ditor), 
I""ape:rs on R egional Development, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965), 
pp. 102-103. 
2 . op. cit . • p. 103. 
l 
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sociological factors may have been a significant obstacle to established 
firms moving from prosperous areas. His views, as be conceded, 
1 
are 'based on personal impressions. and some of it can only be guessed•. 
But even if Eversley' s contention is accepted, it seems that it is consider-
ably less relevant to our own problem than it is to the British case. In 
the first place, the rate of growth in Britian has been considerably s lower 
than in South Africa, and the achievement of substantial decentralisation 
has depended to a greater extent in Britian on the shifting of plants from 
one part of the country to another. Secondly, though the Government's 
thinking may be changing, 2 it is part of its declared policy to divert 
only new industries: 
"It cannot be overstressed, however. that the development 
of these centres Tborder areas-, can succeed only in a climate of 
general industrial development in South Africa. A programme which 
merely involves the large-scale transfer of existing industries from the 
present industrial centres to centres in the b-::>rder areas would have none 
of the stimulating and cumulative effects associated with economic 
development. What is envisaged is that a larger proportion of the 
new factories should be located and a larger share of the increased 
output be produced, not in the already over-populated urban centres, 
but rather in the border areas 11• 3 
In the absence of evidence to this effect, there seems to be no 
reason to assume that South African entrepreneunial behaviour is notably 
different from that of their British counterparts, and it seems reason-
able to regard the com.ments by Andrews and Brunner ae applicable to 
new plants, at least, and perhaps also to those already established. Indeed, 
since South Africa is a younger country, and, perh;;;t.ps, not as tradition 
.. 
1. op. cit. , p. 114. 
2. See chapter 10 below where the :'"-)hysical :"'lanning and Utilisation 
of Resouz-ces Act No. 88 of 1967 is discussed. 
3. P rime lv1inister•s statement, 2 June 1960. 
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bound as Britian in the field of business. they may, if anything, 
be even more strongly motivated by the desire for profit and less 
by psychological and sociological factors.. While the latter may 
be decisive in some particular instances, then, there is no reason 
known to the writer, to believe that these cases are significant in 
number, or that they tend systematically to reinforce regional con-
centration of industries. Provided the government can identify these 
cases, a by no means easy task, profits and the value of goods and 
services produced may be increased by :ntervention. Where metro-
politan and border areas sites are equally profitable, but social factors 
favour the former, diversion of the plant will not give any economic 
benefit, but if it is desired for non-economic reasons. it will at least 
do no harm. 
Finally, in this connection, it is worth noting that in terms 
of the liberal tradition in economics, the consideration of non-profit 
factors does not really represent a market imperfection. Even in 
the analysis of perfect competition the fact that decision makers, 
conswners, workers and entrepreneurs alike, consider both monetary 
and non-monetary factors, is readily acknowledged. uThe excellence 
of a moderate income obtained by moderate work11 is noted by Marshall. 1 
Basic to this tradition is the belief that it is a good thing for an individual 
to be in a chosen position, and that non-monetary factors are part of 
the opportunity costs which enter in this choice. Increased output, 
obtained by forcing workers to work longer hours, and entrepreneurs 
to choose the profit-maximising location against their will, even though 
increased net incomes resulted in both cases , would not be regarded 
as an economic improvement by liberal economists. 2 The view that 
1. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th Edition, 1938, p. 136. 
2. Provided entrepreneurs were compensated, however, intervention 
on these grounds might be regarded as aaseptable. even by liberal 
economists, so long as they judged the loss of non-monetary benefits 
by entrepreneurs to be more than offset by social benefits to the 
community as a whole e. g. a better distribution of income, or an 
improvement in the quality of life. See for instance E. J. Mishan, 
The Costs of Economic Growth, Staples Press, London, 1967, where 
some interestin2 noints relevant to this issue are made_ 
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it is economically undesirable for entrepreneurs to take non-profit 
factors into account when these conflict \.Vith the government's purposes, 
however, merely represents an alternative, defensible ethical position. 
Arro!ments Based on Economically Relevant External Effects in 
Static Punalysis 
(i) The Nature and Policy Implications of External Effects. 
Even. in perfect competition the market will not perform its 
functions properly if social and private marginal costs and benefits 
do not coincide, that is, if there are external effects. The essence 
of the matter is that external effects prevent producers from behaving 
in an optimal manner. In a market economy producers are guided 
by private rather than social returns. Thus if a producer is in a 
position to increase the output of his product at a cost which is less 
than the resulting increment to gross remuneration, it will pay him 
.to do so~ even though the marginal cost is so great as to offset any 
gain to the community. Similarly private enterprise may fail to 
Undertake an investment or increase output, because private mar-
ginal cost exceeds the private marginal return, even though it is 
socially aesirable to do so. 
Perfect competition, therefore, is not a sufficient condition 
:for optimum welfare~ and external effects, which can occur in perfect 
competition>are reflections of the failure of the market to conve y the 
right signals to private economic units. In other words, the rewards 
which are signalled by the price mechanism do not correspond to the 
value to society of the additional product which they would produce in 
each line of activity. Furthermore, perfect competition is also not 
a necessary condition for optimum welfare since the latter can in 
principle be achieved in a planned economy just as well as in a com-
peti tive market economy. Indeed, the presence of external effects 
is the basis of most arguments for state control. 
The concept of external effects. however, requires more careful 
definition. Perhaps still one of the best general statements of the 
meaning of external economies and diseconomies, is that given by 
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A C P . l • . 1gou : 
"Here the essence of the matter is that one person A., in the 
course of rendering some service, for which payment is made, to 
a second person B, incidentall~lso renders services or disservice 
to other persons (not producers of like services) of such a sort that 
payment cannot be exacted from the benefitted parties or compensation 
enforced on behalf of the injured parties. n 
The pr·incipal elements of this definition are that there is a 
direct in.terdep~ndence between individuals whether producers or 
consumers, in the sense that the individual A's activities affect B 's 
utility, !!!!!! that A is unable to exact payment from B for benefits con-
ferred, or B to obtain compensation from A for harm done by the latter. 
As we shall see below it will be necessary to b~oaden this definition 
to take into account ' 1costs consequent on private production which are 
voluntarily taken over by third parties e. g. the government11 • 2 The 
benefits conferred, for which payment is not exacted, known as external 
economies, mean that the social value of a good exceeds its private 
~lue. whereas the reverse is true in the case of external diseconomies, 
which involve uncompensated damage inflicted on others. External 
diseconomies may conceivably be so great that the social value of an 
additional unit of a good is negative even though its private value is 
positive. 
Pigou , it should be noted, formulated the concepts in marginal 
terms. 3 It is the difference between marginal social benefits and 
l. The E conomics of Welfare, Fourth Edition (MacmHlan 1932), p. 183. 
Z. Harald Jnrgensen, ''Private and Social Costs," The German Economic 
Review, Vol 2, No. 4, 1964, p. 275. 
3. The need for this formulation is clearly demonstrated by W. J. 
Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, Second 
Edition, (London. 1965), p. 26. 
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marginal private benefits which d~termines whether external economies 
or diseconomies are present. In perfect competition, 1 in order for a 
welfare optimum to be achieved, the marginal social costs of each 
product must be equal to its price. bu4 without government intervention~ 
it is the private marginal cost which is equated with price. The 
important implication of this for economic policy is that when social 
marginal costs exceed private marginal costs, more of the good is 
produced than is socially desirable, while the reverse situation results 
in too little being produced. 
The traditional prescription for dealing with such .situations is 
that the government should attempt, by means of a system of taxes and 
subsidies or some other device, to correct for divergencies between 
social and private marginal costs, and so bring about an improved 
allocation of resources. For instance. where social cost exceeds 
private cost the government might impose a tax per unit of output 
·sufficient to cover any incidental damage inflicted on other members 
of society by the activity, thus raising private xnarginal costs to the 
level of social margL'flal costs and causing a reduction in output. 
External effects may, in similar fashion, prevent an optimal 
distribution of manufacturing activity between different areas, and so 
provide a prima facie case on economic grounds for government inter-
vention. For i1stance, part of the costs of a new firm establishing 
itself on the Witwatersrand may be imposed on other economic units 
in the area and not reflected in the profit and loss account of the firm 
in question. If these costs exceed benefits conferred on other economic 
units for which payment is not receive<4 the firms activities in the area 
are on balance subject to external diseconomies. This, however, is 
not sufficient to establish an economic case for government intervention. 
If~ in addition, however, expansion in the most profitable alternative 
location, which we shall assume to be in the border areas, entails 
1. In a system of imperfect competition the conditions for a welfare 
optimum are rather more complex. 
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external economies, or smaller diseconomies than does expansion on 
the Witwatersrand, it may be possible for government intervention 
to improve economic efficiency by adopting a policy of industrial 
decentralisation. 
In short, it is possible that though the Witwatersrand is a 
more profitable location for a particular firm than is the most profit-
able site in the border areas, the inclusion of external effects in the 
calculation may reverse the order. 
This possibility that due to external diseconomies private costs 
do not provide an adequate deterrent to industrial expansion in the 
metropolitan areas was'referred to in the statement announcing the 
establishm ent of the P ermanent Committee: "In addition it may be 
expected, the decisions of the entrepreneur as to the location of his 
plant are not influenced by the cost which the community a s a whole is 
called upon to bear". 1 It is one thing, however, to • tate the possibility of 
an economic case on these grounds, but quite another to pinpoint particular 
cases of external effects, and to find satisfactory methods of correcting 
for them. We shall now consider several arguments which seem to 
depend on the phenomenon of external effects, and a ttempt to suggest 
what form of government intervention, if any, i s desirable. In particular, 
we shall ask whether the measures at present being used are capable 
of r emedying any misallocation of resources which may arise from the 
specific devergencies between social and private costs and benefits 
discussed. 
(ii) H igh cos t of land, labour and transport 
The Viljoen Commis sion argued a s followSJ: "The economic 
costs of concentration are reflected in the subs idation of housing, 
transport and other public services, in t r affic congestion, high u r ban 
land values , high local :rates , and will in future create increasing 
difficulties in regard to the availability of labour and the dis posal of 
1. P rime Minis ter's statement, 2 June 1960. 
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effluent11 • 1 
In the context of their discussion it seems that they regarded 
these factors, not merely as obstacles to expansion in the metro-
politan areas, but as part of the case for a programme of gover n -
ment induced industrial decentralisation. Indeed, several of these 
factors do involve external diseconomies which might warraut gov-
ernment intervention, but "high urban land values'', nincreaaing 
difficulties in regard to the availability of labour. 11 and, nhigh local 
rates", which is dealt with in the next section, seem to be in a 
special category. 
High land values and high labour costs, as such. in large 
industrial centres do not lead to a misallocation of resources which 
calls for government intervention on economic grounds. When a. 
firm expands on the Witwatersrand, for instance, it will add to the 
d~mand for land and labour. so contributing in some measure to a rise 
in rents and wage rates. Thus, in addition to the costs which the 
firm bears itself, it imposes on other users of these factors. costs 
for which payment is not exacted from him, and hence# in terms of 
our definition, there is an external diseconomy involved. Despite 
thia, however, there will not necessarily .be an adverse effect on the 
allocation of resources. which requires government intervention. 
For the sort of external economy in question is the 11pecuniarytt as 
distinct from the "real11 variety, to mse Jacob Viner's 2 important 
distinction. In static analysis3 pecuniary external economies do 
not lead to a mis-allocation of resources. The Witwatersrand firm's 
1. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Policy Relating to the 
Protection of Industries, U. G. 36/1958, the Government Printer, 
Pretoria~ p. 54, para. 451). 
2. See W. J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, 
Second edition, (G. Bell & Sons, London, 1965) p. 25. 
3. Arguments involving dynamic processes are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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expansion, while it imposes higher wage and land costs on other firms, 
"has also conferred a benefit on the suppliers of the input and since the 
benefits and costs which fell on A himself were necessarily equal in 
magnitude (what purchasers paid the suppliers received} the indirect 
welfare effects may be taken to cancel out. A has not paid for the 
indirect consequences of his act, but on balance these c onsequences 
were nil". 1 
Variations in rents, wage rates and other factor prices, there-
fore, are an essential part of the mechanism by which the market per-
forms its functions of allocating resources between industries and 
regions. Rising factor prices provide an automatic deterrent to the 
establishment of firms in the metropolitan areas and to l ocation in 
border areas, and government intervention on these grounds is, there-
fore, unnecessary. The fac t that the "congested" areas continue to 
grow despite these higher costs, suggests that the economic value of 
being located in these areas is great enough to make the payment of 
high rates and wages worthwhile. To say that activity in an area 
should be discouraged because wage rates are high is like saying that 
we should curb output in all industries which are able to pay high wages. 
As we shall see below, however, difficulties may arise if factor prices 
are inflexible, so that they do not respond properly to changes in the 
supply and demand, and the price of a factor in one centre relative to 
that in another centre thus becomes distorted. 
(iii} The Cost of Social (Nerheads. 
The Viljoen Commission, as we noted, also mentioned nhigh 
local rates" as one o£ the economic costs of concentration, and another 
closely related argument for decentralisation is that the costs of public 
1. Baumol, op. cit . ., p. 25. 
services, utilities and other social overheads per inhabitant are 
greater for large urban areas than for small. 
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So far as the services provided by local authoritie s thems elves 
are concerned it seems we should expect costs per inhabitant to fall 
as city size increases, at least up to a certain size which is optimal 
from this point of view. Johansen for instance suggests there are 
probably economies of scale in municipal administration, for the 
following reasons: 
11A municipality must always have a certain administration. Offices 
must be set up and personnel appointed. If the population of a muni-
cipality is too small, the administrative organs will have some dif'-
ficulty in utilising their capacity, and for a g iven standard of admin-
istrative quality the administration will then prove comparatively ex":" 
pensive per resident 'lll. i t h in the municipality. In small municipalities, 
too. every single administrative organ will tend to deal with matters of 
h i ghly differing kinds, with the result that the re will not be much degree 
of specialisation a . 1 
To the writer's knowledge, published empirical evidenc e relating 
to the costs of municipal administration in South Africa is not available. 
It is of some interest to note, however, that Johansen finds the actual 
position in N orway in 1950 to have been that "the actual administrati-ve 
expenses per inhabitant were greater in the large municipalities the... 1 
in the small". 2 But, he adds~ " there is no doubt that the standard 
of administration was higher in the large centres than in the small. 
At the same time the large municipalities were r elatively wealthie r, 
so they undertook a greater u umber of tasks. They therefore had 1more 
things 1 to administer. Finally in the small municipalities relatively 
1. L. Johansen, Public Economics, (North Holland P ublishing 
Compan y, Amsterdam, 1965), p. 346. 
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mere administrative work was carried out by elected representatives, . 
These factors were studied by the Municipal Divisions Committee, 
which came to the conclusion that it was 'remarkable' how high 
administrative expenses were in the smallest municipalities 11 • 1 
Municipal administrative costs, however, are only one 
aspect of the cost of the services which they provide, and the pos-
ition may well be different from that described by Johansen when all 
municipal activities are included. While the cost of land and labour 
is higher in large centres, so that public services would~ to cost 
more for this reason, certain services, for instance, the provision 
of sewerage and the generation and distribution of electricity and gas, 
are probably subject to significant economies of scale so that the net 
effect may actually be lower costs for these per inhabitant. Despite 
the probability of internal economies of scale in the case of some 
amenities, however, a United Nations study presents data showing 
that, in Italy at least, social overhead costs per additional worker 
rise as the size of cities increases. They say: 
"Large sc~e development of industry involves complementary 
investments in economic and so.cial overheads. A recent Italian ~tudy 
suggests that the costs of social fixed investments made necessary 
by the addition to a locality of one new worker employed in a new 
industry may be high and may increase in direct proportion to the 
size of the population centre in which the industry has been established. 
The costs to be supported by the State, province and commune for 
urban public services in the widest sense - streets, lighting, sewers, 
schools, hospitals, police, co:m.tnunications ~ and by public a...J.d private 
authorities providing services and utilities - city transportation, gas 
and el~ctricity for domestic consumption, and telephones - are 
estim.ated in this study to vary frorn 123, 000 lire (E/ U.S. 197} in 
centres of 30, 000 inhabitants, to 194, 000 lire ($ U.S. 310) in centres 
1. op. cit., p. 346. 
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having between 30, 000 and 200, 000 inhabitants, and to 357, 000 lire 
($U.S. 571) in centres of more than 200,000 inhabitants. These 
costs are further increased if housing is included in the calculation. ,,l 
As the passage indicates the figures relate to a number of 
facilities which, in both Italy and South Mrica, are not paid for 
solely by local authorities. The central and provincial governments 
in this country are mainly responsible for schools, hospitals, police 
and commrmications and in addition contribute substantially to road 
construction in urban areas . The statistics unfortunately do not 
specify how the costs of these various items are split between local 
authorities on the one hand, and the State and provinces on the other 
hand, and this aistinctiou is crucial h1 deciding whether a case can 
be made on the basis of social overhead costs for government inter-
vention in the location of industry. 
Even if we ''\1 ere to regard the Italian data presented as evidence 
that a similar relationship betwr->en the cost of public service s per 
inhabitant and city size is likely to hold in South Africa, it is still 
not clear whether the costs incurred by the municipality itself per 
inhabitant, increase as city size increases. Let us assume, for 
arguments sake, however, that the latter relationship does hold in 
this country. Would this in itself imply that measures to check 
further expansion in the larger cities arc necessarily desirable? 
l. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
The Establishment of Industrial Estates in Underdeveloped 
Countries, (New York 1961), p. 15. The same figures, with-
out mention of the particular items involved are quoted by H . B. 
Chenery and P. G. Clark. Interindustry Economics, p. 295 
where they are attributed to A. Molician, ' 'Industrialisation and 
I) 
Decentralisation, paper presented to the Tokyo Conference on 
Problems of Economic Or> wth, April ] 957. 
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'To advocate 11decongestion11 of urban areas in which the 
costs incurred by the municipality are high, simply because the cost 
of public services paid for by th~ municipality itself per inhabitant are 
high, seems to be no more reasonable than it would be to argue that 
industry should be discouraged in a certain area simply because wage 
rates are high. In the first place, electricity provided by municipalities 
is invariably paid for by users only, and, as in the case of labour, the 
willingness and ability of firms to pay the price seems to be the best 
t est available of its econom.ic value to them. Likewise water is often 
charged directly to users and is not paid for out of general revenue. 
If services if thf s sort are excluded. however, it may still 
be found that the cost of services paid for by the municipality out of 
property rates increases more than in proportion to population. I'~ ever-
theless, since those who contribut:properiy ~ates income also constitute 
the municipal electorate, it seems reasonable to assume that they regard 
the continued expansion of population in the municipal area and the 
increase in the cost of services which this may entail as worthwhile. 
It is a feature of our political tradition that local authorities are per-
mitted a certain degree of autonomy in matters of this sort. This 
is particularly desirable where there are "strong grounds for taking 
local needs and desires into account, and utilising local knowledge in 
finding the best solution1\ 1 The municipalities fre edom., like that of 
any other decision making unit, is always constrained by the country's 
legal code; and, in particular, by those regulations which specifically 
affect local authorities. For instanc e, they are sometimes compelled 
to carry out certain measures or activities, or in some cases ::,tat~;: 
grants may depend on their complying with certain standards laid down 
by law. Within this framework of regulations, however, municipalities 
l. Johansen, 21?· cit., p. 349. 
are usually free to decide whether to extend the services which 
they provide or not. 
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There is something to be said~ therefore, for regarding a local 
authority as a self-contained decision making unit. The costs which 
they impose on themselves may thus be regarded as being "inter-
nalised" by the municipality, in particular those who pay property 
rates. If this principle is accepted it is hard to see that there is 
any economic ground for concern if municipalities choose to provide 
facilities costing more than they would in some other part of the 
country, simply because they do cost more. The cost of such 
facilities is, in any case, only one aspect of the cost of production 
in an area, and if, despite a rise in the cost of the former, the in-
dustrial sector of the area continues to expand. this may be because 
the other advantages of the area offset this possible disadvantage. 
Arguments to the contrary seem to imply that it is economically 
desirable for the cost of municipal facilities per head of population 
to be the same in all urban centres'. Vihether the cost of services 
to municipalities rises in smaller or greater proportion than population, 
a matter on which the writer has no evidence for South Africa, seems 
to b~ irrelevant to the economic case for decentralisation, provided 
these are paid for by the municipalities themselves. It is worth noting, 
too, that as in the case of Britian, 'there is no real evidence that the 
so-called "congested"' areas wish to discourage further influxes of 
workers'. 1 
The position is entirely different where the costs imposed on 
the central and provincial governments per additional worker rise as 
the city increases. The evidence given above for Italy is not 
clear on this point, but if it means that the contributions of the state 
and province do increase with city size, then there does appear to be 
an external diseconomy, relevant to location policy, involved in the 
1. H. W. :Richardson and E. G. West, 'Must we always Take V. ork 
to the \\i orkers? ', Lloyds Bank Review, January 1964, p. 40. 
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expansion of large cities. In so far as the costs of social overhead 
are not borne entirely by the inhabitants of a particular municipal 
area, a new firm establishing itself in the area imposes costs on tax-
payers in general. The costs impos ed on others outside the area as a 
result of expansion of activity represent external diseconomies since, 
in accordance with the definition given earlier, we include in this term 
' 'all costs consequent on private production which are taken over by 
1 
third parties e. g. government''·- It is not enough, however, to show 
that the central or provincial government covers part of the addition-
al social overhead required by each additional worker in a "congested" 
u rea. There is an external diseconomy relevant to location policy, 
only if the central or provincial government's contribution is greater 
in large than in small centres. 
The Viljoen Commission, as we saw above, included ·'the 
subsidisation of housing, transport and other public services 11 among 
the economic costs of concentration, while the Prime :Minister in 
his statement of June 1960 refe rred to "the relative increase for the 
central, provincial and local authorities in the cost of supplying civil 
and social services, the maintenance of law and order, the organisation 
of traffic and market facilities and the provision of numerous other 
seririces". Indeed considerations of this sort were an10ngst the major 
economic arguments advanced by the Barlow Commission2 in 1937 for 
the diversion of industry from London. 
Again there is a lamentable lack of published empirical evi-
dence for South Mrica. Nevertheless~ one instance which may b e 
worth mentioning is the provision of public transport for Africans in 
the larger urban centres. The Deputy Minister of Bantu AdMinistl·ation 
l. Jurgensen~ op. cit., p. 275. 
2. See Report of the Royal Commiss ·on on the Geographical 
Distribution of the Industrial Population, p. 188. 
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and Development stated in the House of Assembly early in 19671 
that the cost to the central government of subsidising transport 
between African townships and white areas was almost R 12 million 
per annum. These subsidies, as he pointed out, were originally intro-
duced to .compensate the South African Railways for erecting rail links 
to the new tovmships, most of which are for Africans settled away 
from the cities under the big resettlement schemes such as Meadow-
lands near Johannesburg, and Kwa Mashu near Durban, and for 
running specia~services to the townships. Bus services run by private 
companies are also subsidised by the government. 
These transport subsidies apply mainly to the larger urban 
centres because of the great..Jdistance of most of the townships from 
anu 
the places of employmentt / the cost to the central government per 
additional worker may be greater in the metropolitan areas than in 
other centres. It is :oot clear, however, whether and to what extent 
the Government is subsidising transport costs from urban townships 
serving border areas to places of work, for instance. from L'mdantsane 
to East London. As we point out in chapter 6 below the tlistance 
between the latter two is very considerable and workers moved from 
E ast London to Umdantsanc have to incur higher transport costs as 
a result. The case for government intervention to decentralise indus-
try on these grounds· depends on whether the transport subsidy per 
worker is greater in the metropolitan than in the border areas. In the 
absence of empirical evidence, howevert we shall assume, for argu• 
mcnt's sake that no transport subsidy, corresponding to the above 
mentioned R 12 million. is paid in respect of the transportation of 
Africans to and from their jobs in border industries. It might, of 
course. be argued that the need for transport subsidies in the tnetro-
politan areas is created by the government's own policy regarding the 
situation of African townships. But, setting this aside, it seems that 
1. Eastern Province Herald, Port Elizabeth, 19th May 196 7. 
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a genuine external diseconomy in the expansion of large centl'ee may 
be involved here. 
\'that form of government action is appropriate for coping with 
this situation. L' it is regarded as economically unde s rable? As in 
the caae of all problems arising from external effects the appropriate 
economic solution is that which is cheapest. Fo:- instance, in deter-
mining whether decentralisation is the appropriate remedy:r the re-
levant consideration is whether the external discconomy imposed on 
the government by the establishment of an additional firm in a metro-
politan areat is greater or less than the decline in productive e fficiency 
which would result if the firm were, by some meana or othe r, diverted 
to aorne other location. C nly if the forme r were greater than the 
latter would diversion of the firm be economically preferable to the 
Government accepting the additional tranaport subsidy which location 
in the metropolitan are a would entail. In othe r words, diversion 
would b e the cheape st remedy so long as the subsidy per worker re-
quired to induce the firm to move elsewhere did not exceed the trans .. 
port subsidy per worker i.n the metroploitan area. This is the test 
which must be applied so long as the present syatem of subsidisiu.g 
urban Bantu transport facilities is retained, and the only alterilativea 
optm to the government would b e to dive rt the firlT', or do nothing 
and bear the subaidy. The latter is likely to be the 'optimal' for1n 
of government 'action' in most cases. 
The trouble with this solution is that it does not eliminate the 
external dise conorr1y in queertion, and firms who survive the above test 
and gain entry into the metropolitan areas where transport subsidies 
dre paid, still impose a cost on the govel"nm~nt. rrh~ latter imposition 
nay be preferable to dive r s ion in most cases, but if the Government 
wishes to e lim.inate the external di.seconomy it appears that the only 
sound solution is th ... aboliti on of the transport subsidy. It would 
certainly be economically better than the avoidan ce of external costs 
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of this sort by prohibiting the entry of all or even a large propor-
tion of, prospective newcomers to the metropolitan area. The 
Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, in the state-
ment referred to earlier, in fact hinted that the subsidisation of 
urban Bantu transport might be discontinued. Whatever may be 
said against such a step on other grounds ,it is preferable to whole-
sale diversion of industries, as a means of eliminating the external 
costs. 
Say the government withdre w the subsidy of R 12 million per 
annum on Bantu urban transport services. Unless Bantu workers 
are to lose as a result of it, either the total wage bill in the areas 
affected would have to rise by this amount, or employers would have 
to make increased payments direct to a fund to be used to replace the 
Government subsidy. Let us say that employers at present making 
contributions in terms of the Bantu Transport Services Act1 bore the 
full burden resulting from the withdrawal of the Government's subsidy. 
The levy paid in terms of the Act applies to adult male Bantu em-
ployees and the rate paid varies from centre to centre with a minimum 
rate of 2~ cents per week per employee and a maximum rate of 10 
c ents. Taking into account the total contributions made to the fund 
by various centres between 1st April 1965 and 31st March 1966. and 
the rates per employee applicable in each c entre, 2 the writer ba s 
calculated that the number of man-weeks in respect of which payment 
l. No. 53 of 1957 (As amended). 
2. Based on information contained in the annual reports of t he 
Department of Transport and of the :National Transport Con-mission 
for the period 1 April 1964 to 31 March 1965 (p. 28) and l April 
1965 to 31 March 1966 (p. 31). 
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was made by employers in Durban, Pinetown, Port Elizabeth and 
certain centres in the Southern Transvaal 1 was 17, 931, 191 in the 
period mentioned. If only contributors to the Bantu Transport Levy 
Fund in these areas were to make up for the withdrawal of the Id2 
million government subsidy, their contributions per male adult Bantu 
labour wo.uld have to increase by an average of just under seventy cents 
per week. 
It is by no means clear that it would be equitable to impose the 
burden entirely on employers at present contributing to the Bantu 
Transport Levy Fund, since other workers also use these transport 
services, or that only employers in the centres mentionE:d should bear 
the cost, since the government subsidises transport in other centres 
as well. But the information contained ir the Bantu Transport Ser-
vices Account for these c e ntres seems to provide a firmer base than 
any other of which the writer is aware, for an estimate of the maximum 
impact of the abolition of the Government subsidy on labour costs per 
worker in the larger centres. In view of the qualifications made in 
the first sentence of this paragraph, however, it appears that 70 c ents 
per week per worker is the maximum increase in labour costs p..,r 
Bantu lnale employee that can be expected on this account. 
While employers would obviously not welcome an increase of 
about R 3. 00 per month, on average, in their costs per adult Bantu 
w orker, it seems highly improbable that this alone would have a sig-
nificant effect on the r.ate of expansion of the areas in which they a re 
situated. Some firms close to the "margin of transference 11 , especially 
light labour intensive industries, may feel impelled to relocate their 
l. The Southern Transvaal c entres included in this calculation a re 
Alberton, Boksburg, Brakpan, E denvale, Germiston, Johannesburg, 
Vanderbijlpark a i td Vereeniging. 
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factories, perhaps in border areas, and some prospective new-
comers to the areas may be put off. But at least then the expansion 
of old firms and the establishlnent of new ones in these areas would 
be determined by thu economically efficient criterion of the ability 
and willingness to pay the higher labour costs. This is obviously 
more likely to lead to an efficient allocation of resources than direct 
Government intervention in individuallocational decisions. If it is 
economic efficiency we are after, the market mechanism in this case 
at least seems to avoid the inevitable element of arbitrariness, the 
greater scope for mistakes, and the administrative costs involved in 
direct Government intervention in the location of industry. Th\s is 
especially so since the external costs are so small. It is possible , 
however, that when added to other · external diseconomies which may 
areas 
be involved in the expansion of tae metropolitan/the case for Govern-
m ent intervention ma.y become more convincing. We must, therefore, 
consider other possible economic grounds for state control. 
One irnportcu1.t conclusion to be drawn from this examplt. is 
that the presence of an external diseconomy of this sort does not 
mean that induce d decentralisation is auto1natically justified. It is 
not immaterial what specific method is use d to eliminate external 
effects, and, indeed. if the present system of transport subsidisation 
is r etained, it will probably be economically bt:.tter in all but a very 
f ew case s :for the Government to accept the transport costs impoeed 
o n it, rather than divert firms to the border a.reas. 
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(iv) Smoke. pollution of the atmosphere, noise and effluent disposal. 
The Barlow Commission's statement of the economic dis-
advantages of the concentration of industries and the industrial pop-
ulation in a few large centres is rather similar to that of the Viljoen 
Commission quoted above except that it includes in addition "smoke, 
pollution of the atmosphere~ and noise which are not only injurious 
to health but also involve economic loss''· 1 
Whereas in the last section we were concerned with costs taken 
over voluntarily by the central and provincial governments, the 
,..nuisances" mentioned by the Barlow Commission involve costs in• 
flicted on other individual producers and households in the area, and 
perhaps on municipal authorities as well. Similar considerations, 
however, must be taken into account in deciding what government action, 
if any, is necessary to remedy possible inefficiencies in resource 
allocation which may result from these sources. 
As a firm expands or establishes itaelf for the first time in 
a particular area, it intensifies the problems of smoke. air pollution, 
noise etc., (unless by law firms are compelled to take measures which 
entirely prevent these effects). These factors also tend to influence 
the expanding or new finn's costs, but the firm in question bears 
only the average cost per unit of output arising f r om smoke, noise 
and other such nuisances. In making its locational decision, there• 
fore, the average cost of these nuisances enters into the firm's cal-
culations instead of the marginal cost, whereas the latter is the relevant 
consideration from a social point of view. The marginal cost, which 
is equal to the rise in total costs arising from such nuisances as a 
result of the firms activities, whether these costs are borne by the 
firm itself or by others, exceeds the average cost so that the volume 
of smoke, noise, etc. tends to exceed the socially 'optimal' level. 
I. Report of the Royal Commission on the Geo2raphical Distribution 
of the Industrial Population, p. 188. 
These problems will arise no matter where the firm is situated. 
but since large cities are more densely populated than small towns 
the marginal cost, resulting from increased industrial output, is 
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likely to be higher, and to exceed the average cost by a greater amount, 
in Tnetropolitan than in other areas. The point is stated as follows 
by Baumol: H ••• The magnitude of the external effect of a given 
act depends not only on the decision of the actor but also on the activity 
patterns of the persons who are affected. The laundry bill imposed 
on the people in the vicinity by a smoky factory will vary in size with 
the number of residents in that neighbourhood. The more people 
who live there ( a matter which may be entirely beyond the control of 
the factory's management), the more serious the externality question". 1 
It is apparently some such reasoning as this which must lie 
behind the advocacy of decongestion on grounds of smoke and other 
nuisances of this type. 
The task of deciding whether corrective action should be taken, 
and what form it should take, is a complex and difficult one. In 
particular, once external diseconomies of this type are isolated, which 
suggest that from an economic viewpoint the expansion of the city is 
being pushed too far, it does not automatically follow that any measures 
which slow down growth in the area will lead to an improved allocation 
of resources. 
One possible solution is a law compelling firms to avoid in-
flicting such external costs upon other individuals. The conditions 
most favourable to this solution are stated by Jurgensenz as follows: 
"Where high additional social costs go hand in hand with small 
economies for the enterprises we shall :find the most favourable point 
of attack for economic measures . The overall social costs of pro-
duction would decrease since they would be diminished by the high 
1. W. J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, p. 31. 
z.. op. cit. , p. 281. See also his arithmetical example of the economies 
of eliminating dust pollution caused by a cement factory. 
additional social costs for households and public authorities and in-
c r eased only by the smaller additional private costs". 
17•) 
For instance, it may be that the cost of avoiding pollution of 
a river by a chemicals plant is small in comparison with the damage 
inflicted on a holiday r esort down---stream, and it will then be econom-
ically desirable to compel the firm to take avoiding action. It may 
be possible for instance to process the effluent in a way which renders 
it harmless, or to divert it from the holiday resort in question. It 
should be noted, however, that even though small compared with the 
external diseconomies involved, the costs of avoidance may so re-
duce the profitability of the enterprise as to render it uneconomic 
in its present location. Whether the latter is the case or not, the 
mere fact that avoidance costs are lower than the external diseconomy, 
does not necessarily mean that the complete elimination of the nuisance 
by a particular firm is the best alternative available. The costs and 
benefits of this measure must be compared with the alternatives of 
a partial reduction of the nuisance to an optimal level, and relocation 
of the plant. The latter will be preferable to measures to eliminate 
or reduce the nuisance in the present location, if the change in the 
location of the factory results in an increase in production costs which 
is smaller than the avoidance cost, or if the net gain from relocation 
or diversion of the plant is greater than the net gain from partial avoid-
ance. Under the assumed circumstances, therefore, it is possible 
that the relocation or diversion of a firm will be the best solution 
avai1able, from an economic point of view. This may be true even 
if, by forcing it to vacate its present location or preventing it from 
entering an area, the firm finds it unprofitable to produce at all. 1 
It appears that "in those cases involving high avoidance costs 
and low additional social costs"2 it would always be economically 
undesirable to compel a firm to prevent the damage which it inflicts 
1. Presumably this was the position in the case of the titanium oxide 
factory situated on the Natal South Coast, which was ordered to close 
down in 1963. 
2. Jurgensen, op. cit. , p. 286. 
on others altogether. Likewise the loss of productive efficiency 
involved in diverting the plant to some other location m~y exceed 
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the social costs imposed on other economic units in the area. In 
these circumstanc-es, the best solution. in principle, at least~' seems 
to be the introduction of compensation, in terms of which the offending 
factories are taxed and the proceeds used to compensate th~ injured 
parties. Where the number of injured parties is large. however, the 
costs involved in determining the loss to each and administering the 
compensation scheme may render such a scheme uneconomic. Alsot 
as Baumol points out, in view of the fact that the amount of damage 
inflicted depends very largely on the number of people in the vicinity 
of the factory "a rule which states that the factory owner should be taxed 
by an amount equal to the cost of the disadvantages his activity im-
poses is likely to be neither unambiguous or ~bviously just. ,l In 
other words, a reduction in the number of people in the vicinity of the 
factory presents itself as another possible measure. 
If the real national product is to be maximised, it is necessary 
to select the best of all practicable alternatives; the ideal solution can 
seldom be achieved. Even though. in a situation in which the exter-
nal costs imposed are smaller than avoidance costs or the fall in ef-
ficiency resulting from the relocation or diversion of a firm, a tax-
subsidy scheme may be the best in principle, the latter may not be 
practicable. Other alternatives must, therefore, be considered. One 
of these is a tax on firms emitting smoke, based on the marginal 
social cost of the damage arising from this source, without an accom-
panying compensation scheme.. Thus firms would take the full social 
costs of their production into account, and people living in the vicinity 
would be free to choose whether the disadvantages of the smoke nui-
sance were greater or smaller than the advantages of remaining where 
1. op. cit. , p. 31. 
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they were. Another possibility is the introduction of regulations 
which will partially reduce the smoke nuisance. This may be worth-
while even though it would be uneconomic to compel firms to avoid 
altogether the smoke damage inflicted... But whether an economic 
solution can be found or not, it is clear, in the cireumstances en-
"\isaged. that the relocation or diversion of the plant would be econom-
ically undesirable. · It would be better to do nothing, rather than inter-
vene in the location of industry. In practice, a certain amount of 
harm caused by nuisances such as this, i8 inevitable, and the larger 
the town the greater the damage. Aa one American judge has put 
the matter. "without smoke~ Pittsburgh would have remained a very 
pretty village". 1 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the detection, estim-
ation, and correction of external diseconomies of this sort is a com-
plex matter.. It is possible,. as we have ~hown~ that in some partic-
ular cases external diseconomies, of the so:rt discussed inthis section, 
either alone or together with other types of external diseconomies, 
indicate that government intervention in the location of industry is 
the appropriate economic remedy. In other cases the appropriate 
remedy. if the presence of these external effects is to be exploited in 
such a way as to actually increase economic efficiency, n"lay be one 
of a number of rather intricate devices. In still others it will be 
preferable to allow the external diseconomy to persist, rather than 
adopt any of the practicable methods of "correcting" for these external 
effects. A policy involving "correctionn for external diseconomies 
o.f this sort solely by intervening in the location of industry will ob-
viously not lead to the optiznal arrangement of resources. 
It will. therefore, be necessary to consider each individual 
case on its merits and unless the external diseconomy is so conspicious 
and obviously2 greater than the loss wh.i,ch would result from re-
L Musmanno, J., in Versailles Burrough vs. McKeespoort Coal and 
Coke Co., 19351 83, Pitts. Leg. J., 379, 385. 
2. As it was for instance in the case of the titanium oxide plant 
mentioned in an earlier footnote. 
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location in or diversion to someother centre,. it will require some 
very nice calculations involving considerable ingenuity in deciding 
whether Governm-ent intervention in the location of industry is the 
appropriate form of action (or inaction) from an economic point of 
view. The estimat~on of the size of the sort of external costs under 
consideration awaits a large scale research project backed by sub-
stantial :financial resources. Where the external costs are so large 
that they obviously exceed avoidance or relocation costs, and these 
costs can easily be attributed to a particular firm, it will usually be 
found that other inhabitants of the area will complain, bringing the 
matter to the attention of the authorities, who have power to intervene~ 
or that some party or parties will take legal action against the 
offending producer. It is therefore the less obvious cases that might 
require intervention initiated by the Government, and it is precisely 
these which present the greatest computational problems in deciding 
whether to relocate or divert the firm, and how large a subs : dy if 
any should be paid to induce the firm to establish in another area. In 
the absence of statistical evidence it cannot be said with any degree 
of conviction whatsoever that significant subsidies, and a substantial 
diversion of industries to non-metropolitan locations. can be justified 
on these grounds. Since in the ·less obvious cases in question th e 
external costs imposed by a firm are likely to be relatively small. the 
number of cases in which location policy is appropriate, ia likely to be 
correspondingly relatively insignificant. When in addition it is noted 
1. Local authorities. it should be noted, often have the power to deal 
with such cases themselves.. e. g. the ease of the Phillips Carbon 
Black plant in Port Elizabeth. Grahamstown residents a few years 
ago also complained about smoke emission from the local pottery 
but the management replied that measures to avoid this would force 
them to close down. Grahamstown chose to put up with the external 
costs. 
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that, in those cases in which Government intervention in the 1ocational 
process seems to be appropriate, the net economic benefits of such 
intervention may be greatest if the firm is diverted from eay~ Johannes-
burg to K.roonstad,. V anderbijlpark or Parys for instance, rather than 
to a border area~ the likelihood of significant border areas industrial 
production being justified on economic grounds seems smaller st;ll. 
While the writer is extremely sceptical about the scope for induced 
border areas production which can be supported on these grounds, this 
is essentially a question of fact and the results of a large scale research 
project, possibly undertaken by the Government, might conceivably 
present a different picture. It is, therefore, only in very special cases 
that diversion of firms to border areas will be the best way of dealing 
with this particular type of external effect. The principle which needs 
to be applied for the best economic results is expressed by Coase as 
follows: 
"When the change in the location of the factory results in a 
r eduction in production. thi s obviously n eeds to be taken into account 
and needs to be weighed against the harm which would result from the 
factory remaining in that location. The aim of such regulation should 
not be to eliminate smoke pollution but rather to procure the optimum 
amount of smoke pollution, this being the amount which will maximise 
the value of production". 1 
In addition there are of course various technical difficulties 
confronting attempts to correct for external effects, whether these 
are related to the location of industry or not. For in stance* on the 
basis of static welfare analysis, Buchanan and Kafoglis dispute the 
traditional view that a firm conferring external benefits should be 
encouraged to increase its output. 2 There is also the lesson of the 
I. op. cit., p. 42. 
2. J.M. Buchanan and M.Z. Kafoglis. "A Note on Public Goods Supply,11 
American Economic Review, Vol. 53, June, 1963. 
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Lipsey-Lancaster theory of the second best that upiecemeal application 
of single welfare conditione in a situation where not all such condition s 
can be satisfied may, at least in some cases, serve only to decrease 
welfareu. 1 At the same time, howe~rer, the theory of the second 
best can also be used to call in question partial arguments aaainst 
government intervention just as effectively as it weakens the case for 
. . 2 government a c t1v1ty. 
There is the danger, however, that by taking such considerations 
too eeriously we shall be led to complete inaction, since in reality it 
is impossible to meet all the optimum welfare conditions simultaneously, 
and improvements are and must be brought about pieee1neal. While 
this is true, we must be equally wary of the view that additional social 
costs in a particular sphere of the economy always automatically justify 
government intervention or that any measure which eliminates these 
costs will serve as well as any other. A ca.refulcomparison, in terms 
of their total effects, of the present situation with the proposed new 
arrangement of resources is necessary. 
(v) Traffic Congestion. 
Traffic congestion is probably the most frequently cited ar-
gument for industrial decentralisation. Earlier we 1nent ioned the 
contribution of central and provincial governments to the c osts of 
urban road construction, which may possibly involve an ext ernal dis-
economy of the sort arising when public authorities voluntarily take 
l. W . J . Baumol~ Welfare E c onomics and the Theory of the State .. p . l9. 
See also E. J . Mishan, The Costs o£ Economic Growth, p. 55. 
2. Baumol, op. cit., p. 30. This point Baumol attributes to Professor 
Olson. .An example is "critisism of federal farm programmes in 
an economy in which monopoly power is widespread". 
over part of the costs consequent on private production. But this 
is quite a different problem from traffic congestion as such. Even 
if the provincial and central governments did not contribute to the 
cost of roads in large urban areas, or rather, did not contribute 
176 
more relative to smaller centres than might be economically justified, 
traffic congestion would still involve an external diseconomy, in the 
form of costs imposed by additional road users on those already in 
the area. 
The nature of this external diseconomy is much the same as 
that involved in the case of smoke, air pollution and other similar 
nuisances. It is very ni.cely described by E. J. Mishan: 1 
"The extent of the social damage inflicted by traffic congestion, 
even on itself alone, tends to be underrated by a public which habitually 
thinks in terms of an average figure rather than in terms of the appro-
priate marginal concept. . . Suppose that, over a certain period, just 
about a hundred cars can use a given stretch of road comfortably. Ten 
more cars contemplating the use of the road need reckon only the 
congestion costs to themselves. Ignoring all other social costs and 
assuming, for arguments sake, that the costs of cor..~estion are the 
same to each motorist, the increment of cost caused by these ten is 
eleven times as high as the costs actually experienced by them, and on the 
basis of which experienced costs the ten make their decision. An 
unregulated traffic flow thus tends to be too large and, by one means 
or another, should be reduced to an 'optimal' traffic flow - one at 
which the marginal, or incremental. cost of congestion is equal to (or 
no greater than) the value placed on driving in that stream of traffic, 
bearing in mind the costs of all the alternative modes of travel available. 
"The same principle applies to the additional firm that settles 
in a crowded city, so adding personnel and traffic that further impede 
the movement of others in the city. The firm, however, need take 
1. op. cit. , pp. 75-76. 
account only of its relatively negligible share of the additional 
inconvenience it inflicts on everybody". 
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The problem arises essentially from the fact that road users 
do not bear the full burden of the additional costs which their use of 
roads entails. Indeed, the contribution made by road users to the 
costs of road building bear little relation to the extent to which they 
use the roads. There is little incentive to conserve road space and 
as a res ult the demand for it tends eontinuall y to outstrip ~
The basic contribution to road construction costs in urban 
areas is obtained through the annual license fee and property rates. 
These are lump sum charges and are quite unrelated to the actual 
use made of roads by individual motorists. They provide a deter-
rent to road usage only in so far as they have an income effect, and, 
once they are paid, the costs of road travel consist solely of petrol, 
wear and tear, and the drivers time. The price of petrol includes 
tax which is also used to finance road construction, and the users 
contribution to this tax revenue will vary roughly in proportion to the 
mileage covered, though it also depends partly on whether he uses busy 
or deserted roads. Since a large part of the capital costs of con-
struction are covered by the aru.1.ual license charge, however, the 
users contribution to petrol tax revenue is only a very small part of 
the road construction and maintenance costs which each additional. 
mile of his journey makes necessary. The use of roads, thus. t ends 
to exceed the optimum level for this reason apart from others. Further-
more, the difference in the users contribution to the petrol ta x p e r 
mile between busy and deserted roads is a poor refle<:tion of the 
diffe rence in construction and maintenance costs which his usage 
imposes. Thus the incentive to conserve road space in general, and 
in particular to conserve space on congested roads, is inadequa te. 
When the costs of petrol usage, wear and tear, the drivers 
time , and other costs of delay are taken into account the position is 
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still more unsatisfactory. For in. this case as we have already 
noted the individual user feels the additional costs o.f road usage 
only in so far as they afiect himself. whereas these are only a small 
part of the costs which his journey imposes. When this consideration 
is added to the divergence between marginal social and private costs, 
discussed in the preceding paragraph~ it appears that significant 
external diseconomies are involved. 
In principle, the problem could b-e solved by an appropriate 
system of pricing for road usage. As F. H. Knight pointed out 
many years ago in dealing with another but closely related problem: 
11 
••• under private appropriation and self-seeking exploitation ••• 
the course of events is very differentn. 1 Techniques have b een 
developed. in recent years for measuring certain of the marginal 
congestion costs, and the use of these as an aid to the implementation 
of a road pricing system which would produce the 'optimal' traffic 
flow has been strongly advocated in Britian. Such a system of 
pricing would of course not remove congestion altogether. but it 
~uld reduce it to the optimal level by discouraging all users for 
whom the value o£ road travel was less than its social cost. E. G. 
W est2 summaris es the views of the Smeed Report 3 on road pricing, 
published in 1964, as follows: · 11that when practicable there s hould be 
a charge for travel in congested at'eas~ so that those who do inflict 
loss on others are not arbitrarily k ept out but are invited to contribute 
to them.. The degree of actual congestion ·will then depend on how 
far particular users show themselves willing to pay the charges. 
" 1. Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, The Wuarter-
ly Journal of Economics, Vol. XXXVIII ( 1924}, reprinte d in the 
American Economic Associationts Readings in Price Theory, p. 162 .. 
2. E. G. West, 'Regional Planning: Fact and Fallacy; Lloyds Bank 
Review, April 1966, p. 39. 
3. Road Pricing: The Economic and Technical Possibilities, Ministry 
of Transport, London, HMSO, 1964. 
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Under these circumstances there is not likely to emerge any given 
degree of congestion which is 'just right' and worthy of being made 
uniform for all areas. Although it may be a shock to be faced with 
paying the economic cost of using the roads in a particular district, 
this does not prove that they would not pay it and s imply move some-
where else. It all depends on!!!. the cost circumstances (transport 
being only one) in each locality". 
While the Smeed Report regarded the introduction of a satis-
factory pricing system as a practically attainable solution to the pro-
blem, there are a host of technical difficulties which still need to 
be overcome. In any event, it s eems to be highly improbable that 
a solution of this sort to traffic congestion in South Mrica will be 
considered in the near future. Other methods of controlling the 
expansion of the volume of traffic in the large urban areas will have 
to be used. What is clear, however, is that traffic congestion in the 
sense of high volume of traffic per mile is an inevitable concomitant 
of the growth of large urban areas, and by the very nature of things 
traffic congestion will be greater in some urban c reas than in others. 
If the mere existence of large cities with a high volume of traffic per 
mile of roads, is to be regarded as a sufficient reason for industrial 
decentralisation. the logical conclusion is that the deg:;.~ee of traffic 
congestion should be the same in all centre• throughout the country. 
As in the case of other congestion costs, the probletn is to maintain 
traffic congestion at the optimum level not to avoid congestion altogether. 
Large cities like New York and London have developed despite 
the high ave:rage congestion costs which motorists bear, so that it 
appears that these high average congestion costs were offset by other 
advantages. The relevant question is how much s lower they would 
have grown had motorists had to bear the full marginal costs of their 
road usage. The first step necessary is the calculation of the diver-
gence between average and marginal congestion costs. Unlike the 
nuisances discussed in the last section it seems that the only way, 
in the absence of an appropriate pricing scheme, to prevent road users 
from inflicting large traffic congestion costs on others in large, is to 
shift users to smaller centres. In so far as these congestion costs 
are due to additional firms establishing themselves in metropolitan 
areas. this implies a relocation or diversion of industry. The same 
general principle discussed in relation to other external diseconomies 
is relevant here: Ignoring other diseconomies. it will be economically 
desirable for the government to divert industries from the large 
industrial areas in those cases in which the resulting reduction in the 
firm' s profits would be less than the difference between the average 
and marginal traffic congestion costs. E . J. Mishan is of the opinion 
that certain ' intangibles'• which we discuss in the next chapter under 
the heading of non-economic costs, "are by far the more important 
part of the external diseconomies inflicted by traffic on the city" but 
that if we ignore these, the " 'optimal' traffic flow ... need not be very 
different from the existing flowtt. 1 To the writer's knowledge, there is no 
evidence that the size of the divergence of marginal and average traffic 
congestion costs (excluding non-economic aspects) warrants a more 
significant scale of "decongestion .. in South Africa than Mishan believes is 
needed on these grounds in Britian. Again the decision whether to de-
centralise industry, and the size of the inducements to be paid, if any, 
requires a careful assessment of external and internal costs and benefits 
together fo r each individual firm. 
(vi) Other arguments 
In this section. three arguments for a policy of industrial 
decentralisation, which appear to have rather less aubstance in 
them than those discussed in the preceding sections will be dealt 
with briefly. It should be noted too that these arguments are rather 
more difficult to categorise than others. since it is not clear that 
they involve either of the two sorts of factor s which at the beginning 
of this chapter we said might prevent the market from p-erforming 
its functions properly. 
The first of these relates to the fact that the major obstacle 
to further expansion of manufacturing activity in the Witwatersrand 
is the growing scarcity of water in the area. The possibility of 
1. op. cit. , p. 86 and Appendhr C. 
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developing additional supplies of water and the costs at which this 
can be done are technical matters which will not be discussed here 
primarily because. even if the writer were competent to do so, they 
are not essential to our problem. 1 We are concerned , not with the 
highly conjectural matter of what effects the future availability of 
water is likely to have on the industrial development of that area. but 
with the question whether the po~sibility of increasing difficulty in 
obtaining adequate water supplies for the Southern Transvaal is 
itself necessarily a good reason for diverting industries from that 
area. 
Assw:ne that a growing scarcity of water will be experience d 
in the Southern Transvaal, and that additional supplies will be obtain-
able only at higher costs per unit. Referring to a prediction that 
there will be a huge shortfall in the supply of water to the area served by 
the Vaal River, Professor Reynders says: 
nrt is clear therefore that timely action is required in order 
to ensure that the limited water supplies of this important source 
i s used in the most efficient manner, and to prevent a situation 
arisin g in which the further concentration of economic activities will 
make the supply of sufficient quantities of water very difficult if not 
impossible to maintain. There is much to be said for the thesis that 
from an economic point of vie w , it is better to place a timely curb on 
furthe r concentration in this area~ leaving an elastic margin for e x-
pansi on. rather than allow the position to develop to a point where no 
further population could be carried and only then applying m e asures 
to avoid expansion". 2 
l. These aspects of the problem are at pre sent being investigated 
by the Commission on Water Affairs unde r the Chairmanship 
of Dr. S . P. du Toit Viljoen. 
2. H . J. J. Reynders, " The Centralisation and Decentralisation of 
Secondary Industry in South Africa, " Finance and Trade R eview, 
Vol. 11, No. 4 , April/May, 1957, p. 222. 
1R2 
Professor Reynders, then, is apparently in favour of 
checking growth in the Southern Transvaal, but it is not clear what 
measures he had in mind for this purpose. If he meant that, in view 
of the difficulties foreseen in supplying water at a reasonable cost to 
the Southern Transvaal. the government should take steps to build up 
social overhead capital in other areas where water was relatively more 
plentiful and cheaper, so that the development of industries would not 
be impeded by the availability and price of water, then his suggestion 
seems perfectly acceptable. The need for the government to provide 
the social 'infrastructure' and a favourable atmosphere within which 
economic growth can take place is obviously not in dispute, and it 
would be straining the accepted sense of the term to regard it as 
'government intervention'. 
If, on the other hand, he means tha.t the government should 
use physical controls on expansion, or give financial assistance to 
border industries, simply because of the Southern ·Transvaal's water 
problems, his view is more questionable. Keiilicr of these n'le&sures 
r epresent an efficient way of rationing· water supplies or allocating 
them between different users. Financial incentives for border in-
dustries are related predominantly to the amount of fixed capital used 
and the connection of the latter with water usage is extremely tenuous. 
Furthermore, such inducements give users in the Southern Transvaal 
no additional incentive whatsoever to conserve water. A more sat-
isfactory solution seems to be a water charge designed to keep the 
long term demand for and supply of water roughly in balance. This 
will of course raise costs to fir1ns, and will tend to shift those close 
to the margin of transference to locations outside the Southern T rans-
vaal, though not necessarily in the border areas . This. however~ 
would be a cheaper way of solving the problem than either physical 
controls or border industries incentives. Only if for some technical 
or social reason, it is decided not to raise water charges, might some 
form of government intervention in the location of industry be necessary. 
But if the problem is to be solved in this way, a good deal more decen-
tralisation of industry with all its e conomic costs. will be necessary 
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to check the usage of water than if an appropriate system of water 
charges can be found. The other alternative is for the government 
to continue subsidising the development of additional water supplies 
for the Southern Transvaal, a solution which might well be cheaper 
than the elimination of excess demand by diverting industries, espec-
ially since it is by no means certain that it will be a'S difficult to main-
tain adequate water supplies to the Southern Transvaal as it seemed 
it might be at the time Reynders was writing. 1 
The second of the three arguments for "decongestionu considered 
in this section, was advanced by the Board of Trade and Industries 
in 1945: 
uln so far as the estimates of the future production of gold in 
the Witwatersrand can be accepted as reasonably correct. there is 
bound to be a fairly rapid decline in total purchasing power and the 
demand for goods and services in the near future. This means 
that many industries now flourishing on the Rand ~ill find it hard to 
exist when the ~eduction in gold production sets i~. From the long-
run point of view there is, therefore~ a distinct danger in this concen-
tration of industries in the Southern Transvaal11 • 2 
This argument the writer finds very hard to understand. The 
Board presumably was amdous to avoid the problem of declining 
regions which arose in Britian in the 1920's and which led to the adop-
tion of the 'depressed areas' policy. The curious aspect of the 
Board's view is that their proposal if adopted would only serve to 
precipitate the decline in demand in the Southern Transvaal which 
they foresaw. 
Even if a decline in total demand in the area is expected, though 
there is no apparent reason why it should be, the wisdom of siting 
1. See. for instance, T. J.D. Fai:r and L. P. Green, "Development of the 
'Bantu Homelands', " Optima, March 1962. 
2. Investigation into Manufacturing Industries in the Union of South 
Africa, Report No. 282, Cape Town 1945, pp. 100-101 para. 321. 
industries in less profitable locations now, because at some stage 
in the future some of them might become unprofitable in the Southern 
Transvaal, is extremely doubtful. It does not seem that we can 
reasonably assume entrepreneurs to be so lacking in foresight that 
they will inevitably fail to take these prospects into account, and so make 
locational decisions detrimental to their own long term interests. Thia 
is especially so if sound information pertaining to the future output and 
demand of the mines is sufficiently publicised. The avoidance of further 
concentration now itself involves costs which will doubtless be greater 
than the costs of adjustment which might become necessary if demand 
falls ~ the mines die. 
In fact, the greater the volume of manufacturing industry in 
the Southern Transvaal, the easier will the process of adjustment be, 
since a large manufacturing sector can more easily absorb the re-
sources released by the mines as they decline. To discourage new 
plants in the region1 for the reasons given by the Board. would there-
fore be most unreasonable. Though initially stimulated by gold mining, 
manufacturing industry will today not inevitably collapse when the 
initiating force disappears. We have reached a stage in which manufac-
turing industry, in large measure, lives a life of its own, and does 
not depend for its existence solely on gold. 
Third, there is the following case for government intervention, 
adva11.ced by Professor Lewis: 
"Prices reflect wages, but wages are bad guides to location, for. 
wages being sticky, the wage differentials between to·wns where ther e 
is hca'\.'Y unemployment and toViTilS where there is not are not as wide 
as a free mark~t would require... . . . !-!or do prices adequately check 
the cumulative or multiplier processes at work in location. If by 
some chance accident a big factory migrates from one town to another .•• 
cumulative forces are set up. The loss of purchasing power in the town 
it has left reduces the mark~ts for firms that remain, and causes some 
to move, their movement in turn driving away still more. And in the 
town to which it has moved there is a cumulative upswing. Prices are 
supposed to check these tendencies through rents and quasi-rents, but 
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these are sticky. This is why when a town starts to run down, it 
d . ul may 1e ••••• 
The essence of the argument seems to be that there is a 
divergence between 11market11 and "shadow" prices, 2 in particular 
in the price of certain factors in the declining region relative to those 
in the expanding region. The divergence arises, presumably, be-
cause factor prices in a declining region are sticky in a downward 
direction,. 3 so that in those regions they are too high relative to fac-
tor prices in prosperous regions. Relative prices, therefore, do not 
respond properly to changes in demand and supply conditions in factor 
markets, and so contribute little to the achievement of an equilibrium 
in the geographical distribution of resources. The burden of adjust• 
rncnt falls heavily on the level of aggregate demand. which falls in the 
declining areas till it is equal to aggregate supply~ and on factor 
movements from these regions to those which are expanding. 
The inapplicability of the particular situation which Lewis 
has in mind to the South African case should be obvious. Whereas 
he is here concerned with declining regions we in this country are 
not, and our problem is to generate industrial development in regions 
which have hardly known it before, and to create de novo the necessary 
social overhead capital. It is true that thEjnotion of a divergence 
between market and shadow prices of the sort described above may have 
some r e levance i..'"l the locational problems of this country, but if such 
a dcvergence exists it does not arise from the failure of factor prices 
to fall from some previously attained level in declining areas. 
l. op. cit., p. 78. 
2. See for instance, J. Tinberg<m, The Design of Development. This 
is, of course, a special sort of divergence between social and 
private marginal costs. 
3. This is pre~:JUmed since there is no evidence of prices being rigid 
in prosperous r egions in an upward direction, except perhaps 
during a most severe depression. 
186 
Possible causes might be a tendency towards national wage standard-
isation due to wage fixing by industrial councils or by the Wage Board. 1 
But the appropriate remedy for this problem, if regional wage differen-
tials are in fact too narrow in this country, seems to be to widen the 
differentials between regions, in particular bet~een the metropolitan 
and border areas1 not the subsidisation of border industries. Indeed, 
through the Wage Board and the :Fermanent Committee the Government 
appears fully able to prevent an undue narrowing of wage differentials 
and border areas. The Government has committed itself to the prin-
ciple "wage differentiation in respect of the border areas" 2 and the 
Wage Board and P ermanent Committee have been charged with the 
responsibility of applying it. This issue is discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 7 below. It is possible that for welfare reasons the Govern-
ment might not wish to set wages at a level as low as variations in 
regional labour market conditions might allow in which case wage 
differentials would not be "as wide as a free market would require", to 
use Lewis 1 expression. In this cas e the subsidisation of border in-
dustries might be undertaken, but it seems reasonable to regard the 
basis of subsidisation in these circumstances as "non-economic" 
1·ather than economic, and consequently we deal with it in chapter 6 
below. 3 
It is of s ome intetest to compare Arthur Lewis 1 remarks with 
I. See , for instance, the dis cussion in chapter 4 above of wage 
fixing in East London, and als o chapter 7 below. 
2. P rime Minister's statement, 2 June. 1960. 
3. Where we also note the problems involved in making a clear 
distinction between "equity11 and "efficiency" considerations in 
resource allocation problems. 
... 
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a rather novel argument for tariff protection advanced by E. E. Hagen. 
He bases it on the 11empirically observed fact that in any economy in 
which per capita income is rising secularly, the output of manufacturing 
and mining grows secularly relative to agriculture. . • . • As a result 
of this secular trend, except in the case of perfect geographic and 
occupational mobility of labour wages in manufacturing must be higher 
than in agriculture. This is true even in the long run and even aasurning 
complete absence of monopoly in all markets. As a result of this wage 
disparity, manufactaring industry having a real comparative advantage 
will be undersold by imports when foreign exchanges are in equilibrium. 
Protection which permits such industry to exist will increase real in- · 
come in the economy". 1 
This disparity according to Hagen consists of a 'real 'and of 
an 'unreal' part. The tunreal' part compensates the worker for the 
higher expenses of city life, and the greater disutility of factory work, 
and it may also reflect differences in the quality of labour. The 'real' 
part represents the excess of the manufacturing wage over transfer costs 
and may be paid in order to overcome frictions, such as the need to 
learn new skills, to leave friends and acquaintances and to abandon an 
old way of life for an unknown new one. The case for protection seems 
to be that this latter group of obstacles to mobility will eventually fall 
away. By contrast with Lewis then Hagen is apparently arguing that 
wage differentials !:>etween agriculture and industry tend to be "too 
large" by the "real" portion of the disparity. It is not clear. however, 
on the basis of what principle the 'real' and 'unreal' elements of the 
disparity mentioned above can b.e distinguished from one another. Z 
1. E. E. Hagen, 'An Economic Justification for Protection'. Quarterly 
/JOv~Mf!,iE01 
Journal of Economics, ., 1958, pp. 497-8. 
2.. ' . See D. W. Goedhuys, Social and Private Cost in the Infant Industry 
l Argument, S.A.J.E., Vol. 31, No.2, June 1963, pp. 134-135 for 
some critical remarks on Hagen 's vie w. 
10:" •.l ~ 
The Interdependence of Investment Decisions, 
While pecuniary external economies and diseconomies do not 
result in a missallocation of resources under the assumptions of a 
state analysis. it seems to be widely accepted that they are a real 
obstacle to economic efficiency in disequilibrium economics. Such 
external effects play a prominent part in the literature on the economic 
development of backward countries and regions. Indeed most of the 
significant "theoreticaP' generalisations about the problems of develop-
ing countries involve the idea that pecuniary external effects are wide-
spread and substantial, and that they must be taken into account if 
resources are to be allocated in a way which will give a :rapid rate 
of growth. They imply various techniques for speeding up economic 
development. Thus in development problems, while :real or technical 
external effects are still relevant. we must in addition take into account 
pecuniary external effects. 
Scitovsky who did a great deal to clarify this distinction, 
presents the case for considering pecuniary external effects, as follows: 
11Profits in a freely competitive industry lead to investment 
in that industry, and the investment in turn tends to eliminate the 
profits that have called it forth. Thus far, then, investment tends 
to bring equilibrium nearer. The same investment., however, may 
raise or give rise to profits in other industries, and to this extent 
it leads away from equilibrium. For example, investment in induetry 
A will cheapen its product, and if this is used as a factor in B, the 
latters profits will rise. This then is a case when the price reduc-
tion creates •••.•• pecuniary economies benefitting firms •••••• 
u. • • • The profits of industry B created by the lower price 
of factor A, call for investment and expansion in industry B, one 
result of which will be an increase in industry B's demand for industry 
A's product. This in its turn will give rise to profits and call for 
further investment and expansion in industry A, and equilibrium is 
reached only when successive doses of investment and expansion in 
the two industries have led to the simultaneous elimination of profits in 
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both •••• 
uwe conclude, therefore, that only if expansion in the two 
industries were integrated and planned together would the profitability 
of investment in each one of them be a reliable index of its social 
desirabilityu. 1 
This seems to be merely a more rigourous statement of 
Rosenstein-Rodants version of the balanced growth doctrine~ the 
essence of which is that a group of investments which would be profit-
able and may therefore not be undertaken by individual investors., who 
do not take account of external economies. ln Scitovsky*s example 
the fundamental source of the disequilibrium seems to be the existence 
of significant internal economies of scale in industry A. If its capacity 
is utilised at only a low level, its output is expensive and the expansion 
of firms using this output as an input is inhibited. B will not produce 
because of this; consequently A lacks an adequate market to sell at 
a price which will give a profit and also will not produce. If A could 
be assured that B will take a certain volume of its output, and B knew 
that A would sell at a low price if B bought this volume both might be-
come established and make satisfactory profits. The obvious question 
about the quantitative significance of resource misallocation which 
occurs as a result of uncoordinated decision making arises. Hardly 
anything is known about this phenomenon. It is also not clear why it 
should be a particular impediment to growth in undeveloped rather 
than advanced countries and region•. except. perhaps that a given increase 
1. Tibor Scitovsky. 'Two Concepts of External Economies', Journal 
of Political Economy, April 1954~ p. 148. 
l. P.N . Rosenatein-Rodan, 'Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern 
and South-Eastern Europe. t Economic Journal, June-September, 1943. 
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in capacity represents a smaller proportionate increase in areas 
already posessing large total productive capacity, so that the 11lumpinessu 
of investments is not as great a problem in the latter.. Scitovsky's 
argument also seems to emphasise pecuniary external economies · to the 
neglect of pecuniary external diseconomiea which is particularly 
likely to arise if there is a "big push" in a backward region where 
skilled labour and other key factors, including capital in some cases, 
are scarce. In other words the concerted attack along many fronts 
which this argwnent seems to imply. requires a fairly substantial 
volume of those very resources, the scarcity of which is in most cases 
the fundamental reason for the underdeveloped condition of the regions 
in question. 
Despite these unanswered questions of fact and theory. we 
shall merely continue our attempt to give a faithful explanation of the 
need to coordinate investment decisions stressed by Scitovsky, and 
others, on the assumption that i t is a theoretically valid case which 
may have some relevance for policy in particular instances. The 
interdependence of investment decisions therefore make s necessary 
coordination of these decisions by the government, if resources are 
to be efficiently allocated. Without such coordination certain commo-
dities may continue to be ilnported into a country whereas if considered 
in conjunction with other induatries, taking inter-industry relations 
into consideration, they may be producible more cheaply at home. 1 
Private coordination is conceivable, but 11the drawback to private co-
ordination is the large amount of capital required for an integrated 
investment. which is often not available to a single firm in an under-
developed country, and which if made, leads to a monopolistic position 
1. Hollis B. Chenery, The Interdependence of Investment Decisions, 
in The Allocation of Economic Resources, edited by Mos es 
Abramowitz. (Stanford University Press. Stanford 1959) pp. 
82-120. 
-
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because of the difficulties of entry. These arguments do not apply 
so strongly to foreign investment for export, where such integration 
is very common". 1 
It appears from the above, that in some cases the. mere co-
ordination of investment decisions is sufficient to bring into existence 
a group of industries, each viable as a member of a group, even though 
one or more may be unprofitable when considered in isolation. This, 
it see:rns, is because coordination has the effect of removing what 
Koopmans has called "secondary uncertainty", 2 thereby increasing the 
rate of retul'n after discounting for risk. Thus no subsidy may be 
required even on a temporary basis. It is merely necessary to co-
ordinate investment decisions, that is, to follow Rosenstein-Rodan's 
prescription that "the whole of the industry to be created is to be 
treated and planned like one huge firm or trust". 3 
This argument, applied usually to underdeveloped countries, 
is of obvious relevance to regional development, for it implies that, 
if we consider certain industries in isolation location A may seem 
preferable to location B, but, considered as part of a complex of 
industries, B might emerge as preferable to A. Co-ordinated 
planning may in fact actually increase the tempo of the whole country's 
growth, since, though on an industry by industry basis A may have been 
better than B , it is possible that in neither area would production have 
actually been profitable on this baais •. 
In a detailed study of a petro-chemicals complex for Puerto 
Rico, Isar, Schooler and Vietorisz argue that "the possibility exists 
that orthodox comparative cost analysis of each sector individually 
1. Chenery, op. cit., p. 114. 
2. T. C . Koopmans, Three Essays in the State of Economic Science~ 
(New York, Me Graw- Hill), 195i. 
3. Rosenetein-Rodan, op. cit., reprinted in A. N . Agarwala and S. P . 
Singh, (editors), The Econorni~ of Underdevelopment, p. 248. 
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might indicate negative or inconclusive results for Puerto Rico when 
analysis of these sectors in combination might yield positive results. 
Such a situation can arise because of economies of scale and integration, 
urbanisation e<:onomies, by-product relations, and other positive 
agglomeration factors". 1 We conclude, therefore, that because of 
pecuniary external economies it is conceivable that government co-
ordination of investment decisions per se, that is, without necessarily 
being accompanied by subsidisation, may in some cases be able to im-
prove upon private location decisions, and so increase the rate of 
growth of the national real product. This, however, clearly presupposes 
a high degree of co-ordination, so that all the activities <:ornprising a 
particular complex of industries can be simultaneously and without de-
lay established at the optimum, equilibrium levels of output dictated 
by the inter-industry relations. 
We can do no more than state this possibility as an example 
of one type of phenomenon which might provide an economic basis for 
government induced decentralisation. But as we have said, very 
little seems to be kn"<>wn anywhere about whether failure to take into 
account external effects leads to a significant deviation from the op-
timal allocation of resources. One problem is that it is in practice 
extremely difficult to distinguish between internal economies of scale and 
historically decreasing costs. The selection of industrial complexes 
which might thrive in border areas if the individual units comprising 
them were properly co-ordinated requires a great deal of highly 
sophisticated empirical research as the study by Isard. Schooler and 
Vietorisz, quoted above. shows. In South Africa to the writer's 
knowledge, no one has made a systematic attempt to provide similar 
information relevant to locational decisions, and we have no idea whether 
1. l\:. lsard, 1:. W. Schooler and T. Vietorisz, Industrial Complex 
Analysis and Regional Development (John Wiley and Sons, New 
York 1959) p. 26. See also Walter Isard, Methods of Regional 
Analysis (Technology Press and John Wiley, , 1960) chapter 9. 
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such possibilities of beneficial co-ordination arc important and 
numerous, or whether the argument is interesting mainly as an 
intellectual curiosity. It should be noted, too, that the version of 
the arguznent with which we have dealt does not require subsidisatio~ 
but only co-ordination. The case in which subsidisation of an indus-
trial complex might be justified is dealt with in the section headed 
rtinfant areas11 below. 
In chapter 3, we have already touched on the possibility 
of linking an intermediate goods producer to a supplier processing 
basic raw materials, in underdeveloped regions, like the border areas. 
A difficulty we noted there is that usually in the case of firms using 
intermediate inputs a variety of different types of inputs is used~ and 
that unless the latter are all obtainable in one fairly compact area, 
there is a strong tendency for such firms to be market oriented. 
The Infant Industry Case. 
Government induced decentralisation may als+e economically 
justifiable in terms of the infant industry argument. The infant 
industry argument is well known, but it will be set out here in order 
to emphasise the rather stringent conditions which must hold if it is 
to provide a basis for economic tariff protection or subsidisation of 
firms in the border areas. 
The latter, essentially, derives from a special case of the 
external effects phenomenon. As we noted above, a divergence be-
tween social and private cost may justify government intervention in 
the form of taxes, .subsidies, or other measures. Such intervention 
may be warranted more or less indefinitely if the divergence is 
permanent, but a feature of the infant industry argument is that, in 
the circumstances envisaged by it, only temporary assistance is 
1 
necessary to overcome external effects. The short run effect of 
1. In international trade theory the distinction is made between the 
Graham case for permanent protection and the infant industry 
argumen. See Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International 
Trade. {Harper7 New York, 1937) p. 482 .. 
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infant industry protection on the national real product is adverse, 
but long term, it enables the protected commodity to be acquired more 
cheaply than would have been possible without some initial protection. 
In principle, p:i"otection should be removed at this stage. The essential 
feature of the infant industry argument is a dynamic learning process, 
which presents the prospect of inefficient domestic industries becoming 
mo1·e e fficient than foreign competitors after a period of temporary 
prote ction. 
Bastable, 1 however, pointed out that the mere prospect of 
overcoming a historical handicap is not enough. He laid down the 
condition that the ultimate saving in costs should compensate the 
community for the high costs of tht. iearniug period. It is necessa ry 
that, when a suitabl~ discount factor is appli d to the earl y excess 
costs and to the eventual cost savings, the commodity still should be 
worth producing. 
? 
Murray G . hemp"" shows in diagra1nmatic tcr1ns that the case 
most favour.abl~ to the .l'v.ill-Bastable infant industry argument is that 
of static increasing costs, that is, decreasin.g returns to scale within 
the individual fir1n. he n1.akes four assu1nptious: 
(i) factors of production are in pt.rfectl)" clastic supply to tn(:; industry; 
(ii) factor prices are constant in time; 
(iii) abroad the industry is mature, that is, it lias uotning further to 
learn from experie.-J.c e; and 
(iv) all static ecouornies and dis~conomius are internal to the firm. 
(iii) is not ess·el1tial - :'it is only the difference between the 
stage and rate of progress at home and abroad that is relevant". 3 Vv hat 
is really significant for our purpose is th~ fourth assumption which 
11di£ferentiatcs th..:: infant industry dogma, the essential feature of which 
is the postulation of a dynamic learnin.g process, fxom those protectionist 
1. See h.~urray '--· Kemp, 'The l\.lill-Lastable Infant Industry Logma', 
J ournal of Political L conomy, Vol. LXVIII, February 1960. 
2. ibid. p. 66. 
3 . hemp, p. 66. 
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arguments which rely upon static external economies and diseconomies 
of production11 _. 1 
In accordance with assumption, (iii) we think of the "worldn 
price, as being constant through time. Initially the minimum average 
cost of domestic firms i& greater than the world price and a subsidy is 
paid to the industry to cover this difference. The minimum average 
cost of domestic productioT11 however, falls over time as firms learn 
with experience, the rate at which it falls depending on the time rate 
of learning,. As the minimum average cost falls the subsidy is 
lowered untU, when cost equals the world price, the subsidy is abolished. 
Thereafter, the domestic cost falls below CP and if the cost savings, 
discounted at some appropriate rate, during this pha~e are greater 
than the discounted value of the social losses incurred during the early 
learning period the Basta.ble teet is m·et~ 
This argument is valid only in the case where new entrants 
benefit from the experience of established firms. For in this case 
when domestic costs fall to the level of the wo:rld price new firmG 
will be able to enter the industry on an equal footing with the pioneer 
firms, and the entire benefit of falling costs would be passed on to 
consumers- The pioneer firms, as a resul~ would not be at any ad-
vantage as a result of their experience during the early learning period, 
and would make no more than normal profits, so that over the whole 
life of theh operations they will register losses. It follows therefore 
that firms would not pioneer production in this industry unless protec-
tion was provided during the ea:dy l e arning period. Subddisation is 
thus a necessary condition for the establislunent of the industry, and the 
reaping of the benefits of lowe r costs of production after the initial 
learning period. 2 
1. ibid. 
2. c£ J. E. M eade. Trade and Welfare, The Theory of International 
Economic Policy~ Volume II, (Oxford University Press, London 
1955), pp. 255-257. 
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When the learning process is internal to the firm the Mill-
Bastable infant-industry argument does not hold. For in this case 
a subsidy covering the full difference between the world price and 
domestic cost would not be required, as it would be impossible for 
new firms to enter on an equal footing with established firms. Thus 
the prosepct of later profit may be sufficiently attractive to pioneer 
firms to induce them to shoulder the losses involved in the initial 
learning period. 
Most authorities on the infant industry argument regard it aa 
resting upon a d ivergence between so<:ial and private marginal costs. 
For instance, Myint writes: "Thus the infant industry argument, which 
further postulates that the neglected industry A may enjoy decreasing 
cost as it expands, can therefore be regarded as a particular case 
(although a highly dramatic one) of the divergence between social and 
private costs". 1 D. W. Goedhuys, however,. claims to have shown 
that nthe justification of the infant industry argument (in circumstances 
where it is justified) rests not on social cost being lower than private 
cost but on being equal to it, with the prospect of both falling to lower 
levels in due course". 2 
Kemp's version of the infant industry argument, however, 
does eeem to the present writer to involve a divergence between social 
and private net costs. In the case where firms learn only by the ex-
periences of other firms and the Mill-Bastable test is passed, it is 
socially desirable that the industry be established but it will not pay 
private enterprise on its own to commence production. This fact 
alone suggests that there must be a divergence between social and 
1. H. Myint. fln£ant Industry Arguments for Assistance to Industries 
in the Setting of Dynamic Trade Theory'. in International Trade in 
a Developing Worl~ edited by R. Harrod and D. Hague, p. 174. 
2. 
1 
Social Cost and Private Cost in the In£ant Industry Argument; 
S. A. J. E., June 1963. p. 133. 
private cost in some sense. All payments made by firms in the 
early learning period are running costs from the private point of 
view, since in the circumstances described they will never be able 
to recover their losses in a subsequent period. But from a social 
point of view the whole amount paid to factors of production cannot 
be regarded as a running cost, and must be seen as a form of capital 
investment on which a return will accrue in the future. For, unless 
these firms' payments exceed their receipts in the early learnin g 
period, the benefits of future cost savings will never be received by 
the community, but if private firms do accept these losses the com-
munity will benefit eventually. The firms themselves, however, do 
not enhance their future earning power by accepting losses initially. 
There is thus a higher rate of return for the community than for private 
e n terprise so that social net cost is lower to the former than to the 
latter. Since the rate of return to private enterprise on the invest-
ment in learning is zero, the initial investment will not be unde.rtaken 
without some form of protection from the Government. Though the 
infant industry argument does appear, then, to depend on a divergence 
between social and private cost, the dynamic nature of the learning 
process, which makes time an essential feature of the argument, re-
quires that it be sharply distinguished from protectionist arguments 
which rely upon static external economies and diseconoznies of pro-
d . 1 uctlon. 
In the case of the dynamic learning process underlying the 
infant industry argument, it is necessary to discount the losses in 
t h e early learning period and the cost savings in subsequent periods 
in order to find the present value of the net saving or loss. If the 
result is a net saving then the social cost per annum will appear as a 
1. See G. von H aberler, The Theory of International Trade (London 
1936), pp. 206-8, and Viner, op. cit., pp. 480-82. 
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negative amount. In effect this means that a certain amount of the 
cost savings eventually achieved could be taken (taxed) away from the 
community by some outside power and the community would still be 
no worse off than it would have been had the industry not been nurtured 
into existence. In the infant industry case, therefore, protection ac-
tually has a beneficial long run effect on the economy. Even if the 
Mill-Bastable tests are not satisfied, however, where a dynamic learn-
ing process of the sort described occurs, it does mean that the required 
subsidy per annum does fall over time, so that the initial tax burden 
is not permanent. It may be possible to with-draw the subsidy as soon 
as the industry begins to produce at the world price, and even if the net 
saving is negative the subsidy cost per unit of output in the initial learn-
ing period may be very small, spread over the life time of the industry. 
Quite apart from the difficulties involved in deciding whether the 
infant industry argument applies in a particular case, and of removing 
the tariff or subsidy after the industry has grown up, a good deal of 
scepticism amongst economists whether the scale on which tariffs are 
actually used in the real world can be justified on this basis and on the 
basis of other types of external effects, (perhaps requiring permanent 
protection)~ It is clearly possible that some degree of tariff 
protection against foreign competition, and also some degree of 
subsidisation of industries in underdeveloped regions within a country, 
may be supported by the infant industry argument. The fact remains, 
however, that there is no evidence to show that either the use of tariff 
protection against foreign competition or protection provided in the 
form of subsidies to 'decentralised' industries,can to any significant 
extent be justified on these grounds. 
l. See for instance H. G. Johnson, 'The Cost of Protection and the 
, 
Scientific Tariff, Journal of Political Economy, August 1960, 
pp. 340-341. 
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Infant Areas. 
We have been considering the infant industry argument in 
relation to an individual industry, as is usually done. However, 
it may also be applied to a group or complex of industries in the 
same area. We mentioned above the case in which mere co-ordination 
without subsidisation would enable an improvement in location to be 
brought about. But this presupposes a high degree of co-ordination, 
so that all activities are simultaneously and without delay established 
at the final levels dictated by the inter-industry relations. In fact, 
however, some producers would have to come into operation before 
others and early starters may be at a cost dis~dvantage for this reason. 
This is especially likely to be the case in activities in which internal 
economies of scale are significant over a large range of output, such 
as an electricity generating concern (though it need not be a public 
utility). At an early stage of development demand may be so small 
that no electricity can be sold at prices that cover production costs. 
The electricity company is, therefore, subsidised, and price is dras-
tically cut to a level comparable, say, with that prevailing in advanced 
industrial areas. Demand begins to increase as other firms in the 
planned group come into operation1 but it does not rise immediately 
to the level necessary to cover costs at the prevailing price. \'f hen 
the whole complex is established, however, the firms in it,are so 
much more efficient than competitors in other areas that the initial 
loss of efficiency reflected by the existence of the subsidy is offse t, 
that is, net savings discounted at the prevailing rate of interest are 
positive. Thus .the electricity company generates pecuniary external 
economies and, even though electricity is not actually produced more 
efficiently than elsewhere, it makes possible the expansion of other 
potentially efficient industries. Without a subsidy to the electricity 
company the group of industries would not come into existence. There 
is an initial adverse effect on the real product but the subsidy can be 
removed eventually and the long run effects are favourable. (It may 
be thought that'no subsidy is necessary, because, if the group of in-
dustries expands and is sufficiently efficient. they will be able to pay 
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a higher price for electricity so that early losses can be more than 
offset. But in fact private enterprise is unable or unwilling to wait 
so long before making profits). 
Temporary subsidisation may therefore be justified in such 
circumstances, as in the infant industry case. It should be noted, 
however. that the two cases result from quite different sorts of 
external effects. We can see this clearly if we extend the argument 
of the previous paragraph to the area as a whole. It may be that the 
costs of all producers in the area are affected by the general ~ 
of economic activity. 1 As output in the area expands a pool of skilled 
labour develops) hospitals. schools,. entertainments, engineering work-
shops, transport services, shipping centres etc. improve, and the 
costs of basic services like electric power, water, gas etc. fall. 
So as a particular industry expands it confers benefits on other in-
dustries in the area and these are called agglomeration economies 
(diseconomies}. As the general level of activity expands in this 
way, therefore, there is a tendency for the costs of all producers 
to rise or fall. 
Thus we find one writer suggesting in the case of Britian that 
"although control of location which directed industry to depressed 
areas might involve some initial cost, this would not persist as there 
would be cumulative effects of development, resulting in the areas 
becoming the ideal location for industry". 2 This might be called the 
infant area argument. It resembles the infant area argument in that it 
involves short run losses but long run gains which are sufficient to 
offset the initial losses. 
It may be too that a dynamic learning process similar to that 
of the infant industry case, but applying now to all industries together, 
not merely to one, contributes to the tendency for long run costs to fall. 
1. That is, not only, as i.n the infant industry case. as firms acquire 
experience ·with the passage of time. 
2. S. R. Dennison, The Location of Industry and the Depressed 
Areas, (0. U. P., London 1939), p. 120. 
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For instance in a new, hitherto undeveloped, area little may be 
known about difficulties peculiar to the area which may be encoun-
tered. Thus potential pioneer firms may apply too great a discount 
factor for risk in assessing their prospects in the area, simply be-
cause of the absence of a precedent of su-ccess in the area and the 
feeling of uncertainty which this engenders. 1 A successful pioneer 
firm may thus reduce the risk factor applied by others in future and 
so be followed by a number of imitators. 2 The firm may also make 
real progress in acquiring knowledge of local conditions, and in learn-
ing how to cope with them, and this knowledge may very well be freely 
available to other firms, whether in the same induatry or not. In 
these cases the similarity between the infant industries and the infant 
areas arguments is very close. But in addition some of the factors 
making for agglomeration economies are a function of size, as such, 
and not of time as in the infant industry case proper. Furthermore 
in the latter case the relevant economies are external to the firm but 
internal to the industry; agglomeration economies on the other hand 
are external to all firms and all individual industries in the region 
but internal to the region. 
The notion of infancy, when applied to a region as a whole, 
is much less precise than when applied to a single i:nd1.l&try. Indeed, 
the above outline of what we have chosen to call the "infant areas' 
argumentr is simply an attempt to provide a plausible and firmer 
1. See Lionel Needleman, op. cit.~ pp. 50-51 on the uncertainty 
surrounding locational decisions. 
2. In Scbumpeter's terms; the opening up of a new region is also 
au innovational activity, and there his remarks about the cluster-
ing of innovations to apply to it as well. 
basis for the following sort of assertion; which comes in this case 
from the Prime Minister's statement1 announcing the border indus-
tries policy: 
"There are great advantages for the industrialist in establish-
ing his undertaking in an already developed industrial area. Facilities 
such as water power, transport, housing and social amenities are 
already available. It is fairly easy to obtain skilled labour,. to repa ir 
machinery, and to replace parts. The manufacturer also maintains 
close contact with buyers, with financial institutions and with the 
authorities. In a large industrial area, specialisation among indus-
tries is also easier and all types of auxiliary industries exist •..•... 
"The process of concentration is, therefore, a cumulative 
one, and unless the Government influences the climate of location, 
the developed areas will tend to develop still further, simply because 
they are already developed, and the undeveloped areas will remain 
in this state because they~ undeveloped" . 
The essence of the idea seems to be that big centres have an 
advantage over small centres because the former have gathered 
momentum in their development. The attractive power of large 
centres is so great that the deve lopment of smaller centres is inhibited, 
and what is required is that the gove rnment, through a concentrated 
e ffort, should create the same momentum ia certain less developed 
areas and so break the hold of thelarger c entres over them. Cnce 
this is done future progress is r elatively easy for,as Dennison has 
said "once development in the depressed areas IT'!! initiated, the 
cu1nulative character of industrial growth I will I remove the need 
for further inducements". 2 O r, in Arthur Lewis' more picturesque 
1. 2 June 1960. 
2. S. R. Dennison, The Location of In dustry and the Depressed 
Areas, (0. U. P. , London, 1939}, pp. 103-104. 
terms: "You have, as it were, to begin by rolling your snowball up the 
mountain. Once you get it there, the rest is easy, but you cannot 
get it there without first making an initial effort". 1 
We dealt above with the case where firms were subsidised 
indirectly. by not being required to pay the full costs of electricity. 
This enabled them to establish themselves in the area, so providing 
the :L""lcentive for the emergence of other ameniti es, which in turn 
reduced their costs and so stimulated further expansion. The initial 
subsidies, however, could equally well have been paid directly to in-
dividual pioneering manufacturing concerns in the area. Subsidies are 
required it seems, because without them, given the initial lack of fac-
ilities. no firm will begin production at all, since they cannot appro-
priate the full value of the benefit which it creates. Pioneer firms 
thus need to be subsidised if the full potential of the area is to be 
realised. These subsidies serve to neutralise the advantage which 
rival centres gain from the mere fact that they began to develop first. · 
In this form the relevance of the argument for border industries policy 
is more easily seen. 
But what must be obvious about this sort of argument is that 
it cannot be used to justify assistance to firms in any area one pleases 
to choose, or to justify assistance to any firm in the area chosen. 
l. The Industrialisation of the British West Indies, Caribbean Economic 
Review, May 1950. 
It is interesting to note, however. that elsewhere Lewis argues that 
once ah are~ begins to decline, this declh1e becomes cumulative 
straight away. The volumo of activity in th~ area, therefore. seema 
to be relevant only in determining whether upward n'loYemcnte become 
cumulative; there is thus a noteworthy assymetry (inconsistency?) 
about the argument as presented by Lewis. See his Principles of 
Economic Plan ning, p. 78. 
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King William's Town is obviously not undeveloped simply because of the 
absence of agglomeration economies. Hence it can apply only to areas 
showing sufficient promise of being able to support themselves in due 
course, and, as we have already suggested, if the assistance given 
is to be economically based, there must be good reason to believe that 
the initial subsidies will yield a satisfactory return in the long run. 
Furthermore, the argument should not be interpreted to mean that 
any firm which generates external economies, in the ways described, 
should be assisted. Each and every firm must be capable eventually 
of standing on its own feet, except perhaps in those special cases in 
which there is very good reason to believe that the discounted present 
value of the benefits which it confers on other firms, exceeds the dis-
counted presented value of its losses. 
The requirements for economically beneficial industrial de-
centralisation on these grounds are, therefore. rather stringent, and 
the scope for government action of this sort accordingly may be very 
limited. In addition, it must be remembered that, while we have no 
evidence of the quantitative significance of agglomeration economies 
as an independent locational factor, it appears from our discussion 
in chapter 3, that the market followed by raw materials were the pre-
dominant factors bringing about the present degree of concentration. 
A s we stressed there, too, the market and agglomeration econOYnies, 
as such, m.ust not be confused, and regarded as a single locational 
factor, for they are logically .quite distinct. 
Agglomeration economies are simply forces which tend to 
reduce costs from the level at which the y would otherwise stand. 
But they are not the sole determinant of costs. and, indeed, have 
probably played a relatively small part in determ.inin.g the location 
pattern in South Africa. The infant areas argument discussed here, 
and as presented by Lewis for instance, tends to encourage the belief 
that it is mainly the lack of agglomeration economies in the border areas 
which stands in the way of their development, so that large scale expen-
diture by the government will necessarily put selected border areas on 
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a par with the Southern Transvaal, that growth will necessarily 
become self-sustaining, and that this expenditure will necessarily 
be economically justified. While it may be that the past tendency 
towards regional concentration will continue, it is by no means clear 
that this will be solely "due to the agglomeration advantages of the 
existing industrial areas", as one passage in the Schumann Committee 
r-.eport seems to suggest. Considering that we have no real idea of 
the significance of agglomeration economi<..s as such, and since there 
is no evidence that they are significant, large ecale schemes for decen-
tralisation, based on the infant areas idea, seem to be full of economic 
uncertainties and risks. 
Apparently because of the alleged importanc e of agglomeration 
l 
economies- L. "P . McCrystal says that "the development of towns 
with minimum populations of 200, 000 - when these towns are far from 
metropolitan areas - is suggested since tentative empirical evidence 
indicates that this is the order of magnitude of town size which is 
required to support the necessary s ervices 11 • But since the avail-
ability and cheapness of the services referred to, whatever they may 
be, is not the only cost determinant, we obviously cannot assume that 
llaving fostered the development of a town of this size . firms in it will 
necessarily be capable of supporting themselves. Similarly, while 
it may be universally true that the cost of public services per u nit -
reaches a minimum when a town reaches a size of, say, 200, 000~ 
which may therefore be regarded as the optimum size from this point 
of view~ the optimum town size obviously depends on other considerations 
as well, in partieular on factor endown1.:mt, which, of course, various 
considerably :from one town to another. 
T h e emergence of depressed areas in I3ritian, contai&·ling de--
clining or slow growing towHs of significant size, like Glasgow for 
1. L. P. Mc Crystal ' Measures to promote Decentralisation of 
Industry', Standard Bank Review, August 1967, p. 9. 
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instance. is clear evidence that there is nothing necessarily 
ucurnulative" about growth and that size as such is not a guarantee 
of continuing prosperity. 
Finally~ an apparent element of paradox in the infant ar.eas 
argument should be noted. If indeed agglomeration economies are 
as potent a cost-reducing force in the metropolitan areas as the argu-
ment implies, would it not be desirable to er>courage their further 
expansion? After all it is because of agglomeration economies that 
countries are advised to concentrate on a few industrial centres to start 
with, as we noted in chapter 3. The Viljoen Commission pointed out. 
too, though in a different context, namely in connection with the 
strategy for decentralisation: "Because of the limited scope of the 
South African market, and the long distances that separate the main 
centres, the concentration of industry in a few centres can effect 
considerable economiesn. 1 \Ve argue d earlier that the concentration 
of the cou..""ltry's industry in four main areas probably enhanced the 
country's rate of economic growth. Whether and why the time has 
now co1ne for a policy of government intervention to divert industries 
to decentralise industry is an intriguing question. It is not without 
interest too that while on the one hand the potency of aggloMeration 
economies in large centres is so much stressed in this argument for 
decentralisation, on the other hand' the diseconomies of congestion are 
also advanced in support of thE: same policy. 
Perhaps this apparent contradiction can be resolve d in the 
following way: As town size increases, at first average net agglOln-
eration effects (economies minus diseconomies divided by output) are 
positive and rising and are, therefore, exceeded by marginal n~t 
agglomeration ~ffects, but at some 1.:-vcl, due to incr~asing diseconomies. 
average net agglomeration wfects r~ach a peak. Thereafter they fall 
so that they exceed rna rginal net agglomeratio11 effects, and the latter 
may eventually become zero and, perhaps, even negative. Say a 
1. Viljoen Commission, para. 454, p. 55. 
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promising border area is in the rising phase of the average net 
agglomeration effects curve but the \\ itwatersrand is in the falling 
phase. Since the border area has only just begun to develop, its 
average net agglomeration effects may be smaller than those in the 
Witwatersrand, and since it is the ave~age size of agglomeration e co-
nomies which determines the cost reducing effect per unit~ the \V it-
watersrand bas a cost advantage on this score. But this situation is 
quite .consistent, in the circumstances envisaged, with marginal 
agglomeration effects being greater in the border area·s, and even 
with negative marginal net agglomeration effects in the Witwatersrand. 
The marginal benefit from agglomeration effects may, therefore. be 
greater in a border area than in a large centre, but the border area 
does not develop, because of its lower average net agglomeration 
effects. The payment of a subsidy per unit of output, to a border 
area, equal to the excess of the marginal net agglomeration effects 
in the border areas compared with the Witwatersrand, may the refore 
have a beneficial effect on economic efficiency. Whether it is true., 
however, that this situation actually prevails, and whether the subsidy 
based on it would result in a significant degree of decentralisation, 
would obviously not be easy to determine. 
Concluding R emark s. 
We have shown that if external effects of various sorts are 
present, it may be possible in some case s for governmental measures 
of various sorts to bring about improvements in the allocation of 
resources. The optimum form of government "action1 ' depends on 
the particular type of external effect, and must be chosen from several 
possible alternatives. 0ne of these alternatives is intervention in the 
location of industry, and this will be the most appropriate measure in 
certain special circumstances described above. In those case s in 
which such intervention in the location of industry is called for, this 
does not necessarily involve the diversion of industries to border areas. 
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Viest's remark with reference to traffic congestion that "we cannot 
argue that, because London is congested, the same is true of the 
whole of the South East, in Essex, or Kent or Sussex111 ie of some 
relevance in this connection. Some location on the periphery of the 
Southern Transvaal complex might well maximise the economic benefits 
of decongestion relative to any decline in productive efficiency associated 
with diversion of a firm. 
Only in certain special circumstances, which, at least in 
principle, can be fairly clearly defined, will the diversion of firms 
to border areas be the best or "second best" remedy for diseconom.ies 
associated with congestion. It is conce ivable, too, that the infant 
industries and infant areas cases, discussed above, may also provide 
opportunities for economically beneficial industrial decentralisation. 
But H border industries policy is to be justified on the basis of economic 
considerations it is not enough to point to mere possibilities. External 
effects arc present in all economic situations but this does not mean 
for instance that e very underdeveloped country or region would be 
advised to embark on a programme of forced industrialisation. \'ihat 
is necessary is the isolation of individual flrms, thE diversion of which 
would result in an economic improvem~nt, and this raises all the 
problems of measuring and comparing all relevant costs, both internal 
and external, in alte rnative locations. If diversion of a large scale 
is to be sustained on economic grounds, it must be shown that such 
individual cases arc numerous and important. This has not been done 
in South Africa. 
Furth-.:rmore there is no apparent :reason why we should believe 
that such ind'vidual cases are nun<erous and important in this country . 
.t\.S one writer has rernarked in the context of location policy: ''Some 
l. op. cit. ~ p. 39. 
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recent rediscoverers of Figou have drawn conclusions from this 
part of his analysis leading to enthusiastic and confident programmes 
for social engineering, based on the assumption that the ordin ary 
market has failed over a very large field ...•• 111 He is, however, 
extremely sceptical about this view of things. Likewise S. P. 
Dennison suggests that we take seriously the possibility that "the 
degree of divergence between the optimum and actual patterns of 
location is not as great as is usually beli{;!ved by upholders of a policy 
of control". 2 As we show L.J. chapter 8, too~ the proportionate loss of 
efficiency, that is rise in private production costs, resulting from the 
diversion of industries appears to rise very steeply as we push the 
volume of diverted output or employment beyond a fairly low level. 
Unless external effects also rise rapidly, becoming increasingly 
g reat relatively to private costs, the economic loss from a social 
point of view will also rise steeply. But the increase in private costs 
resulting from diversion seems to bear little rela tion to the size of 
congestion costs avoided by decer.tralisation. Furthermore, inducements 
to border industries, related in the main to the volume fixed 
capital investment, s eem to be a very blunt and inappropriate device 
for remedying such exte rnal eff(.cts as may justify decentralisation. 
These considerations suggest that it would b~ wise to treat claims 
regarding the econo"Tlic 3.dvantages of this policy with a good deal of 
r eserve. E ven if a certain degree of decentralisation might be e con-
omically beneficial, we are obviously safe in rejecting outright any 
suggestion that decentralisation on the scale which some official 
pronouncements seem to envisage wUi not caust sorrlc economic harm. 
The question of how rnucb damage is lik::...ly to result we leave till later . 
In conclusion, the following comment by P rofessor Johnson 
is of some interest and suggests an approach to th~;; problen• which 
we shall investigate in the next chapter. Le says: 
"Existing theory of economic welfare already suggests ont! 
approach to a scientific tariff. This would be a tariff which would 
correct divergencies between marginal social and marginal private 
1. E . G. West, Lloyds B ank Review, April 1966, pp. 40-41. 
2. op. cit., p . 118. 
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costs... . wherever such divergencies of social and private costs 
could appropriately be remedied by the tariff. By extension a scien-
tific tariff of this kind could comprise using the tariff where the most 
appropriate remedy is somehow ruled out and where the tariff would 
produce some improvement . ... 
"Such a concept of the scientific tariff follows directly from 
the modern theory of welfare economies. But it is not the concept 
of a scientific tariff which tariff advocates who use the term seem 
to have in mind. Instead, these people want to use the tariff as a 
means of promoting non-economic objectives of various kinds, iden-
tified in one way or another with the effects of the tariff in domestic 
production and consumption of certain products". 1 
I 
I. H. G. Johnson, •The Cost of P rotection and the Scientific Tariff, 
Journal of Political Economy, August 1960, pp. 340-341. 
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Chapter 6 
ECC'NOMIC COSTS. AND NON-ECONOMIC BENE FITS: 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK . 
We now turn to the second type of objection to the market 
mechanism, namely, that even if it performs its functions properly 
the results achieved by the functioning of the market are undesirable 
in themselves. This allegation stems frorn the indisputable fact that 
the objective of economic efficiency and rapid growth may conflict 
with other objectives of a political or sociological nature, and that 
the market mechanism will not necessarily produce the best balance 
between them. As we observed at the beginning of this study, it is 
seldom possible to obtain more of one objective without even partly 
giving up another: if it is possible, no policy issue arises. Economic 
efficiency and rapid growth while they increase material wealth may 
impair the quality of life, 1 disrupt established social relationships, 
and even cause serious political problems. It is therefore a per-
fectly legitimate function, indeed a duty, of Government to ensure 
that the non-economic costs of economic growth do not become ex-
cessive. 
Thus we find the Barlow Commission 2 writing as follows 
on the problem of industrial concentration: 
". • • . when the problem becomes social in texture rather 
than economic, then modern civilisation may well require a regulating 
activity of some kind to step in and take reasonable measures for the 
1. See E . J. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth, for a s trong 
attack on "growthmania" in the advanced countries. 
2. op. cit. , p. 194. It may be noted that the first paragraph of this 
quotation implies that "a regulating activity of some kind" may not 
be necessary if the problem does not become "social in texture". 
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protection of the general national interests. 
"· ••• An enlightened national conscience may well be heard 
to insist that while successful prosecution of industrial activities is 
vital to the life of the nation, due attention must be paid to social needs, 
and consideration given to the question how, with the co-operation of 
industry and those engaged in its management, grave social evils 
where shown to exist can be mitigated or removed". 
lt is clear from the above passage and from other parts 
of their report that while they thought certain incidental economic 
benefits might accrue, the Barlow Commission's re~ommendation of 
II 
a policy to "loosen up the central areas of congestion was strongly in-
fluenced by social and strategical factors . Hence they were pre-
pared if necessary to go beyond the limits dictated by economic con-
siderations alone in order to secure these non-economic benefits. The 
principle laid down by the Barlow Commission is of course perfectly 
sound, since as we have pointed out there is no good reason why econ-
omic growth should be the foremost objective of State policy in Britian. 
South Africa. or anywhere else for that matter. It is, therefore, of 
little value to conclude merely that since induced industrial decentralis-
ation if carried out on a significant scale, will tend to have adverse 
economic effects, it is not to be recommended. This was for long 
the approach of the economist in discussions of tariff protection when in 
fact the aims of tariff protection were largely non-economic~ 1 The 
real issue is whether the political and social benefits of industrial 
decentralisation in South Africa exceed the benefits of the higher level 
of economic efficiency and growth which may have to be foregone. 
Disagreement on both the value of the political and social benefits on the 
one hand, and the economic costs on the other hand, are responsible 
I. A convincing statement of this view is contained in H. G. Johnson, 
nThe Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining and the 
Formation of Customs Unions! paper read to the International Trade 
Workshop of the University of Chicago, November, 1964. {Since 
published in the Journal of P olitical Economy, LXXIII, 3 June, 1965). 
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for the controversy surrounding border industries policy. Since 
disagreement on the former is largely the result of fundamental 
differences in political faith and judgment, the economist can do little 
to resolve them. Nevertheless it may be of some value in formulating 
and assessing policy if we attempt to set out the issues in the starkest 
terms possible. 
The traditional techniques of economic analysis are surprising-
ly useful for this task. In order to bring out the issues as vividly as 
we can, we shall regard the government as a "buyeru of border areas 
industrial production, and it may be supposed that, like any buyer~ 
it has a demand curve for the "good" it is buying. The nature of 
this demand curve is discussed a little later on, but for the moment 
we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of the nature and derivation 
of the supply curve with which the Government is confronted. In fact, 
as we shall see, it is much easier, though not easy, to say something 
fairly definite about the supply curve in question and much of this 
study, including the preceding chapter, is concerned with this aspect 
of the Government's decision regarding the amount of border areas 
industrial production it will .. buy". 
Under ideal conditions, and given sufficient research man-
power, it would be possible to construct a cardinal supply curve 
showing the maximum amount of additional industrial output which 
would be produced in the. border areas at various 11prices 11• The 
diagram below may help to elucidate the ensuing discussion. 
The diagram includes a device familiar in international trade 
theory. Along the horizontal axis is measured the average aggregate 
addition to industrial production in the border areas per aimwn. The 
concept of border areas industrial production as an aggregate poses 
the problem of valuation s.ince it is obviously not possible to use 
physical units. We shall value border areas industrial production 
in the prices prevailing in each industry in the least cost location 
outside the border areas, in other parts of South Afri~a. 1 If the 
border areas producer is the only one of its sort in the country, 
then the price used in valuing its output is that which would prevail 
in the least cost location outside the border areas if a producer 
existed there. 
Likewise on the vertical axis the price and cost of aggre-
gate border areas industrial production are expressed as proportions 
of prices either actually prevailing$ or those which would prevail, 
in the least cost location in other parts of South Africa, in the cir-
cumstances mentioned above. Assume all industries can produce 
in other parts of South Africa at constant costs, 2 and make the long 
1. This corresponds to the procedure used in some discussions of 
international trade theory, in which domestic production is valued 
in "unit values at world market prices". See for instance 
Johnson, op. cit. 
2. This is not essential to the argument, but simplifies the task 
of exposition. 
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run equilibrium price per unit of output equal to unity in all these 
industries. The ratio of border areas prices and costs to the non-
border area prices can either be less than, greater than or equal to 
unity depending on whether the least cost location for the country as 
a whole is in the border areas, is not in those areas ,or whether the 
border areas site is exactly as efficient as the most efficient (least 
cost) site elsewhere in the country. 
In the diagram, therefore, OP is the price of the perfectly 
elastic supply of industrial production from the rest of South Africa. 
PSR is the supply curve for the rest of the country (i.e. for non-
border areas), and SS shows the average annual aggregate addition 
to industrial production which will be generated in the border areas 
at various prices, where the latter are all expressed as a pr<:.port~on 
of OP. For instance the price OF exceeds OP in the proportion 
PF /OP, and since OP is equal to unity, the proportional marginal 
excess cost of OM1units of additional border areas output over the 
marginal cost of production h'l the rest of the country is simply PF. 
In other words PF is the proportional marginal shortfall in the ef-
ficiency of the border areas for industrial production compared with 
the rest of the country. 
In chapter 8 we attempt to construct an index of marginal 
excess private cost for each of 130 manufacturing sectors. · It is 
useful,. however, to clarify a number of issues in purely conceptual 
terms before that task is undertaken. 
curve 
Some special features of this supply/need to be emphasized. 
First, it relates not to the total amount of industrial production in 
the border areas, but to the addition to border areas industrial pro-
duction which is generated per annum, on the average. over a certain 
number of years. That is; it shows the absolute average annual rate 
of growth of industrial production in the border areas, as a function 
of the revenue per unit expressed as a proportion of prices in non-
border areas received by manufacturing concerns in the border areas. 
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Second, the supply curve is an aggregated supply curve in the sense 
that it relates not to a single firm, but to all actual and potential 
border areas firms together. Just as the supply curve of a particular 
industry is the aggregate of the supply curves of the individual firms 
making up the industry, so SS, the supply curve of additional indus• 
trial p1.·oduction as an aggregate, can be broken down into a number 
of industry supply curves. Third, SS slopes upwards towards the 
right for the following reasons: (i) it is assumed that all industries 
are producing subject to increasing marginal production costs; 
(ii) as each industry's output expands the geographical extent of the 
market will increase so that transport costs per unit of output expand; 
and (iii) as industrial production in the border areas increases, 
industries less and less suited to location in the border areas will 
have to be sited there. While we have drawn SS as a smooth steadily 
rising curve, it is clearly more likely to be a stepped line, but a curve 
of the latter sort would merely be an inconvenience and adding nothing 
essential to the analysis. 
Fourth, the position of SS, in particular the fact that it cuts 
PSR at some positive level of production, is partly explained by the 
fact that some industrial output can be produced in the border areas 
more cheaply than in other parts of the country, so that the border 
areas represent the best location for these units of output. These 
industries, in other words, do not require any government assistance 
to induce them to go to the border areas. The amount of additional 
industrial production generated by such industries per annum is OM, 
and producers o:f all these OM units, except the last, should be pre-
pared to pay the government a tax rather than lose the right to estab-
lish themselves in border areas. The latter is clearly true of 1nost 
sugar mills in :Katal. for instance. Such additional industrial produc-
tion is not, therefore, the result of government intervention, and if 
firms producing these intra-marginal units do receive border areas 
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inducements. the latter are superfluous. Only additional industrial 
production in excess of OM units would require inducements and when, 
as in the last chapter, we ask whether government intervention is 
justified on economiC grounds we refer to those cases in which firms 
will not produce in the border areas unless the government diverts them 
to these areas. For the moment we assume that when industries are 
diverted, this is done exclusively by the use of'positive incentives, 11 
that is by means of direct and indirect subsidies of various sorts. 1 
In the absence of government interven~ion, the average ar>..nual 
increase in border industries output would be OM. Our problem in 
chapter 5 was whether there was any case on economic grounds for 
government action to induce units of output in addition to OM. 
Let us consider the effect of a subsidy per unit of output on 
the supply curve SS. A proportional subsidy equal to PF per unit of 
output, say~ is made available to industrial producers in the border 
areas. Costs per unit of border areas additional industrial production 
thus fall by PF, and the supply curve falls vertically throughout its 
length by this amount. The relevant supply curve allowing for the 
subsidy is s 1s 1, and the annual increase in border areas output rises 
to OM 1• The amount of induced border areas production thus, is 
MM1 units. 
Assuming for the moment that external effects and other 
factors which might otherwise justify subsidisation of this sort on 
economic grounds, are absent, there is a loss of productive efficiency 
which is reflected in a fall in the real product,. The total amount 
paid in subsidies is PCEF, part of which. PAEF. represents the re-
distributive effect of the subsidy, and not a real loss in economic 
efficiency. The total social cost of the extra MM 1 units induced is, 
therefore, simply equal to the area ACE which is the producer cost. 
Unlike a tariff, a subsidy does not result in any loss of consumers' 
1. The effect of physical control is dealt with in chapter 10. 
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surplus by users of the products protected, as there is no increase in the 
price of products produced by firms diverted to the border areas. 
Thus the total excess private and (under the present assumptions) 
social cost of the assistance given to border industries by means of 
subsidiaation is ACE, and the proportional marginal excess private 
cost of producti on is equal to the vertical distance between SS and PSR 
namely EC (=FP). The latter is simply the excess of. the marginal 
cost of OM1 units to private producers in the border areas (without 
the subsidy) over th~ price of that unit when produced outside the 
border areas. 
If an average annual increase over and above OM is to be 
achieved in the border areas, therefore, a subsidy must be paid to 
producers, and the subsidy required per additional unit of output in-
creases as output is inc reased. It might be noted, however, that if 
instead of paying a proportional subsidy of PF per unit only sub-margin-
al units had been subsidised, just to the extent necessary to induce 
th eir production in the border areas, the total subsidy payment would 
have been ACE , e q ual to the producer cost instead of PCEF and no 
income distribution effect would have been involved. The total social 
cost is thus the same in both cases. 1 
The above remarks are not meant to suggest that border in-
dustries are in fact assisted by the Government in either of the two 
ways discussed. N or is it suggested that these forms of assistance 
should be used, since they would be appropriate only if the government's 
obje ctive were to generate a given a1nount of induced industrial output 
in the border areas at the lowest possible total cost, or the maximum 
a mount possible at some predetermined total cost. If the obje ctive 
were to achieve these aims with the smalle st increase i n the tax bill 
then the method described in the preceding paragraph would be preferable. 
1. Politically. though, it obviously makes a difference whethe r an 
amount ACE or PCEF has to be raised in taxes for this purpose. 
Hence inducements to border industries are given non a s e lective 
basis". 
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In fact. however, the Government does not give subsidies baaed 
direct! y on the additional output contributed by firms in the borcier 
areas. Instead, as we_ shall see, they rely upon a limited range of 
indirect subsidies such as tax rebates and low interest loans which 
in the main are related to the amount of fixed capital used by the 
asaisted firms.. The appropriateness of the.se measures, however, 
cannot be fruitfully discussed until we learn more about the real 
objectives of the policy. 
~ow it is clear that, in terms of the above discussion, the 
government may be regarded as a buyer of industrial production, 
if it induces an addition to productive capacity in excess of CM. 
From one point of view the price it pays is equal to the tax revenue 
needed to pay the subsidies given to border industries. Let us 
assume that the government is sufficiently discriminating to avoid 
subsidising intra-marginal units. In this case, if it uses a subsidy 
proportional to the increase in total output, it is necessary to pay 
a "pri ce" per unit of additional border areas output of MM 1 equal to 
CE, the marginal excess cost of CM 1 units. Cn this basis the supply 
curve facing the government as a "buyer" of additional industrial pro-
duction is AS, with ASR as the horizontal axis and the perpendicular 
through A as the vertical axis. AS thus relates induced (bought) 
additional border areas industrial production per annum to the subsidy 
("price") paid per unit. If the government subsidises sub-marginal 
units only to the extent that is absolutely necessary, however, we no 
longer have a convential supply curve (relating price per unit to quantity), 
but, on the system of axes just described, a line AS relating the quantity 
indue ed to the total amount paid which in the case of AC ( =MM 1) units 
is equal to ACE, or to the marginal subsidy CE. 
Up to this point in the present analysis we have been implicitly 
abstracting from the possibility, discussed in chapter 5, that (i) 
permanent subsidisation may be justified by divergences between social 
and private costs, that is by external effects, so that subsidy payments 
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in respect of units of border industries output which are sub-marginal 
from a private point of vie w, might tend to increase the national real 
product rather than dinlinish it; (ii) t emporary subsidisation, based 
on some variant of the infant industry argument. though initially un-
favourable to economic efficiency may have a beneficial effect on the 
national real product in the long run. 
We now consider the effects of taking into account the first 
possibility. The vertical distance b e tween SS and PSR represents 
the marginal excess private and social cost of border areas industrial 
production under the assumption that there are no external effects. 
External economies (diseconomies)attaching to the diversion of indus-
tries to border areas, however. would cause the marginal excess 
social cost to be lower (higher) for a particular level of output than 
the marginal excess private cost. If net external economies were 
positive (negative) for all levels of border areas industrial production, 
therefore, a curve drawn to reflect marginal costs of additional border 
areas output from a social rather than a private viewpoint would be 
below (above) S S throughout. Let us call the new curve ST. 
ST obviously c a nnot lie wholly below PSR since this would 
mean that all new industria.}. establishments in the country should be 
sited in the border areas and subsidised in order to maximise the 
national real product. But it is possible, indeed the official view 
s e ems to be that it is highly probable~ that at l east some level of 
proportional eubsidisation is justified on economic grounds in the sense 
that it would increase the national real product. This, as we noted 
above, has not been established beyond doubt, but we shall assume, 
for the sake of argum.ent, that it holds good. Thus it seems plausible 
to assun1e that ST lies below P SR for all levels of production up to 
OM 1, say, and thereafter rises above it. 
1 ST, the refore, passes 
1. We have drawn ST ort the assumption that the absolute size of mar-
ginal external economies resulting from border industrie s production 
increases as the level of production in creases, but that m arginal 
external economie s are a constant proportion of marginal private 
• EC. .::: ~ 
costs, 1. e. E 1'1 1 w 1"'\;:1. , 
through C and the level of induced additional border areas output 
per annum, which is justified on economic grounds, when external 
economies are taken into account, is MM 1. 
2?. ~-
We shall, for argument's sake ignore all the problems, dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter, associated with the detection, measure-
ment, and correction of external effec ts if they are to be exploited for 
the economic benefit of the country. We shall, for the same reason, 
also ignore the fact that subsidies relating simply to output or capital 
usage (as in the case of the present border areas incentives), or even to 
employment ( a possibility discussed below) are unlikely to be the ap-
propriate method of diverting industries, where diversion is called 
for, to correct for the external effects.. Under these assumptions 
we may conclude that if MM 1 units are diverted to the border areas 
by a subsidy of EC permit, the average annual increase in border areas 
industrial production of GM 1 will be optimal from a social point of 
view. vYhereas at the additional output level OM 1 the marginal 
excess private cost is EC, the marginal excess socialcost is zero. 
If for some reason the Government were to induce a greater 
increase in border areas industrial production than MM 1, say M :W. 2 , 
t h e proportional subsidy, required per unit of induced production would 
be PH (equal to the marginal excess private cost). Due to the external 
effects, the subsidy ls greater than the marginal excess social cost. 
but since the latter is now positive, the diversion of the M 1 M 2 involves 
an economic loss. If more than M M 1 units of industrial production 
are to be diverted to the border areas per annun1. therefore, there 
should be some non-economic benefit to compensate for the positive 
marginal excess social cost. In other words, if MM2 units are 
diverted the total economic loss from the point of view of society as a 
whole is CQR. Unless non- e conomic benefits (somehow valued in the 
same units) exceed this, it will not be worth the cost. 
The SS curve includes firms which benefit from the type of 
external economies associated with variants of the infant industrie s 
case. Production by some of these firms involves an excess private 
cost in the early learning period and will, therefore, not be undertaken 
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without assistance. Nevertheless when the external economies are 
taken into account the costs to society are lower than the marginal 
costs of private firms. Some production in this category will thus 
be economically worthwhile from a social point of view, while other 
production units which do not pass the Baatable test described in chapter 
5, may neve1·theless involve a smaller marginal excess social cost 
than SS suggests. Thus the average annual reduction in private costs 
due to the external economies resulting from the dynamic learning 
process associated with infancy,_ causes SS to fall vertically by an am-
ount equal to this average annual reduction. Correspondingly, since 
the price required per unit of output of infant industries in the border 
areas falls with each successive year, we may regard SS as relating 
the annual increase in output in the border areas to the average of the 
prices received per unit over the whole life of the infant industries. 
Thus this special type of external economy bas the same effect as other 
external economies resulting from border areas industrial production, 
and the divergence o! ST from SS may therefore be regarded as showing 
the combined effect of all types of external economies. 
On the basis of marginal social costs, therefore, the average 
annual increase in border areas industrial production warranted by 
economic considerations alone is vM1 and the optimal volume of diver-
ted industrial production is MM 1,. That is it is economically desirable 
for governmE:nt action to induce MM 1 units of production over and above 
the annual increase CM which would have come about had the market 
been left to itself. The subsidy required on the marginal unit is E C, 
but the marginal excess social cost is zero. The size of the subsidy 
required on the marginal unit, and the excess social cost, however. 
both increase as the volume of induced border areas production increases. 
and when the latter is :r. •• n . .tf2 the size of the subsidy required on the mar-
ginal unit and the marginal excess social cost are QW and QR respectively. 
Some other determinants of the position and sl ope of the SS 
curve, which have important implications for government policy should 
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also be noted. The slope of SS depends partly on the elasticity of 
the supply curves of border areas firms, that is, on the proportionate 
increase in border areas industrial production relative to the propor-
tionate increase in price; and partly on the rate at which new firms 
are established in the border areas in response to increases in price. 
The steeper the slope of SS, the greater will be the size of the subsidy 
required on the marginal unit for any given volume of induced industrial 
production. If, as our analysis of chapter 8 below sugge•ts, the mar-
ginal excess private costs rise very sharply after a certain point, as 
firms increasingly unsuited to location in border areas have to be diverted, 
the tax costs of inducing border areas industrial production rise cor-
respondingly steeply. Assuming, as we have done , that marginal 
external economies are a constant proportionof marginal private costs, 
the slope of ST will increase in the same proportion as the slope of SS 
increases, and accordingly. the marginal excess social costs of any 
particular volume of induced decentralisation also rise steeply. The 
economically optimal scale of induced border areas industrial production, 
determined by the intersection of ST and PSR is correspondingly reduced. 
It follows that if, as we show in chapter 8, marginal excess 
private costs rise steeply as the volume of induced border areas indus-
trial production increases, the same will be true of marginal excess 
social costs. Thus, while the diversion of industries might pos sibly 
be carried out on a certain (probably small) scale without imposil1.g an 
undue strain on tax resources and on industrial efficiency, it appears 
that if carried beyond this level marginal excess private coats and mar-
ginal excess social costs rise very sharply. The analysis of chapter 
8. therefore, su~gests that the costs of government intervention since 
1960 (discussed in chapter 9), though not insignificant, m a y not be a 
good guide to the probable effects of any significant intensification of 
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decentralisation measures. The costs might well rise in a greater 
proportion than the increase in the average annual volume of diverted 
industries. These, however, are questions of fact, which are dealt 
with later, and we now return to the task of this chapter which is to 
clarify issues, in particular to elucidate in general terms. the nature 
of the costs and benefit s of government intervention in the location of 
industry. 
The position of the supply curve depends also on a consideration 
discussed in chapter 4, namely the distribution of border areas indus -
trial production between different specific centres in the border areas. 
Our SS curve has been drawn on the assumption that government inter-
vention will divert firms to those particular sites in the border areas 
which are best suited to the firms in question, (even though no border 
areas site would have been chosen without intervention) so that the mar-
ginal excess private costs of induced border areas industrial production 
on any particular scale are minimised. or, if there are economiC benefi ts 
resulting from diversion, so that these benefits are maximised. 
But if the Government merely attempts to divert industries in 
such a way as to m:i.nimise the economic costs of a particular volume 
of border areas industrial production (or employment) or to maximise 
the latter at a given cost, the resulting distribution of additional pro-
ductivity capacity between different border areas centres may be un-
satisfactory in view of the non-economic objectives of the policy. For 
instance, the cost cr~terion might indicate that a large proportion of 
induced additional capacity should be sited in border area centres, 
like Rosslyn, which are close to large cities, 1 and in, say, the ~atal 
1. This is particularly likely since, as we show in chapter 8, the cost 
areas 
of diverting industri<!s from locations in the metropolitan/, when these 
represent the least cost locations, tends, other things being equal, 
to be smaller the shorter the distance between such locations and 
the border areas sites to which the industries are diverted. 
225 
border areas, rather than in the Transvaal or Eastern Cape border 
areas. But if the distribution resulting from this criterion is un-
satisfactory from other points of view, the Government may prefer 
to pay a higher total price, in terms of subsidies and loss of productive 
efficiency, for a particular aggregate amount of additional border areas 
productiv!ty capacity for the benefits of a better distribution between 
border areas centres. For instance, it rr1ay be prepared to give larger 
inducements to firms in what seems to be regarded as the problem area. 
the Ciskei. 1 This will increase the marginal excess private and social 
cost of a particular volume of diverted industries. In other words, 
the slope of both SS and ST will increas~. In other words, any particular 
SS curve with its corresponding ST curve implies a specific pro-
portional distribution between individual border areas. The greater 
the departure from the least cost distribution the steeper will SS and 
ST be. 1'he Government clearly regards the border areas intended 
to provide employment for Transkei and Ciskei Bantu as presenting 
the greatest difficulties, and has given them special concessions 2 
not available to other border areas. 1'\evertheless, the volume of 
additional employment induced in these centres since 1960 has been 
relatively small,. There have been hints though that increased em-
phasis will be placed on these centres in future, and this will clearly 
have a bearing or ... the marginal excess social costs of measurE::s to in-
duatrialise the border areas. 
The reason for regarding these centres as representing a 
problem area is apparently that ll'l. relation to available jobs, and 
development potc...""ltial the Dantu population is very large, as we showed 
i.u chapter 3. This· is another indication~ if further indications are 
needed, that economic considerations play a negligible part and that 
as a result ev.:!n quite small amounts of induced decentralisation are 
likely to invlove econ.omic loss. 
1. See chapter 9, p. 390 
2. See chapter «l, p. 367 
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But as we acknowledged at the outset,. it is sometimes desirable 
to forego economic benefits for non-economic benefits, and we: cannot 
object to border areas policy simply because it appears that some 
economic harm may result. While a good deal more can be said about 
the economic costs of border areas industrial production and more will 
be said later in this. study, it is necessary now to turn our attention to 
tht: demand side of the proble1n. Little further progress can be made 
in our discussion unless we do so. We are, therefore, concerned now 
with the non-economic benefits of decentralisation policy. For reasons 
that will emerge shortly, if they are not already apparent, the discussion 
of non-economic benefits is absolutely essential to an assessn~nt of the 
economic implications of this policy, and is not in the nature of a 
digressionin the context of a study primarily concerned with the economics 
of industrial decentralisation. 
The government has a preference for border areas industrial-
isation as against industrialisation in other areas. 1 In the technical 
language of economics, it bas a 'taste' for border areas industrial 
producti<m. The chief benefit which the Government and hence= the 
electorate derives is the gratification of a political desire to bring 
about racial separationt which ia seen as necessary to ensure the sur-
vival of the white minority in South Africa. Because of the non-e conomic 
value attached to border areas industrialisation the Government is pre-
pared to sacrifice a certain amount of real product as the necessary 
price of greater political security. 
Border areas industrial production can, therefore, be regarded 
~ 
as a 'collective consumption good' or 'public good' " desired by the 
white electorate~ The amount of the good demanded at various prices 
depends on the marginal valuatioll attached by the Government to different 
1. This postulate is modified below. 
2 . Sec for instance Leif Johansen. Public E conomics, (:f\orth-Holland 
Publishing Conlpany, Amsterdam, 1965), Chap. 6; and W. J. Baumol. 
Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, Second Edition (London, 
1965), pp. 19-24. See also H. G. Johnson in an article "The E conomic 
Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining and the Formation of 
Customs Unions.'' quoted above. 
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quantities of the good. The nature of this demand curve is an in-
triguing question which could occupy a book on its own. It would, 
however, be neither· fitting nor especially rewarding for us to attempt 
to go into the details of this matter in the context of our present problem. 
lt seems safe to say, however~ that it is anything but a solid line, that 
it involves a considerable degree of uncertainty, and that it is liable to 
shift its position quite substantially from time to time. Also it is un-
doubtedly true of objectives of this sort that they are not arrived at as 
a result of attempts to make careful and precise, let alone quantitative, 
assessments of their probable effects. Certainly this is true of the 
el<~ctorate who are not in a position to make a rational assessment of 
each policy adopted by the Government, when indeed it might be irra-
tional for them to try to do so, and who, therefore, by and large, are 
simply involved in choosing between slogans. 1 The dangers~£ treating 
policy problems in any naive 1nechanistic sort of way are stressed by 
Profcs sar Hutchison who says: 
"It is the diffusiveness and imprecision of the objectives of 
policies, and i."'levitably high degree of uncertainty as to the ramifica-
tions of their effects which make it dangerously misleading to try to re-
present policy problems simply as calculations, and to evade or U.."'lder-
estimate the role of uncertainty attitudes and judgment11 • 2 
The demand curve GG which we have drawn in our diagram, and 
which is based on the n1arginal valuation attached to different quantities 
of induced border areas industrial production~ is therefore~ purely illus• 
trative. It merely summarises the facts that the Government does attach 
a positive value to border areas industrialisation for political reasons, , 
so that it prefers more to lt:ss of it, that it is unlikely to increase the 
1. Sec Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Politics in a 
Dernocracy", Journal_s>f I~_olitical .E;conomy, LXVI (April 1957), pp. 135-
150. 
2. T. '-tV. Hutchison. Positive Economics and Policy Objectives, (Allen 
and Unwin, London 1964), p. 184. 
2.2~ 
volume of diverted industries in total disregard of other considerations, 
including the marginal excess social cost, and indeed, that even if it 
d id want to do so there is a physical limit to the resources which it 
has at its disposal for this purpose. The scale of preferences of an 
individual for different combinations of consumers t goods is not nec-
essarily arrived at by concious rational calculation, but given the prices 
of these goods and his income level, this docs not prevent us from say-
ing some quite useful things about the problem of 'consumers' choice. 
V'e are merely stating the fact, fundamental to all economic problems 
that there is an opposition between ends and means which has to be re-
solved in some way or other. 
A com.ment by Hutchison 1 again has relevance in this connection. 
Ee says: 
11Li~e consumet"s or housewives, 'policy makers base their 
acts consciously or unconsciously on preferenc~s'2 We are not con-
e <. rnt·d 1H~rP- with the political process by which policy-prcferenc-:s 
and preferencr -, or social -, w~lfare functions nre, or should be, 
arrived at, or with '\vhence they are ultimately to be derived by the 
economist, or with questions of political co•~stitutio11. - making or voting 
procedures ' '. 
\'lith P as tht. el'igin of the system o! ax~s GG shows the marginal 
valuation attach ~d by the Government to dif!t.rent quantities of induced 
bordt!r areae industrial production. V e as sumt. that th¢ Government 
s:.:·~ks to maximise ti·e country's 'real income' which consists of utility 
d erived fro1n both private and public consumption, rathe r than the real 
product defiP.ed a s total production of privately appropriable goods and 
sc:rvi ces. If tht! Government acts rationally in pursuit of this ~oal 
it will induc e border area s indush•ial production to the point where the 
marginn.1. collective uti.Hty of such production in equal to th-.! r.narginal 
sod.al cost of this collective consu.1nption good. Thus irf>ur diagr a1n, 
Ol'.rf2 is the equilibrium average annual increase i-.. border ar?as indus-
trial production, :Nil- r.2 i s the equilibrium induced portion of trc latter, 
1. op. cit., p. 178 .. 
2. C. E. Lindblom, 'Policy Analysis', American Economic Review, 
June 1958, p. 302. 
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the marginal excess cost and the marginal valuation are equal to RQ, 
the marginal excess private cost is WQ~ and the total subsidy bill is 
AQW. 1 Though the Government will be maximising the country's real 
income, as defined, according to its own utility function~ it will not be 
maximising the national real product, since maximisation of real income 
requires a sacrifice of real product in order to gratify the preference for 
collective consumption of border areas industrial production. 
A preference for border areas industrial production does not, of 
course, necessarily imply that a sacrifice of real product will be: necessary 
to satisfy it. If GG cuts Strat C or to the left of C, then no policy pro-
blem arises since increased economic efficiency and increased border 
areas industrial production are compatible with one another up to M M 1 
units of induced border areas industrial production. B ut we show 
GG lying entirely to the right of C because in view of the considerations 
mentioned at the end of chapter 5 it is highly improbable that a signifi-
cant degree of industrial decentralisation can be sustained on economic 
grounds alone, and the indicattons are that the Government envisages 
border areas industrialisation on a large scale. There is as w e noted 
also no empirical evidence to show that external economies relevant to 
location policy are num.erous and widespread. It is true that the Gov-
ernment has not committed itself to any specific target rate of increase 
in border areas industrial production. It has, however, proclaimed its i 
intention of stopping the i.n.fl.ux of Bantu in the larger urban centrt: s, and 
of eventually reversing the direction of the flow. Assuming that this 
tightening of influx control measures will be accompanied by a corres-
onding readiness to induce border areas industrial production on a scale 
sufficient to employ all those Bantu who as a result will need to be em-
ployed elsewhere, the scale of development inplied is apparently con-
siderable, doubtless gre ater than the average annual increas~ (0~.1 1 in 
tht~ diagram) which maximises the national real product. 
1. Assuming subsidies arc given only on sub-marginal units in the border 
areas, and just to the extent necessary to offset the private cost 
advantage of the least cost location. 
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Our postulate that there is a collective preference for border 
areas industrial production, requires to be modified slightly. Since 
border areas policy is seen as an important instrument for bringing 
about separate development, a more appropriate postulate is that the 
Government has a preference for employment in the border areas. In 
particular, it is a preference for the employment of Bantu workers in 
the border areas. The benefit to be derived from border areas indus-
trial production is, therefore, employYnent of Bantu workers in those 
areas rather than in 'white' areas. 
Explicit recognition of the precise nature of the preference for 
border areas development is of considerable importance if the types of 
assistance given and the industries selected for assistance are to be 
those most appropriate to the task. For, after all,the appropriateness 
of specific instruments cannot be properly assessed except in relation 
to the aims which they are intended to achieve. Furthermore, the 
consequences of government induced decentralisation depend very much 
on the specific instruments adopted. The more appropriate are the 
latter the less costly will be the attainment of the objectives of the policy 
at any particular level. And there is little point in evaluating the con-
sequences of pursuing an objective, on the assumption that instruments 
other than thos.e best adapted to the task are to be used. This is one 
of the most important justifications for our discussion of motives in 
the present analysis. 
In his analysis of the scientific tariff structure Johns on has re-
marked that "the precise source of the preference for industrial pro-
duction will influence the form of expenditure of resoul"ces through 
government action. and especially the distribution of resources so 
spent among particular industries". 1 The preference for border areas 
1. We are in effect referring to the scientific subsidy structure as com-
pared with the scientific tariff structure. See H. G. Johnson, ''The 
Cost of Protection and the Scientific Tariff; Journal of Political 
~conomy, September, 1960. 
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industrial production is a derived preference, the source of which 
is the primary preference for Bantu employment in the border areas. 
Given this primary preference, it follows that the Government should 
attempt to equate the marginal social cost with the marginal valuation 
in collective consumption of employment in the border areas. The 
marginal cost of an additional unit of employment in the border areas, 
however, will differ from one industry to another. depending on the labour 
requirement per unit of output, and the elasticity of supply and demand 
in each industry. For instance, the greater is the labour coefficient of 
an industry the smaller is the subsidy per worker represented by a given 
subsidy per unit, and, therefore, other things being equal, the lower 
is the marginal cost per unit of employment in the border areas. Thus, 
other things being equal, industries with a higher labour coefficient 
should be paid a larger subsidy per unit of output if the marginal cost 
of employment in the border areas is to be made equal for all industries 
and hence the total cost of any amount of border areas employment 
minimised. 1 E quality of marginal cost of employment in all industries 
thus is the rule for the distribution of resources spent by the govern-
ment among particular industries. The optimum general level of sub-
sidy, subject to this rule, is given by the equality of the values of the 
marginal social utilities derived from employment in all industries with 
the marginal social costs of employment in all indu• tries. It is obvious 
that these criteria can easily be modified to allow for the assumption 
that it is primarily Bantu employme nt and not employme nt in general 
which is the benefit sought by the Government from border areas indus-
trialisation. The problem of specific instruments and of the most 
suitable industries for diveriJion is taken up again and develope d more 
1. See Johnson op. cit., p. 343: "The scientific tariff rate on a commodity 
whose production constitutes a desirable way of life will be higher the 
higher its labor requirements per unit of output, the highe r ita free 
trade ratio of deomeatic output to consumption, the higher its elasticity 
of supply, and the lower its elasticity of demand" . 
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fully in chapter 9 below. 
While the evidence presented in chapter 1 and more recent 
official statements, 1 show beyond doubt that the dominant motive of 
border .industries policy is racial separation, and that any other benefits 
which might result would be purely incidental, we cannot disregard the 
possibility that there may be other non-economic benefits which can be 
obtained from industrial decentralisation. These may .provide a sound 
basis for government intervention in the location of industry even in the 
absence of the objective of separate development or any economic jus-
tification. The following statement from the report of the Viljoen 
Commission, while reinforcing the view that the border industries 
policy is primarily an instrument of separate development policy, men-
tions a number of factors which the Commiseion may perhaps regard 
as independent and sufficient reasons for inducing industrial development 
in the border areas. After summarising the economic costs, they say: 
ttFar more important are the social costs of concentration. The 
urbanisation of the African has led to the massing of large numbers of 
Natives who have broken from tribal relations that had given their lives 
content and meaning and have congregated in the large industrial cities. 
The massing of large numbers of people who are inadequately fed, whose 
family and social life are disintegrated, who are forced to travel long 
1. For instance, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development has said that the flow of Bantu labour "must be 
reduced, then it must be stopped, and then it must be turned 
back... the government is in deadly earnest about this and is 
absolutely determined that it will succeed11 • He indicated that 
development in the border and Bantu areas would be needed to 
employ labour no longer needed in the cities. Reported in the 
Financial Mail, March 10~ 1967, P- 63Z. Ha iii al~o reported 
to have said that to allow the inflow of Bantu labour into the Wit-
watersrand and the Western Cape wo-uld mean the 'Suicide of the 
White Nation'. Evening Post. Port Elizabeth, March 7, 1967. 
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distances to and from their work, and who consequently fall an easy 
prey to immorality and political subversion, represents the social 
cost of industrialisation in this country111 
The statement seems to imply that, quite apart from the greater 
political stability to which it may contribute, and which, it is arguable~ 
will benefit all in the long term, border areas industrialisation will avoid 
certain adverse effects on the well-being of individual African families 
which arise from their presence in large urban centres. 
Let us consider the fact that Africans in the large industrial 
centres are forced to travel long distances to and from work. First, 
it is by no means clear that the distances travelled to and from work 
by Bantu employed in border industries will be shorter than those in-
volved in the larger urban areas . Umdantsane the large township con-
structed to house workers employed in the East London - King William's 
Town area is a considerable distance from the places of employment 
of some of the irihabitants. Wr~ting of urban townships of this sort, 
situated within the bordersof the African reserves, Muriel Horrell says: 
11 
'Homeland' townships are often further away from the towns 
where the workers are employed than are the municipal townships, and 
transport and other living costs may be higher. The writer estimated 
that African families in East London may be involved in additional costs 
ranging from R2. 80 to R8. 95 per month, depending on where the 
workers are employed. 
"As mentioned above, some workers may have to commute for 
considerable distances, returning home at weekends only and living in 
the towns where they are employed during the week. This will be the 
case at the Selosesha township at Thaba 'Nchu, which will eventually 
serve the Free State goldfields - 180 miles away - as well as Bloemfontein, 
40 miles distant, and Thaba 'Nchu itsel£11 • 2 
1. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Policy Relating to the 
Protection of Indust.rie• .. U. G. 36/1958, p. 54. 
2. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1965, pp. 193-194. 
234 
The reference to the Free State goldfields and Bloemfontein 
is quoted here, not because these can be regarded as border areas10 
as defined in chapter 4, but because it does suggest that a shortening 
of travelling distances cannot easily be accepted as one of the objectives 
of border industries policy. 
E ven if travelling distances to and from work are shorter in the 
border areas, it should be noted that Africans wil:ynot necessarily be 
better off in this account. The avoidance of lengthy journeys may be 
regarded as conferring a net benefit on workers only if conditions of 
employment in the border areas are at least as favourable in other re-
spects as in the large metropolitan centres. 
Other parts of the passage from the report of the Viljoen Com-
mission, in particular the references to the "Natives who have broken 
from tribal relations that have given their lives a content and meaningtt, 
and to the disintegration of family and social life, may be intended to 
suggest that these problems would be lessened in border areas, and 
that either Africans would feel themselves to be better off on this account 
in border areas, or at least that in the view of the Government they would 
in fact be better off. First, however, it appears that the families of 
border industries workers will be permitted into the urban townships 
like Umdantsane on a permanent basis only if the head of the family 
is a householder in the area, that is, if he owns a house. One of the 
conditions necessary for this, however, is that he ''renounce rights to 
land holdings (including arable plots) elsewhere in any Bantu or Trust 
area". 
1 Those who· do not choose to do this "may live in hostels (if 
available), or as lodgers ~ouses owned or rented by others~ but may 
not have their families with them except for visits. 11 2 Will the fainily 
life of workers in this category be any better in the urban townships sit-
uated within the borders of the Bantu areas. than in the large industrial 
cities? ttHome visiting"3 may well be rather easier for some workers 
than it would be if they were employed in Johannesburg, say, but the 
rural land holdings for most are likely to be a considerable distance 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Muriel Horrell, op. cit. , p. 192. 
ibid. 
-
See P. M ayer, op. cit. 
away, and regular and frequent contact with the family may well 
involve substantial transport costs even in border area townships. 
235 
In the case of the initially landless or those who renounce rights 
to land elsewhere, it is possible to have thefamily living permanently in 
the urban township. But would not beads of family in this category also 
be likely to take ~eir families with them to the large industrial areas 
if they were employed there? Our analysis of chapter 2 suggests that 
the landless do have a stronger incentive to permanent urbanisation with 
their families. If they do not take them is this or is it not largely due 
to influx control regulations? 1 If indeed, in.fl~ control is a significant 
reason for the separation of workers in the larger cities from their fam-
ilies, canthe possibility of bringing the members of such disintegrated 
frunilies together in urban townships like Umdantsane be regarded as a 
benefit of border areas industrialisation, which is independent of the 
political benefit discussed above? 
Perhaps we should see the disrupting of tribal relations, that is, 
the fact that members of the Bantu population "have had to sever th~ir 
communal ties in their traditional habitations", Z as a disadvantage of 
employment in the large industrial areas which is additional to the pro-
blem arising from the breakup of the family. Professor Mayer's ex-
cellent work3 on the process of urbanisation shows that it is extrem.ely 
dangerous to generalise about Africans as a whole. In a large number 
of cases. it appears, newcomers to towns regard life there as preferable 
to the tribal relations and they are only too happy to sever their ncom-
munal ties". So far as second and third generation urban dwellers are 
1. We showed in chapter 2 that the increasingly severe application of 
influx control in Cape Town during the 1950's was asaociated witha 
sharp rise in the masculinity ratio in Langa. 
2.. Prime Minister's statement, 2. June 1960. 
3. op. cit. 
concerned, most have not had any first hand experience of life in the 
traditional society and consequently do not feel deprived of it. 
Very little seems to be known about the social strains and ten-
sions experienced by Natives massed together in large numbers and 
whether these tensions are greater in the townships of the large indus-
trial areas than they are in a township like Umdantsane, which bas al-
ready grown to a significant size. 1 It appears, also, to be at least ques-
tionable whether communal ties can be any more easily maintained in 
Umdantsane than in Johannesburg, and, presumably, if the Government 
succeeds in generating substantial industl'ial employment in the border 
areas. the urban townships there will increasingly acquire the charac-
teristics of the Mrican townships in Johannesburg and other large centres. 
It is hard to see how the need for adjustment to town life and factory em-
ployment and the severing o£ communal ties can be avoided whether 
additional manufacturing employment is provided in the large industrial cent-
res or in the borde:r areas . Industrialisation always involved urban-
isation and this in turn demands adaptation by migrants to a new way of 
life. If the potential benefits of economic growth are to be realised it 
may be that these difficulties must be faced. 
Let us say though, that there is a certain group of Mricane who 
would prefer life in a border areas urban township to life in Johannesburg, 
other things being equal. At present the IJ"'.igrants decision to move is 
an entirely free one and he is under no legal compulsion to settle in the 
large industrial centres. On the contrary, he moves despite official 
discouragement. . It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that they 
reckon the economic advantages of u rbanisation to outweigh any social 
disadvantages that go with it. The readiness of workers to live in 
Johannesburg, even if the atmosphere there is regarded by them as 
1. See Muriel Ho rrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1967. 
Thel·e are a ccording to this survey 6087 dwellings in Umdantsane and 
an official population of 40,000. But Mr. David Lazarus the Mayor 
of East London has claimed that the de facto population is between 
80, 00 0 a nd 100, 000. 
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unsatisfactory, is of course perfe"Ctly understandable. For after all 
material poverty is itself a social evil, and the poorer is a people, other 
things being equal, the greater is the value it attaches to additional mater-
ial income relative to an improvement in the friendliness of its surroundings. 
Indeed, a number of the social problems encountered in the urban areas 
have their origin in poverty as such, as the Viljoen Commission's ref-
erence to "people who are inadequately fedH sugge&ts, and consequently 
cannot be solved merely by denying them access to the large industrial 
centres and instead diverting them to the border areas. I£ those Africans 
who prefer life in the border areas residential townships to the townships 
of Cape Town and Johannesburg, but for economic reasons would choose 
the latter, are not to be worse off in border areas~ they must actually be 
employed there at real wages which, taking into account this possible non-
economic benefit, are equivalent to those prevailing in the metropolitan 
areas. Border areas development which proceeded at a slower pace than 
is necessary to achieve this minimum requirement can hardly claim to 
have as one of its objectives an improvement in the African1 s social en-
vironment. Clearly no champion of 11decongestion" in Britian could con-
vincingly claim that a worker unemployed or employed on very poor 
terms in North-east England is necessarily better off because he is spared 
the ''over-crowded" conditions of London. 
An important characteristic of certain of the alleged social evils 
of industrial concentration is worth noting. If it is felt that more weight 
should be given to social conditions as distinct from productive capacity, 
it does not follow automatically that industrial decentralisation is the only 
or the cheapest remedy available. Several social problems can be rem-
edied at least in part by expenditure in the congested areas themselves 
to improve amenities. 
to earlier states: 
The Board of Trade and Industries report referred 
"The social aspects of undue concentration in large cities are 
well known. Unless adequate housing, good food, hospital facilities~ and 
other social amenities are provided for, it must have an undermining 
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effect on the physical and moral well-being of the working population 
and thus on the long term productivity of the nation". 1 
This statement implicitly recogniees the possibility of dealing 
with -certain social problems at the urban end. The optimal remedy 
dependson whether the additional costs involved in raising conditions to 
an acceptable level in the congested areas are greater or less than the 
economic cost of diverting industries to be border areas. It is also 
apparent that adequate housing , hospital facilities and other aocial amen-
ities can only be maintained at a satisfactory standard if sufficient sums 
of money are spent on them. "The increase in crime and the additional 
services needed to counter thesE~ evils11 2 may also fall in some measure 
in the same category. It would be interesting to know whether .. the in-
crease in crimen implies an increase in the crime rate in the large urban 
centres compared with the urban townships serving the border areas, and 
if so, whether the crime rate in the metropolitan areas could be signific-
antly reduced by reducing the size of the African population of those areas, 
without giving rise to worse social evils, including those associated with 
poverty, elsewhere. 
The following remarks by L. P. McCrystal also seem to be 
relevant within the present context: 
11 
•••••• in developing countries. acute problems are generated by 
urbanisation as a result of the fact that people £rom rural areas stream 
into the cities in advance of any job opportunities being available for them 
there. The overc;rc,wded, insanitary and unpleasant conditions to which 
this phenomenon gives rise throw a heavy burden upon the local authorities 
concerned. resulting in extraordinarilylarge outlays having to be borne 
by local taxpayers". 3 
1. Report N o. 282., Investigation into Manufacturing Industries in the 
UnionofSouthAfrica, 1945, para. 32.1, pp. 100-101. 
2. Prime 1/linister's statement, 2 June 1960. 
3. Measures to promote decentralisation of industry, The Standard Bank 
Review. August 1967. 
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It should be noted that strictly speaking these considerations, 
which we have already touched on in chapter 2. constitute an argument 
for influx control rather than for the diversion of industries to the border 
areas. For the essence of the diversion of industries. is that it reduces 
the number of jobs in the large cities relative to the number that would 
otherwise have been available, and it clearly would not be sensible to 
say that industries should be diverted from the large cities because 
there are not enough job opportunities for workers there. In chapter 
2, it was agreed that it might be advisable to adjust the rate of inflow 
of people to the metropolitan areas to the rate at which jobs were be-
coming available: The evidence, however~ did not indicate that there 
was any imbalance in this respect. and. in fact, it seemed that given the 
demand for labour in the larger centres, the rate of inflow of workers 
might even stepped up without adverse effects on wage rates. 
A somewhat different line of argument for inducing industrial 
production in the border areas is based on the need for greater equity 
in the distribution of income. Isard and Smolensky for instance argue 
that "while national goals such as a large increase in per capita income 
may be sensible for countries in which regional differences are not great, 
for countries in which regional differences in income are great, the goal 
of reducing such differences may have high priority, even higher than 
a rapid rise in national income per capita. In Italy for example, nat-
ional goals must yield at least in part to regionally oriented goals". 1 
Given the fact that the Bantu areas contain the poorest section oi South 
Africa's population this argument is certainly worth examining in some 
detail. 
Support for a more even distribution of income seems to explain 
the fact that many who oppose the policy of territorial separation are 
1. W. Isard and E . Smolensky~ Application of Input Output Techniques 
to Regional Science, in Structural Interdependence and Economic 
Development, edited by T. Barna, London 1963, p. 107. 
nevertheless strongly in favour of governmental measures to develop 
the backward sector o£ the economy. But where income redistribution 
ia the main consideration the emphasis is usually placed on agricultural 
and industrial development inside the Bantu areas themselves.. Never-
theless border areas industrialisation might in some circumstances have 
a favolU"able redistributive effect. and also, since social overhead capital 
ia more fully developed there, it may be cheapest to concentrate on these 
areas initially. 
In Southern Italy, aome workers migrate very readily to the 1\orth, 
to other countries in Europe and elsewhere in the wol"ld, while others 
show a strong resistance to moving over long distances. Mobility also 
varies a good deal amongst Bantu workers. There will be some who for 
some reason or other cannot, or choose not to, migrate to the urban areas, 
and rnany of these will experience a low level of income as a result. 
Fa.ctora which may cause this are for instance a positive preference for 
life in an area ncar friends in a particular locality. inability to obtain a 
wage on which the whole family can be supported in the city* ignorance 
about job opportunities or even sheer inertia. We cannot include a con-
sideration like ninahility to get a job in an establiahed industrial area "as 
a factor here, for we are examining the case for diverting industries to 
border areaa, and as we noted above the diversion of industries reduces 
the number of jobs in large cities relative to the number that would 
otherwise have been available. 
Border areas industrial development, therefore. will tend to im-
prove the living standards of those potential industrial workers in the 
border and Bantu areas whose resistance to migration is very strong. 
Thus it appears that if tax revenue is utilised to subsidise bord r industries, 
a redistribution of income from taxpayers to certain persons in the border 
and Bantu areas, that is from richer to poorer, will tend to occur. Border 
areas policy, then, need not rest entirely upon the goals of separate, in-
creased economic efficiency, and the social evils associated with con-
gestion, diacueaed above. A more equitable distribution of income may 
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be regarded as a desirable end in itself. 
To the extent that subsidised border industries does not consist 
entirely of projects which can be justified on one of the economic grounds 
discussed in chapter 5, however, there will tend to be a conflict between 
allocative efficiency and equity. It is well known that because of the 
interconnection between income distribution and resource allocation, 
there are serious pitfalls involved in speaking as if problems of equity 
and efficiency can always be distinguished unambiguously. 1 The problems 
arise basically from the fact that an altered income distribution tends 
to alter relative prices. It is nevertheless meaningful to distinguish 
between equity and efficiency in the case, which is likely to be most 
common, in which as a result of redistributive measures the national 
real product, whether measured in terms of the initial relative prices 
or in terms of those prevailing after the income redistribution, is smal-
ler either iu absolute terms or relative to what it might have been with-
out these measures. 
In the face of such a conflict it rna y be considered worthwhile to 
forego some degree of economic efficiency for the sake of a more 
equitable distribution of income. That is even in the absence of a policy 
of separate development we might want to push the annual a verage increase 
in border areas industrial production beyond the economically optimal 
level, OM 1 in the diagram. We may visualise a demand curve reflecting 
the marginal valuation of the income redistribution benefit derived from 
border areas industrial production. Thio may also lie to the right 
of C, though not necessarily as far to the right as GG. Indeed there 
are reasons to think that relatively little decentralisation to border areas 
would be desirable on these grounds. 
In a poor country the marginal valuation of this benefit, expressed 
in terms of economic growth foregone, tends to be lower than in rich 
countries. Johnson argues that "the higher the level of income reached, 
the less serious will be any slowing down of the rate of growth brought 
about by redistribution policies. An advanced country can afford to 
sacrifice some growth for the sake of social justice. But the cost of 
1. See for instance E. J. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth. 
(Staples Press. London. 1967), pp. 48-50. 
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greater equality may b e great to any economy at a low level of economic 
development that wishes to grow rapidly..... I should add that the problem 
may not in fact be as serious as I have made it out to be, since in the 
course of time rapid growth tends in various ways to promote a more 
equal distribution of wealth 11 • 1 
In quoting this passage it is not intended to suggest that we 
should not concern ourselves about the problem of income distribution 
in South Africa. No doubt several desirable improvements could be 
brought about in this respect. The point is simply that the costs of 
redistribution policies cannot be taken lightly in a country like South 
Africa which has a very low per capita income compared with the coun-
tries of Western Europe and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the 
size of the redistribution benefits relative to costs is likely to depend a 
great deal on the particular type of redistributive measures adopted. 
'I here are reasons to believe that in the case of attempts to redistribute 
income by means of subsidised border areas industrialisation, the bene-
fits tend to be low relative to costs. 
Firstly, the beneficial effects of border areas development on 
the living standards of those potential industrial workers in the border 
and .Bantu areas who show a strong resistance to migration, will be 
felt mainly by those living in or in the immediate vicinity of border 
areas industrial centres themselves. The benefit felt by those further 
away from the border areas. for instance, by those living well inside 
the Bantu areas will not be as great, especially if their poorer econ-
omic circumstances are in the first instance due to their s trong resis-
tance to migration. In other words, for those living in reserves re-
mote from the border areas. the obstacles (excluding legal ones) to 
migration to industrial employment in the larger cities may not be 
significantly greater than those impeding movement to the border areas. 
The fact that the subsidised industrial development is taking place 
mainly in centres outside of the border areas therefore, lessens the bene-
ficial redistributive effect. It does less to overcome the obstacles to 
1. Money, Trade and Economic Growth, p . 159. 
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mobility, which are the source of the regional income distribution 
problem, because the border centres are usually completely surroun-
ded by 'white' farming areas, with the reserves being situated several 
miles away. For the same reason the potential stimulus provided by 
industrialisation to Bantu agricultural development is minimised. The 
transport costs on t~e produce of potential Bantu market gardeners, for 
instance, are higher, and competition from white farmers is keener than 
would be the case if the industrial activity being fostered were inside 
the reserves themselves. 
Secondly it may be noted that what is involved is not merely a 
redistribution of income from the white taxpayers to Bantu workers in 
the border areas. As is all too evident from the existence of firm in-
flux control measures, certain workers prefer the higher wages in the 
cities to the lower earnings in the border and Bantu areas, despite pos-
sible obstacles to movement. The diversion of industries to th-.: border 
areas, therefore, in effect involves a shifting of income from such 
.Bantu whose opportunities for finding employment in the larger indus-
trial centres are reduced. Only those who prefer lower wages in the 
border areas to higher wages in the cities gain. The gain of the latter 
is, therefore, partly offset by the loss of the former. 
It is indeed important to note that whereas separate development 
can be achieved only by the economic development of the border and 
Bantu areas, living standards in the reserves tend to be raised both 
by such economic development and by migration to other areas including 
the metropolitan areas, for the reasons discussed in chapter 2. Thus 
a conflict between the objectives of separate development and incorne 
redistribution arises at some level. In other words the scale of borde:r 
areas development required by political objectives may well exceed 
that which can be justified on the basis of income distribution effects. 
It may be that from the latter pnint of view, the scaleof induced border 
areas development which has occurred since 1960 is not exces::sive. 
But as we show in chapter 9 below, the rate of development to the end 
of 1966 falls well short of that needed to achieve certain of the Govern-
ment's proclaimed objectives in the sphere of separate development. 
241 
Furtherrnore, it is obvious that while border areas development 
if carried out on a certain scale may have a favourable effect on living 
standards in the Bantu areas this will tend to be counteracted by measures 
which check the rate of migration to the larger urban areas. In the 
present circumstances in South Africa. border areas development is 
apparently seen as a means of employing not only those who show a 
strong resistance to long distance migration, that is, as a means of 
redistributing income, but also as a means o! employing those who 
are perfectly willing to move and indeed also some who are already 
settled in the cities. A certain amount of border areas industrialisation. 
therefore, is needed simply to compensate those refused admission to 
or endorsed out of urban areas when they would have been able to obtain 
employment there.. In view of this) any contention that in the South 
African case a desire for a more equitable distribution of income is 
a primary consideration does not appear convincing. 
In a situation in which Bantu workers are admitted into the 
larger industrial centres at the rate at which the latter can provide 
employrnent for them, it may be plausible to argue that the encourage-
ment of border industries represents an attempt to provide employment 
for the inhabitants of the Bantu areas at a faster rate than would other-
wise be possible and so to achieve a more even level of per capita 
income between regions. That is. the income distribution argument 
can be convincing only if induced border areas development gives rise 
to such an improvement in employment conditions that those who might 
otherwise have been employed in the advanced sector, including the 
metropolitan areas, now choose of their own accord to take jobs in the 
border areas. The mere existence of various types of influx control 
measures, and evidence of the stringency with which they have..: been and 
are to be applied. 1 indicates that border industries policy cannot be 
1. For instance, to mention only one striking case, there is the decision 
to freeze Bantu employment in the Western Cape at the level which 
prevailed at the end of August 1966 initially, and then to bring about 
a reduction in this level at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. 
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reasonably se-en as a device whose primary purpose is to redistribute 
income, or that this will be an effect incidental to the pursuit of some 
oth.er objective. Comparisons with welfare motivated regional develop-
ment policies in, for instance, Italy, to which the remarks by lsard and 
Smolensky quoted above refer, are therefore most misleading since 
workers from Southern Italy capable of obtaining employment in the 
l"orth are not debarred hom migrating if they wish to do so. The fact 
that i."l sorrJ.e cases decentralisation measures may plausibly be seen as 
a device for redistributing income does not mean that this is nece ssarily 
the case in South _.ltfrica. 
It is therefore not possible to accept the following interpretation 
of border industries policy: 
111'he socio-eco:.1omic advancement of the Africans has always 
been the underlying humanitarian ideal behind the plan for border 
industries. 
"Initial! y it will provide employment where none existed before, 
a."ld to a certain extent it has already been successful in this aim. 
F{;r1nanent industrial employment for 41, 000 non-whites of whom 
Africans are in the r.aajority, has been created •.... 111 
In ar1..y case as we show in chapter 9 below the whole of this 
increase in non-white employment cannot be attributed to Government 
iutervention. 'ihe Permanent Committee reports, themselves, indicate 
that a significa:u.t proportion of the increase took place in unassisted firms. 
Furthermore» as we shall show, it is not clear to what extent employment 
increases in assisted fir1ns themselves is attributable to the i....""lducements 
given by the Government. Employment in firms which have actually 
been diverted to the border areas is to some extent also simply a sub-
stitute for employn.1.ent in the same firms elsewhere. 
1. Trade Union Council of South Africa, Fact Paper, The Industrial 
Development of the Border Areas of South Mrica! April 1966, p. 68. 
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One consequence of accepting "the socio-economic advance-
-
ment of the Africans" as the dominant aim of border industries policy 
is that "the location of Rosslyn, so close to Pretoria" is seen as 0 an 
anomal y in this plan to spread industries more equitably!'· Once the 
policy is properly interpreted such anomalies disappear. 
Generally, there is a tendency to overlook the fact that the 
development :of border industries is not the only possible way of pro-
viding industrial employment for the ' surplus' labour of the border and 
Bantu areas. This would be so only if Bantu workers could not be 
attracted to the larger urban centres at the wage rates which employers 
there were prepared to offer. Some writers on British regional prob-
lems also seem to overlook this sort of consideration. For instance, 
l' .. eedleman argues that "rather than allowing pools of unemployed labour 
to persist in the outlying regions, it would be worthwhile to give very 
much greater inducements to firms than have hitherto been offered11 • 1 
Needleman implies that it would be ec~nornicall y beneficial to take work 
to the workers. The basic weakness in Needleman' 15 accompanying 
analysis is that it contrasts the effects of investment in the depressedareas 
with the alternative of doing nothing. Ee does not compare estimates 
of costs and benefits of subsidising employment in the depressed areas 
with the other obvious alternative, namely, encouraging the movement 
of workers. 
It may be noted that the 'pools' of Bantu labour in the back-
ward regions of South Africa 2 are a reflection of structural employ-
ment, ~ue essentially to a laclc of comple mentary :factors of production. 
I. Needleman, op. cit., p. 55 
2. L. P. McCrystal, 1Iv!easures to promote decentralisation of industry: 
Standard Bank Review, August 1967, p . 3 presents a view similar 
to Needlemans. He says 11 conditions of apparent over-full employ-
ment of labour and capital are generated when, in point of fact, if 
the country is looked at as a whole, there may be enough labour to 
sustain the e conomy's growth rate at a higher level than is being 
achieved under conditions oi localised economic growth". 
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The country's stock of productive capital and skilled labour is inadequate 
to provide employment for the whole Bantu labour force at the wage 
rates prevailit·tg in the modern sector of the economy~ It is not nec-
essarily best from an economic point of view to use additions to the 
quantity of these scarce factors in the border areas rather than else-
where. The strong flow of migrants from the backward to the advanced 
sector of the economy described in chapter 2, and the consequent need 
for controls on migration, indicate that in South Africa ,at least, economic 
growth is not hampered by inadequate regional mobility of the Bantu labour 
force. 
In this connection, it is interesting to note the following comment 
by. Richardson and West on the .tendency in Britian to stress almost 
exclusively "the principle of bringing work to the workersn: 
' .....• in order to have a. high rate of growth there has to be 
a high degree of labour mobility. N. E. D. C. recognises this ' 11£ the 
necessary deployment is to be carried out smoothly and to the best 
advantage, measures will have to be taken to facilitate mobility of 
labour and to avoid the hardship of :!'edunda.ncy". (Conditions Favourable 
to Faster Growth, para. 39). The encouragement of such mobility 
clearly works in the opposite direction to the widely accepted aim of 
nregional balance"· It follows that if we want a .faster rate of growth 
l 
we must be prepared to accept its consequences' 
Fjnally, reference must be made to strategical considerations 
as a basis for industrial decentralisation. The Barlow Commission 
after arguing that ndue attention must be paid to social needs", says: 
11Sim.ilar reasoning applies with increased force where much of the 
danger of destruction of property, and of death to the civilian population, 
from air attack 'is the direct result of urbanisation and the gr~at aggre-
gations of population. Such danger n'lay menace the life of the nation, 
1. h. \V. I .. ichardson and E. G. \Vest, ''Must we always Take Work to 
'>" the Workers; Lloyds :Sank Review. January 1964, P• 35. 
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and no one, industry least of all, would deny the right of the nation 
to take proper steps for its own protection in such a ca~eu 1 This 
view is indisputable but as the Barlow Commission clearly recognises 
there are obviously limits to what one should be prepared to pay, in 
terms of reduced industrial efficiency, for greater security in time of 
war. The strategical dangers of industrial concentration in South Africa 
and measures necessary to reduce them should be the subject of a 
detailed investigation on its own. It may well be found that "strategical 
needs might be reasonably met by decentralisation within narrow limits,. 
limits too narrow, however to meet the social and economic disadvan-
2 tagestt or for that matter to meet the needs of separate development. 
It is noteworthy that neither the Viljoen Commission Report nor the 
Priine Minister's statement announcing the establishment of the Permanent 
Committee makes mention of strategical considerations. It does not 
appear either that in implementing decentralisation policy since. 1960, 
strategical :factors have been included to any significant extent in the 
criteria used in selecting 'growth points' or the industries to be assisted. 
One conclusion to which the discussion of this chapter leads, then, 
is that border industries policy cannot be convincingly explained in terms 
of objectives like _redistributing income, shortening travelling distances 
within urban areas, maintaining communal ties in t act; or alleviating the 
social evils associated with large population centrations. The objective 
which overrides all others is racial separation. It must be stressed 
that this search for motives has been undertaken because it is impossible 
to evaluate the specific measures adopted, the industries assisted, and 
the scale of border areas development which is apparently desired unless 
1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the 
Industrial Population ( Cmd~ 6153, 1940), pp. 194-195. 
2. ~·· p. 196. 
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the dominant motive for the policy is made explicit. 1 There is little 
point in evaluating border industries policy except in terms of the 
Government's own criteria. Any attempt to substitute other criteria 
for those of the Government would involve us in a discussion of the merits 
of r acial separation as a political programme. In other words we 
would then be asking whether the Governf!lent should attach as much 
value to territorial separation as it does. But as we acknowledged at the 
outset this is e ssentially a matter of political judgment and belief, and 
the economist can claim no special competence in this field. 
Andrew Sbonfield provides us with the following useful reminder: 
"The notion of a national plan which is somehow the expression 
of the 'general will', i.e. serves the deeper spiritual need of the com-
munity rather than merely making it more productive in turning out 
an undifferentiated. mass of goods. fits readily into the mainstream 
of French thought - running right through from Jean-Jaques Rousseau 
to P ierre Masse, the head of the Commissariat du P lan in the 1960'su. 2 
While the nature of the Government's preference for border 
areas industrialisation seems to b e clear, certain additional information 
is necessary H we are to asses s the economic implications of decen-
tralisation policy. We need to know more about the Government's scale 
of preferences, in particular about the way in which, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, different combinations of rate s of economic growth 
and border areas industrialisation are r anked on a scale of better and 
worse. This would enable us to derive the demand curve GG in our diagram 
1. Hutchison, op. cit. , p. 179, quotes the claim by Seers that he has 
"known cases where the main achievement of an economist, but not 
a negligible one, has been simply to let a minister think aloud about 
his problems and bring to the surface his real motives and his 
judgments on social and economic policy •.• " · 
2. Modern Capitalism, (Oxford University P ress, L ondon 1965), p. 83n. 
Hutchison in emphasising the need to el~idate the utility functions 
of policy makers says: 
2. 50 
u ..... however difficult it may be to obtain a full range of precise 
and consistant indifference curves~ or preference functions, the 'rational' 
application of systematic economic knowledge to policy must depend on 
making the best attempts possible. To the extent that thase atten"...pts 
are inadequate or incomplete th~ application of economic knowledge to 
policy is ti:rrationally' or.at any rate~ inadequately baaed, and one is 
simply launching policiee with no clear and precise ideas of the objec-
tives one is trying to arrive at.. Therefore. one of the first nece.saary 
tasks in elucidating the choice of policies is to elicit, as precisely as 
possible, whether from a minister or from the public. the answers on 
which preference functions can be drawn ilpu. 1 
Unfortunately in the pres.cnt case much too little is known about 
this preference function. It is true that certain official statements such 
as those na::ntion.cd above 2 give aom.t. indication of the degree of racial 
•epa1•ation desired. )Jut the light these shed on the preference function 
referred to is limited. In tht! :first plac~ political strategy may some..:. 
tinKs inhibit complete candour in a governmentta public announcerc.ents. 
In addition, however, cvenifthese indications of a strong desire for "t-acial 
s eparation can be taken· to reflact an equally powerful deai.re for border 
a1·t"as iuduatriaiisation,. it is not clear how much economic growth the 
Govel:'nmertt is prepared to forego for the implied degree of industrial 
de c-entralisation. 'D..:mand' is not 1n~rely a desire for a good; it is 
this desire backed by a readiness and ability to pay. 
htdecd it iso by no meahs clear that the economic implications of 
border industries developntent on the scale required to employ those 
1. op. cit.. p. 179. 
z. .See fo-otnote p.~~a.bove, 
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Bantu workers denied permission to work in the urban areas is fully 
appreciated. 1 It is here perhaps that economic analysis can be of most 
use. The rate at which an additional 'unit' of racial separation can be 
obtained in exchange for foregone economic efficiency and growth is the 
main focus of attention in the remainder of this study. Our treatment 
of the 'supply' side of the problem in this chapter is intended to br:eak 
down any Utopian traces of what Isaiah Berlin has described as 'the 
natural tendency of all but a very few thinkers to believe that all the 
things they hold good must be intimately connected, Ol' at least compatible, 
with one another'. 2 'This simp! y means forcing recognition that choice 
"positively" is, or may be, necessary'. 3 
We have shown that up to a point the various possible objectives 
of industrial decentralisation may be compatible with one another. For 
instance external effects may be such that if appropriate measures are 
introduced decentralisation will actually increase the value of the national 
real product. Decentralisatio11 for economic reasons n•ay, th erefore, in-
cidentally reduce possible social evils, bring about a more even. distribu-
tion of income and foster separate development. But the rnaguitude of 
development called for by economic considerations may be lower than the 
community thinks is warro.nted on grounds of equity or for political 
reasons, and it will actually have to pay a price in terms of economic 
growth to obtain th~ latter two types of benefits. After the economically 
optimal point (0~ .. 11) has been reache d, the objectives of income re-
1. :The F.inancial ~/ail, March 10, 1967, p. 632, for instance , reports on 
the address by the Deputy 1'/inister of Bantu Administration and Develop 
ment to organised industry in the Western (:ape as follows: 'W hereas he 
had earlier in the mornin g, scoffed at critics who warned that artificial 
labour shortages would retard development ("the story of lower produc-
tivity because of less labour is so much nonsense") he subsequently 
conceded that, with enforced decentralisation, it was possible that there 
would be slower growth in the ·western Cape and the V, itwatersrand. 
2. Two Concepts of Liberty, 1958, p. 13n. quoted by Hutchison, op. cit., 
P· 179. 
3 . Hutchison, op. cit., p. 180 . 
• 
distribution and separate development may be compatible with one another 
ovel· a certain range, but various pieces of circumstantial evidence seem 
to indicate clearly that separate development as such is the overriding 
consideration. ~-Iow much of this latter objective it will be prepared to 
actually "buy11 depends on the rate at which separate development can 
technically be substituted for economic growth compared with the rate 
of substitution which the Gcvernment considers worthwhile. In view of 
our ignorance about the latter aspect, which we have already remarked 
upon above, we have been forced to focus our attention mainly on the 
opportunity costs of border areas industrialisation. In chapter 8 a 
statistical analysis is presented which should give us a full e r apprec iation 
of the probable economic costs associated with various degrees of in-
duced industrial decentralisation. Since we lack any detailed know-
ledg~ of the Government's preference function and hence of the precise 
position of GG, its demand curve :for induced border areas industrial 
production. we shall have to assess the consequences of the policy on the 
basis of a number of alternative assumptions regarding the velum-<.. of 
additional employment which the Govermnent will actually attempt to 
induce in the border areas. These assurnptious, together with the re-
sults obtained in chapter 8 will, it is hoped, give some indicatior of the 
economic and perhaps also the political implications of using border 
industries policy as an ins~rUincnt of. separate development. 
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CHAPTER 7 
LABOUR AND THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF BORDER AREAS. 
Introduction. 
To the industrialist. balancing the advantages of rival sites for 
his factory. one of the major attractions of the border areas is their 
abundant supply of unskilled Bantu labour. In some instances, as we 
saw in Chapter 4, manufacturing activities are sited in the border areas 
primarily because of the availability and cheapness of unskilled labour. 
This is eo despite the fact that the cost of other factors such as auxiliary 
services, transportation of materials and finished products. fuel and 
skilled labour, may be higher than elsewhere. 
But such cases in which unskilled labour is the decisive consider-
ation, are rel~tively few compared with the total number of manufacturing 
plants. The pull of markets and materials is far stronger than that of 
labour resources and the evidence of Chapter 3 suggested that in South 
Africa the market has been the most powerful single influence on the 
location of industry. Labour orientation is therefore relatively un-
common, and orientation to unskilled labour less common still. 
In the border areas themselves we have found, too, that low 
unskilled wage rates have been the decisive consideration in relatively 
few cases. 1 This seems to apply to the international division of labour 
no less than to the location of industry within a country. B. C. Swerling 
1. See for instance the discussion of the Natal and Ciskei border areas 
in Chapter 4 . 
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has observed that "world trading relationships depend to a greater degree 
on the unequal distribution of natural resources than on comparative en-
dowments of labour and capital". 1 This is not to say that labour costs 
do not play a part in international or inter-regional trade. The greater 
are wage differentials between regions or countries the more likely 
is a particular industry to be drawn to the least labour-cost location. 
As we observed earlier, the general level of wages also has a bearing 
on the location of industry, ix.l that, if it rises more rapidly than other 
costs, such as transport, the ratio of the wage bill to net output tends 
to increase, and the incentive to move to cheap labour-areas is inten-
sified. An increasing stock of capital per worker, provided it is not 
offset by l abour saving technical progress (and technical progress tends 
to have a labour saving bias) is one factor which will tend t o increase 
the ratio of labour costs to net output, and so increase the importance 
of low wage locations. Another is an autonomous change in the product-
mix of manufacturing activity, which increases the relative importance 
of those industries in which the labour cost ratio is compd.ratively high. 
Technical change which reduces the locational significance of skilled 
labour resources, that is, which leads to a 'dilution' of labour, will 
also tend to increase the attractiveness of the border and Bantu areas. 
'While tendencies of this sort, working in favour of orientation 
to unskilled labour resources may be operating in South Africa, other 
considerations, including the availability of skilled labour, usually 
predominate. The industrial development of the border areas there-
fore, depends in the main on their natural resource endowment, in the 
case of materials oriented industries, on the size of markets in the 
same region. and on their geographical situation relative to the country's 
1. 'Capital Shortage and Labour Surplus in the United States, ' 
Review of Economics and Statistics, August, 1954, p. 289. 
larger market areas. 1 Nevertheless, the existence of relatively 
abundant and cheap supplies of unskilled labour is a fact of some sig-
rii.ficance in selecting industries suitable for diversion from the larger 
centres to the border areas and for the economic effects of state 
induced industrial decentralisation in South Africa. 
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The larger the ratio of unskilled labour costs to net output in a 
ll'Etropolitan location, the greater will be the fall in these costs relative 
to total production costs as a result of diversion to a border area. 
Other things being equal, then, the proportionate marginal excess 
private cost of induced border areas industrial production will be smaller 
the greater is the ratio of unskilled labour coats to net output. Pro-
vided allowance can be made for the fact that "other things" are not 
equal, i:t appears that we should be able to rank industries according 
to the marginal EScees private costs of diverting them to the border 
areas. In other words it may be possible to develop an ordinal supply 
curve corresponding to the cardinal supply curve SS of the previous 
chapter. An attempttodo this is made in Chapter 8 below. It also 
appears that if the attractiveness of locations enjoying cheap unskilled 
labour is increasing, because of any of the factors mentioned above, 
the supply curve of border areas industrial production SS will tend to 
shift towards the right. so reducing the marginal excess private costs 
of diverting production to the border areas. Preparatory to the supply 
curve analysis presented in Chapter 8, we shall set out in this chapter 
some information regarding regional wage differentials in South Africa 
and conclude with comments on the significance for industrial location 
o:f labour resources, in particular the labour resources in border areas. 
1. This applies equally to the location of industry in the Southern 
United States. See G. TI.;. McLaughlin and S. Robock. Why Industry 
:Moves South. (National Pla nn ing Commission of the South, 19 49). 
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Regional Wage Differentials in Manufacturing Industry: 1934-35 to 1959-60 
Table 17 shows the average earnings level of industrial workers 
according to racial group and sex, in each of a number of regions of 
the Republic for selected years between 1934-35 and 1956-57. Where 
available, figures are given on the same basis for 1959-60. In addition, 
these average earnings levels in each regicm have been expressed as 
percentages of the corresponding figure for the Southern Transvaal in 
Table 18. 
This information, it should be noted relates to all manufacturing 
industries together and there will doubtless be variations in relative 
earnings differentials between individual industries. But our subsequent 
discussion of certain specific industries suggests that the results obtained 
from our initial aggregated treatment of earnings in manufacturing industry 
are a fairly reliable reflection of the position in most industrial classes. 
Male Bantu labour, which is numerically the most significant 
type of labour, is of particular interest in the context of the present 
studyo Average earnings varied relatively little between the four main 
industrial classes, but it is noteworthy that the highest level, which pre-
vailed in the Western Cape, was 7. 6 per cent higher than in the Southern 
1 Transvaal in 1953-54. In line with our discussion of East London above, 
we also find that average earnings were only 3. 4 per cent lower i:.r'l. this 
centre than in the Southern Transvaal. This is of some interest in view 
of the usual supposition that owing to its much less developed condition 
and its proximity to the Ciskei and Transkei reserves, East London has 
the advantage of an easy supply of labour at low wage rates. It appears 
that in the past, if East London has had any labour advantage, it has 
been mainly in the availability rather th&"l in the cost of male Bantu 
workers. 
The ranking of the main industrial areas, in terms of average 
earnings of male Bantu workers, apparently held unchanged between 
1944~45 and 1953-54 except that in 1950-51 the level was slightly higher 
in the Southern Transvaal than in the Durban-Pinetown complex. There 
does, howevero appear to have been a fairly consistent and steady 
1. Chapter 4, pp. 123 ff. 
TABLE 17 1 Average earnings of production workers in manufacturing industry by race, sex and region. 
-Whit••· . Atli&Uee Ce1oured •att.Tee 
Regioa 
-
Year Mal•• Ji'tmal.ea Persona Malee Ji'tmal.ee Pereene . Jlalee P-.al."•'. Pereo~ 11&1•• l:taal.•• Para one 
R R R R R R R R R :a B. R 
Yeriaa O&pe 1934-35 - - 301.2 - - 116.0 . - - 239.2 - - 1.64.8 
1.94+-45 750.0 302.0 607.2 220.2 1.57.2 219.8 391.6 257.8 359.2 359.4 242. 0 31.3· 4 
1950..51. 1009.2 464.2 880.6 211.6 236.2 211.2 613.4 392.6 601.4 419.4 ,,, ..  420o8 
19!r5-!J4 1.306.0 609.8 1161.4 322.0 291.6 321o8 729.4 394.6 635.6 58().0 532.0 5()8.8 
1956-51 1876.2 830.2 15!6.2 346·2 -297.8 345.8 928.6 474.8 842.8 611.0 428.2 533. 0 
1959-60 
- -
1188.4 
- -
387.8 
-
- - - -
-
Port m.u..H'UI;'Ui tabage 1i34-35 
- -
279.8 - - 102.0 - - 228.4 - - 171.6 ' 
1944-45 646.0 291.2 310.8 204).4 138.0 208.6 332.0 293o6 327o4 317.4 212.8 29}. 8 
1950..51 963.8 455o8 836o4 258.0 20To4 255.8 513.2 340.6 . 466.0 447.4 3()6.1 40f.O 
19!5,_54 1.209.8 586.4 J.OT4o4 309o8 209.6 302o8 617.6 445.6 5'f3o0 542.6 297ol "463.4 
195~!JT 1826.4 727.8 !1.438.4 328.8 346o4 330o2 t'r2.6 374o4 660.0 
'''·' 
' 321.2 414o8 
1959-40 
- - -
":" 
-
392.4 
- - -
1 
--
... 
iUt Ioenl.aa 1,4-35 
- -
319.4 
- -
. 91.2 
- -
1.86.0 
- -
147.4 
194+-45 '-7Ho2 310.2 ·580.6 200.4 115.4 200.2 343.6 185.8 260.4 264.2 160.6 219.2 
195o-!Jl 892.2 422.8 752.4 239.2 84.8 234o0 47'5.8 313.6 375o2 3S0o8 282.0~ 333. 0 
U5:3-54 1174.8 523.2 979.2 289.0 178.0 282.2 . 469.8 187.2 268.6 
'"'·· 
215.2 295o4 
1956-J7 1666.6 694·4 1290.6 312.0 132.4 273.0 523.2 430.6 462.4 411.8 340o6 317o2 
.Dvbu/!>beton. i934-:55 
- -
401.8 
- -
85.6 
- -
223.2 
- - -
1944-4-J 924.0 219.0 829.6 207.4 175.2 207.2 300.8 155.0 295.2 J96.2 244o2 443.6 
19~ 1178.8 469.8 1101.6 252.4 ,283.8 251.6 416.8 219.6 406.0 T23o4 334.6 5,54.0 
195,_54 1448.4 621.6" 1278.4 300.4 238.0 299.6 510.0 287.8 497.2 835.0 413o9 641.4 
1956-51 1401.4 922~8 1327.8 319.6 238.4 318o4 535.6 304.8 533.2 940.2 411.6 638.6 
195~0 . 
- -
1994).0 ' 
- -
373.0 
- - - - -
Sou:\hem ~ · 19J4-:$J 
- -
466.4-
- -
8T.O - - 219.8 - - 17lo4 · 
1944-45 s,a.o 407.4 735·2 196.8 201.0 196.0 497.8 311.4 . 456.6 368 •• 280.8 ! 325.6 
19'o-t! ·. 1382.8 580.6 782o0 255.4 301.4 258.4 679.4 393o8 573o8 404o0 42~.4 262.6 
195,_54 1504.6 735.8 1375.0 299.2 358.0 300.8 685.0 505.0 618.0 5tT.8 P.3o8 551.6 
195~51 2062.8 944.0 1804.8 345.2 367.8 346.2 196.4 528.2 703o4 655.8 512.2 587. 6 
19J9-60 
- -
2025.6 
- -
392.8 
- - - - - -
R .. "$ f4 Cape 1~34-35 
- -
236.0 
- -
64o8 
- -
316.0 
- -
116.4 
194+-4f 504.8 268.6 •5T.a 1.34.0 87o8 131o4 3Uo4 ... 311.4 212.6 145.4 191. 4 
1950-51 811.0 402.8 739.9 182.4 154.6 180.8 434.4 216o6 ' 408o0 281.6 209.8 265.2 
195,_54 1068.6 546.2 986.6 316.4 l.J4o4 .2l4o0 512.6 - 5l.2oi ,,6.2 .248o4 )1.512 
- 19~7 l.460o2 667.2 1243.2 244.6 103.4 222.6 ~4.6 624.0 517.2 389.0 263o0 359o8 
a .. , et ••tal. 1934-35 396.8 I 56.6 86.6 , l8lo6 
- - -
- - - - -
1.944-45 768.0 3~0.2 T.53o8 134o8 75.0 134.4 .254.6 122.6 253o4 352.4 347.2 351o8 
- 19JO-tl 10~.8 44)1.8 1.025.2 ·1T2o8 147.8 172o6 357o4 138o8 '55o2 ••• • 380.2 '466•6 i9U•f4 1298.2 552.&- 1263.8 198.2 141.8 168.2 454~2 117.0 449o2 595o2 · 448.0 578.4 
19!Ji-Jr 1925.4 846.8 1764.2 233.4 62.4 21.8'.6 s;l9.6 254.2 524.8 191o6 455.0 759.4 
Pre"\ori.a 1, .. ,
- - - - - -
- - -
' 
- -
lt!M);otl 1105.4 447.6 1057.2 239o0 193o6 238o4 575.8 ~·4 517.6 }84.2 l53o6 376.2 
~,,..,. 1526.4 57lo6 1452.6 296.6 245.2 296.0 174.6 451o2 720o8 451o4 294.2 m.o 
1!5"'-57 1954.8 ' 836.2 1818.4 302o0 240o6 201.2 9}4.2 230o6 !01.2 54!So2 266.8 482·4 
\ 
Rea"\ et !lrauvaal 1934-35 
- -
4l2o8 . -
-
62.8 
- -
150.6 
- -
~.a 
14)44-45 
' 
667.4 297.0 635o2 108.4 78.2 108.2 . 358.2 
-
358o2 ll5o2 2.10.0 185.4 
1JJO-tl 1065.8 812.6 1017.6 145.4 102o4 145o0 
'"·' 
l65o0 374.0 }09.2 211.6 300.8 
1953-54 1372.8 536o0 1333o8 l17o4 "123o8 175.8 372.0 154-oO 529o2 3551o4 216.4 3~3.6 
195~J7 1886.2 815.8 l.T42o8 245o0 147.4 242o0 T02.6 2T1o8 646.4 "464.2 251o0 43!Jo0 
--
Oran ge Free State _ 1934-oo35 
- -
308.0 
- -
63.6 
- - - - -
107o4 1 
1J44-45. 628.0 3l.To6 575o8 132o6 95o0 132.2 
- - -
225.2 120.0 220.0 
1tJO-Jl 1135·4 433o4 106Jo6 1 182o4 148.6 182.2 
-
- -
328.8 231.2 293o2 
1!53-54 1365.4 490o4 13llo4 1219.0 178.2 218.4 665.0 - 665.0 366o4 '"·' 362.2 19"-'T 1176.6 810o6 1617.0 424.0 306.2 401.6 120.6 - 120.6 252o0 117.4 249. 6 . 
!otal Repablie 1!34-35 
- -
' 389.8 
-
82.0 
- -
119. 4 
- -
158.2 
1!44-4-!J 178o4 355o2 6T7o0 183.6 160.8 183o2 294.2 199.6 29o0 335o8 238.2 300o6 
195~1 11~.6 JlT.I 1001.0 232o8 242.6 234o4 4l.3a8 263o2 404o2 443o4 338oi 403o2 
195,..,4 1410.0 660.0 124)5.2 217.8 2n.2 ·217.8 503o6 353o4 493o0 52Jo0 399o0 4T8o8 
1956-!JT i.ae5.8 858.0 1648.8 311.0 265 .. 4 309o2 550.8 360.0 534o2 573o6 414.4 510o4 ,. 
O&pe 1!"4tdeJr .U.U 19Ji-tT 1588.6 698.8 1284.6 25lo6 123.4 234o4 
195~0 
-
-
l468o4 
- -
288.6 
Natal Bord e r Areas 14)5~5T · 1!42.4 858.2 1172.4 233.8 134.6 222.8 
1!!Jg.,.60 
- -
1857.8 
- -
2!56.2 
h8uvaal Bord.• .lnu . 1,5 .... , 1622.4 740.4 1472.8 154o8 84.0 151.4 
1959-60 
- -
1663o4 
-
-
256.2 
O&J• :Jqrd.er .U.U' - .ran ' 1959-57 1453.2 n3.s l272o2 206.4 IJ4o0 199o8 l 
LoJI.cl.oa 195g..60 .. 
-
1474.2 
-
. - 230.6 
-
J 
-· 
I O!Es Hgu"ea ~or ;re&n up to 1953-54 ine1ude all eee"$ora f4 s .. enUr,y induatr,r, ine1udillg eonetftetion and eleotrioiV• , 
Piga.rea for 1956-17 iMlude· eoae"$:zueUoa llu~ ea1udo el .. ~rioiV •d ill addi.Uon di.ttor !rca those :ter tbe earlier :rea.:ra ill eo tar 
aa· ee:r"\aia aoditle&Ua.a. were -.de in the eeope aDd meiho4 o:t the IDduetrial C«DBQa ~etween 1954-55 and 1956-57. 
!!Jae 1,!5,..0 ODlude Mltil eoD.IItruUoa aDd eleetrioiv but are oiherwb• oompa:rane wi-th 1956-57. 
-'-Y.•:J:tYt• •~• figuree :tor 1956-51 ino1ude working proprietors. 'lhi.s a:t:teete ODl.y the ?-v•rag• eami.Dge o:! whitoa lli¢.:!1oan~ • . 
Sourc e: Publi s h e d Indus t rial Cens u s r e po r ts s uppl e m e nted by unpubl i s h ed information k i ndly s u pp li ed by 
t h e Bu r e a u of Sta t i s ti c s. 
TABLE 18 
~verage earnings of production workers in manufacturing industry 
by race, sex and region. (Index numbers , Southern Transvaal = 100) · 
WHITES N~TIVES ~SIATICS COLOUREDS 
Males Females Persons Males Females Persons Males Female!! Persons Males Female!! Persons 
..2. _!_ L _!_ _!_ j.L _!_ _!_ _!_ _!_ .L ...!.. 
Western 1934-35 - - 64.4 - - 133.3 - - 108.8 - 96.1 
Cape 1944-45 90.1 74.1 82.6 111.9 78.2 111.6 78.7 82.8 78.7 97.6 86.2 96.3 
1950-51 73.0 80.0 112.6 106.3 78.4 105.8 90.3 99.7 104.8 95.1 80.3 91.0 
1953-54 €14.8 82.9 84.5 107.6 81.5 107.0 106.5 78 .1 102.8 98.7 103.5 92.2 
1956-57 91.0 87.9 88.4 100.3 81.0 99.9 116.6 89.9 119.8 93.2 83.6 90.7 
1959..¢0 
- -
88.3 - - 96.6 - - - - - -
Port 1934-35 - - 60.0 - - 117.2 - - 103.9 - - 100.1 
Elizabeth/ 1944-45 77.6 71.5 69.5 106.4 68.7 105.9 66.7 94.3 71.7 86.2 75.8 96.3 
Uitenhage 1950-51 69.7 78.4 107.0 101.0 68.8 99.8 75.5 86 .5 81.2 88.8 72.5 87.8 
1953-54 80.4 79.7 78.1 103 .5 58.5 100.7 90.2 88.2 92.7 92.3 58.0 84.0 
1956-57 88 .5 77.1 79.7 95.2 94.2 95.4 97.0 70. 9 93.8 86.2 62.7 80.8 
1959..¢0 
- - - - -
99.9 - - - - - -
-East 1934-35 - - 68.5 - - 104.8 - - 84.6 - - 86.0 
Lond.on 1944-45 93.1 76 .1 79.0 101.8 87 .3 101.6 69.0 59.7 57.0 71.7 57.2 66.4 
1950-51 64.5 72.8 96.2 93.7 28 .1 91.2 70.0 79.6 65.4 69.6 66.6 72.0 
1953-54 78.1 71.1 71.2 96.6 49.7 93.8 68.6 37.1 43 . 5 64.0 41.9 53.6 
1956-57 81.0 73.6 71.5 90.4 '36.0 78.9 65.7 81.5 65 .7 62.8 66.5 64.2 
Durban/ 1934-35 - - 86.1 - - 98.4 - - 57.4 - - 130.2 
Pinetown 1944-45 111.1 53.8 112.8 105.4 87.2 105.2 60.4 49.8 64 .7 161.8 87.0 136.2 
1950-51 85 .2 80.9 140.9 98.8 94.2 98 .5 61.3 55 .8 70.8 143.5 79.0 119.8 
1953-54 96.3. 84.5 ioo.2 100.4 66 .5 99.6 74.5 57.0 80.5 142.1 80.5 116.3 
1956-57 67.9 97.8 73.6 92.6 64.8 92.0 67.3 57.7 75.8 143.4 80.4 108.7 
1959..¢0 - - 98.7 - - 95.0 - - - - - -
Rest of 1934-35 - - 50.6 - - 74 . 5 - - 143.8 - - 67.9 
C a p e 1944-45 60.7 65.9 62.3 68.9 43.7 66.7 62.6 - 68 .2 57 .7 51.8 60.9 
1950-51 58.6 69.4 94.6 71.4 51.3 70.5 63 .9 55.0 71.1 55 . 9 49.6 57.3 
1953-54 71.0 74 .2 71.8 72 .3 37.5 71.1 74 .8 - 82.9 57.2 48.3 57.1 
1956-57 70.8 70.7 68 .9 70.9 28.1 64.4 72.1 118.1 82.1 59.3 51.3 61.~ 
Rest of 1934-35 - - 85.1 - - ~5.1 - - 39.4 - - 106.0 
N a t a 1 1944-45 92.3 78.6 99.8 68.5 37.3 68.2 51.1 39.4 55.5 95.7 123.6 108. 0 
1950-51 76.6 84.6 131.1 67 .7 49.0 67.3 52.6 35.2 61.9 96.6 89.8 100.9 
1953-54 86.3 75.1 91. 9 66.2 39.6 55.9 66 .3 35.0 72. 7 101.3 87.2 104.9 
1956-57 93.3 89.7 97.8 67.6 17.0 63.1 66.5 48.1 74.6 121.8 88.8 129.2 
Pretoria 1934-35 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1944-45 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1950-51 79.9 77.1 135.2 93 .6 64.2 93.0 84.8 91.0 90.2 76 . 2 83 . 5 81.3 
1953-54 101.4 77.7 105.6 99.1 68.5 98.4 113.1 89.3 116.6 76.8 57.3 74.5 
1956-57 94.8 88.6 100.8 87.5 65.4 87.0 117.4 43.7 128.1 83.1 52.1 82.1 
1959-60 
- -
- - - - - - - - - -
Re11t of 1934-35 
- -
88.5 
- -
72.2 - - 68.5 - - 50.6 
Transvaal 1944-45 80.2 72.9 86 .4 55.1 38.9 54.9 72.0 - 78.4 50.3 74.8 56 .9 
1950-51 77.1 140.1 130.1 56.9 34.0 56.6 58.4 41.9 65.2 61.3 50 .0 65.0 
1953-54 91.2 72.8 97 .0 59.3 34.6 58.4 83.5 28.5 85.6 61.1 42.1 62. 3 
1956-57 91.4 86.4 96.6 71.0 40.0 69.9 88.2 52.6 91.9 70.8 49.0 74 .0 
1959-60 
- -
- - - - - - - - - -
Orange 1934-35 - - 66 .0 - - 73.1 - - - - - 62. 7 
Free 1944-45 75.5 75.5 78.3 67.4 47.3 67 .1 - - 61.1 42.7 67.6 
State 1950-51 82.1 74.6 136.0 71.4 49.3 71.1 
- - -
65 .2 54.6 63 .4 
1953-54 92.1 80.2 95.4 73.2 49.8 72.6 97.1 - 107.6 62.3 65 . 5 65.7 
1956-57 86.1 85.9 89.6 122.8 83.8 116.0 90. 5 
-
102.4 38.4 31. .6 42.5 
1959-60 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Cape 1956-57 77.0 74.0 71.2 72.9 33 .6 67 .7 Border 
A.reas 1959-60 - - 72.5 - - 73.5 
Natal 1956-57 94.2 90.9 98.2 6?.7 36.6 64.4 Border 
A.reas 1959-60 - - 91.7 - - 65 .2 
Transvaal 1956-57 78.7 78.4 81.6 44.8 24.3 43.7 Border 
Areas 1959..¢0 - - 82.1 - - 41.9 
Cape Border 
A.rea11 ex- 1956-57 70.4 75.6 70.5 59.8 25.6 57 .7 
eluding 1959-60 
- -
72.8 
- -
58 .7 
East London 
~: Based upon Table 17. 
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tendency for average earnings in the Southern Transvaal to rise relative 
to those in the other main industrial centres between 1944-45 and 1953-54. 
The tendency, according to our figures, was accelerated between 1953 -54 
and 1956-57, so that average earnings in the Western Cape in the latter 
year were only very slightly higher than in the Southern Transvaal, and 
the level in the Durban-Pinetown and Port E lizabeth-Uitenhage areas 
were the lowest of all the major industrial areas. The writer has 
certain reservations about the compar a bility of the data for 1956-57 
with that for earlier years, but since they do not apply to the years 
1944-45, 1950-51 and 1953-54, it seems we may conclude that there 
was a tendency in the 1950's for average earnings of male Bantu work-
ers in the Southern Transvaal to rise l"elative to the other industrial 
centres. 
Despite this apparent trend, the differences between the larger 
centres were relatively small and are unlikely to have had any significant 
bearing on locationa1 decisions when the choice lay between one of the 
main industrial areas. Regional earnings differentials assume sig-
nificant proportions only when one compares the less developed parts 
of the country with the metropolitan areas. Excluding the four main 
industrial areas, in 1953-54 average earnings in the Cape, Natal, 
Transvaal and O r ange Free State were respective ·y 72. 3, 66. 2, 59. 3, 
a.11d 7 3. 2 per cent of the level prevailing in the Southern Tl'ansvaal. 
Provided earning s differentials are not offset by significant differences 
in productivity, it appears that firms can achieve significant savings in 
the cost of their Bantu labour by establishing themselves in the smaller 
centres. With the exception of the T r ansvaal, (excluding the Southern 
Transvaal) in 1956-57. the relative average earnings in the less develop-
ed reg ions were remarkably constant over the period under consideration. 
The regional earning s differentials become more signiiican.t still 
if we take border areas on their own. Compared with the figures for 
all the less developed centres together, the average earnings of male 
Bantu in border and Bantu areas in the Cape (excluding East London) 
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and the Transvaal were 59. 8 and 44. 8 per cent respectively of the 
Southern Transvaal level in 1956-57. Virtually the whole of N atl:\1 
outside Durban and Pinetown is regarded as either a border or a Bantu 
area so that the figure of 66. 2 per cent given in the preceding paragraph 
applies here too. 
Though East London is officially classified as a border area 
its average earn ings for male Bantu, 90. 4 per cent of the Southern 
Transvaal level in 1956-57, was considerably higher than the average 
for the Cape border and Bantu areas taken as a whole. This indicates 
quite clearly that it is m~sleading to generalise about relative average 
earnings in the border areas apart from saying that they are on the whole 
considerably lower than in the metropolitan areas. It is a striking fact, 
that average earnings for male Bantu vary quite significantly over very 
short distances, even when they are employed in the same industry. 
The number of male Bantu employees in manufacturing industry, thei r 
average earnings, and the relationship of the latter to the Southern 
Transvaal l evel, are g iven in Table J. 9 for a number of specific magis-
terial districts which fall within the border and Bantu areas. 
It is noteworthy that average earnings in King William,s Town, 
where manufacturing is dominated by a cotton textile factory, were 
nearly .?.5 per cent lower than L..,_ East London, although these two centres 
are only about 40 miles apart. With the exception of Queenstown, there 
appears to be a marked direct relation between the number of industrial 
workers and the average earnings level in the Cape border and Bantu 
areas. It is probable too, that proximity to the reserves has a bearing 
on the average earnings in a centre. 
Likewise, in Natal average earnings were considerably higher 
in P ieterrnaritzburg than in most other magisterial districts. The 
second highest average rate of pay occurred in the Mtunzini district, 
which, though fairly low down the list in terms of the number of male 
Bantu employees and surrounded by reserves, contains large, highly 
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TADLE 12 
Avern&e earnings of Bantu males in certain :'llgisterial Districts 
in the Eorder areas in 1956-7 
% of 
Number of Average wage level Southern 
em;elolees R :e.a. 1'ranavaal 
Southern Transvaal 346. 2 lCO.O 
Cape 
East Iondon 4,56~ 312.0 90.4 
King .villism' s Town 2,944 237.4 68.8 
Qu.Hnstown 612 25,. 2 73 . 9 
... a.rrenton 1,045 209. 6 60. 7 
Vryburg 629 190. 0 55. 1 
Jlt. Currie 395 156. 2 45·3 
Umtata 259 161.4 46.8 
Natal 
Pieter.marit~burg 6,499 3()8. 6 89. 4 
l<liprivier 2,074 198. C· 51.4 
Hlabisa/:Wwer Umfolozi/!longoma 3,590 217. 2 62.9 
Newcastle 1,997 215.0 62.3 
Estcourt 1,783 191. 6 55. 5 
Dundee 1,696 256. 4 74. 3 
D~into 1,558 251.8 n.o 
Lions River 1,-481 214. 2 62.1 
Mtunsini 1,293 278. 4 8C:. 7 
Port Shepstone 1,282 199. 0 5·1. 1 
Vryheid 979 163.6 47. 4 
Inanda 642 226. 4 71.4 
New Hanover 865 169. 8 49. 2 
Richmond 419 141.4 41.0 
Alt'red 251 121. 2 35.1 
Cwnperdown 63 175.0 50. 7 
Transvaal 
J?11grim8rest 2,610 125. 6 36.7 
l'lelspruit 2,183 123. 8 35.9 
Letaba 1,849 133. 6 38.7 
Piet Retiet' 1,'713 1?1. 4 49.7-
Rustenburg 1,606 211. 8 61. 4 
Sibas~Soutpanaberg 960 125. 4 36. 3 
Pieters burg 795 214.4 62.1 
Berberton 640 162. 2 47.0 
Potgietersrust 497 174. 8 50. 6 
Ilrits 365 222. 4 64. 4 
Lyden burg 181 151.0 43.8 
Wannbath!l 133 157. 6 45. 7 
Source: l"'ureau ot Statistioe, Industrial Census 1956-7, Special Report Ko. 240. 
capital intensive. sugar and pulp and paper mills, which must pay 
fairly high wages. On the other hand in the Klipriver district where 
the number of employees ie larger and a textiles factory is the pre-
dominant industrial activity, average earninge were only 51. 4 per cent 
of the Southern •rransvaallevel. The correlation between the number 
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of employees and average earnings appears to be much looser in I\.atal 
than i n the Cape. It is interesting that deepite fairly substantial employ• 
men.t of Bantu males in the Transvaal at P ilgrirnsrest, .1_.elspruit, Letaba 
and r iet Retief/Rustenburg av~rage earnings were only 36 .. 1. 35. 9, 38. 7 
and 36. 3 por cent of the Southern Transvaal level, and were lower than 
in any of the other districts listed except Alfred in Natal where only l5 l 
were employed. Among the Transvaal border areas with a relatively 
large manufacturing employment, average earnings were hiehest at 
I~ustcnburg where there is a cigarette factory. 
Wage• in the clothing and textiles finna at Harnmarsdale were 
reported in 1963 to be substantially lower than in Durban firms in the 
same industry,. only 30 miles away: "One of the clothing f~ctories L at 
Hammarsdale] employs about SOO Africans at weekly wage• etarting at 
I~3. ~5 a,..1d rising to R7. Whlle the top rate is about .!8 per cent below 
the comparable rate for a Durban factory, hour& are longer (45 compared 
with 4~1). overtime rates are lower and the Hammarsdale work•rs do 
not anjoy the .fringe benefits that industl'ial council agreements have es-
tablished for employees in co.ntrolled areas. " 1 The ratio of Hammarsdale 
to Durban wages in the clothing industry appears to be of much the same 
.... r4cr as that betwe~n l~ing Williams Town and East London menMoned 
above. It is also said that a large disparity in wage levels exists be-
twc0n another border areau ngrowth point". Roselyn, and Pretoria. 
though they are only lZ miles apart. 
1. The Soutll African 'Fin~ndal .},"nil, September ~0, 1963, pp. 111-112. 
It should be noted that the racial com~tion of the labour force 
differs between Han'lmarsdale and Durban. 
The tendency for wage rates to differ quite substantially between 
centres within a relatively small geographical area is, of course, not 
peculiar to South Africa and bas been noted in several other countries. 
McLaughlin and Robock who associate wage levels with town size write 
as follows: nwage differentials between large and small towns are 
often confused with the North-South differential • • • These small town 
plants in both the North and South have about the same wage rates but 
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a significant differential exists between the small town and the metropol-
itan areas. 111 Broadly speaking a similar relationship between earnings 
levels and townsize seems to prevail in South Africa. But for reasons 
outlined earlier 2 we should also expect to find a tendency for unskilled 
wage rates to be lower for those centres closer to the Bantu areas and 
for them to be lowest of all inside the latter. Due to the very low 
agricultural productivity of the Bantu areas incomes per head are much 
lower than elsewhere in South Africa, as the obstacles to short distance 
migration are likely to be smaller than in the case of long distance 
migration. Gustav Ranis has found that L1 the early days of industrial-
isation in Japan the going wage rate "differed with local differences in 
the total remuneration on the soil. Labour recruiters found their task 
easier in the poorer inland regions than in the maritime provinces 
where fishing and other forms of by-employment raise the opportunity 
cost of labour. This market, moreover, had interesting discriminating 
monopsomy-power, competitive-seller characteristics. The overall 
scpply of labour might be characterised by a step function consisting of 
a series of perfectly elastic segments rather than the commonly assurr!ed 
horizontal curve at a given (subsistence plus placement cost) wage rates". 3 
1. G. E . McLaughlin and S . Robock, Why Industry Moves South, p. 70. 
Z. Chapter 2, pp. 38 39 and Chapter 5, pp. 184 - 187 · 
3. Gustav Ranis, 'Factor F roportions in Japanese Economic Development', 
American E conomic Review, September 1957, p. 596. See also A. Tang, 
E conomic Development in the Southern P iedmont, 1860-1950, (Chapel 
H ill, University of North Carolina Press, 1958.) 
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Regional E arnings Differentials in Some Specific Industries. 
R e gional wage differentials of roughly the san"le magnitude as 
those discussed above emerge when similar calculations are made for 
individual industries. It appear s , therefore, that the regional differen-
tials revealed when all manufacturing activities are take n together cannot 
be explained to any significant extent by variations between regions in the 
1industry-m~'. 
TABLE 20 
Average Ea:;mings of Mal e Bantu Workers by R egion 
in Certain Industries 1953-54 
(Index !-!umbers. Southern Transvaal Average = 100 } 
Food Textiles 
o/'\ % 
Western Cape 92.4 86.5 
P ort Elizabeth/Uitenhage 92 . 6 61.9 
East London 87.9 98.9 
Durbani P inetown 87.2 88.1 
Southern T r ansvaal l ()f' . Q lfJO. 0 
P retoria 91. 3 72. 3 
R e s t of Cape 61. 1 59.7 
Rest of I'!atal 58.2 55. 5 
Rest of T ransvaal 54. 0 48. 2 
Orange F !'ee State 55.0 1Ct6 . 7 
Wood products 
% 
115.4 
107. 3 
80. l 
98.4 
1{)0.0 
103. 3 
66. 0 
51.() 
44. 6 
86.2 
Source: Calculated fl·om unpublis hed information kindly supplied by the 
Bu r eau of Statistics. 
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Table 20 shows that, despite individual differences in the ranking 
of regions according to their average earnings levels, the food, textiles 
and wood products sectors in 1953-54 had a good deal in common. 
E xcluding the main industrial areas, average earnings relative to the 
Southern Transvaal in the food, textiles and wood products industries 
respectively were as follows: 61. 1, 59. 7 and 66.0 in the Cape (ex-
cluding East London); 58. 2, 55. 5 and 51. 0 in Natal; and 54. 0. 48. Z 
and 44. 6 in the Transvaal. In each case, therefore, average earnings 
were lower in Natal than in the Cape but higher in Natal than in the Trans-
vaal, and the differential was roughly the same for all three of these 
industries. Also it is noteworthy that in both Natal and the Transvaal 
the differential was greatest in the wood products sector and smallest 
in the food sector. 
The clothing industry is of particular interest in view of the 
importance of labour costs and the fact that growing labour problemu 
in the predominant centre appear to be causing a tendency towards de-
centralisation. 1 In recent years government assistance to clothing 
firms in the border areas may have accelerated this process, but 
labour supply and cost have apparently exerted an independent influence. 
Table 21 is reproduced from H. A. F. Barker's extremely 
detailed study of the clothing industry. 2 As Barker points out, these 
figures 'reveal that the average weekly wage rates in the coastal a r eas -
Cape Western. Cape E astern and Natal- were respectively only 82, 79 
and 72 per cent of those of the Witwatersrand, while the corresponding 
percentages for the weekly median wage rates were still lower at 75, 
76 and 69 per cent respectively. For Kirri>erley and K roonatad the 
percentages were 65 (average weekly wage) and 60 (median weekly wage) 
while the average weekly wage in the other uncontrolled regions was 
only 33 per cent of the corresponding rate on the Witwatersrand'. 3 
79, Table 5. 1. See above, Chapter 3, p. 
?.. The Economics of the Wholesale Clothing Industry in South Mrica 
(1907-1957), {Pallas Publications, Johannesburg 1962). Table X lll, 
p. 108. 
3. op. cit., p. 127. 
Area 
Witwatersrand (1 ) 
Cape Western (2 ) 
Cape Easte r n (3) 
Durban and envi rons (4) 
Kimber ley and Kroons t ad 
Other a r eas (5) 
All areas 
Racial percentage for 
all r aces 
TABL E 21 
Number of employees in the clothing industry, acco r ding to a r ea and 
r a ce, a n d ave r age and med ian wage s paid a t Augus t 1955 
Employees Area perc ent age s (6) 
of total employees Average weekly 
European Col oured Asi atic Nat ive Total wageR 
5,693 4, 764 345 6,655 17,457 42.2 13. 20 
2 , 008 12,604 602 297 15,511 37.5 10.83 
27 1 857 1 31 54 1. 31 3 3. 2 10.48 
269 1. 3 10 3,597 324 5, 500 13. 3 9. 53 
85 6 19 30 8 1 815 2.0 8.69 
40 60 29 644 773 1.8 4. 35 
8, 366 20,2 14 4,734 8,055 41, 369 (8 ) 100.0 11.48 
20.0 48.9 11. 4 19. 5 100 
(6) 
Median weekly 
wag eR 
13.42 
10. 08 
10. 28 
9.20 
8.08 
8. 08 (7 ) 
10.08 
Sour ce: H. A. F. Barker, op. cit., Table XIII , p. 108, w h ich in turn was based u pon statistics in Wage Boar d report dd. 1st May, 1956, 
Tables IV and VI in the annexures and par a . 24 , pp. 54 and 55-57. 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
( 7) 
(8) 
Witwater srand includes Johannesburg, Germiston, Benoni, Boksburg, Brakpan, Krugersdorp and Springs . 
Cape Wes t ern includes the magis t e r ial districts o f t h e Cape , Wynberg and Bellville. 
Cape Eastern includes Port Elizabeth, East London, Uit e nhage and Kin g William's Town. 
Includes Verulam. 
" Othe r areas " includes Char lestown, Port Shepston e, George, Umtata and Stand erton. 
Including cost of liv in g allowances . 
T h e available data does not per mit of ascertaining the median week ly wage for "Oth e r a r eas" . 
The total nu mber of clothi n g indus t ry e m ployees i n 1953- 4, according to the l atest available results of the Cen sus of Industrial 
Establishments (published in Special Report No. 217) was 49, 849. ThP. figures here quoted for August 1955, are collated from 
the manufacturers' returns received by t he Wage Board and the total of 41, 369 indicat es a coverage of about 83 per cent - not 
a substantial drop in the number s employed . N 
r:1' 
a-. 
These figures it should be noted relate to the average wage 
level in different centres taking all racial groups and both sexes to -
gether. While this sort of comparison may be useful in the clothing 
industry, it tells us little about the order of wage differentials that 
can be expected in other industries in the rural areas, in view of 
va:dations in the race and sex characteristics or the labour force. 
Barker attributes the higher level of wages in the Witwatersrand 
partly to the higher proportio11 of white workers in the industry in 
that region. But in addition average wage levels in the Transvaal 
clothing industry apparently increased much more rapidly than in 
the coast al regions between 1940 and 1955, despite a sharp fall in the 
p1·oportion of whites in the Transvaal labour force and an increase in 
the proportion of Bantu. 
11ln 1940 when the proportion of Europeans employed in 
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the Transvaal clothing factories was about 70 per cent, the 
prescribed wages of female machinists were 22 per ceut higher 
than those in the coas:tal areas. But by 1955. when the per 
centage of European employees was only 32.6 the wage disparity in 
favour of the coastal factories had increased to 30 per cent for the 
Eastern Cape, 33 per cent for the Western Cape and 46 per cent 
for Natal. 111 
Barke:r. explains this trend in the follo'itYi.ng terms: 
11Cape Town and Port Elizabeth both had ample supplies 
of suitable coloured labour, while Durban was similarly well 
endowed with Indian workers. But in proportion to their needs. 
both Johannesburg and Germiston were less favourably situated. 
For their labour requirements they were obliged to augment an 
i<''lcreasingly inadequate supply of Europeans • in competition 
with the attracticns of distributive, clerical and other i.ndustt'ial 
o:::cupatio::Ls - with lunited numbers o:f colourecls and a growing 
proportion of untrained natives of lesser suitability for the work. 112 
1. op. cit., P• 128. 
Z. op. cit., p. 129. 
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He points to the faster rate of increase of female employees in 
industry in the Witwatersrand than in the coastal areas as further evidence 
of the pressure on the Witwatersrand' s labour resources. The impression 
given by this analysis is that forces operating in the labour market at 
least at the less skilled levels, are tending to offset the Southern Trans-
vaal's other locational advantages in the clothing industr • As our 
anal -sis of relative wages in manufacturing industry as a whole shows 
there was also a tendency for the average earning s of male Bantu to 
increase faster in. the Southern Transvaal than in other centres between 
1944-45 and 1956-57. This is clearly- in keeping with Barker ' s view 
of the situation in the Witwatersrand l abour market. 1n part the gains 
made by· Bantu i n the Southern Transvaal may be due to a general ten-
dency to upgrade workers in order to replace white labour which was 
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. But it may also be evidence 
of g rowing difficulty in obtaining labour of all types in the Southern 
Transvaal area. A tendency of this sort. toe: ether with the steadily 
increasing proportion o£ Bantu workers in manufacturing industry will 
obviously tend to increase the attractiveness of sites in the border areas. 
not only for certain branches of the clothing industry but for other of the 
more labour intensive industries as well. ()ther thing s being equal, 
the cost of diverting industries to the border areas would tend to decline. 
Regional Wage I"·olicy. 
The writer's purpose in thie chapter and the next is, as stated 
earlier, to throw light on the 'divertibility' of industries, that is, on 
the ease or difficulty whith which industries may be induced by the 
Government to establish themselves in the border areas rather than in 
locations which they would otherwise have selected. As we have noted, 
and hope to demonstrate more clearly iu Chapter 8, reg ional wage 
differentials, and changes in them, have an important bearing on this 
question. These differentials, however, are not determined solely 
by differences in the cost of living in various parts of the country or 
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by local peculiarities in the demand for, or the supply of labour services, 
as they are in a classical economic model. In reality they depend on a 
complex set of political, sociological and economic factors. 
An issue which has caused considerable controversy is Govern-
ment policy regarding the disparity between wage rates in the metropolitan 
and rural areas, in particular the border areas. In 1960 the Govern-
ment commit:ted itself to the 11maintenance of the principle of wage 
differentiation in respect of border areas, in so far as such differentiation 
can be justified on grounds of lower productivity and lower costs of living". 
"The purpose of wage differentiation" it was stated, "is not to facilitate 
unfair competition among various regions but to assist in the removal 
of factors inhibiting the decentralisation of industry. With this intention, 
minimum wages in border areas in respect of which industrial councils 
do not at the moment have jurisdiction will be determined as at present 
in terms of the Wage Act, on the recommendation of. the Wage Board. 
When industrial councils do exist no change is envisaged. Industrial 
councils are expected, however, to assist the government in the im-
plementation of the policy of decentralisation . a • and particularly in so 
far as industries which employ large numbers of Natives are concerned. 
Since industrial councils do not have all the data and information at 
their disposal to enable them to determine their wage policy in the border 
areas, the initiative in this connection will be entrusted to the Permanent 
Committee. It will be the duty of this committee, after consultation 
with the Wa ge Board, to establish a liaison with the industrial councils 
. 1 
through the department of labour. " 
Even prior to 1960, if a region or a particular type of labour 
was not covered by an industrial council agreement, wages were set by 
the Wage Board in terms of the Wage Act of 1925, when the Board was 
asked to do so by the Minister of Labour. According to the statement 
1. P rime Minister's statement on the establishment of industries in 
the border areas, l June, 1960. 
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quoted, however. the Government intended, in effect, to put the determin-
ation of all wages in the border areas in the hands of the Wage Board, 
and the Permanent Committee whether an industrial council previously 
had jurisdiction over them or not. The statement also suggests an in-
creased determination to resist attempts by industrial councils to extend 
their area of jurisdiction to include centres in the border areas. 
The obvious implication of the statement is that the Government 
believed that if wage fixing were left to industrial councils the regional 
differentials established would tend to be, in some sense, undesirably 
small. Despite the assurance that uunfair" competition would be avoided, 
this policy has met wit h vehement opposition from employers, and, in 
great measure also!J from employees in the larger industrial centres, 
especially on the Witwatersrand. Tjlis conflict ie of course not a novel 
feature of industrial relations in South Africa. Indeed, one gathers from 
1 Barkers work~ a long, bitter struggle by employers in the clothing industry 
to limit the size of regional differentials had been in progress more or less 
continually since at least 1926. The focal point of this struggle has grad-
ually shifted from the wage differentials existing between the Witwaters-
rand and the coastal centres, to those existing between all the controlled 
areas on the one hand and the uncontrolled areas on the other. though 
the former issue, it seems, is still very much alive. 2 Instead of achieving 
the greater uniformity of wage rates which they had been seeking for so 
long, the threat to Witwatersrand clothing manufacturers of keener com-
petition from producers released from the need to comply with "' civilised 
wage standards" seemed to have increased. In view of its high labour 
intensity, the difficulties inherent in the creation of a satisfactory regional 
wage structure appear in a more acuteand obvious form in the clothing 
industry than in any other, and it is, therefore, an instructive example, 
to which we return shortly. 
1. H. A. F. Barker, op. cit. ~ Chapter X. 
2. See Barker, op. cit., p. 403, where he calls for the establishment 
of a 'national industrial council for the whole industry.' 
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Collective wage settlements have tended to reduce the size of 
regional differentials in those advanced countries having strang trade 
union movements. Soma observers in the United States for instance 
consider that national wage standardisation has created difficulties for 
certain localities, and generally has had an adverse effect on the develop-
nEnt of less prosperous regions. In order to counter these adverse 
.effects of sn:all regional differentials, Buchanan and Moes1 have suggested 
a device involving subsidies to firms in less prosperous regions. In 
Britain, too, there has been a tendency to rationalize and reduce differentials 
between the areas brought under one agreement. But, according to 
D. J. Robertson the index of actual earnings in different parts of the 
United Kingdom, presented in the table below indicate that the differentials 
established by collective settlements have been nullified by competitive 
forces. He says: 
". • • Workers earnings have • • • tended to settle down to reflect 
regional differences in the balance of supply and derm.nd for 
labour • • • The result of the inter-action of these processes is 
that we now have a pattern of regional differentials in earnings 
which corresponds in broad measure t o t~e relative prosperities 
of different parts of the country, while, at the same time, we have 
a much more uniform pattern of coll~ctively deternined wage rates 
which allows for little differentiation between areas. " 2 
1. J. M Buchanan and J. E. Moes, HA Regional Cow1ter~asure to 
National Wage Standardisation , u American E cononic Review, 
June 1960, pp 434-438. (/..ON]JCN, f"'I'I~MIW../'IAI l<j&t.) 
., 
,.. The E cononics of Wages," pp. 124-125 • 
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Earning Index for each Region of Great Britain 
Region 
North 
East and West Ridings 
North Midlands 
East 
London and South East 
South 
South West 
Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Earning Index 
Great Britain = 100 
95.5 
96.9. 
98.5 
101.0 
108. 1 . 
100.7 
96. 3 
100.8 
98. 6 
98. 0 
93. 0 . 
Source: C. E . V. Leser, 'Earnings in British Regions', Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, 1954. The index is based 
on Census of P reduction Data. 
The actual earnings differentials reflected in this table 1 are 
appare11tly rather narrower than thoae which we showed earlier 
exist in South Africa. This is probably attributable to the fact that 
compared with this country, the British economy is more integrated, 
the degree of region31 imbalance is lower, the motlility o:f labour is 
greater due to the smaller land area, and the less prosperous regions 
include some fairly large centres which already have a tradition of 
industrial activity, but which have tended to decline, or at least to 
expand less rapi~y than other parts of the country. It is, therefore, 
easier for the market mechanism to prevail against any tendency towards 
national wage standardisation. It should be noted that if the market 
is to produce differentials wider than those between agreed minimum 
wages in different regions. either the minima established for the roQre 
1. Reproduced £rom D. J. Robertson. op. cit. 
prosperous regions must have been so low as to have been ineffective 
from the start, or a certain amount of ' wage drift' must occur in the 
prosperous regions after the minima have been determinetL ' Wage 
drift' however talr.:es time and unless accompanied by increases in 
productivity implies rising labour costs and prices. 
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One possible interpretation of the governments: policy accounce-
ment, then, is that they wished to avoid t he adverse effects of national 
wage standardisation to which we have referred. But : is there any 
objective way of determinL11g the 'right' degree of differentiation in 
regional wage levels or is it a purely arbitrary matter_? Is it not 
merely a matter of the relative bargaining strengths of different groups, 
srnU.l differentials favouring some interest groups and :large di:C:ferent-
ials favouring others? Is there for instance an economically 'right' 
regional wage structure or is there no special merit in having different-
ials which reflect differences in cost of living, productivity and peculiar-
ities in local labour market conditions? 
Lewis ' contention, di!Jcuaaed in Chapter 5, that government 
intervention ill the location of industry is justified on economic g rounds 
because "wage differentials between towns where there is heavy un .. 
eiJl>loyment and towns where there is not are not as wide as a free 
:mtrket would require" 1 implies that a regional wage structure determined 
by market forces does posseso some special merit. So do the remarks 
by Buchanan and Moes and by D. J. Robertson in the works mentioned 
above. Lewis as we noted is concerl'led with the 1•elationship between 
wages in prosperous and declining regions, and the unduly small different-
ials resulting £rom downward wage rigidity in the latter. It appears that 
he would regard the workings of the market in this case as unsatisfac-
tory because it does not lead to the fall in wages in the poorer regions 
which is necessary for the market's equilibrating function to work 
properly. It appears, too, that he would regard the market as satis-
factory if such a fall took place, even though it meant an absolute fall 
1. Principles of Economic P lanning, p. 78. 
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in real wage• for t hose actually employed b"l the poorer areas, below some 
previously attained level. Presumably, therefore, he would be even 
readier to oppose a tendency for wages in poorer areas to be pushed up 
to some higher level not previously attained. 
What is the basis of the this preference for regional differentials 
reflecting market forces? Fuudamentally it is that too narrow a gap 
exaggerates the real marginal social cost of l abour in the poorer r e lative 
to the richer areas an.d results in a misallocation of resources. This of course 
is well kuownt but in the light of some views expressed on regional wage 
policy in South Africa it may bear repe ting. Assume for arguments sake that, 
allowing only for differences itt cost of living and in productivity, w ge 
r~ tea are perfectly uniform throughout the country in each industry. 
There are. however, obstacles to the mobility of l abour due to what 
'f' rofe ssor Hicks has called the "indirect attractions of living in a 
particular locality111 which h1clude such things as travelling coste, the 
disability caused by the need to adopt to a new job and learn new skills, 
to l eave friends and abandon au old way of life for a1'l unknown new Ol'~e, 
and even sheer inertia. Obstacles of this sort impede movement not 
only from agriculture to industry in general, but from one industrial 
ce .. 1tre to another, and their magnitude tends to v1ry directly with the 
dist nee whh:h hae to be travelled. ::-.:ow this do s not mean that those 
who wish to move between regions should not be permitted to do so. It 
simply means that if these frictions are to be overcome, workers must 
have an adequate incentive to move. In the case of Dantu workers in the 
Ciskei, a larger rea l wage rate is required to induce movement to .r ohannes-
burg than migration to .t-\.ing V. illia ms Town. 
All but perfectly mobile workers and those who actually prefer life 
elsewhe re, would rath r obtain employment of a somewhat lower wage r1.te 
in the po~>rer static region than work in an expanding region at the uniform 
wage rate. But they are prohibited from offering their services at a rate 
1. J. 1~. Hicks. The Theory of ¥\ages, Second '"'::dition (:tv. acmillan. 
London 1963), p. 74. 
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le•• than the latter.. lf, at the prevailing uniform r te it ia n.ot poesible 
for all those W'lnting en)ployme ~t in the p.oorer a ..re to obta.i11 it, they 
have no D-lternative but to mi;;r to, even though by doini so tb y will 
feel themselves worse IJif thi.tu they would b we be~n itt th~ poor r area 
at a lower wa e r.1t • At the sarr e time if lov.er v,;1aee were p•rmitted 
in thf' poorer "ir ea new firms would h~tld to be a t tradetd to the r<:"a ...1.d 
firms already established thf".rtt would te.-ld to expbo.nd, thus providing 
dditional cmployrPent. Thua h)tb tht' ddition. 1 worlu~r• U'lployed 3Ud 
th• firm• cmpl~yin"" them would be bP.tter '->ff tha., with \miforn-.. wa e rat •• 
and. it rnieht b~ noted, the cou.otry• • :ra.tc of ecotH)l:rric gro'Jith "-"lbanced. 
The lower the W"'ltf~ aece•eary in the po~r r :'lrea if th.er a.re to be enough 
job vacancies to emidoy all those a eki.na work th r • the greater the 
number of workers who will feel th£ better we"e conditi~ne in the xpaudhtg 
au•c<' e adequ-3.te to overcome the 11indire-ct attracti.O.Ll.& of li'\'iag in a pnrtic ~ 
1l l' locality". 'Uld they u-ill accordingly migl"ate. 
Furthe-rmore, i! the c~p.!)dty o! the pr.ospe:roua regio!'l to absorb 
workP-rs &t the prevailing uniform wage r~te. ia less than the number who 
c nnot be employed at this rate in the poorer ar~~•• a problem of u.n ~ 
employment will arise. when it might .not bAtV'e done so. or might b~v« ooen 
lea seriou•• in the abeence of national w ge atand:trdia.a.ti'>n. It gee 
wi.tho\,lt a!6ying that if a arate !or the jobn h aet for: ~u worker• in :i ptu•w 
tlcula.l" catesory regardless o£ where they re employed, eo that pro-
ductivity difference• a.re nvt taren into o.c<:ount in the wage. a;tructure all 
the adverse effects deacribed will bo atill !urth~r acc.entuated. If work~ 
era from the poor~r .orea are lees productive than otbcre~ their ehancco 
of obtaining employm~~tnt will be jeopardiaed not only in their home 
loc litif!e., but in the expanding arcaa a well. 
Considerations oi the sort just discussed prtlsumably underly 
ooth the remark• from L wie quoted above and th~ !Jllowing c..'>mme.nt 
by the Board. of Tr~de ~nd Industries . 1 
u'the comparatively low wagee in rural are"'a in. most count.ric 
h:1s been d.u~ to the fact tlu\t su.ch r as ueually pr&d•tce a surplus 
p<3pul"Jtion and that eped.al incentives to m igration tow:trd& urbzm areaa 
1. -.eport r-~o. 282~ p. l 0 0. 
are necessary, while living conditions are also such that a lower 
wage rate in rural areas is often preferred to a somewhat higher rate 
in cities". 
There are important reasons why regional wage differentials 
would need to be larger in South Africa than elsewhere. As we have 
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seen, there have been considerable disparities over long periods of time 
in the average earnings of Bantu males in different regions, the level in 
the Cape (including East London), the Transvaal and Natal border areas 
being lower by 27. 1, 55. Z and 32. 3 per cent respectively than in the Southern 
Transvaal. In view of the apparent relative constancy of these figures 
over time it seems that they may correspond roughly with variations in 
local supply and demand conditions for Bantu labour. When in addition 
to this we bear in mind that a particular type of job in an industry may 
be performed by different racial groups in different areas, it is clear 
that the regional wage differentials for that job may have to be quite sub-
stantial to reflect differences in productivity and variations in local labour 
market conditions. Some of the factors which make for large regional 
wage disparities in South Africa and which create serious problems in 
setting wages are nicely summarised in the following remarks by the Wage 
Board: 
"the problem of safeguarding existing factories and encouraging the 
establishment of new ones meets with difficulties. These are cormec-
ted mainly with the peculiar racial composition of the population and the 
equally peculiar dualistic structure of the economy. The ethnic com-
plications arise from the fact that the different racial groups have 
different living and wage standards. Hence if as is the case in this 
industry, one locality employs whites, another uses coloureds or 
Indians and another takes on Bantu to perform the same work, there 
are bound to be ethnic wage differentials that, rightly or wrongly, tend 
sooner or later to generate conflict. Then, again, in an economy with 
a pronounced dualistic character, where a developed sector faces an 
undeveloped one, geographical differentials will be a prominent feature 
Z77 
of the wage structur·e. In the stockings industry, this complicating 
factor is likewise present. Now, when the two factors of multi-
racialism and economic dualism operate in combination, the wage 
problem becomes the more difficult. In other words, when in the 
netropolitan areas of the developed sector whites or even coloureds, 
but in the towns of the undeveloped sector Bantu are employed in 
the same occupations, very large wage differentials may arise." 1 
It is of course very difficult to determine in any objective way 
what the size of regional wage differentials should be. In view of the 
factors which we have indicated, and given the racial composition of 
the labour force in different regions, we should expect these differ-
entials to be quite substantial. Disputes as to whether the regional 
differences are too large or too small in a particular industry, how-
ever, seem to arise mainly from a failure to agree on the criteria 
which should be used in establishing minimum wage rates in different 
regions. It is, therefore, of interest to examine the main objections 
put by opponents of the country's regional wage policy and some of 
the criteria which they have suggested should be applied in setting wages. 
T·errns appearing frequently in critical comments are those such 
as "fairly established". ucivilised wage standards", 11fair competition11 
and, of course, "unfair competitionu. The most systematic and thorough 
statement of the case against current regional wage policy is contained 
in the work by H. A. F. Barker referred to above. Barker does not 
deny that some regional differentiation in wage rates is justified but 
contends that the differentials actually prevailing are in some sense too 
large and, by implication, that the differentials which would be estab-
lished if uncontrolled a reas were included in industrial council agree-
ments, and, in particular, if there existed a single national industrial 
1. Wage Board Report on the Industry for the ~:anufacture of La.dies 
Stockings, February 1963. 
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council in the clothing industry, would in some sense be preferable. 
First, it is clear that Barker's criterion of the appropriate 
structure is not the same as that of Lewis, namely, what "a free market 
would require". He does not explicitly set out his view of the appro-
priate criteria but asserts inter alia that "in principle there can be no 
objection to a wage differentiation which does not exceed the current 
disparity in regional costs 111 and further on: ":Cven were it possible 
to fix wages and other working conditions so that regional costs were 
equalised, that would still be tantamount to an official invalidation of 
the original decisions made by existing manufacturers on the location 
of their plants. When wages are arbitrarily fixed at levels which do 
more than bring regional cost to parity, that amounts to more tha.."'l 
virtual exploitation of the originallocational advantages secured by cap-
ital investment and labour and becomes a differential tax on existing 
manufacturers, to pr·omote State objects of which the cost should be 
borne by the whole community". 2 
A ccording to this view, thep., wage rates should be set so that 
r.m.nufacturers in high wage areas3 can retain the overall cost advantage 
which originally made them choose their present locations. At wort:t, 
wage differentials should be no greater than those which will equalise 
the costs of production of firms in different parts of the country. and 
clothing manufacturers in the border areas should definitely not be 
allowed. to pay wage rates which will give them an overall cost advantage 
1. gp. cit., p. 402. 
2. ()p.cit., pp. 411-412~ 
3. In the context of his discussion, it appears that this really 
means manufacturers on the Wit watersre.nd. See for instance 
the paragraph in the middle of p. 411 of Barker's study. 
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over manufacturers in the larger centres. There is no need to dwell 
upon the fact that this criterion has no economic justification whatso-
ever. It is obvious that even if a particular location is optimal initially, 
market forces may eventually swing the balance in favour of other centres. 
The argument that a regional wage differential which puts some clothing 
manufacturers in the larger centres at an overall cost disadvantage 
"merely diminishes the productive power of society111 is, indeed, a most 
extraordinary one. As we have already noted, Barker himself concedes 
that the slower rate of increase in wage rates in the coastal centres, 
compo.red with the Wit wat ersrand, is due to the more abundant resources 
of suitable Coloured and Indian labour in those centres. It appears then 
that the regional wage differentials are probably no more than what "a 
free market would require" and that they simply reflect the real cost 
of labour in different areas. The truth seems to be that in certain branches 
of the clothing industry the competitive position of other areas is improvLTlg 
due to market forces, and that certain manufacturers on the Witwatersrand 
are in the uncomfortable position of having to adapt to these changing 
circumstances. 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Barker's concern is 
primarily with the interests of clothing manufacturers on the Witwaters-
rand. For he complains not only of unfair competition between controlled 
and uncontrolled areas but also of what he evidently considers the excess-
ively large wage differentials between the Transvaal clothing industry and 
the coas tal centres. Since wage rates in the coastal centres are deter-
mined by industrial councils, it appears that it is not the absence of 
collective bargaining through industrial councils, and the lack of safe-
guards for workers intere!!ts which this might entail, which is the main 
point at issue. Barker recommends the establishment of a national 
industrial council for the clothing industry arguing that "it is difficult 
1. Barker, op. cit., p. 412. 
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to understand how the multiplication of such independent and virtually 
competing bodies [ regional indust rial councils] can be expected to 
remedy a condition of unequal wage structures, in which the negotiating 
parties to each council have dissimilar interests ••• "l This indeed is 
the crux of the problem. There are divergent regional interests and 
it appears that only manufacturers on the Witwatersrand and perhaps 
also workers there, stand to gain from smaller differentials between 
this area and the coastal centres. So far as the disparity between the 
larger urban areas and the rural areas is concerned, Barker comPa.ins 
that to a considerable extent these are based on the lower wage require-
ments of native workers, not on locational disadvantages per sen. 2 
But as we have argued it is desirable that the regional wage differentials 
reflect the lower supply price of workers in the border and Bantu areas. 
This is not to recommend discrimination on racial grounds. On the 
contrary, adequate regional differentials are necessary if workers in 
poor regions are to be allowed to offer their labour rates which give them 
a chance of obtaining employment. This is not inconsistent with their 
being permitted to migrate to higher paid jobs in larger centres if these 
are available. 
Whatever guiding principles are established for setting regional 
wage differentials, they are always difficult to apply precisely in prac-
tice. There is inevitably an element of arbitrariness involved. In 
setting wages for the clothing industry the Wage Board distinguished 
between several different areas. Their report3 stated that the regional 
classification "tries to keep in account such factors as the general indus-
trial development of the a rea, the type of labour available, the experience 
of the employees in the factories concerned, the na ture of the clothing 
manufactured and therefore the market for such clothes, the general 
level at every place and the non-statutory wage regulating instruments 
1. op. cit-. p . 412. 
2. op. cit. , p. 403. 
3. Wage Board Report on the Clothing Industry - Certain Areas dd. 
April, 1961, p. 39. See also Wage Board Report dd. 11.5.1962 
on wages in firms producing soap, candles, edible oils and fats. 
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(including possible exemptions) applicable to such places and the financial 
condition of the entreprises". It appears that the Wage Board also took 
into account the racial composition of the labour force in the area and in 
its recommendations on the clothing industry placed U mzinto in a relatively 
high category ubecause it is close to Durban and has a good type of labour, 
namely Indians at its disposal."· 
It is impossible to apply these criteria in a perfectly consistent 
way and some anomalies must arise. But on the face of it the criteria 
mentioned are those which must be applied if some sort of rationality ia 
to be instilled into the regional wage structure. Even if, as some allege, 
the Wage Board sets wage minima which are too low it seems to the writer 
that there is less danger in this than minima which are too high. If 
the Board sets a minimum wage rate in a particular firm in a rural area 
which is 'too low', yet a clothing firm paying the minimum rate is able 
to satisfy its need for labour and make a profit, this would suggest there 
were a number of potential industrial workers in the area who preferred 
'a lower wage in the rural areas to a somewhat higher wage in the cities'. 
Both employer and employed apparently benefit. If on the other hand, 
Bantu workers preferred to migrate to the larger centres and the firm 
could not obtain a satisfactory labour supply it would be forced to raise 
its wages. The possibility of migration is the safeguard against ex-
ploitation of labour in the border areas. 
It is true that, owing to influx control and other restrictions on 
the geographical mobility of Bantu labour, the alterahtive of migration 
to the metropolitan areas is not always open to workers in the reseJ!:ves 
and border areas. But it is hard to see how a greater degree of uniform-
ity in the wage rate in different regions can solve the problem arising from 
such restrictions. Indeed, it appears that unless offset by a sufficient 
amount of Government subsidised employment, unduly high wage rates 
in the border areas will simply aggravate the difficulties of finding work 
for those Bantu unable to migrate. Those who disapprove of these 
implications of measures restricting the mobility of Bantu labour should 
direct their arguments against these measures. The appropriate solution 
to the problem ie clearly not the establishment of smaller wage differentials 
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between regions. 
The above remarks should not be construed as an argument for 
excesa;ively high regional wage differentials. In particular, the present 
writer is not recommending, as some observers have done, that the 
manipulation of regional wage differentials is the most efficient manner 
of bringing about industrial decentralisation. If wage rat es in the metro-
politan areas were increased sharply, this would obviously reduce the 
number of Bantu who could be taken int o wag e employment in these areas. 
The number of workers dependent on the border and Bantu areas for 
employment would therefore increase and the wage rate in the backward 
areas of the country would be depressed. The rise in the wage rate in 
the metropolitan areas relative to the backward areas would consequently 
increase the cost advantage of the latter areas in a number of lines of 
production, and so tend to increase the proportion of manufacturing indus-
tries establishing in the less developed parts of the country. But this 
would be achieved only at the cost of perpetuating and intensifying the 
economic dualism described in Chapter 2, and at the cost of lower Bantu 
living standards. It is noteworthy that the tendency for wage rates to 
be pushed up too rapidly in certain sectors of the economy is the crux 
of Mrs. Lutz's explanation1 of the persistence of economic dualism iJ;t. 
Italy. 
1. op. cit. The essentials of the argument are contained in her Chapter 2. 
Wage Rates and Labour Supply as Locational Factors. 
As we observed earlier, in the case of the vast majority of 
locational decisions, markets and materials, not labour costs, are 
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the predominant considerations. The emphasis in the previous section 
of the clothing industry may therefore tend to exaggerate the importance 
of l a bour costs and supply in determining the overall locational pattern. 
It also exaggerates the liklihood of a marked reduction in the degree of 
regional con centration taking place as a result of market forces alone, 
without some form of financial assistance from the Gover~ment. Within 
the clothing industry itself certain sectors obtain significant advantages 
from being sited in the largest market areas and regional wage differentials 
would have to be very substantial before they would be persuaded to trans~ 
fer their production activities to the border a.reas. In manufacturing 
indu stry as a whole the effect of increasing regional differentials depends 
in similar fashion on the proportion of industries in which labour costs 
a re important relative to other costs. 
It is clear too that potential l abour cost savings in the border 
areas do not depend on labour intensity in general, and it is the sig-
nificance of unskilled labour costs which counts. In underdeveloped 
countries and regions it is usually relatively easy to obtain workers capable 
of performing repetitive tasks or even tasks requiring a greater degree 
of judgment. A United Nations report comments as follows on the 
position in Mrica: 
"The main difficulty lies at the levels in the factory hierarchy, 
foreman, plant supervisors, technicians and skilled mechanics, 
maintenance engineers, experts in matedals, Ctesi.gners. research 
workers. production and programme engineer~; works managers 
and all the various executive and administrative decision making 
personnel normally responsible for organising and maintaining the 
smooth flow of production". 1 
I. Process and Problems_ of Industrialisation in Underdeveloped Countries. 
Dnited Nations. Department of Social and Economic Mfairs. 
(.New York. 1955), p. 41. 
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The supply of workers of this sort is extremely meagre in the 
border areas compared with the larger industrial centres. Some of the 
types of labour mentioned need considerable training and experience 
while others require in addition, a fairly high general educational level. 
It is improbable that the Bantu and border areas themselves will be 
able to provide a significant proportion of the demand for labour of 
this sort, especially if bo1·der industry development takes place on a 
sca l e 
substantial/and even if efforts to train Bantu are intensified, Firms 
in the border areas will, therefore, have to rely heavily on the importation 
of white workers either from overseas or from other parts of the country, 
to fill such posts. 
But it is well known that skilled workers, by and large, show a 
preference for the larger industrial centres. In reply to a questionnaire 
sent by the writer to firms in the cotton and woollen textiles industry, 
numerous complaints were made about the shortage of skilled workers 
in this industry in all parts of the country, but the position appears to 
be more difficult in the rural areas. One Western Cape firm made the 
point that 'the recruiting of trained personnel from overseas is consider-
ably easier if the mill is near a big city'. Another Cape Town firm said 
that its European overseas staff prefer Cape Town and o~ the question 
of border areas location it said 'it would be impossible to get our white 
overseas staff to live outside Cape Town'. A firm situated in a border 
area centre also referred to 'the difficulty in obtaining skilled Europ-
ean labour due to being situated in a small town plus shortage of reason-
ably priced houses at nominal charges'. There is thus some reason 
to believe that. even if wages for this type of worker are not in fact higher 
in the border areas than in the larger cities, it would be more difficult 
to meet requirements at any given wage in the bc:rder area than in a 
metropolitan location. 
The overall labour cost ratio is, therefore. not necessarily 
a good index of the relative importance of labour cost savings which 
can be achieved in the border areas. Naturally the proportion of 
skilled workers in the labour force varies from one industry to another, 
but no South African statistics for individual industries are available to 
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illustrate this. Where the skilled labour has to be moved to the border 
areas. the wages nece s sary and the difficulties in obtaining suitable 
personnel may offset the savings in the cheaper semi-skilled and un-
skilled labour available in the new location. Thus the concentration of 
skilled workers in the large centres may act as a brake on the movement 
of industry to the border areas, particularly when the proportion of 
highly skilled workers is large. We are· here abstracting from other 
factors reducing the importance of semi-skilled and unskilled labour 
resources, like raw materials and markets and strong linkage effects 
in large industrial concentrations, which are taken into account in the 
following chapter. 
In our analysis of divertibility in the following chapter we shall 
use the ratio of white to total employees as a rough measure of the pro-
portion of skilled workers in the labour force of each industry. This 
measure of course has obvious limitations, since not all whites are skilled 
and some skilled jobs, though relatively few, are performed by Coloureds, 
Indians and Bantu. 1 Nevertheless this measure provides a very useful 
first approximation as an indicator of the difficulties which may be expected 
in various industries in border areas locations on account of the scarcity 
of highly skilled workers there. 
There are two trends which may be tending to reduce the sig-
nificance of this obstacle to border areas development. Firstly, the 
' mechanisation of manufacturing industry h a s in the past steadily reduced 
the proportion of operations that require the all round skilled worker of 
the craftsman type and replaced them with workers who, while they require 
a high degree of skill in some operations or groups of related operations, 
are not the all round craftsmen of tbe less mechanised era. 
It was found in Great Britain in the 1930's that 11in most firms 
investigated the period of training required to trah1 workers for a par-
ticular process is comparatively short. In some cases it was a 
1. See R eport of the Department of Labour for 1956, p. 27. 
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matter of days only. In others it would involve several weeks, or perhaps 
months, but apart from those industries which involve an apprentice ship 
there were no cases of firms in which an appreciable proportion of the 
workers needed periods of training approaching those necessary for the 
craftsman sk:ll eo often found in the declining industries. Broadly 
speaking it can be 8ilid that a number of weeks is the time usually re-
quired. " 1 The Federation of B.ritish Industries in its evidence to the 
Royal Corrurission on the Dist ribution of the Industrial Population placed 
the factor of availability of labour supplies next to nearness to the Imrket 
as a locational factor but added that this "may have a different meaning to 
what it possessed in earlier times. Such labour now tends to connote 
adaptable and relatively inexpensive. rather than highly skilled, labour, 
and consequently industries enjoy a wider range of choice of location than 
was probably the case in the past, provided they are able to finci a.'l area where 
z the quantity of labour is ample". 
It seems likely that this trend has operated in South Africa as 
well, tending to reduce the pull of skilled labour resources in the case 
of particular industry. But as against this, it should be noted, in-
creasing mechanisation while it may reduce the proportion of skilled 
workers in the total labour force, tends also to reduce the overall 
relative importance of labour costs, and the latter is also a significa~-1.t 
factor influencing the pull of plentiful supplies of cheap semi-skilled and 
u..'!'lskUled labour. For reasons which we discuss in the following chapter, 
any shift in the structure o£ manufacturing industry towards heavy indus-
tries may also reduce the importance of labour resources generally 
as a locational factor and increase the cost involved in diverting indus-
tries towards cheap labour areas. 
l. S. R. Dennison, The Location of Industry and the Depressed Areas, p . 78-79. 
2. Quoted by Dennison, op. cit. , p. 7.9. 
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TABLE 22 
Racial Composition of the Labour Force in Secondary Industry * 
Whites Total Coloureds Asiatics Bantu All Non- Whites RaCes 
% % o/o tlf,.. % % 
1924-25 33 67 18 7 42 100.0 
1929-30 36 64 15 6 43 100.0 
1932-33 41 59 15 6 39 100.0 
1934-35 40 60 12 5 43 100.0 
1939-40 36 64 13 5 46 100.0 
1944-45 30 70 14 4 52 100.0 
1949-50 30 70 14 4 53 100.0 
1954-55 27 73 13 4 56 100.0 
1959-60 26 74 -----18----- 56 100.0 
1964-65 24 76 -----20----- 56 100.0 
Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, G-7, for all years 
up to 1954-55; Statistical Year Book, 1966. pp. H-33, 
H- 38 and H-39 for 1959- 60 and 1964-65. 
* Manufacturing industry (including the motor industry), plus 
construction and electricity in all years, except for the 1964-
65 figures which do not include the relatively small electricity 
sector. 
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The changing racial composition of the labour force shown in 
the table above is not due entirely to changes in production techniques. 
and in the structure of manufacturing industry. It is due in large 
measure to the upgrading of non-white labour, for the general shortage 
of white workers has florced firms to employ Bantu in jobs for which 
they were at one time thought to be unsuit able. Professor Hobart 
Houghton wtites that "in the post-war period of full employment, white 
workers were able to move into preferred occupations, creating in 
certain less attractive jobs an acute l abour crisis. In these cases. 
the employers, in order to maintain output, engaged non-whites in 
jobs previously filled by whites. The fact that these non-whites were 
a ble to fill these vacancies enabled the economic progress to continue 
unchecked". 1 The successful absorption of non-white workers in 
the metropolitan areas may make industrialists more confident of their 
ability to operate successfully in the border areas and at the same time 
to benefit from the lower wage rates there, than they were in the past. 
Whether as a result of an upgrading of Bantu labour, or changes 
in technique and the structure of manufacturing which require a lower 
general level of skill. it appears that the proportion of non-whites in 
the manufacturing labour force is likely to continue to increase steadily 
in the future. This is due simply to the fact that the natural rate of 
increase of the non-white population is more rapid than that of whites, and 
the additional econoir~cally active members of both these groups will 
depend very largely on manufacturing industry for employment in future. 
The increasing relative importance of non-whites in the industrial labour 
force can be avoided only if the rate of immigration from overseas is 
stepped up substantially, or if legal restrictions are placed on this 
process. The effect of the latter, however, would be a cumulative 
1. D. Hobart Houghton . .. Economic Dangers of Separate Development;' 
Optima. Dec. 1959, p. 190. 
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increase ·in the number of unemployed non-whites. Barring this latter 
possibility the cost of Bantu labour should become an increas-ingly 
important consideration, and the potential labour cost savings obtain-
able from location in border areas · should increase, especially if the 
level of skill required continued to fall because of mechanisation. It 
must be emphasised, however, that, despite this tendency the proportion 
of industry in which labour costs are the decisive consideration may 
remain relatively small. 
Reports on the efficiency of Bantu labour in the border areas 
vary considerably. Evidently the Cyril Lord management has "dis-
covered that the training of Mrican weavers and spinners had not h~en 
as easy a task as they may previously have imagined. The result of 
this inexperience has been a higher than normal percentage of loomstate 
production was second-grade cloth, 11 and "another manufacturers ex-
perience showed that fully 7 or 8 years had to elapse before Africans 
could be qualified in more sophisticated production". 1 On the other hand 
it is reported that "at R osslyn a button factory owner favourable compared 
his labour with the best he had employed overseas. "Z 
On the. basis of discussions with firms in the Natal border areas, 
Barker concludes that "clothing manufacturers who elect to open fac-
tories in the N atal rural areas with Bantu labour must expect lower 
standards of output and quality, below what would be normal in similar 
urban undertakings, but that the duration and extent· of the disparity, eo 
far as it is dependent on the element of labour alone, has tended to be 
overemphasised... The advantage of paying lower wages in rural areas 
is therefore, likely to be more than offset initially by handicaps of the 
type already mentioned. 113 But he adds that "the experience already 
gained by management is sufficient to show that, with proper training 
and suitable breakdown of manufacturing process, B.u"'ltu garment 
l. See Trade Union Council of South Africa, Fact Paper, The Industrial 
Development of the Border Areas of South Africa, p . 56. 
Z. Ibid. 
3. Op. cit., p. 165. 
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workers are capable of reaching a satisfactory standard of efficiency 
in factory production of lower and medium grade articles, mainly of the 
utility type, within periods of a few months to a year depending on natural 
aptitudes. After a year or two of further experience, initially untrained 
Bantu males from the Native Reserves were found to match the quantity 
and quality of output of efficient urban males of longer standing in the 
industry. 111 Even in the clothing industry, however, difficulty is ex-
perienced in obtaining satisfactory supervisory personnel and it was 
reported in 1963 that one firm in Hammersdale was transporting a 
number of Indian supervisors from Durban each day. 
In support of Barker's view there is the experience, going 
back to the late 1940's, of the Dunlop factory in Durban where it was 
found that after the introduction of scientific methods of selection and 
proper training ttnot only has the turnover been reduced and a better 
average standard of employee obtained, but Natives have been successfully 
trained on work which at first was considered beyond their general capacity". 2 
On the specific question of labour turnover in the border areas, 
views also appear to differ. Sadie felt that labour turnover would be 
lower than in the large industrial centres because rtworkers will no longer 
be migratory workers". But it should be borne in mind that a large 
proportion of Bantu workers in the metropolitan areas are not migratory. 3 
Also in East London, which is a border area, a large proportion of workers 
consists of temporary migrants, 4 probably larger than in the metropolitan 
areas. Thus centres on the periphery of the reserves may not be less 
1. OJ2o cit. f P• 163. 
2. The Department of Economics, University of Natal, The African 
Factory Worker, (Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 101. 
3. Profesaor. D. Hobart Houghton, The Sout h African Economy, p. 86, 
for instance mentions that a "large textile factory in Uitenhage found in 
1962 that 100 per cent of its employees lived with their wives and 
families in the town". 
4. ibid. 
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dependent on migrants than employers in the large centres. Further-
more whether labour tunrover is higher amongst migrants than amongst 
settled urban dwellers seems to depend very much on the area considered. 
Mrs. Glass, for instance, finds that "a higher proportion of men with 
low urbanisation rates separate and that these men have a higher resig-
nation rate than men who are not urbanised ... 1 As against this, however, 
Hobart Houghton has found little difference in E ast London in the labour 
turnover amongst migrants and non-migrants. Labour turnover there 
seems to have been more closely related to other factors on other 
factors such as age and marital status: "It would seem, therefore 
that labour instability and high tornover cannot be directly attributed to 
the migratory system". i 
P erhaps the difference between these findings may be done to 
the fact that migrants in E ast London can return more quickly and at less 
expense to their homes in the Ciskei and Transkei, so that they indulge 
in "home visiting" periodically over weekends and during their normal 
annual v a cation. As Professor N; ayer has shown the frequency with 
which uhome vioiting" takes place does depend on the distance of the rural 
3 homestead from East London. They might thus retain their connections 
with firms in E ast London, and on average, work approximately the same 
number of months per annum in these firms as second and third generation 
town dwellers. They might nevertheless be classified as migrants 
because their wives and children were living in the rural homestead, and they 
had not severed their ties with the country. Thus it may be that in general, 
when labour migration is undertaken over long distanc es, and periods of 
absence from both the reserves and urban employment are consequently 
longer, turnover rates may be higher amol'lg migrants than amongst 
urbanised Bantu. While it may be that turnover is higher amongst migrants 
1. y. Glass, The Black Industrial Worker, (Preliminary Report, National 
Institute for F e rsonnel Research; 1960), p. 24. 
2. Hobart Houghton, op. cit. , p. 90. 
3. P . :v1ayer, op. cit. , p. 95. 
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than amongst non-migrants on the Witwatersrand, say, whereas this 
ie not the case in East London, no satisfactory evidence is available 
on the comparative rates of turnover between these and other centres. 
Given the available evidence, however, it does not appear that any use-
ful generalisation can be made about the present or probable future rates 
of turnover in the border areas compared with the metropolitan areas. 
But it is quite likely that methods of selection and training, the avail-
ability of housing. 1 and restriction on permament settlement by entire 
families have an important bearing on the matte!'. 
Unfortunately no systernative comparative study of labour 
efficiency in different areas has been undertaken . But there is no apparent 
rea son why, with adequate training and selection Bantu workers in the 
border areas should not reach the same standards as Bantu workers else• 
where within a reasonably short period of time, and in due course be 
able to fill large proportion of the positions at a higher level. Pro-
vided differentials are set which adequately reflect not only their lower 
productivity compared with both black and white workers elsewhere at 
the present stage, and until these differences are eliminated, but also2 
differences in the real opportunity cost of labour effort in different 
regions, discussed earlier, the labour resources of the border and Bantu 
areas should provide a strong incentive to the establishment of labour 
intensive industries and the exploitation of processable raw materials 
in the border areas. In view of the trends described above the significance 
of this incentive may well increase over time, and the cost of diverting 
1. In a factory established in the border areas about 17 years ago, 
labour turnover was high initially, but this was before adequate 
housing was providedc near the plant, and fairly recently it was re-
ported by them that their turnover is 3Z per cent per annum and the 
absentee rate on the average 3 to 4 per cent per week. 
z. Since differentials allowing for productivity differences only merely 
equalise labour costs. 
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industries to these areas will tend to fall. 
Professor Arthur Lewis in pressing the case for industrial-
isation of the West Indies provides us with this useful reminder: 
"Whenever a new country begins to industrialise the old hands look 
on and sneer, 'Those people will never mal~;e a success of industry' 
they say, 'they are lazy, unpunctional, dreamy, undisciplined ••• ' 
They eneered at Russia, at the end of the nineteenth century, at 
Japan, at Italy. And in each case they were soon to be astonished 
by the rapid growth of productivity as people grew accustomed to the 
industrial way of life. " 1 
W. A. Lewis, The Industrialisation of the British West Indies, Caribbean 
Economic Review, M~y l9SO. 
Chapter 8 
THE 'DIVERT!.JILITY' OF MAI'"'4'UFACTURING l.l"~OUSTRIES. 
L1t roduction. 
It is clear that virtually any industry ie 'divertible' in the 
sense that it nay be influenced by Government assistance to site it-
self in a border area rather than in some other centre which would 
have been chosen in the absence of special incentives. An industry 
is econonically divcrtible to a border area site. however. if in that 
location it doea not operate at nnrginal social cost of producing and 
distributing the product which are higher than in the location which 
would otherwise have been chosen. Where diversion of an industry 
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is uneconorric,. there will be an excess rxnrginal social cost. as defined 
in Chapter 6, involved. 
It appears that it would be ideal if thoae responsible for i:m-
plementing border areas policy, had a complete ~u:hedule of the mar-
ginal social co8ts of carrying on each and every type of activity in the 
border areas. expressed as a proportion of the correapondinB nnr-
ginal social cost for the least cost site in other areas. I! they pos• 
seaaed, in addition, satisfactory projections of the national rate of 
growth in each of these rranufacturing activitiea. they would be able 
to construct a functional relationship between narginal social cost of 
industrial production in the border areas and the average annual in· 
crease in border areas industrial production. Construction of the 
anpirical counterpart of the curve ST, showing the marginal social 
cost of the annual rate of increase of border areas industrial pro-
duction, would then be possible. As we have ahown web a curve 
indicate& how nuch growth in border areas industrial production would take 
place without subsidisation, how rmch could be econonically subsidised 
and, generally, how the marginal exceas social cost (whether positive or 
negative) varied with the average annual increase in border areaa in-
dustri.:U production (or enployrx:ent). 'I'he data giving ST would ahow 
those industries and the volume of output in each, which would give any 
particular average annual addition to border areas industrial production 
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or employment at the least poeaible total excess social coat. This 
information would clearly be of great aaaiatance to the Government 
in deciding how large a volume of produ-ction or employment it waa 
worthwhile diverting to the border area• per annum. 
But the obatac:lea to the conatruction of auch a. schedule are eo 
enormoua as to be virtually ina~rable. Cne of these problema we 
encountered in chapters 3 and 4. namely. that of predictina what the 
futul'e rate of induatrial elq)anaion in the border areas w&a likely to 
be. both in absolute tenna and relative to other &J'e&a in the absence 
of Government intervention. ~ e ertcountcred it in aakin& the question 
whether there were any forces evident in 1960 which auggeated that the 
degree of industrial concentration would increase. rather than dec:recue 
or remain unchanged. if private ente.rpri•e waa left to ita mam devic:ea. 
But a• we suggeatecl there. to anawcr thia que~lon would require a 
detailed knowledge of the natural reaourcea of the border and Dantu 
area•, their probable future rate of diacovery, the technical and econ-
omic poaaibilitiea inherent in theae resources, and of future rates of 
growth in specific induatriea. factors which are virtually impoaaible 
to aaseaa !or a lougish period of time with even a fair decree of pre-
cision. 1\ny attempt to do thia would be of eo speculative a nature a.a 
to be practically wo.rthleas. Nevel"thelesa the evidence oxamined in 
chapter• 3 and 4 did DOt augaeat that a aignifieant reduction of the de .. 
gre6 of regional concentration wa• about to take place apontaneowtly, 
without government intervention, and thu ia an important fact to which 
we return at tbe eDd of thi8 chapter. 
Becau•e of the difiic:ultiea involved in predicting the future rate 
of growth in the border araa• with any preciaion, in chaptera 5 and 6 
we focuaeed our attention on the caae for -and the effect• of diverting 
induatriea and this we shall continue to do in the pre•ent chapter. In 
thia chapter we are concerned in particular with the following question: 
In the caae of thoae industries which would not establish them•elve• in 
the border area• without Government intervention. how large will be the 
marginal and total excess private coats 1 of compelling them to do ao? 
1.. As defined in chapter ~· 
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We deal with priva~.~ rather than social coats becaue determin&tion 
of the latter involvea measuring the extea-nal effects relevant i.n each 
case. The identification and measurement of external effects ia. a.s 
we mentioned in chapter s. an. enormous taak requiring a large acale 
research project on its own.. Once marginal exceaa private costa are 
obtained. however. they can auhaequently be corrected for external 
efiecta aa and when information on the latter is acquired. 
Alao we cannot hope to compile a complete schedule of m&J'ginal 
ex.ceaa private coata ~nea.,red in absolute terrna. To do thia it would 
be neceaaary to carry out a comparative co.t study for each aDd e-very 
manufacturing activity in South Africa. l'>leverthelesa it appears poa-
aible. aa we hope to show, to give a useful indication of the relative 
siu of the marginal excess private costa of di"V'ertinl difierent manu-
facturing activities to the border area•~ when the latter would not have 
b en aelected without government intervention. \:..hat we ahall aeok 
in thia chapter. then. is aome preciaely dafined index of the excess 
private costa (the vertical distance between AS and PSR in our diaaram) 
of diverting each of the 130 manufacturing sectors listed in the Cenaua 
of Industrial Eatabliahments.. "!'hie index we shall eall the 'divertibllity 
index'. V.'hat ia envittaged ia a achedule of auc:h divertibUity indexes 
for a particular year, which will enable ua to rank induetriea in order 
of the marginal exc:caa private c:a.ta of diverting them~ and which will 
giv us an eatimate of the marginal excees co&ta of diverting each ae.c• 
tor relative to the correapon.dlng value for each oth•r industry. 
Thus even if we cannot aay that the exccaa private coat. of 
divertfn& activity X to the border areas ia 1eo much'. and in Y it ia •ao 
much1 • both expressed in absolute term.s. it would be uaeful if we could 
give even a rough indication of whether it i• likely to be .ay, twice or 
hall as much in aetivity X aa in activity Y. This. too, ahould indicate 
those induatriea upon whieh attention should be focusaed by those re-
aponaible for implementing border induatriea policy if a particular rate 
of illduced induetriaUaation i• to be achieved aa cheaply ae possible. 
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Given the actual national rates of gTowth of outpu.t or employment 
in each aector over aome specific paat period it should also be poa• 
aible to establish a functional relation.hlp between the averaae volume 
of diverted border areas industrial production and the index of rna~­
ginal exceaa private coat, over that period. lt ia obvioualy a matter 
of some importance for policy to know whether the marginal excess 
private coats of diverting induetl"iea to the border areaa a.re likely 
to increa.ac slowly or rapidly u the volume of diverted output or em-
ployment ia increaaecL. It should be remembered, too, that. for the 
reaaon.a given iu chapter 6 a rapidly ri•inl marginal excesa private cost 
(steep AS curve) implies a correapondinsly rapid rate of increase in 
marginal exceaa social costa (steep CT carve). 
The Labour Coat natig, the Racial Composition of the LaboUl' Force 
and Divertibili!J. 
The baaic proposition upon which our rankil'lg of induatriea 
in terms of 1divertibility' ia baaed, i• that the greater the ratio of 
labour coat& to net output in an industry. the etronger, other thinK! 
being equal, will be the attraction exerted by a cheap labour area upon 
that induatry. Thet rea.on for thi• is that the labour coat aavina •• 
a percentage ol total co•ta which can be achieved by establishing in a 
cheap labour area., given the regioJUU. differential in wage rates, depends 
ceteris paribua, on the amount of labour coats per unit of output.. Thus 
we regard a high :ratio of salaries and wages to net output .. a favour-
able indicator of divertibility, aince it iD<licatea that the potential per 
centage •aving in total coat savings lready provides some incentive 
to location in a cheap labour area. 
'We 
1 
muat, however, take accoUDt of the fact that other th:inga 
are not equal and that thouah two induatriea may have exactly the aamc 
labour cost ratio the marginal excess private co•t• of diverting them 
may differ a good deal. Tho firat modification of the ba.aic proposition 
stated above. therefore. is due to a conaideration mentioned in chapter 
1, namely, that the aize of labour coat a&vina•. given the regional wage 
d.ifierential,dependa not only on the labour inten.ity of produetion. but alao 
on the proportion of these coats which are paid to workers of a type al-
ready fairly readily available in the border areaa. A high proportion 
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of skilled workers in the total labour force ia an UDfavourable in .. 
dicato.r of divertibility, aince skilled labour ia one of the chief ob-
atacles to economic growth in South Africa aa a whole at preaent, 
and the ahortage is eapecially acute in the border area•. Since we 
have no satisfactory independent information reprding the dearee of 
skill required in South African mua.ufacturing industriea, the racial 
composition of the labour force ia used as an ind.ex. A high ratio of 
non-white employees to total employee• ia, therefore, reaarded aa a 
favourable indicator of ' divertibility'. 
'l'hus, the labour coat ra&:io and the ratio of non-whites to total 
employees together indicate the potential percentage aaving in total 
coata. due to labottr cost aavinga, which may be achieved by eatabliah-
ing in a border area location. The value of these indicator• &Dd. cer-
tain other• which are needed for the task of thia chapter have been 
calculated on the basia of information publiahed by the Bureau of Statia• 
tics for the year 1960-6 t 1 and are presented in the Appendix to thia 
chapter. The relationahip between the racial eompoaition of the labour 
force and the ratio of salaries and wagea to net output (the labour coat 
ratio) for the 1 Z9 manufacturing sectora listed in the industrial cenaue 
report for 1960-61 is illustrated in Table l3. 
Aa the appendix to this chapter showa, for inatance. diamond 
cutting and polishing. watches and c:locks. and furrier• a.re the moat 
c:onspicuoua example• of industriea whic:h require a high proportion 
of white (akilled) labour, the proportion of non-whites in the total labour 
force being zz. 37 and 36 reapeetiftly Thus theae industriea together 
with aeveral other• appear in the column headed uso or lf:laan on the far 
left hand side of Table 23. Other induatrie• with a low non-white 
labour component a.re clruga and pharmaceutical preparations (50 per 
cent), 'all other machinery' (50 per cent)., electrical machinery and 
motora (50 ~r cent), optical and photographic goods (SZ per cent) and 
stationery (Sl per cent). From the point of view of skilled labour re-
quirement•• therefore. all the•~ industrie• have a low divertibllity 
index, but the further to the right ia the position oi any industry in 
I. Special Report t-'o . ZS7 .. Industrial Census 1960-61. 
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COAt \( 
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out-out 
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1.9-20 
21-22 
23-24 
25-26 
27-28 
29-30 
31-32 
}3-34 
35-36 
}7-36 
39-40 
41- 42 
4}- 44 
45- 46 
47- 46 
49-50 
51-52 
53-54 
55-561 
57-581 
5q-6o 
61- ' ? 
6}- 64 
65- 66 
67-66 
69-70 
71-72 
73-74 
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79-80 
SO or looa 51 - ss 
I 
Phara:.aceuticale L 
Motor & other apiri te K 
( Offio e ~ach1nery) L 
All other .ach1nt£I M 
Watches & clocka L 
~L 
(Rubber ste.mps) L 
(Printing) L 
Electrical rnachina;::y: &: !ndustriA.l mining &: con-
~ M a true tion machinery H 
Oet ical &- E:hot!?_8ra.(!:hic 
goods L 
Diamond cutti !,'J L 
Stationery L 
(Aooqbl.y & repair o! 
a ircraft) L 
!ABLE 2:5 
Relation between the racial composition o! the labour .f'orce and. the labour coat ratio in South Atrica.. ... manutactur.!!!&.induatriee 12'<'"'-f.; 
Num.ber ot non-white worlcera aa a percenta.se ot the total labour terce 
56 - 60 61 - 65 6_6 - ~0 71-7~ 76- 80 Ill - 6~ 
Plavour!E.:B: Eaeencee K (c..,ont) H 
Condensed llilk H 
Poltab .. oto. L Tea b1ondin& L ~L 
Muaical inetrumonta lS 
(But t or & cboeao) H (neor) M 
Paper a: paper board H Other c1~thi!!& L 
Cottee roasting etc. )I YoutH 
Other baa1c chemical.e B D1oUUor1u otc. M JoUr otc. L Other knit t1!!!!; mille II 
(Pe.inta)otc . If I~ II 
Cool<J.n& !ate H (Animal !oodo ) H Plcklea 1 aaucee! etc. II 
Pert111earM H ( Flour & grain mills ) H 
Other I!!:E•r 2Mduota M Crude oil calc.- etc. H 
rem and ateel H 1!.!.!. L (Jam,cannad , preserved 
drisd fruit etc.) Jd 
& 
(other non-metallic 
mineral product •) H 
(Aerated water) 1 
Other ch emical• II D1ointeo tanto R (B1ackem1 thing) H (Wood carving ete.) H Blankets M / /Bioyo1ee H 
Ti n ware ld (:Footwear repairo) L 
Rubber producto H 
All other electrical (Ice oreaa) If (Glaeu) II Pelt, padding etc. H 
machi ner;r H SWaeta &: cbooolatea :W: Other J!laatic :eroduc t e Jd 
Head. ad etc. oe tal. pro-
To:ta 1 &E:g:rtins s;oods L 
ducto H 
Be.eic non-terroua Pa;eer by e etc. L Sort turniohi!l&• L Hoeier;y L 
metale H Ineulated cablee &: Cablea,tencing wir e. 
wiree H etc. H 
(Bespoke tailorin&) L Plaster a other com- (Other wood product &) M 
hploai?ee &: carbide H 2oai te boo.rda &d 
Railroad equipment H+ 1!1ll1norz L lad~tion jewelle!I L General &: 8!11&11 l eather 
goode L 
Sheet metal Erlduets M 
Jewellery L (Bakeriee )L /Travel goode L 
Womena a: girla clothing L 
Button• etc. L 
A&r1oul tural maehiner;r (llarble, otono) If Hate a: ca;ea L (lleat producto ) H+ Meno &: b~;x:a clothi!!B; L 
H+ All other metal 2r~ (Picture !r&l>oe) L (PurnHure) II 
duct• II 
( S1gnwr1 ting, poetero) Footwear L Bono milling & bloodmeal H 
etc . L Metal pipes H (Electroplatir.g) ld 
Scientit ic &: c ontrolli !!! 
i n1trumenSa II 
(Ship & boa!) buildin&o 
& reoe.iro L 
Harnea• & aaddl•!:f. M 
C&ll'f'q soode L 
~: See etatiat ical apper.dix to Chapter 8. 
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Tanneries H 53-54 
10delling in cement W 
rick a c!: Til eo ) K+ 55- 56 
# 
Lsdies her.db!&!! L 
(sa,. millaTH+ 
57-56 
-
59-60 
61- 62 
6}-64 
(E1ec trico.l contracting ) 65- 66 
L 
67-68 
69-70 
Vinegar L 71- 72 
Pl,l!!OOd etc . II 
73-H 
75-76 
77- 78 
79-60 
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Table 23 the more favourably placed is it ill this respect. Thus by 
cofttrast with the induetries mentioned, thoee like cotton textUesJ ealt 
w-orks. cotton ginning etc. which appear on the far right of the table 
have a non-white labour proportion of between 91 and 95 per cent. 
As we have stressed several times it cannot be taken for granted 
that the racial composition of the labour force is a reliable indication 
of the unskilled total employees ratio, becauee of the fact that not all 
whites are a'kllled and not all n.on-whitea are unskilled. The problem 
i• also complicated by the industrial colour bar which reduces the ver• 
tical mobility non-white labour. Furthermore the effect of the colour 
bar on each particular non-white group varies from one part of the 
country to another. .Mary Piercy has pointed out that: 
1*an outstanding fact which rrJ&kes it unwiee to generalise and 
which create& problema in central legislation and administration dealing with 
labour. ia that both cvatom and evolution in the allecation of work have 
been moclified accottding to the work forCE: available district by diatrict. 
The wide local variations in the racial compoaition of the population 
partly determine what work force has been used by industry locatin& 
in particular areas. There are considerable numbers of non-whites, 
particularly coloureds and Asiatics in the vY eater1.1 Province and in 
N atal .. holding jobs of various ekills and craf'tmatuthip, to which they 
would not be a.dmitted elsewhere. Industry has in fact been built up 
on varying local labour aupplyu .. 
A firm in the border areaa may therefore be expected to employ alar .. 
ger proportion of Bantu than another firm producing similar products 
in one of the large urban centres. The greater freedom of employera 
in the border areas to use Bantu labour in semi-skilled and akilled jobs, 
occupied by other races in other areas. may atimulate efforts to train 
Bantu workers !or the more akilled jobs and eo in some meaau.re help to 
alleviate the preaent shortage of 8kills which exists throughout the 
country. Also in an i.· ·~ustry in which the proportion of whites ie great. 
1. Mary J. Piercy. ''statutory Work Reservation - requirement of a. atatic 
or of an expanding economy?~ S.A. J.E •• June 1960. 
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but women conatitute a large part of the labour !orce,it may be 
easier to subatitute non .. whitea for whites. Each industry mu.~ 
therefore!:c~efully examined to see whether, in fact. non-whites 
c:annot, in the bordel" areas. fill some jobs performed by whites in the 
larger centres. 
'Iheae qualification•. however. may not be a.s serious aa they 
seem at first eight. 1t ia not unre.asonable to suppose that in thou 
induatriea in which the coat benefit offered by the uae of non-white 
inatead of white labour have been greatest~ the breakdown of the in.-
dustrial colour bar will have aone furthest,. and that a high white/ 
non-white ratio is, therefore. a fairly good index of the importance 
of akilleQ relative to unskilled labour as between induatries. 
Alao, the lower down on Table Z3 does an industry appear, the 
greater ie the ratio of aalariea and wages to net output. Thus we find 
that the labour coat ratio is loweat in C:fc;}ment, cond~msed mUir, tanning 
extract and coke. all very capital-intenah~ industries which appear 
in the top row of Table 23 and highest in a eaembly and repab of air-
craft, atationery, canvas goode etc., which appear in the bottoM row. 
The lower the l'OW in which an industry appears, therefore. the greater, 
other thing• being equal, will tend to be the potential labour coet 
aa.vings as a percentage of total co•ta if the industry ia aited in a cheap 
labour area. But &iven th~ labour cost ratio, the greater is the pro-
portion of non-white• in the labour force the greater will tend to be the 
relative importance of labour coat saYings obtainable by establiahina in 
a border area.. Thus, !or in•tance, though having about the same high 
labour coet ratio ae canvaa gooda, barneas and saddlery. it appeara, 
would gain more from a border area. ltx:ation sinc:e it has a g~atet­
proportion of non-whites in its lal»ur force. Generally. the clo8(1!1" 
:io an indu•try to the lQwer right hand c-orner of the tabl~ the smaller 
will tend to be the exceae marginal private eosts of dh·erting it. 
In the lig:ht of the foregoing it ie now poaaible to rank induatriea 
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in order of their suitability for diversion to border areas. by takinff 
into accOWtt hotlt the labour cost ratio and the proportion of non-white 
workers in the labour force. and by ignoring for the moment the fact 
that other !actors apart from labour coats also determine location. 
lf industry A is more labour intenaive than a ~ but B employs a greater 
proportion of non ... white•~ the saving in labour coats achieved by locating 
ita the boMer area.a. as a percentaae of uet output may be the same in 
both cases. For instance if Bantu wages are 40 per cent1 lower in the 
border area• than in the m(;tropolitan areas. ancl if in the latter area 
the ratio of white to Bantu wage rate a is 4t 1. 2 then if in indu•try ~in 
the metropolitan area the labour cost ratio is 60 per cent and the labour 
!o.rce ia 39 per cent B.-ntu. and in industry B the corresponding per 
centages are 58 and 40. then ac a result of low~r Bantu wage rates 
both induatries can achiev~ coat savings equal to the same per <amtage 
of net output by establi•hing themaelves in the border area~. Thus 
under these assumptions. a 2 per cent smaller labour cost l."atio if 
compenaated for by a 1 per cent higher propo:t"tion. of Bantu workers, 
puts botb industries in the same position •~ far a• their divertibility is 
concerned. 
We could auperirnpoae on Table 2.3 a number of 'indif!erenct.! 
ct.trYea' eaeh repreaenting di:fterent combination• of labour intensity 
and non-white labour content. which result in an equal attraction to 
border a.reas on account of potential labour coat savings. Since. on the 
asaumptione made in the previow. paragraph a 2 per cent smaller 
1,. Thi• is based on the dbcuasion of regional wage diffennces in 
chapter 1 above. 
2. Table 17 in chapter 7 above the r.atio of the average earnings of 
white malca to tbo•e of Bantu male• in 1953/54 to be 4. 05 in the 
Weatern Ca-pe. J. 9 in Port Elizabeth/Uitenh ge. 4. 8 in f'urban/ 
PilWto~ and S. 0 in tb Southern Transvaal. 
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labour coat can be compensated for by a 1 per cent higher proportion 
of Bantu workers, theae indifference curves would be linear with a 
poaitive slope o:f l . l'he further towards the right i• the tindifference 
c'tlrve' on which a particular industry !t:ill.•~ the more suitable ia that 
industry in terma of labour coau. for diversion to the border areas. 
'-1oving towa:tda the left from one 'indi!ference curve• to another the 
indostriea encountered become increasingly leaa •uitable. either be ... 
cause the labour coat o r the non-white propo-rtion of the labour force 
or both have fallen. By drawing in theae indifference curvea then we 
could rank induatrica on the basi• of potential labour coat savinge. 
But thia method of ranking industries in terms of labour coat 
•avina• potential .aa a proportion of total coste ia rather cumbersome 
since Table ll does not ahow the preciae point on our indifference map 
representing the combination o! labour cost ratio and th~ racial com-
poaition of the labour force for each industry. The beat method of ob-
~ainingjpreciae d.ive.-tibility index for each induatry on the baaia of these 
two factors Se(m.\a to be to calculate arithm tic 11 y the diatance from 
the origin of the particular indiff~rence curve on which each induatry 
lies. Aa we pointed out above. on the asaumptions road.s about the 
Saatu regional wage differential and the white/B ... latu wage rate ratio 
in the metropolitan arc •· a. labour coet ratio/ non-white labour pro-
portion combination of 60 end 39 per cent reapectively is equ{valen.t 
to a combination of 58 and 40 per cent respectively. This is because 
the labour coat ratio 'aubs.iitutea' for the non-white labour ratio along 
our indiffernce curves at a rate. of 2 per cent for 1 per cent. Thu. we 
can express all coml)inatioua in labour coat ratio equivalents by multi-
plyina the non-white labour proportion by 2 and adding this product to 
the actual labour coat ratio. Thus both induatriea A and B have diver-
tibility indexes of 138 (i. e. 60 + 39 x 2; and SS + 40 x 2) on the bui• 
of these two !&ctors. 
1 hi a calculation ha.• been made for all the 129 sectors and the 
reaulte- are presented in the appendix to this chapter. 1 The greater is 
1. PP·4U·.3 below 
this indelt the more favourable are conditions !or diversion of the 
ind~atry to a border area at a low marginal excess p r ivate coat, 
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othe~ things being equal. The industries could, therefore, be ranked 
in deac~ndin.g order of the size of this particular index of divcrtibility. 
But it ooem• that little would he gained hy doh: :1 ao, for a<;: cording to 
this ir ..dex: on ita own 'la.diea handbags' and 's w mills' are about equally 
div<;rtible, and ,brick and tile• bas a higher divertibility index of thia 
aort than either of the first two mentioned. This. however, seems 
highly improbable. and it is clearly about time another considc.ration, 
namely. the weight of materials ueed was introduced into the discus•ion. 
The Weight of Materials and Divertibility. 
The divertibllity of industries to the border areas d pands not 
simply on potential labour cost savings but on the •W. of sw::h aav1ngs 
in relation to -.ny additional transport and othttr coetG re•ulting from 
diversion. Tran•port costs are by far the moat important of these 
non~labour c:oate in tho locational decision because of th~ir 'Yreater 
variability betwoen locations. For instance, capital costs n'lay in some 
cases be a large:r proportion of total costa than are trantJpo.rt coste. 
but capital C(JSts, determined by iut~rest rates and depreciation u•ually 
vary much leas between locations th-.n do eith~r labour or transport 
costs. In other worcis, capital is much more mobile than labour and 
infinitely more mobUa than most natural rcsourc s. Very often when 
transport coats are a small proportion of total coats.. tbia is precisely 
because thfJ leaat t ransport coat locatiol'l baa been chosen and it doe• 
not necesaa:dly imply thii.t transport cost• arc an h•aigaificant con•ider-
ation. 
To d6al with this problem CJf labour ()rientation~ that is of locating 
plants in ch~ap area. away ft"om their minimum transport cost loeaticma~ 
Alfred \1 eber 1 invented the 'labour coeffiei.ent•. U. eber st&tee th~ 
1. Alfred Weber~ Theorx of the Location of Industries, tra.nslated with 
an introduction :md notes by Carl J. Friedericl'l, (University of 
Chicago Preas, 1958), Chapter IV. 
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following theorem: *A. location can be moved from the point of min-
imum transportation coata to a :more favourable location only if the 
saving• in the cost of labor which this new place makea poaaible are 
larger than the additional costa of tran•porta.tion which it involves•. 1 
Our concern in thia chapter is with the '--xceaa of the incr-ea•e in trana ... 
port coat& pel' unit of output over the decreaae in labour coata per unit 
of output. that is with the exceas private coata per unit of diverted 
manufacturing activities. The smaller this excess the leas uneconomic 
will the diversion of indWJtries be. 
The labollr eoefficient i• the ratio of the labour coat per unit 
of prodv.ct at exiating location• to the locational weight of that unit. 
The locational weight ia the aum of the required weighta of localised 
raw materials. t:biquitous raw materials: are not included in the loc-
ational weight. sinc e in their W'lproceaae.d state they need nevt!'r be 
transported. And in t.'eMr•s analYlJi• all weighta are expreeaed as 
1 ideal weight• ', that is, actual weight adjuated ao as to have the effect 
of equaliaing transport rates on all materials and product• (e. g. a. ton 
of a com.rndoity which incura a rate twice as gteat aa a atandard com-
modity i• considered to have an ideal weight of two tone.} 
The labour eoat sawing in l•eber'e ana.lyeie depende on the 
&mount of labour coats incurred per unit of output and the 'percentage 
o£ compresaion• of wage rates achieved by the cheap labour region ro• 
lative to the rates u.aed in co~tiDg the coefficient. Thia yields the 
la.bour coat saving per unit of product. Then the denominator (loca.tional 
weight per unit of :product) must be multiplied by the transport rate and 
the net additional diatance involved in location away from a minin-um 
transport ai tc. This yiclda the additional tranaport co•t i.J:lC\ll"'Md by 
locating in the cheap labour region. C'nly if the labour cost aavit'g ia 
greater than the additional tranapo.rt co•t would it bo to the iuduatry• • 
1. qp. eit. , P• 103. 
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advantage to locate in the cheap labour region, other costa being 
equal or insignificant. In other words, the greater ia the labour 
cost ~r unit of product, the greater th-e regional wage differential, 
the smaller the locational weight. the smaller the tran.port coat 
rate~ and the shorter the distance of the cheap la.bour location from 
the minimum traaaport coat point, the greater will be the attractive-
n oaa of the cheap l bour location .for the industry. Othel" things being 
equal~ therefore, the hiiher an industry~• labour coefficient. the more 
likely it is that the labour coat aavinga it could achieve in a cheap labour 
area will exceed the additional tranapol"t coats incurred in not locating 
at a minimum transport coat site. 
It would be ideal if we could obtain labour coefficients for all 
South African manufacturing sectora. following the ateps outlined by 
•• eber. a.a summarised in the preceding two paragraphs . But thE. 
calculation o! Wever's labour eoefficient for eve1:1 one activity would 
be an extraordinarily difficult taak. \c. e can. howeverJ obtain a uae-
f~ll index of divertibllity u•ing V. eber 1a basic idea and aucb etatiatical 
information as is available to ua. 
We have already obtained a mea4JU!'e of potential labour cost 
savings which correeponde to the numerator in \t' eberta coefficient, 
except that his labour coat saving dependa only on the amount of le.bour 
costs incurred per unit of output and doca not involve the complicating 
factor of the racial composition of the labour force. This as he point& 
out is gr~ater the greater tbe regional wage differential. but our c:al-
culationa arc bas~d on a aingl~ given wage differential of 40 per cent 
between border &..Y'ld metropolitan areas.. Aleo aa we should uote his 
denominator is larger, the greater the distance of the cheap labour 
location from the minimum tranaport 4:0st point. Thus, for instance, 
for a given industry it would be ea•ier- to divert firms from Johannes-
burg o~ :Pr~toria to Roasl yn, or from Durban to l ~ammarsdale, than 
it is to divert them from s.ny major centre ( bich would otherwise hav~ 
b~H~n $.,lected) to the, say., Tugela. Baain 0r, especially, to the Giskei. 
T'rtlvided the regional wage differential ia not sufficiently greater for 
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the Ciskei than for tbe Natal border areas, the marginal exceaa private 
costa of diverting a firm !rom. Johannesburg to a !'l.atal border area will 
be lower than that of diverting it to King \dltia.m'a Town. To aimplify 
matters, therefore, we shall take the distance of the privately preferred 
location from that preferr-ed by the Government as given for all thC! indus-
tries considered,. and will comment on the implications of thia procedure 
later. 
A variable corresponding to Weber•s locational weight still has 
to be found. As ia ahown below heavy industriee uauall y use capit01l 
equipment which givee a high horae-power per worker ratio. The 
reaaon for this is that, heavy material• are uaually handled by mean• 
of correspondingly powerful equipment. The higher the horae-power 
per worker, therefore, the more sipificant transportation costs tend 
to be per Wtit of output, and the more likely is it that the minimum 
transportation coat point will be aelt'lcted. The heavier the industry 
in terms of this n:.tt:!&Sure the greater will tend to be the incre~ue in 
costs resulting from the diveraiorL to a border area.. A low horae-
power per worker ratio is, therefore, regarded as a favourable in-
dicator of divertibility. 
It might be notec in passing that it' the diversion of a heavy in· 
dustry to a border area involves a positive excess private cost, it ia 
unlikely that the ir.itial coat disadvantage will eventually fall away due 
to a learning process like that which forma the baaia of the hdant h-
dustry argument. For, improvement over time in labour efficiency ia 
one of the major aourcea of external economies in the infant induatry 
case. Labour costa in an it1fant industry would, therefcre, nc;ed to be 
significant to make increasing labour efficiency an important factor. b-ut 
in fact h~avy industries te-nd to be chaTacteriaed by a low laboul" cost 
ratio. Jf they are diverted to a non-optimum location heavy eubsidisa.tion 
over a long period of time may be necessary. 
Let us examine the atatistical rel a.tionship between the capital 
intensity of an induatry and the weight of materials procesae<l per year . 
Order 
l&t 
2nd 
3rrl 
4th 
5th 
Sth 
7th 
8th 
9th 
lOth 
llth 
12th 
13th 
14th 
15th 
I 16th 17th 
18tiJ 
19th 
20th 
21st 
22nd 
23rd 
24th 
25th 
26th 
TABLE 24 
ORDER OF INDUSTRIES IN WEIGHT OF MATERIAL USED PER YEAR PER OPERATIVE IN GREAT BRITAIN IN 1935 
For eighty-one industries where data can be estimated 
Industry Weight* Order Industry Weip;ht* Order Industry 
Retail and Wholesale Bespoke O. S6 27th Rope 9. 60 55th Furniture 
Tailoring 28th Tool 10.7 56th Bread 
Wholesale Tailoring 0.68 29th Machine Tool 11.6 57th Wholesale Bottling 
Mackintosh l.Ol 30th Marine Engineering 12. 2 58th China 
Corsets 1.19 31st Motor Manufacturing 12.3 59th Rail Carriage 
Hosiery 1.48 32nd Manufactured Stationery 12.5 SOth Brewing 
Elasti" Webbing 2.05 33rd Textile Machinery 13. 2 6lst Wire 
Airc-raft 2.17 34th General Hardware 13.3 62nd Paint 
Boot and Shoe 2.31 35th Domestic Hollow-ware 13.7 63rd Construction Eng:neering 
Tobacco 2. SO 36th Rubber 13.8 64th Foundry 
Cutlery 2 . ~7 37th Cardboard-box 14. 5 65th Aluminium, smelt, roll 
Hats 3.10 38th Tin- box 14.7 66th Soap 
Printing 3.59 39th Asbestos 14. 8 67th Tube 
Cotton Weaving 3.70 40th Jute 15.1 68th Tinplate 
Textile Packing 4.45 41st Biscuit 15.3 69th Fish Curing 
Brass Finishing 4.50 42nd Cocoa 15.4 70th Paper 
Lace 4.80 43rd Agricultural Machinery 16.2 7lst Glass 
Linen (G.B. and N. I.) 5.00 44th Prime Movers 16.2 72nd Other Chemicals 
NeedlE.. 5.10 45th Electric Cable 18.0 73rd Oil and Tallow 
Wool 5.50 46th Leat.her Tanning 18.6 74th Building 
Electric Light Fittings 5.90 47th Wallpaper 20.6 75th Butter, Margarine, etc. 
Cotton Spinning 6.00 48th Starch and Polish 22.5 76th Cattle Food 
Safe and Lock 6.40 49th Chain, Screws, Forgings 24.0 77th Seed Crushing 
Printing Machinery 7.00 50th Bacon Curing 25.5 78th Fertilizer 
Silk and Artificial Silk 7.30 51st Shipbuilding 25.5 79th Iron and Steel** 
Canvas 8.00 52nd Linoleum 28.8 80th Grain Milling 
Electric Machinery 9. 40 53rd Copper,Brass,Smelt,Roll 29.~ 8lst Coke and By-products 
54th Preserved Food 29.7 
Weip;ht* 
3.3 • .3 
32. 3 
35.0 
35. 6 
36. 2 
40.8 
43.0 
4') . 1. 
44.2 
50.1 
50.2 
53.0 
55. 3 
65. 4 
68. 0 
89.0 
99.0 
128.0 
130.0 
170.0 
171.0 
231.0 
251.0 
287.0 
330.0 
357.0 
1680.0 
* Tons per worker per year. **Blast Furnaces and Iron and St eel Rolling and 
Smelting. 
P. Sargant Florence, Investment, Location and Size of 
Plant, Table 1, p.lO. 
Order 
let 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
lOth 
11th 
12,th 
13th 
14th 
15th 
16th 
17th 
18th 
19th 
20th 
21st 
22nd 
23rd 
24t!l 
25th 
26th 
27th 
28th 
29th 
30th 
31st 
32nd 
33rd 
34th 
35th 
36th 
37th 
38th 
39th 
40th 
41st 
42nd 
43rd 
44th 
45t~ 
46th 
47th 
48th 
49th 
50th 
51st 
52nd 
53rd 
54th 
55th 
56th 
57th 
58th 
59th 
60th 
6lst 
62nd 
63rd 
TABLE 25 
HORSE-POWER PER WORKER IN SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1959-60 
Furriers 
Ladies handbags 
Millinery 
Industry 
Sausage casings 
Electrical contracting 
Imitation Jewellery 
Mens' and boys' clothing 
Ties 
Bespoke tailoring 
Women's and girls' clothing 
Tents, tarpaulins, etc. 
Watches and clocks 
Rubber stamps 
Signwriting, posters, etc. 
Soft furnishings 
Picture frames 
General and small leather goods 
Office machinery 
Repair of aircraft 
Jewellery 
Tea blending and packing 
Umbrellas, etc. 
Travel goods 
Peanut roasting 
Boot and shoe repairs 
Vinegar 
Hosiery and other knitted clothing 
Boot and shoe factories 
Bags and sacks 
Toys, sporting accessories, etc. 
Bakeries 
Mens' and boy's hats and caps 
Drugs and pharmaceutical preparations 
Blacking, polishes, blanco , etc. 
Jelly, custard and pudding powder 
Aerated waters and soft drinks 
Tobacco 
Ship and boat repairs 
Buttons, buckles, etc. 
Brushes and brooms 
Stationery 
Diamond cutting and polishing 
Paper bags, cardboard boxes, etc . 
Printing,publishing & allied industries 
Saltworks 
All other electrical machinery 
Harnesses and saddlery 
Modelli11g in cement. 
Canning and preserving fruit 
All other machinery 
Electroplatin'S 
Electrical machinery and motors 
Tinware 
Plywood including laminated boards 
Blankets 
Spinning, weaving etc. of wool 
Sweets and chocolates 
Pickles, sauces , etc. 
Flavouring essence 
Coffee grinding, etc. 
Distilleries , wineries 
Coffins 
Other paper products 
Horse-power 
per worker 
. l 
• 2 
• 2 
. 2 
.2 
.2 
.3 
· 3 
.3 
·3 
.) 
.3 
. 3 
.3 
.4 
.4 
.4 
.4 
.4 
· 5 
. 5 
. 5 
. 5 
.5 
.6 
. 7 
.7 
.8 
. 8 
.8 
. 9 
LO 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.2 
1.4 
1.5 
1.5 
1.6 
1.6 
1.7 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
2. 0 
2. 0 
2. 0 
2 . 0 
2 .0 
2 . 0 
64th 
65th 
66th 
67th 
68th 
69th 
70th 
7lst 
72nd 
73rd 
74th 
75th 
76th 
77th 
78th 
79th 
80th 
8lst 
82nd 
83rd 
84th 
85th 
86th 
87th 
88th 
89th 
90th 
9lst 
92nd 
93rd 
94th 
95th 
96t h 
97th 
98th 
99th 
lOOth 
lOlst 
102nd 
103rd 
104th 
105th 
106th 
l07th 
108th 
l09th 
llOth 
111 th 
112th 
113th 
114th 
ll5th 
llfi th 
117th 
118th 
119t h 
120th 
12lst 
l :'2n1 
l 23rd 
124 th 
125 th 
I:1dustry 
Glass making, bottle making , etc • 
Professional, scientific and controlling 
I instruments 
1 Other plastic products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Wool scouring 
I ce cream and ices 
Other knitting mill s 
Soap and candles 
Paints, varnishes, etc . 
All other metal products 
Inks, matches, glue, etc . 
Preservation of timber 
Marble, stone, slate, etc. 
Spinning, weaving e tc. of cotton 
Ropes, cordage, twine, etc. 
Plaster and composite board 
Beer and malt 
Other wooden products 
Blacksmithing 
Preparation and preserving of meat 
Bricks and tiles, etc. 
Agricultural machinery 
Aerated waters and soft drinks 
FP.lt, paddiOF,, wadding, etc . 
Manufacture, assembly and repair of bicycles 
Railroad equipment 
Rubber products 
Lime works 
I ndustrial mining and constr. machinery 
Headed and threaded articles 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Sawmills, etc. 
Cables, fencing wire, e tc . 
Tanneries and fellmongering 
Disinfectants, etc. 
Butter and cheese 
Bal anced animal feeds 
Metal pipes 
Insulated cables and Wires 
Wat tle bark grinding 
Condensed milk and milk powder 
Flour and grain mills 
Tanning extract 
Explosives and carbide 
Ot her food industries 
Crude oil , cake and meal 
Compound cooking fats 
Rock lobs t er and o t her f i sh r roduc ts 
Wood carvin~ , wood turninR, etc. 
S':le l t i ng & refining o~ non-ferrous metals 
Coke (incl ·.lding coal gas ) 1 etc . 
Fertilisers 
Yeast 
Bonemilling and bl oodmeal 
Other basic industrial chemicals 
Crushed stone 
Chaf f cuttinr , etc. 
Sur.ar mills 
Iron and steel 
Pa per and pa perboard 
Cement 
Motor ~ other s pirits for fuel, etc . 
Source : Unpublished information kindly m'lde available b.v the Bureau of Statisti cs. 
Horse-power 
per worker 
2.0 
2.0 
2.2 
2.2 
2.4 
2..5 
2.5 
2.5 
2 . 5 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.7 
2.8 
2.8 
2.9 
3 .0 
3.0 
3.1 
3.3 
3.3 
3.3 
3 .4 
3.4 
3. 4 
3.5 
3.6 
).6 
3.6 
3.8 
3.8 
3.9 
3.9 
4.4 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4. 7 
4. 7 
5.0 
5. 0 
5.0 
5.1 
5. 2 
5 .3 
? .4 
5. 7 
6. 0 
5. 3 
7 . 6 
8 . 0 
8 .9 
9 . 3 
10 . 0 
11.3 
13.6 
16 . 8 
17.1 
l fl . 6 
26 . 2 
44 . 1 
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1 per worker. Professor Sargant Florence has calculated the latter 
measure for 81 British industries for the year 1935. His results are 
preseRtecl in Table 24 above. Table 25 above contains a list of South 
African industries in ascending order of their horse-power per worker 
ratio in 1959-60. A comparison of Sargant Florencers weight per work-
er per year ratios and the South African horse.power per worker ratios 
show• a striking direct relation between the former and the latter. For 
instance 27 of the 125 South African indu•tries listed in Table 25 bad a 
horse-power oer worker ratio of 4. 5 or more and these may be regarded 
as the very heavy group. F or only 111 of these 27 industries , however. 
is thet-e an industry with an identical or very similar title in the British 
data given in Table 24. It is striking however, that all of theae 10 
induetrie& were amongst the eleven heaviest in Britain in 1935- This 
appears to be extremely c onvincing evidence for regarding horse-
power per worker as a ,ood indicator of weight of materials processed 
per worke.~.· per year in South African industries. 
The inverse ranking of the ten ve-ry heavy induotries for which 
both weight~ and capital intensity are available, based on Tables 24 
and 25 :respectively, i'" pre~ented in T ble 26. We naturally should 
TABLE 26. 
:a,er and paperboard 
Other baeic induBtrial chemicals 
Compound cooking fats 
Crude oil, cake and meal 
Butter and cheese 
Balanced animal feeds 
F ertilizer 
Iron and steel 
Flou1" and grain mille 
Coke and by--products 
Inverse ranking in 
terms of weight of 
materials per ope-
rative from Table 
24 
11 
10 
9 
9 or 13 
7 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Tnverse ranking in 
terms of horee-
power per worker 
from 'table 2 5 
7 
15 
16 
26 
25 
10 
3 
20 
11 
1. ~ •. Sargant Florence, Investment Location and Size of ;"'!ant. 
(Cambridge University f'resB, 1948). 
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not expect to find anything like a perfect correlation between the 
weight of materials and capital intenaity amongst these ten illduatriea, 
and the Jr...ain point which it is wbhed to make, is simply that in general 
the more capital intensive an industry ia the heavier it tenda to be. 
The industries which deviate moat marked! y. but neverthelesa 
not too seriously, from what ia otherwise a fairly consistent relation 
between weight and capital intensity, are butter and eheeae. balanced 
animal feeds. and flour and grain mills. 'fheae three are all indua-
tries which te.nd to be widely dispersed a.nd on the small aide, compared 
with the other heavy industries. Thus it may be that the heaviness of 
theae industries and the widespread nature of their markets and raw 
materials cauat: tbem\to be diepersed and operated on a relatively small 
•cale, and that thia restricts the scope for greater capital intenaity. 
In addition. it baa been possible to obtain a direct measure of 
the weight of materials used expressed in tona per worker per year for 
a certain number, though not all. South African manufacturing sectors 
for the year 1957-58, and the results of these calculations are presented 
in Table 27. Included in this t&ble are six other industries havina a 
horae- power per worker ratio of 4. 5 or more, but which did not aeem 
to have a close counterpart in the British clasaification given in Table 
24. These aix are cement (997. 2 tone), •ugar mUla (763. 1 tons), 
tanning extract ( 184. 5 tons), chaff-cutting, bone milling etc . 077. 7 
tonal. condensed ·milk and milk powder (88. 0 tons) and rock lobster 
(7Z. 7 ton•). As Table 27 shows these were amongst the heaviest of 
the 30 South African sectors for which actual weights are available ao 
that again the relation between the weight of materials processed and 
horae-power per worker is confirmed. Cement, the heavieat industry 
liated in Table 27. had the second highest horae-power per worker 
ratio aa Table 25 reveal•. Sugar mills were second highest in terma 
of weight and fifth highest in terms of horae-power per worker. ~n-
erally, the correlation is very good. The remaining 11 industries with a 
horae-power per worker of mo:re than 4 . 5, fo:r which neither British 
TABLE 27 
WEIGHT OF MAT'f'RIAL USED 0 ER YEAR '!?£R F..MT.::JLOYEE 
JN SOME SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES . IN 
1957-58 
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Tons per year per worke r 
:Preparation and preserving of meat 
Butter and cheese 
Condensed millt and milk powder 
Ice cream and ices 
Jam1 canned, preserved and dried fruit 
Rock lobster, fish preserving and other fish products 
Flour and \ll"ain mills 
Bakeries 
Sugar mills and refineries 
Sweets and chocolates 
Balanced animal feeds, c:haffcutting, bone milling etc. 
Compound cooking fate 
Coffee roat!!ting and chicory grinding. tea blending 
and packing 
Wool $Couring CJ.nd cotton ginning 
Blankets, cotton and wool spinning and weaving 
~aper bags, cardboard boxes and mounts 
Stationery and other paper products 
Printing, publishing and allied induttt:dee 
Tanneries and fellmongering 
Rubber product~ 
Fertilisers 
Tanning .extract 
Soap and candles 
Paints, varnishes, lacquers and distempers 
Drugs and pharmaceutical preparations 
Bricks and tiles 
Cement 
Headed and th:readed a:rticles 
Sheet metal products 
Tinware 
Cables, fencing wh·e and wi:re pr::>du<:ts 
101. 8 
53. 6 
88.0 
lZ.S 
15.9 
72..7 
222.8 
24. 5 
763. 1 
s. 7 
177.7 
76. 1 
14.7 
7. 4 
z.z 
19. 0 
14.9 
5. 6 
13. 3 
1. 9 
343. 5 
194. 5 
15. z 
1. 4 
o. 6 
81.4 
997.2 
24.1 
14 .. 9 
9. 9 
11.0 
Source: Compiled from Industrial Censuses. 1956-57 and 1957-58, 
Special Report No. l49. 
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nor South African weight• are available. also appear to be of a very 
heavy nature. 1 
At the other end of the scale of beavinesa and capital intenaity, 
the correspondence between the 1935 British and the 1959-60 South 
African cenaua cl.a.saification and nomenclature is much poorer and, 
therefore. compari•on of British weights and the South African horse-
power per worker ratios ia mueh more difficult. But it nevertheleas 
doea seem that the induatries with low horae•power per worker ratios 
in South Africa are of a very light .nature. For inatallc:e. as Table l5 
•!tows, there were 30 indu.tries in 1959-60 with horae-power per work-
er ratios of leas than 1. 0. Of these 14 were either in the wearing ap-
parcal (including footw-ear} or textlea groups, and two were in the leather 
goods sector. That these are very light induatrica is indicated by the 
data in Table l( which ahowa that in Dritian in 1935. 16 of the 17 textiles 
and clothing induatric~• liated were amongst th.e 27 industries with the 
lowest weight of material• per worker per annum. only jute manufactur-
ing (40th) being heavier tbanthls .. 
Nearly all of the 27 moat capital intensive South African induet~ 
ries listed in Table 25 above are heavily dependent on primary raw 
materials. V. eight loaa in the proceaa of production ia thus considerable 
u{some caaea. and aa a result this industry tenda to be drawn to the 
•ource of raw materials e. g. sugar mUla, tanning extract, wood pulp, 
chaff cutting etc •• coke and by-products, rock lobster (and fish pre-
serving etc. ), food and other products. In other caeea {flour and grain 
mills, cement, crushed atone, butter &lld cheeae, bala:need an1mal feeds) 
weight lo•s is not aa significant,. but nevertheleaa the considerable weight 
and/or bulk of the materials in relation to value often reaulta in plants 
1. Some of the more important of these are motor and other spirits for 
fuel. cruahed stone. basic non-ferrous metal•, explosives and car-
bide. wattle bark grinding. insulated cable• and wirea, and metal 
pipes. 
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being establiehed at the market or at the eource or materials closeat 
to the market. If internal economies of large size are not eufficient to 
compenaate for higher traneport coats of regionally concentrated or 
centralised production, plants in the industry will tend to be widely 
ecattered throughout the country. On the other hand where the mat .. 
erial• are not widel y scattered throughout the country. and the optimum 
size or plant is very large,. the erection of plants may be restricted to 
a few pointe, either at the aource of mater-iala or ~t the principal mar-
kets e. g .. iron and steel, motor and other spirits. basic non-ferrous 
metale, explosives and carbide, inaulated cables and wires, a nd metal 
pipes. f"'>r. aa in the. case of the condensed milk and milk powder in-
duatt-y, periaba.bility of materia.la may dictate a location near the source 
of raw materiale. 
The e aeential conclu.ion of thia section so far, then. is that 
capital intenaity. as measured by horse-power per worker is directly 
related to the weight of mat-=ri.ala processed per worker per annum. 
and. therefore, that the higher is the forme r ratio. the more eoatl y 
will it be to divert the industry, other thinaa being equal. A low horse-
power per worker ratio may, therefore. be taken a.a a. favouable index 
o! di vertibllity. 
The fact that highly capital intensive induatl'ie e do lU)t appear 
to be eaaily divertible is moat unfortunate from the pOint of view of 
the objective of rapid industrialisation in the borde..- areaa. Capital 
intensive induatrie e have certain characteristics which are highly de-
sirable in a programme for irtduatrial dovelopn.'l~t in an underdeveloped 
a.~a. Ae Hh•scbman has shown. they often have strong linkage effecta 
and thua are able to make an important indire ct impact on employment 
and income. 1 In addition. the re is a. tendency for capital intensity to be 
a•aociated with large aize,. when th~ latteJ:" i• measured in terma of the 
number of employee• per e•tabliahment. ao that a capital intensive plant 
often providea employment for a •ubetantia1 number of people even though 
J. A . C .. Hirachman. The Strategy of Economic Development. pp. 106-7. 
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the nuniler of workers per unit o£ ou.~ut may be small. 1 Furthermore, 
in continuous process plant&, such as steeltnilking and oU refining, 
which are usually capital intensive, the worker is u 'paced' by the 
equipment he serves" and "he cannot fall behind the conveyor line or 
drift away for an unscheduled break.,. Thus in an area where labour 
is n-~t disciplined to industrial work the capital intensive continuous 
2 
process industries represent a way of evercoming labour inefficiency. · 
The difficulty involved in diverting capital intensive industries 
to border areas by means of financial inducements, it rray be noted, 
ie quite unconnected with the relative capital/labour endowment of the 
border areas. In other words, it ia not due essentially to a shortage 
of capital relative to labour. with the consequent need to conserve cap .. 
ital resources by fostering l abour intensive industries and using labour 
intensive techniques of production. It is due to a quite distinct con-
sideration as we have shown, na.nely. the fact that capital intensive 
industries tend to be 'heavy' in the sense that they process heavy mat-
erials and that transport costs ten.d to rise fairly sharply as a capital 
intensive industry is diverted from ita ninimum transportation cost 
location, this increaae usually overwhel ning any acconpanying decreaae 
in labour coste. 
It is clear, however, that whUe capital intenaive induatries 
are not easUy divertible, they are not necessarily unsuitable for 
location in the border areaa. As we have sho"Wn they tend to be strongly 
1. SeeP. Sargant rlorence, The Logic of British and American Industry, 
(Routledge and Kegan I aul, London, 1953), p . 69. 
2. See Stephen Enke, 'Capital Intensity as a Mitigation of Inferior Labour: 
A General Theorem, S. A. Journal of iDconorrica, Septeni>er 1961. 
pp. 231-4. Even in a country like South Africa in which unskilled 
labour ia relatively cheap and abundant, there is evidence that in aome 
f'irms more highly Jnchanised techniques have been adopted for this 
reason. For instance. Good Hope Textiles at ZweUtsha, have over· 
corm some of their labour problems in this way. 
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attracted to markets or materials. eo that if the necessary materials 
or markets are foU!'ld in a border area. a. heavy capital intensive in .. 
duatry may very well be suitable for developn1ent in the area. Certain 
of the highly capital intensive industries aueh aa sugar milia, pulp and 
paper. tanning extract. and condensed milk and milk powder are in fact 
prominent in the border areas, and it appears that certain other highly 
capital int~ive incJ:u.triea like iron and s-teel, coke and by-product• • 
fertllilr..era, son\e basic industrial chemicals, and non-!erroas m~tala 
(e. g. copper) have good potential in those area... The view that capital 
intenaive industries will gen~rally not find it profitable to site them-
selves in the border area a and that they ahou.l.d11 therefore, usually be 
e•tabliahed in the metropolitan a.reaa, seems to be groundless. lt i8 
appu-ently baaed on a theory of regional specialisation .. which take• 
into account only the relative capital/labour endowment and which n~g· 
lecta the regional distribution of natural resourcea, the! weight of the 
materials uaed. and whether they involve weight loss in th-e proceaa oi 
production or not. In fact, as we showed in chapters 3 and 4 above, 
!t seems that a large part of the atimulue to industrialisation in the border 
area• will come bom capital inten•ive induatriea, since some of the 
moat significant of the expanding induatries in the border areas are 
o! this nature. Where a capital intensive indueby ia unauita'ble for 
eat:abliahment in the bord-er areas, the teaaJOn must be sought,_ ll.Ot in the 
limitations on capital intensity imposed by the abundance of l&bour re .. 
lative to capital (in other words the relative acarcity of the latt~r) in 
the border areas but in the geographical distribution of markets and 
materials. 
V hat a low divertibillty index due:! to the high capital inteneity 
of an industry simply mean• is that if the necessary :raw materials or 
markets are not found in the border areas. they are unlikely to be in-
flu-enced by Gove.-nrnent inducements to establieh there, unleaa these 
inducements are extremely large. Generally, therefore. capital inten-
sive industri4& are unsuitable for diversion to the border areas. 
It w. therefore, neceesary to modify the indexe• calculated in 
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th~ precedina section on the basis of pc-tential labour coat savings as 
a proportion of total costs, by taking into account the hcrso-power per 
worker ratio. A possibility which immediately euggeata itself is that 
of dividing the index in<:orporating only the labour cO-St ratio and the 
racial composition of the labour force by the horae -power per worker 
ratio t-o obtain a rather lees refined but poseibly still useful version of 
\'feber1s labour coefficient. This poaeibility and others will bo conaidered. 
below. but before doing so it will be convenient to deal with a type of 
manufacturing activity which is already eo widely dispersed as to make 
further diapcraal neither ncc4eaaary nor practicable,. 
Gbiguitous and Widell Di•periJed. Industries., 
While a high capital intensity reduces the divertihility of an 
induatry, it does not follow that a low capital inteQaity and the light-
nee• of materials aseoc:iated with it ensurea a blvourable divertibility 
index. This applies even if both the labour coat :ratio and the propor-
tiou of non-whites in the labour force are large. Electrical contracting, 
for in•tance, appears very close to the lower right hand corner in Table 
23 above. and as Table 25 abowa it has the fifth loweat horse•pow~r per 
worker ratio. But it is neve:rtheleaa obviously not divertible at all, 
since it ia in the nature of a residentiary activity in which customer con-
tact is essential. Activities like eleetrlcal contracting, motor vehicle 
repair, eignwriting. bespoke tailoring~ rubber atam~ and postel'a, fall 
in the aam <:ategory, and cu•tomer• situated in a metropolitan area 
cannot be aerved by finn& engaged in euch activities if they are situated 
in border areae. Certain other activities like bakerie•, flour and grain 
mills and brickwork•, it\ which cloae cuatomer contact i• not a• oa&antial 
as in thoae mentioned above, alao tend to be a• widely dbper•ed as they 
can be given the minimum economic seal . of production and the aize of 
regional market• for their goods and ae.rvicee. Generally, them, there 
is a category of industries which are so ubiquitous or widdy dispersed 
that Governmental measure a to •decentralioe' them are neither nec~saary 
nor practicable. 
Some of these widely dispersed induatries are also fah-ly capital 
intensive owing to the weight of materials and so, for this reason as 
well , may be unsuitable for diversion, by mean~t of various financial 
inducements, from the location which would have been chosen in the 
absence of Government intervention to one preferred by the Government. 
The heaviness of materials or pToducts, which :results in high trans -
portation costs, is often itself a cause of scatter. But in other cases. 
scatter is the result rather of the necessity for clos e contact with cus-
tomerr o1· the pel"isbability of the product or material$, so that like 
electric"ll contracting and bakerieG s ome of these industries may be of 
ti light aort. The latter would not be shown to be unsuitable in terms 
of the capital intena ity index discuPsed in the previous &ection. and it i e , 
therefor e , neces6ary to identify • epara.tely those i~dustrieEl which 
tend already to be dispel'aed. 
Such induAtries may be identified by the s ize of their localisation 
coefficients . since if an induetry ie widely dispe1·sed its localisation co-
efficient tends to be low. As we ehall ee a low localisation coefficient 
does not necesl'!arily mean that the industry is residentiary in character, 
or otherwitJJe unsuitable for inclusion in a programme of industrial de-
centralisation, ~ince there may be some s pecial economic cause of the 
location pattern of an industry within a particular country. A low local .. 
isation coefficient, however, does create a strong presumption against 
the ~uitability of an industry- for dive1•sion to the border areas unle•n 
special economic reasons can be {liVen to explain it. 
The localisation coefficient is a 'measure of t'elative regional 
concentration of a. p,iven indu~try compared to some total national 
magnitude uuch a s population, land area. manufacturing employment. 
or income. It is essentially a comparison of the percentage distribution 
by t'egion o£ emplovment in the given industry with the "regional percentage 
ditttribution of the base magnitude, for example total national manu-
factu-ring employment.' 1 
The locali ation coefficients given below have been calculated 
1. Walter lsard, Methods of Regional Analysis, (l'' ew ~'orko Wiley 
1960L pp. 251-SZ. 
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by ( 1) subtracting for each region 1 the percentage share of total employ-
ment in the given industry in 1959-60 from the percentage ahare of the 
country'a economically active population in 1960 (Z) adding all positive 
difference•. or all negative ciifference•; and (3) dividing the aum of the 
positiv-e (or nt!gative) differences by !"00. The limitate the value of the 
coefficient are 0 and 1. If the industry is distributed region.ally in exact-
ly the same proportion a. the base magnitude the value will be zero, and 
if the entire: industry is eoncen.trated in one region, the value will approach 
uuity. Thua if an industry h~s a very low coefficient~ this indicates that 
it is already diapet-aed. 
The percentage distribution of the country•• economically active 
population in 1960 between the eleven l"egions into which the country hae 
been divided by the writer for the pvrpose of calculating localisation 
coefficient• is given in Table 28. Using thifl infor1nation. together 
with the percentage region.a.l diatribution of 4!mployme;nt in each of tho 
129 South African induatrial •ec:tors, localiaation coefficients have been 
calculated in the manner described abovt::. In Table Z9 the 129 aectora 
ar,list~d in aac~nding order o! the: size of their localisation coefficienta. 
It will be noted that the &ize of the localisation coefficient range e !rom 
0. 124 in the caae of flour and grain mills to 0~ 890. lt is e;.rtrernely 
difiicult to know where to draw the line between highly disperliSed i.ndua ... 
tries which cannot be 4i•pt.raed further and other industries, and the 
choice of a precise dividing line m.ust to some extent be arbitrary. In 
making a !mal aelection of widely dispersed industries of this •ort it 
may be uaciul to compare the order obtained in Table 29 with data for 
Bt"itain aud the Cnited States. 
The rank order of in4uatrtea in terms of localisation coefficie-nte 
appoar1 to vary somewhat from one country to another, but thore llrc a 
1. The eleven :regions upon which the calculations are based ar~: 
(a) Ten of the economic regions used by the Bureau of Statistics. 
their code numbers being 01. OZ, 08, 18. 3(), 40, 41. 42.. 43,. 44. 
(b) 1'he eleventh region consiats of all other magisterial districts 
together. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
(.. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
1 (). 
lL 
Sour ce: 
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TABLE 28 
~~ egional Distribution of S'}utb Af rica's E conomically 
Active ....,opulation 1960 
E conomic Region 
C.::o<fe number 
01 
1)2 
oa 
18 
3~ 
4() 
4 1 
42 
43 
44 
P e r centage 
of E conomically 
Active r>opulation 
5.9 
2.2 
2.6 
1.6 
5. 1 
9. 5 
6.3 
3. 8 
3. 8 
1.4 
57. 7 
Compiled from T opula.tion Census 19607 
nos. 1. 2, and 5. 
}.;fa.gis-terial districte 
comprising region 
Belville 
Cape Town 
~imonstown 
V1ynber~ 
Cere s 
Montagu 
.. aarl 
Hobertson 
Somereet We~t 
c tellenbosch 
Tulba ch 
Wellin~on 
\ orceater 
. -ort l7;1izabetb 
Uitenhage 
E ast London 
·.-;ing William's 
Durban 
·inetown 
.Johannesburg 
Benoni 
Boksburg 
P.r~kpan 
Germiston 
'Kempton '"'ark 
Springs 
'<rugersdorp 
0 berholzer 
'f...andfontein 
~oodepoort 
retoria 
Vanderbijlpark 
Vereniging 
Town 
All other magisterial 
districht 
Sample Tabulation 
TABLE 29 
Localization coeffi cients of Sout h African Manufacturing Industr ies for 1959- 60 
0.124 
0.135 
0.201 
0.209 
0.211 
0.232 
0 .248 
0.257 
0 . 260 
0 . 267 
0 . 269 
0.285 
0.291 
0.313 
0 . 318 
0.328 
0 . 336 
0.343 
0 .346 
0 .350 
0.353 
0.362 
0 .367 
Flour and grain mills 
Sawmills, etc. 
Cement 
Coke 
Blacksmithing 
Coffins 
Marble, stone, slate, etc. 
Rubber products 
Butter and cheese 
Preparation and preserving of meat 
Motor and other spirits, fuel, etc. 
Cotton ginning, fibe working , etc. 
Saltworks 
Beer, Native beer and malt 
Crushed stone 
Aerated waters and soft drinks 
Bakeries 
Lime works 
Preservation of timber 
Wattle bark grinding 
Chaff cutting, compressed fodder, etc. 
Paper and paperboard 
Bonemilling and bloodmeal 
0 _372 (Tanning extract (Sugar mills 
0 •. 377 Condensed milk and milk powder 
0.393 Agricul t ural machinery 
(Boot and shoe repairs 0
•
400 (Balanced ani mal feeds 
0.413 
0.439 
0. 444 
0 .455 
0. 462 
0.473 
0.490 
Modelling in cement 
Paper bags, cardboard boxes, etc. 
Rock lobster, fish preserving, etc. 
Bricks and tiles, earthenware, e t c. 
Bespoke tailoring 
Electrical contracting 
Glass making , bottle making, etc. 
(Ice cream and ices 
0.496 (Boot and shoe factories 
0 . 529 Other non-met allic mineral products i ndus tries 
0.535 Smelting and refining of non-ferrous metals 
0 545 ((Other wooden products 
• (Crude oil-cake and meal etc . 
0 . 555 Spinning , weaving and f i nishing of other cotton products 
0 . 558 All other metal products 
0.559 Printing, publishing, etc. 
0.568 Office machinery 
0 , 584 Cables , fencing wire, etc. 
0.585 Drugs and pharmaceutical preparations 
0 . 597 Picture frames 
0 _599 (Pickles, sauces and condiments (Hosiery and other knitted clothing 
0 . 603 Plaster and o ther composite boards 
(Jam, canned, preserved etc . 0
'
604 (Other knitt i ng mills 
(Fertilisers 
0.608 Furniture and f ixtures 
0.618 Insulated cables and wires 
0.620 Mens and boys clo thing 
0 . 628 Tanneries and f ellmongeri ng 
0.630 Vinegar 
(Sweets and chocolates 0
•
636 (Paints, varnishes, etc. 
0.650 Sheet metal products 
0.655 Musical instrument~ 
(Ship and boat bui l ding and repair 0
•
656 (Railroad equipment 
0. 659 
0. 660 
0. 662 
0 . 665 
0 , 666 
0.673 
0. 674 
0. 677 
0. 680 
0 . 681 
0 . 685 
0. 688 
0 . 689 
0.691 
0 . 692 
0.693 
0 . 694 
0 . 696 
0.698 
0.699 
0.702 
o. 711 
0. 712 
0.713 
0 . 719 
0 .725 
0 . 727 
0 . 728 
0 . 729 
0.730 
0 . 731 
0 . 738 
0.744 
0.747 
0. 749 
0 . 755 
0 . 762 
0 . 766 
0 . 768 
0.769 
0 . 778 
0 . 780 
0 . 786 
0 . 795 
0 . 796 
0. 798 
0.802 
0. 815 
0.817 
0 . 826 
0. 837 
0.839 
0 . 845 
0. 890 
Other f ood i ndustries 
Other plqs t ic pr oducts 
Peanut r oasting 
Optical and photographic goods 
Brushes and brooms 
(All other electrical machiner y 
(Signwriting, posters and showcards 
All other paper products 
All other machinery 
Bags and sacks 
Headed and threaded articles 
Other basic i ndustrial chemicals 
(Coffee r oasti ng and chicory gr inding 
(Wood carvin~, wood turning , etc. 
Spinning, weaving and f i nishing of other woollen products 
Tobacco 
(Soap and cand les 
(Other miscellaneous i ndus tries 
Harness and saddlery 
Women's and Girl s ' clothing 
Fl avour ing essences 
Tents, tarpaulins, etc. 
(General and small l eather goods 
(Industrial , mining and construction machinery 
(Tinware 
(Electroplating 
Felt, padding , waddi ng, etc . 
Stationery 
Electri cal machinery and motors 
Manufacture and repair of watches and clocks 
(Soft furni shings 
(Ot her chemical industries 
Jewell ery and relat ed articles 
Compound cooking fats 
(Bl anke ts 
(Imitat ion j ewellery 
Rubber stamps 
Mens' and Boys ' hats and caps 
Toys , sporting accessories 
Wool scouring 
(Disinfect ants, i nsec t icides , etc. 
(Plywood, including laminated boards 
Yeast 
Manufacture, etc. of bicycl es 
Blacking, polishes, etc. 
Pr ofessional, etc. instruments 
Sausage casing 
Tr avel goods , etc. 
Iron and steel , etc . 
Ties 
Tea blending and packing 
Umbrellas, etc. 
Assembly and repai r of aircraft 
(Explosives and carbide 
(Buttons , buckl es, e t c. 
Distil l eries and wineries 
Ropes , cord~e , twine , etc. 
Millinery 
Ladies handbags 
Furriers 
Metal pipes 
Diamond cutting and polishing 
Jelly , custard and pudding powder 
Source: Based on statistics kindly made available by the Bureau of Statistics 
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number of industries which are widely dispened in South Africa, 
Britain and the United States and it ia these with which we shall con-
cern ourselves mainly.. Profeseor Sargant Florence 1 ha.a published 
localili&tiou coefficient• for l Z4 manufacturing industries in Great 
Bl'itain calculated on the basis of 1930 data. The 31 industries which 
he found to have lcx:aliaation coefficient• of less than 0. 29 are listed 
in 'l'able 3-0 .. 
The Briti•h industrial census classification o! 1930, however, 
was markedly different from the present South African claes;fication 
eo that several of the categories listed above have no closely corres-
pondina South African count -rpart e. g.. apro~ ce<:oa, aluminium, tix· 
bo~conveyora.. gaaworke, laundry etc. However, several others 
listed by Saraant Florence do have a closely corresponding categt)ry in 
the South African cen.us: shoe repair•.. ~lectricity supply. aerated 
water•,. grain milling, bnwiftg,. bread (bakeries). bacon curing,. timber 
(aaWJnills). paint. furniture. building, printing, b:riek and gla.es. In 
South Africa shoo repail"e ha.d a localisation coefficient of 0. 400. ael"t\ted 
waters 0. 328, bre·wing 0. 313. bak~rie• 0. 336. preparation and pre-
SC!rving o!. meat 0 .. Zb 7, sawmills 0 .. ll5- paint 0. 636p fu-rniture 0 .. 608. 
printing 0. 559, bricks and tile a o. 455, and glass 0. 490. All of 
these. then are amongst the 45 industries with the lowest localisation 
coefficients in South Africa, with the exception of furniture and paint 
which nevertheless have fa.irly low coefficients. 
1 Using a very difierent approach, Hoover ha• based a measure 
of clu8ter and scatter of plant• in various industriee on the number of 
counties in the United States in which any plant of that industry was found .. 
l!oover. howevc~, points out that 1 induatries with only a few eatablieh ... 
monts are naturally likely to be found in fewer locations. so in order to 
1. Edgar loi. I!oover. ' size of Mant, (;oncern ami Production Center: 
in a. National Resources Planning Boa.rd neport entitled Industrial 
Location and 1' ational ~esourcea. Table 15 pp. 252-3. 
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TABLE 30 
Industries with Coefficients of Localisation of less than 
0. Z9 in Great Britain in 1930 
Coefficient or localisation 
0.08 
!1. 09 
0.14 
o. 18 
o.zo 
o.zt 
0.22 
(}.24 
o. Z5 
0.26 
0.27 
n.zs 
<1.29 
Industry 
Shoe repair 
Water works 
Electricity supply 
Aerated waters 
Grain milling 
Construction engineering 
Brewing 
Bread 
Leather tanning 
Building matedal 
Apron 
Bacon curing 
Gasworks 
Cocoa 
Tlmbe:r 
Wholesale bottling 
-aint 
Aluminium etc. 
rurniture 
Building 
Wood crates 
'")a per 
Tin-box 
,. rinting 
Foundry 
Rope 
rreserved food 
Conveyers 
Brick 
Glass 
Biscuit 
Source: Sa:r~ant Florence. Investment Location and Size of f lant, 
(Cambridge University T"ress 1948). 
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make allowance for this and get a truer measure of eluste:r tendency' 
he corrects this measure by working out ho• far eaeh industry deviate• 
£rom the expeetcd likelihood. owing to its total nurnber f>f ~lants. ~Ie 
publishe• a table of the 56 industries witb the most extreme deviations 
toward county scatter. tho first 30 of tbe•e being listed below: 
l . Gas~ rnanufnctured 
l~ Flour and gnin mUle products 
3. Ice, manufactured 
4.. Brewt.t"ieB. non-alcoholic 
5~ Poultry dressing and packing. wholesale 
6. c-.u. cake and meal, cottonseed 
1. P rinting and publiching, newapape:r and periodical 
8.. Railroad repair shops, steam 
9. Clay prtxlucts (excluding pottery) 
l 0. Ice cream 
11. Feeds prepared for animals and fowls 
17. Conden•ed and evaporated. milk 
13. Butter 
14. .A.gricultut"al implem~nte and includir .. g tractor4 
I 5. Grease tmd tallow, excluding lubricating grease 
J.6. 1 ood presorvi"lg 
1 7. Coop~ rage 
18... Carriages., wagons~ sleighs and sleds; 
1 '). J. ~laning mills producta made in pla~ing mUla -.1ot con-n"ct~t:. with 
saw nii1ls 
20. roundriee 
2"!.. .Fertiiizora 
2Z. Concrete products 
Z3. Cement 
Z4.. ,''o-od, turiu.•d and shaped .und other wood;.rn goods u .. a.. c. 
2~. Doxes, woodc'l., e"'tclndil·g cigar bo7{es 
26. Vinegar and cider 
l.1. Lumbel' and timber products 
2£. Brooms 
Z9. Liquor•. malt 
30. Saddlery, ha;rntbS and whips 
Several of th~ i:ldustri .. s liate<l above are ai•o ;.~eluded an1oug 
tho~(" wit111ocalisntior~ coeffidc.nts of less that. ... 0. l9 nccording to Sargo.nt 
Florcnco1 & calculations. fu. addition, howcvez; th ... r<- are acvcr"""l which 
are not given by Sargant .F !orence. but whic~1 do hav.t co\4.Uterpa:ru in the 
South Af.rican ciasaificat.ioa. These arc given beiow togctht.:r vith the 
&outh Afric.-m. coef!ici<.!nt : ice cream 0.196. animal feeds 0~ -too~ con-
denaed and C!!Vaporatcd n-..ilk 0. 3 77, butter and cheese 0. 2.60. wood 
preserving 0. 346, fertilizers 0. 604. cement 0 .. 201, wood carving &ul 
turning a. 688 .. 
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On the baeia of the South African coefficients and of the in.dus-
trie• listed by Sargant Florence and Hoover. a number of industrie& 
have been selected as rather conapicuoua exarr..ple$ of ubiquitous or 
diaperaed induatriea and these have been listed in Table 31, together 
with the amo1Ul.t of em.ployment provided by each in 1960- l, 
In the case of these wid ly 8eattered plants the predominant 
determinant of location is trauaport cottts. 1! transport coats on ra.w 
ma~riala are the predominant factor, these can be/minimised by locating 
the industry in fairly c:loee conformity with the. distribution o! m=-.teriahs. 
On the other band, if delivery costa on the produ.et are prepondc rant, 
th~ae can be minimised by locating the plant in fairly closE: conformity with 
the distribution of markets. 
It is difficult to make a clea.rcut distinction between the widely 
dispersed indu•triea liated above, o~ the one band, and oth.,r industries 
in which transport coats are relatively heavy, on the other hand# ~.-hen 
th market is a eoncontrated one. such aa for aome manufactured inter.,. 
mediate product, then if the eoet of transporting the finished product .is 
great. production will al•o tend to be concentrated. '\' ben the mat.erial• 
or ma~kets are fairly widespread, however. the. chief limit on ecatter 
ia imposed by ec:onomiee of ln.rge scale production. The extent to which 
an indu.try's location rE-•em.blea that of the distribution of materials 
or market• is thus limited by the de-pendence oi:ost upon aiz~. '1 he 
higher coete o! amaller plant• impos~ a definite lower limit ou th ... degre 
of localisation. Thu.ts, though certain isuJu.str1es may not be l'epre cnted 
in a large number of magisterial dietricte, th .... y May ha·.re a strong ton-
dency to dispersion. For instance, paints and. cement both have a very 
strong tendency to be oriented to :r.egional marketa. but because of the 
relatively small size of most regtonal rno.rk ~ts these industries are not 
repl'e•ented in a large number oi m'1gieterial districts. Nevertheless 
in both figures for Great Britain artd the U. ~.A. giv~n abov , cemer t and 
paint• are ebown to be widCly dieper•ed industries. Table 29 also showa 
cement to have a very low localisation coef~1cient. There io~ therefore. 
little point in the State attempti!lg to induce industri a of this •ort to 
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TABLE 31 
Employment in Residentiary and other Widely Dispersed 
South African Industries, 1960 -61 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 .. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
to. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
zo. 
Zl. 
zz. 
23. 
Z4. 
25. 
26. 
Preparation and preserving of meat 
Butter and cheese 
Ice cream and i c es 
Jam, canned, preserved and dried fruit 
Flour and grain mills 
Bakeries 
Balanc ed animal feeds 
Beer, native beer and malt 
Aerated waters 
Boot and shoe repairs 
Bespoke tailoring 
Sawmills, eaTpentry and Joinery 
Wood carving, wood turning, etc. 
~re el'vation of timber 
P icture frames and coffins 
rurniture 
Printing, publishing a nd allied industries 
f"'aints, varnishes, lacquers, etc. 
Bricks and tiles 
Glass 
Cement 
Marble6 s tone,ttlate, etc. 
Crushed stone 
Electrical contra cting 
Blacksmithing 
Dersonal services 
Tota l ubiquitous and dispereed industries 
Total a.ll South African manufacturing ind\astries 
* Excludes the motor vehicle indus try. 
Employment 1960-1 
3~ 8€)4 
3,445 
2. 085 
12.753 
13.924 
18. 712 
2,427 
3.393 
5,865 
1, 841 
2,290 
27.941 
171 
677 
957 
17.212 
20~476 
4.063 
26,605 
s. 884 
4.200 
2,109 
3,638 
8,484 
1,'>37 
16,160 
210. 153 
638, 189 * 
Source of employment figu'l"es: Industrial Census 1960- 1. Special 
R epor t No. 257. 
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eetabliah in the border areas since they already tend to develop in any 
area where the demand ia aufi'icient. ln eome instance•~ howe ver. 
where an industry ia not u.biquitoua, but ia situated &o as to serve large 
regional markets. it may be poeaible to induce a firm to establi•h ita 
plant in one part of the region it is to serve rather than at.tOther. 
The reaicbmt.iary. uhiquitoua or widely acattered aetivitiea U&ted 
in Table 31. therefore., ca.n·not be included in a scheme for divertin,J in· 
ciuatriea to the border areas.. Despite the fact that we have iru::luded 
only the more conllpicuoua .,xa.mples of thitt type of activity. the volume 
of employment provided by them tn 1960-61 wa.a quite. au.batantial. In 
the aggregate they employed Z l 0. ! 53 worker• out of a total of 638, 190 
employed in tnanufa<::tu:r-ing industry aa a whole (excluding conatruction 
and electricity) in 1960-61. lt appea.ra. therefore, that activitiea em-
ploying 32.9 per cent of the industJtial labour f~.rce in 1960-61 were 
almost completely place .. bound. ln ·rable 23 above these widely dia-
pcrs<.--d indu•tries are placed in parenthesis to indicate that they arc not 
included in the ranking of indWJtriea undertak(i.n in the following section. 
'lhus a eubatantial proportion of ntanufacturing induatry can be :ruled cut 
of consideration for diversion to the border areae. 1'he growth of theeo 
induatriea in tbe border &r.cae depends basically on the expansion of the 
gen~ral level of economic activity iu the areas. 
Aput from the widely diapersed industries Hated in T able 31, 
there are a aum.ber of other activiti~e auch as founddee~ gen.~ral engin-
eering work•hops. and motor vehicle repaire which are also widcl.y 
dispersed owing to the weight of materials, p~rif!bability, or the im-
portance of cuatomer contact.. :But theac are not given in Table 3!. 
either beeau•e as in the caae of motor vehicle repairs the information 
neceasary for the calculation of coeffichmta haJJ not been avail~ble to the 
writer. or beeaus~ the mM~ufacturing &Etctora inwhlch the:} ar included 
in the indu•trial cenau data do not, taken a• • tvhole, have sufficie11tly 
low lo<::aliaation coefficients. Thua the list bl Table 31 includes only the 
more conapicuoua of the widely d.iapereed industries forwhich separate 
data ie avaUable ... 
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The Range of Div,artible Industl'ie!· 
We are now in a better position to rank induatriea in term3 
of their divertlbility to border areas. In the light of the discussion 
o! the preceding section our taek is reduced to that of ranking indue-
tries employing some 67. i per cent of the manufacturing labour force 
in 1960-61. 1 wo alternative procedures for doing this will be c:onaidered .. 
The first possibility is to uae the dhrertibUity index given in the 
appendix to this chapter. which simply takea into account the labour coat 
ratio and the non-white labour ratio. in order to rank 'light' induetr!e• 
only. on the grounds that attention will have to be concentrated on these 
if diversion of industries ia to be achieved at a moderate e1:cess social 
coat. In 'fable 2l abov« iudu.tdos with a horae-power per worker 
ratio of 3. 0 or more bear the •uffix ' H ' denoting heaviness, with the 
ex:ccption of thoae in the 3. 1 to 4 . 0 horae-poYJ'fH' per worker group 
which ha.ve a labour coat ratio over 50 per cent, which have the suffix 
' H ~ 1 indicating that they are marginal caaee compared with the ' 1 ' 
indus trios. Industries with a horse-power per worker between l. 6 
and 3. 0 are marked 1 ~ 1 1 and thoeo with valu~a between o. 1 au.d 1. 5 
•.t.;1 to denote medium weight and very light industrie• reapcc:tively. 
'.111u.e. a horse-power per W<>rkcr of 1. 5 or less may be reg•rded as a 
favourable indication for diversion. 1. 6 to 3. 0 as neutral. and over 
l 3. 0 as unfavourable. -
In Table 3Z below the 48 indu.atriaa {excluding wt.dely diaper•ed 
industdes) with horac-powel' per work~r ratios of less tu~ 2. 0 are 
listed in descendina order of the inde4 giv~n in the apper•di.c to thi• 
chapter which ia baaed on the potential labour cost aavinga aa a pro-
portion of total costs, which may be obtained by establishing in a border 
area rather than in one ol the larger industrial cetJtres. Variations in 
the horae-power per worker ratio between these light industries them-
selves have had no bearing at all. on tne orde.r in which they ar.a listed. 
L 
This particular approach is uaed by 1". Sargant Florence, op. cit. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. )E 
5. )( 
6. 
1· 
a. 
9. )( 
10. 3( 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. )E 
15. )( 
16. 
17. 
18. 3( 
19. 
20. )( 
21. )( 
22. 3( 
23. )( 
24. 
25. )( 
26. 
27. 
28. )( 
29. )( 
30. 
31. )( 
32'. 
33. 
34. 
35 . 
36. 
37. )( 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. )E 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
TABLE 32 
Provisional Selection and Ranking of Light Industries in 
Terms of Suitability for Diversion to Border Areas 
(Based on Potential Labour Cost Savings) 
Plywood including laminated boards 
Vinegar 
Harness and saddlery 
Ladies Handbags 
Bags and sacks 
Sausage casings 
Modelling in cement 
Brushes and brooms 
Mens' and boys' clothing 
Women's and girls' clothing 
Buttons, buckles, etc. 
Travel goods 
Peanut roasting 
Wool scouring 
Cotton textiles 
General and small leather goods 
Sheet metal products 
Hosiery 
Toys, sporting goods, etc. 
Ropes, cordage and twine 
Woollen textiles 
Blankets 
' Boot and shoe factories 
Plaster and other composite board 
Soft furnishing 
Tinware 
Pickles, sauces and condiments, etc. 
Other knitting mills 
Other clothing 
Other paper products 
Mens' and boys' hats and caps 
Imitation jewellery 
Other plastic products 
Canvas goods 
Paper bags, cardboard boxes, etc. 
All other metal products 
Millinery 
Sweets and chocolates 
Stationery 
Jelly, custard and pudding powder 
Tobacco 
All other electrical machinery 
Other chemicals (Inks , matches and glue) 
Ties 
Soaps and candles 
Musical instruments 
Electrical machinery and mot~rs 
All other machinery 
Total of light industries 
Total of all South African secondary industries , including 
construction electricity and personal services 
* Included in clothing or textile groups. 
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No. employed in 
1960-61 -
2,413 
169 
350 
1,061 
2,200 
269 
5,484 
1,254 
28,295 
20,583 
522 
1,102 
325 
1,778 
14,857 
692 
6,923 
6,965 
1,117 
1,703 
5,233 
6,324 
16,922 
3,715 
1,823 
4,623 
1,007 
903 
625 
2,469 
1,107 
293 
3,219 
1,042 
7,372 
42,600 
1,036 
7,617 
1,654 
338 
4,672 
10,044 
3,039 
355 
893 
1,102 
6,402 
259 
234,750 
796,443 
)E3( Bureau of Census and Statistics , Industrial Census 1960-61, Special Report No. 257. 
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In 1960-61 these 48 lightest industries provided employment for 
234, 750 workers or 36. 8 per ce.nt of the total number of 638. 190 employ-
ed in South African manufacturing industry. 
Of the light industries listed. however. those in the textiles and 
wearing apparel groups accounted for 111, 770 workers or 14.0 per cent 
of total employment in manufacturing industry in 1960-61. It appears, 
therefore. that the industrialisation of the border areas mu•t depend 
heavily on these two groups. Fourteen of the specific 'ndustriea, in 
these two major groups, including all of the more important ones like 
mens' and boya 1clothing, womens• and girls 'clothingJ cotton textiles. 
woollen textiles,. and boot and ahce factories were amongst the 30 ill due-
tries in the ranking. The largest aingle sector in this liat of light indus-
tries was ''all other metal products'* with a labour force o! 42, 600 or 
5. 3 per cent of total employment in. manufacturing industry. This sector, 
howev~r. was fairly low down on the liat in 36th pla.ce, and consists of 
a large number of different products aubj~ct to a variety of locational 
influences. Of the other industries the largest was :~all other electrical 
machinery·1 with 1. Z per cent o£ total manufacturing employment, but 
since its labour force was predominantly white and ;.twas not outstanding-
ly labour intensive, it ranked only 4i!nd. 11.nother relatively large in-
dustry was electrical machinery and motors which employed 0. 8 per 
cent of all manufacturing workers, but this fell low down on the list of 
industries suitable for diversion. 
It cannot be concluded .from the above that industries a ccounting 
.for 36. 8 per cent of total manufacturing employment are 1footlooae' in 
the sense that it makea little dii!er<mce whether they are established in 
the border areas rather than in so:me other centre. The divertibility of 
industries generally diminishes as we move down the. list, and the ~xcese 
private cost of diversion to border areas of industries near the bottom of 
tne list may be quite eubstantial. For inst~cc the large at a ector listed. 
namely$ all other metal products., w)licb cm.ployed 42, 600 people t.:;nds 
-
to be strongly oriented to markets and materials and it is improbable 
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that a large proportion of the types of activiti·~• included in this sector 
could easily be diverted to border area•. Table 32, thel"efore, should 
be •imply regarded as including those industries upon which attention 
might be concentrated if subaidy payments relative to additionat induced 
employment in the border areas i• to minimiaed. 
The justification for con•idering only light industries so far is 
aimply thatt compared witb these,. the diversion of heavier indl.lstries 
ie likely to involve a larger increase in transport costs per unit of out• 
put relative toany l abour coat saving per unit of output. l'hio seems 
particularly likely since induetriea w~th a high horse-.power per worker 
ratio also tend to have a low labour cost ratio, as an examination of '!-. • 
and 'H*• industries in Table l3 above &howe. But the rankirlg procedurt: 
used so far does have the disadvantage that an industry in the medium 
weight category, though being heavier, may have a labour cost saving 
poteatial which is •o much greater than that of a light indulftry, that the 
excess social cost• of d ive.rting th~ lat~r may be greater than tho•e in-
volved in divel"ting the former. ,.., ithin the light gro.,lp of industri,•a, too, 
the ability of our ordering to reflect the actual relative ease or difficulty 
of divel"ting different industries is :reetrictt:d by, amongst other tl'\in"s. 
our fnilure to take into account differences in the weight of ma.teri<d&. 
Furthermore any decision. regarding the 8i":.e of the horse-pow r per 
worker ratios which are to roark of! 'ligbtr from 1 m~dium' industri~s and 
1meduizn1 from 'heavy• must necessarily be arbitrary. 
The tobacco industry provides an exampl" o! the sort o! factor 
which might require a modification of the ranking given U1 !'able 32. 
The labour cost ratio of this industry is low. but it is probably the light-
est of all irldustrif:a. gauged in t:!rms of weight of product p~r unit of 
value. Tran$port costa are therefore an extremely small p.1:oportion of 
total coats, and this industry may be easier to divert to the border areas 
than, for instance, 11atl ot.b.er metal products" though the latter actually 
hae a higher ranking in Table 32 • Th~ reason for thia is that while 
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ci~a,..ette manufactu,..e is highly mechani~ed, and as a result has a low 
labour cost ratio, the machinery is intricate, specialised and expensive 
ratbet· than pat•ticular ly powerful. UnlL"<e most other highly capital 
inten~ive indust'defl the high degree of mechanisation i$ not caused by 
the need to process heavy and bulky raw rnate:rials. Though this in 
dust r y may be divertible to the border areas, however, in view of itt=~ 
extremely light nature, the additional employment generated in this way 
and consequently also !'lalaries and wages> will be low relative to 
additional output. 
Anothe:r important conside,·ation i~ that the rate of growth of 
'light' induRtr ies may not be Rufficiently rapid to enable the dive~Aion 
of industries to take place on the s cale necess~ ·ry to achieve ce ,.tain non 
economic objective~ ., s o that rathel' heavier industries may have to be -
conc;ide..,·ed fo r dive·n!ion even though tbif'l might raise the marginal ex- ._ 
cess p-rivate cost of induced bo-rde r areas em~loyment. It would,. thet"e·-
fo r e> be U!ileful to have a comp;·ehensive ranking of all indus tries in te r m s 
of "~"elative dive:rtibility costs , so that the cost implications of increasing 
the scale of inter vention in the location of industry could be mol'e eas ily 
seen. 
With these conside:rations in mind an index which takes into 
account both potential labour cost 8avings and the weight of materials 
s imultaneous ly has aho been calculated. The horf!e-power per worker 
~atio of each induEtt r y has been divided by its index of potential labour 
coflt savin.~s;, given in the appendix to thi£' chapter . to obtain an overall 
divertibility index. The latter index co-rre s ponds to the r ecipr oca l of 
We·be-r '~ mor e r efined labou"~" coefficient. Unlike the latter _, and unlike 
the index calculated e arlier on the basis of potential labour cos t savings > 
the ,..efor e the lower (highe t") iR our new divertibility index the mor e (less) 
favou-::able a,..e the prospects of divel"sion to a bor der area. In Table 33 
the 1Z9 South Af r ican industr i a l secto"~'!': a r e lieted in a s cending o r der of 
the ~ize of thi~ index Ro that as we move down the list the marginal exc ess 
P.~·ivate cos-t~ of dive1·tin~ indust1:i:ll p 1·oduction and employment to the 
bo1'de ,.. a,.eas t end to inc1·ease. The l:'e s identiar y and other widely 
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47 
2 
ns 
48 
107 
41 
45 
52 
44 
127 
43 
69 
124 
57 
50 
68 
13 
n6 
n2 
n7 
19 
40 
129 
22 
102 
35 
51 
n5 
122 
10 
39 
42 
125 
123 
28 
109 
20 
29 
63 
80 
67 
23 
88 
62 
78 
54 
120 
97 
6 
32 
33 
98 
108 
7 
12 
64 
85 
60 
114 
30 
65 
126 
26 
58 
105 
56 
104 
36 
37 
21 
34 
100 
TABLE 33 
Relationship Between Divertibility I ndex and Proportion of Manufacturing Employment Diverted 
Furriers 
Ladies handbags 
Sausage casings 
Imitation jP.wellery 
Millinery 
INDUSTRY 
Electrical contracting 
Mens' and Boys' clothing 
Women's and girls' clothing 
Tents , tarpaulins, sails and other canvas goods 
Bespoke tailoring 
Signwriting, posters and showcards 
Ties 
General and small leather goods 
Rubber stamps 
Picture frames 
Soft furnishings 
Travel goods, etc. (leather) 
Peanut roasting 
Manufacture and repair of watches and clGcks 
Assembly and repair of aircraft 
Jewellery and related articles 
Vinegar 
Boot and shoe repairs 
Other miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
Tea blending and packing 
Office machinery 
Hosiery and other knitted clothing 
Bags and sacks 
Optical and photographic goods 
Toys, sporting accessories, novel ties, etc. 
Bakeries 
Boot and shoe factories 
Mens and boys hats and caps 
Buttons, buckles, etc. 
Brushes and brooms 
Aerated waters and soft drinks 
Ship and boat building and repairs 
Jelly , custard and pudding powder 
Tobacco 
Stationery 
Blacking, Polishes, blanco, whiting, etc. 
Harness and saddlery 
Saltwo~ks (including saltpans) 
Modelling in cement, etc. 
Paper bags, cardboard boxes and mounts 
Drugs and pharmaceutical preparations 
Plywood, including laminated boards 
Electroplating 
Sheet metal products 
Jam, canned, preserved and dried fruits 
Blankets 
Spinning, weaving ru1d finis hing of other woollen products 
Tinware 
All other electrical machinery, apparatus and suppl ies 
Pickles, sauces and condiments 
Sweets and chocolates 
Other paper products 
Glass making, bott le making , glassbevelling , silvering 
Furniture and fixtures 
Professional , scientific and controlling instruments 
Woolscouring 
Printing, publishing and allied industries 
Other plastic products (miscellaneous) 
Distilleries and wi neries 
Coff ins 
Electrical machinery and motors 
Preservation of timber 
All other non-electrical machinery 
Other knitting mills 
Ropes, cordage, twine, fish and other nets 
Coffee roasting and chicory grinding 
Spinning, weaving and finishing of other cotton products 
All other metal products (except machinery and transport) 
( l) 
I Divertibility Index*, (Index of marginal 1
1 
excess costs ) 
.000 806 
.000 851 
. 000 854 
.000 99r, 
. 001 041 
.001 234 
. 001 315 
.001 382 
• 001 477 
. 001 515 
. 001 604 
.001 796 
. 001 818 
. 001 923 
. 001 951 
.001 960 
.002 262 
.002 283 
. 002 419 
. 002 649 
.002 762 
.002 868 
.002 884 
.002 955 
.003 086 
.003 149 
. 003 286 
. 003 404 
. 003 550 
.003 686 
. 004 109 
. 004 494 
.004 901 
.004 932 
.005 286 
. 005 555 
.005 583 
. 005 978 
.006 748 
.006 779 
.006 944 
.007 112 
. 007 272 
. 007 488 
. 007 537 
. 007 575 
.007 Fll8 
.008 ?25 
. 008 256 
. 008 490 
.008 837 
.008 Fl37 
. 009 313 
. 009 356 
.009 756 
. 010 160 
.010 204 
.010 3fi2 
. 010 426 
.010 526 
.010 666 
. on 111 
. on 167 
.on 494 
. on '560 
.on 801 
.012 053 
. 012 244 
. 012 437 
. 012 556 
.012 73Fl 
.012 844 
.013 157 
! 
I 
i 
(2) 
Employment+ 
1960- 61 
222 
1,061 
269 
29~ 
1 , 036 
(8,484) 
28,295 
20 , 583 
1,042 
(2 ,290) 
(1 ,042) 
355 
692 
( 65) 
( 345) 
( 1,823) 
1,102 
325 
135 
( 443) 
1 ,101 
169 
1,841 
639 
977 
( "177) 
6 ,965 
2,200 
628 
1,117 
(18 ,712 ) 
16,922 
1 ,107 
:'22 
1,254 
(5 ,865) 
(1,406 ) 
338 
4,672 
1 , 654 
574 
350 
2 ,477 
5 ,489 
7 ,372 
6,022 
2 ,413 
( 944) 
6 ,923 
(12 , 753) 
6 ,3 24 
5,233 
4 ,623 
10,044 
1,C07 
7 ,617 
2,469 
(5 ,8Fl4) 
(17 , 212 ) 
597 
1,778 
(20 ,476 ) 
3,219 
5 ,399 
612 
6,402 
( 677) 
259 
903 
1,703 
1,664 
14,857 
42 ,600 
(3) 
Accumulated+ 
Total 
Employment 
1960- 61 
222 
1,283 
1,552 
1 ,845 
2 ,881 
31,176 
'il, 759 
52,801 
'i3,156 
53 ,848 
54,950 
55,275 
5"i ,410 
56,511 
56 ,680 
58, 521 
59,160 
60,137 
67 ,102 
69,302 
69,330 
71,047 
A7 ,969 
09,076 
89,598 
90 ,852 
91,190 
95,862 
97 1 5Hi 
98,090 
98,440 
100 ,917 
106,406 
1n,77s 
n9 ,800 
122,2n 
129,136 
135 , 460 
140,fi93 
145 ,316 
155 , 360 
156,367 
163 ,984 
16fi,4'i3 
1!'7,050 
lfil'l,82F\ 
172 ,047 
177 ,436 
178 ,04R 
1A4 1 450 
184,709 
1R5 , 612 
187,315 
1R8,979 
203,836 
246,436 
(4) 
Figure in Col. 3 
as percentage 
of total of 
431 568 
0.51 
2.97 
3.60 
4.28 
6.68 
7.22 
11.99 
12 . 23 
12.32 
12.48 
12.73 
12.81 
12.83 
13 .09 
13.13 
13.56 
13. 71 
13.93 
15.55 
16.06 
16 . 06 
16.46 
20.38 
20.64 
20.76 
21.05 
21. 13 
22.21 
22 .60 
22.72 
22 . 81 
23 .38 
24 .66 
26.37 
27.76 
2F\.32 
29 .92 
31.39 
32.60 
33 . 68 
36.00 
36.23 
38.00 
38.53 
~8.71 
39. 12 
39.87 
41.11 
41.24 
42 . 74 
42.'30 
43 . 01 
43. 40 
43.79 
47.23 
57.10 
Table 13 continued ..• ~ 
w 
w 
(1) 
Number!! INDUSTRY 
Diverti bility Indexl!J 
(Index of ma~Pinal 
excess costs ) 
5 
87 
59 
18 
84 
121 
90 
76 
77 
81 
119 
1 
38 
111 
27 
113 
89 
53 
70 
99 
101 
31 
66 
110 
96 
92 
103 
128 
95 
14 
79 
106 
9 
72 
75 
73 
3 
8 
55 
17 
4 
94 
83 
71 
16 
24 
91 
74 
15 
11 
61 
93 
86 
82 
Ice cream and ices 
Plaster and other composite boards 
Other wooden products (except furniture) 
Flavouring essences 
Bricks and tiles (clay) , earthenware and pottery 
Musical instruments 
Marble, stone, slate, etc. 
Soap and candles 
Paints, varnishes, lacquers and distemper 
Other chemical industries 
Diamond cutting and polishing 
Preparation and preservation of meat 
Felt, padding, wadding, etc. 
Manufacture, assembling and repair of bicycles 
Beer, Native beer and malt 
Blacksmithing 
Lime works 
Sawmills, carpentry and joinery 
Rubber products 
Cables, fencing wire and wire products 
Agricultural Machinery 
Cotton ginning, fibre working, dyeine of wool, etc. 
Tanneries and fellmongering 
Railroad equipment 
Headed and threaded articles 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Industrial, mining and construction machinery 
Wattle bark grinding 
Metal pipes 
Balanced animal feeds 
Disinfectants, insecticides, etc. 
Insulated cables and wires 
Flour and grain mills, including macaroni, etc. 
Tanning extract 
Crude oil-cake and meal, etc. 
Explosives and carbide 
Butter and cheese 
Rock lobster, fish preserving and other fish products 
Wood carving, wood turning, etc. 
Compound cooking fa t s 
Condensed milk and milk powder 
Smelting and refining of non-ferrous metals 
Coke ( including coal gas), bituminous and allied emulsions 
Fertilisers 
Bonemilling and bloodmeal 
Yeast 
Crushed stone 
Other basic industrial chemicals 
Chaff cutting, compressed fodder, lucerne, meal m)llinR 
Sugar mills and refineries (including syrup) 
Paper and paper board 
Iron and steel, etc . 
Cement 
Motor and other spirits for fuel, lubricating oils and greases 
I 
M See statistical appendix to this chapter. 
!!.liE Column 
Column 
. 013 . 368 
.013 679 
.013 824 
.013 888 
. 013 924 
.013 939 
.Cl4 285 
.014 792 
.015 060 
. 015 204 
. 015 217 
.015 566 
.015 813 
.016 113 
.016 483 
.016 666 
.016 666 
.016 666 
.017 733 
. 018 396 
.018 644 
.019 004 
.019 213 
.019 337 
.Cl9 895 
.020 320 
. 021 176 
.022 815 
.023 380 
.023 589 
.024 043 
. 024 607 
. 024 752 
. 025 252 
.025 603 
.026 153 
. 026 162 
.028 078 
.029 126 
. 030 000 
.030 120 
.033 157 
.039 583 
.040 816 
. 042 081 
.050 028 
.054 589 
.061 149 
.067 661 
.083 582 
.104 494 
.no 322 
.159 756 
.347 244 
+ Industrial Census 1960-61, Special Report No. 257 . 
++ Omitting residentiary activities shown in parentheses. 
(2) 
Employment+ 
1960- 61 
(2 ,085) 
3,715 
(1,119) 
313 
(26,1505) 
1,102 
(2,109) 
4,893 
(4,063) 
3,039 
956 
(3,804) 
2 , 585 
1,040 
(3 ' 393) 
(1 ,037) 
2,598 
(27,941) 
4,969 
5,394 
5,124 
453 
2,538 
4,952 
2,068 
(2,124 ) 
23,843 
469 
7,506 
(2 ,427) 
1,978 
2 ,868 
(13,924) 
1,127 
1,852 
7,549 
(3,445) 
4,373 
( 179) 
2,664 
1 ,799 
6,979 
1,355 
3,877 
79 
434 
(3, 638) 
7,369 
250 
ll,546 
8,237 
33,296 
4,200 
5,843 
.TABLE 33 - continued 
( 3) 
Accumulated++ 
Total 
Employmen t 
1960- 61 
250 , 151 
250 , 464 
251,566 
256 ,459 
259, 498 
260 ,454 
263 ,0~9 
264, 079 
266,677 
271,646 
277,040 
282,164 
282,617 
285,155 
290,107 
297,175 
316,018 
316,487 
323,993 
325,971 
328,839 
329,961) 
331 ,818 
339 , 367 
343,740 
346,404 
348,203 
355 ,082 
356,437 
360,314 
360,393 
31l0,827 
36!3,196 
368,44 6 
379,992 
38~,229 
421,5!35 
425,725 
431,568 
( 4) 
Figure in Col. 3 
as percentage 
of total of 
431 568 
57.97 
58.04 
58.29 
59.42 
60.13 
60.35 
60.95 
61. 20 
61.79 
62.94 
64 .19 
65 .38 
65.49 
66.07 
67.22 
68.86 
?3.23 
73.32 
75.07 
75.53 
76.20 
76.46 
76.89 
78 .64 
79.65 
80.27 
80.68 
82 .28 
82.59 
83.49 
83.51 
83.62 
R5.32 
~5.3!3 
A"l.05 
89.96 
97. 69 
98.65 
100.00 
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dispersed activities which we isolated in the pr6'V1o-u.a section are 
includ..ed in the list but. aa in Table 23 above. they appear in paren-
thc:si& to iadicate that regardlesa of their divertibility index they cannot 
be coneide~ed for diversion. 
It is found in 'lable 33 that all o! the 48 light industries listed 
in. Table 32 ;tr amongst the 57 indu• t.rie4 ( xclu.ding the widely diapened 
oues) with the moat favourable {lowest) d~ve:rtibility indexes. The order 
m which th~ 48 light induotriea appear, how ver, is rather diff~rcnt 
from &at o! Table 32. As we should have expected in view o! ou.r ear-
lier remarks. the tobacco sector h&a riaen on the scale comp rtd with 
the earJ.il'o.r ranking. as have certain brant;;hes of the w•aring app rel 
sector like ladi s h&Ddbags, tie&, m~a nd boys hats and caps. dlle to 
their oxtromc tUgbtness•. Plywood however which shows up better than 
any oth~r induatry in terme of potential J.abol!r coat savings. drops well 
down the .list in th 1\ew ranking bec-ause of ita rel tively high horee-
powcr p6r workor ratio. 
'rhe di vertib~lity irldeY of any induatry '{ relative to that of 1.ny 
otbor industry Y m:~.y b<.. :regarded as showing the marginal xcess private 
cost of <!everting employm nt in induotry .{ to tho border areas relative 
tothc correaponding excess cost for Y. 'lhe valu~ of this relationship 
is that even though we do not give the ex~cted marginal cxceas private 
costs !or each induatry in beolute te~ms, if we obtained information of 
the latter sot't for a few individual sectors, it wvuld t.:.&ble us to g uae 
roughly the. maanitude of mugi.nal excess p:rivatecoats for s etors for 
~hich such information was not available. It appears from lable 33 
that the marginal t.:!XCess private cost of diverted employma."lt in t:~e 
1 h aded and threaded articles' icdustry (with an ind.e.x of 199) hr n..!arly 
twice a great as 41 tsw eta and chocolates' (102). and slightly mor~ 
than twice as great it .. the latter as in 'button•, buck!t:& etc- 1 ( 19). '!hiD. 
relationship c at: b~ ~d to obtain some idea of the rate at whlch the 
marginal excess private coats o! diverthlg employmet.t riae as th\; 
a~l~rag ~ anli'J.ttal volume of diverted border area~ employment is h1crcased. 
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In trable 33 the volume of employmmt in each of the 129 
sectors in 1960·61 ia shown, together with the corresponding cum· 
ulative errployment figure. For instanceo the cumulative total of 
54, 950 in the •tr vel gooda' row is the eum of errploymmt in the trave l 
goode aector and in all the sectors (except thoee in parenthesis) listed 
above it. The cunulative total in each row can be expreaaed as a 
percentage of total nanufacturing employment of 431, 568 in all sec-
tors listed (again excluding thoac in parentheai•l· The aecon"lpanying 
graph has been obtained by plotting the c:Uvcrtibillty index in Column 
( 1) of Table 33 agM11et the eum1lative enployl'l2nt percentage in 
Column (4). For convenience all the divertibility endexes given in 
Table 33 have been nultiplied by J.o. 000 in the graph and throughout 
the ensuing discu•aion. Thus in the graph the divertibllity index 
ranges from 8 in the case of furriers at the top of the liat to 1598 
for ' cermnt' . The index !or 'n:otor and other spirits for fuel etc. 1 
of 3492 is eo. much larger than any other that it is not shown on the 
graph. As the discusaion below mows we nny reaaonably regard 
the curve obtained in thb wa.y as indic ating the relationship between 
the marginal excess private coato of diversion and the percentage 
of additional e!'l'ployment which is diverted. 
In 1960 .. 61 tho total volum! of etq)loyrnmt in all the industries 
listed in Table 33, including those, in parantheaie, was 623, 259. 
Manufacturing enploy.rrent as a whole inc ~uding those sectors :rrentioned 
i.. Thic figure does not include other food industries, other clothing 
tyres and tubea, seat covers, etc~ (rrotor vehiclea), retreading, 
:.:tprings etc. , batteries, manufacture and repair of rrotor vehicles, 
caravans trailers etc., motor vehicle parte and acc~asories, 
autorrotive engineering workohops, autoxmtive electricians, nanu-
facture and repair of radiatore, of panel beaters and spray painters, 
or personal services (laundriea etc). In 1960-61 en'J)loymt".nt 
in these sectors amounted to about 30 tbouaand. 
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in the footnote on the preceding page increased by 39. 95 per cent 
between ~eptember 1960 and June 1966. 1 At the time of writing 
a detailed analysis of the latter figure into the various sub-groups 
is not available, but it seems safe to aaeume that employment in 
the industries listed in Table 33 grew at approximately the same rate, 
since they comp rise the bulk of total m anufacturing employment. 
, ,n thh assun'lption employment in the industries listed would h a v e 
h~creaeed by approxima tely 250, 98 9 between beptember 1960 and 
June 1966, that is, at an verage an.nunl rAte of 43, 650. 2 But 
part of this increase was in those ubiquitous, residentiary and 
other widely dispersed activities appearing i:a parenthesis in Table 
33. :In 1962-63 these industries con tributed Z8. 9 per cent3 of 
employment in industrie s liated in "fable 33. If these residentia ry 
activities had contributed thie same proportion of the increase in 
employment in thE> listed in dustries, their average annual contribution 
to the in crease of 43,650 calculated above, would have been 12, 615, and 
the average annual increase in. the non-residentiary activities listed 
would thus have been 31, 0 35. l.et us a ssumf!!, however, in order to 
put the position in a slightly more f a vour a ble light from the P"int of 
view of the potential volume of divertible employment in this period, 
tha t res identiary activities contributedunly about lA per cent of the 
increase in employmeut between l96f and 1966. In thb case, the 
average annual increase it1 employrrtent in the non- r traidentiary 
3ctivities listed i ra. Table 33 would have been about 33, 051 between . 
1. Manufa cturing errployment in &eptcmber 196(J was 688, a"n (See 
bt ati stical Year Book 1964", p. ~- -7 and explanatory note on p. 
:t.l-69) and iu June 1966 was 963, 8&0 (Bulletin of St atistico, :Juarter 
Fnding , ~.arch 1968, Tabl e B -1 and expl anatory note p . 35). 
2. The average annual increa se in errploy~ut i n the industries not 
included i n Table 33 would thus have been about 4, 168 . 
3. Based on dat.'l in Statietical Year Book 1966, pp. ~- ~ 3C to :.V • 3 7 . 
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1960 and 1966. This appears to be the maximum amount of rrtrm-
ufacturing erq>loyment which night have beeti considered for d iversion 
i.u the period 1960 to 1966. excluding the sectors mentioned iu the 
footnote on the preceding page. 1 
Let us further ae sume !or the rroment that the proportionate 
contribution• of each tnknu!acturing sector to the total avernge annual 
increase in employrrent of 33, 051 over the period, was the aarre as its 
proportionate contribution to total mmufacturing enploymc.nt in 1960 -
61 . As we shall see, this assumption, like another which is discussed 
in the next two paragraphs, tends to ur.derstate the marginal excess 
costa of diverting industries to the border areas and needs to be 
modified later on, but for the time being it is convenient to p roceed 
on this basis. We may then regard the accompanying graph as in~ 
dicating the way in which the marginal exc:esa private costs of divert~ 
ing enployr.rel'.tt to the border areas rise aa the diverted proportion of 
the average annual incre ase in ernployn1ent rises. In the period under 
consideration, 1960 to 1966, this average annual increase is equal 
to 33, 051, but the functional relationship depi cted in the graph and 
Tba le 33 nay equally well be applied to any e~-pected future annual 
increase in manufacturb1.g ertploy~:nt in non · residentia ry rnwufae-
turing industry. Though the functional relationehip nny, of course. 
change over time with changes in the structure of znmufacturing 
indust ry and changes in fundamental rmrket cunditions. evidenc~ 
presented below suggests that the structure of manufacturing indus-
try is changing L"l such a way aa to raise the marginal excess private 
costs of divorsion rather than lower thern. 
1. Since additiot~al errployment in. the latter sectors was relati vely 
sr.r1all and the industries iswolved. mainly the r.rotor vehicle 
industry, do not appe?-a" to be easily divertible to border areas. 
the 
their omission does not detract from ;ensuing argurrent. 
In order to nininise the total exce~s private costs of any 
particular average annual volume of diverted enployrnmt, we should 
according to this analysis divert employnent in the industry at the top 
of the liat until the marginal excess private costs or doing s.o is equal 
to the rnl.rgir,al exr4!ss private cost ':){ diverting employment iu the i.."'l-
dustry listed immediately below it; then the diversion of employment 
in the latter should be carried to the point at which the rmrginal excess 
private cost of doing eo ia equal to the corresponding costs in the in-
dustry third 011 the liot; and so on, untU the desired total average A.nnua.l 
increase is achieved. In other words, though the 1nu•ginal excess 
private costs of diverting e.r:rployment in the industry at the top of the 
list may be lower than in the next sector, up to a point, the marginal 
excess costs of diverting the entire annual increase in the top industry 
may e"ceed the corresponding coste of diverting a part of the average 
annual increase in enploym.mt in the industry immediately below it. 
lneeed, it see~ that for most coneecutive pairs of industries this is 
almoat certain to be the case. For instance the Inlrginal excess private 
costs of diverging the whole of any additiorJ. to ernplo~nt in the 'mens 
and boys clothing' sector is bound to exceed the rrarginal excess coste 
of diverting a snull proportion of the 'sweets and chocolates' sector, 
even though the for~r has a divertibility index of 13. ~ and the latter 
an index of 101. 6. 
There does not eeem to be any way in which this aspect of 
'dininiehing returns' can be taken into account in the present analysis. 
For simplicity's sake, therefore, we shall assutne, for the moment, 
that the tn!rginal excess private costa of diverting errployment in a 
particular industry are constant. The l"l'llrginal excess private costs 
o£ diverting employment will, therefore, rise only because, given the 
limited annual addition to employment in each sector, industries lesa 
and lees suitable for diversion to bot-der areas have to be brought within 
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the ac:ope of decentraliaation. policy. •• the seal~ of the desired 
annual volume of diverted employm~nt is Jncreued. \\ e assume, then, 
that to minimise coats, all the additional employment in the moat 
eaeily divertible ind\leuy at the top of the list ia divert c:1; plus all 
the additional employm~nt in tJH iD.duatry immediately below it; and 
so on. until the d~•lred a.verage annual in.crea.ae in diverted employ-
ment is acb.b~ved .. 
C.n tbeae u.sumptiona the graph deph:ta thn way ill which th~ 
marginal excess private coats of divertina manufacturing employm«mt 
rtae a• the div~rted percentaae of tb average annual increa.ae of 
:n, 051 rises... The reaults may be .eurnmariaed. aa in 1abl~ 34 below. 
Table 34 • 
.Relatlon.s~ip between Percentage of ..\dd!tional l..-1anufa£!!.!ring 
F..mplo'ymeut; Vivert!_4 and the DivertibUity Index 
Pe-r~entae of 
~ddit~,.·{O!\e 
Diverted 
10.0 
zo.o 
30 .. 0 
40 .. 0 
so.o 
60.0 
70.0 
80.6 
90. 0 
100. 0 
of th<3 Marg!nal Seftor. 
r UMOOl" of rivertibility 
J oba Diverted ' Index of 
(Baaed on annual • fa.rfzinpl Sector 
increase of 33, 051) '!lldex ~f 
3, 305 
6.610 
9,915 
13., z~o 
16, sa6 
19.831 
23 .. 136 
Z6,44l 
29,746 
33.051 
~ targinal r:xce•• 
F'rivate (;oats) .. 
13.8 
44.9 
84 .. 9 
114 .. 9 
131.6 
15G.b 
211~8 
300. 0 
1044. 9 
3.72 •• 
4. ame of 
.. ~trs!P&! 
Seetgr. 
t iverted. 
4omena and 
girl• clothing. 
noot and shoe 
factor .. ea. 
Jam. canned. 
fruit.- etc. 
Dl•tUleries and 
wineri a .. 
All other 
metal products. 
()thcl' cb<tmical 
indu•trie& .. 
lncilatria.l, mining 
and conatrw."tion 
machinery. 
Compound 
cooking fat•. 
Paper and 
paperboard 
Motor and other 
apirita etc. 
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The table •howe that the difficulty (8ftd hence the etxceea cost) 
involved in diverting U:ldustrioa. at firat increa.eee more than in pro• 
portion to the perce.ntaae of the total averAge annual increase in em• 
ployment wbic:h i8 divert d. Fo2' in&tance m order to divert 10 .. 0 
per cent of the 33. OSl total increaae in employment it ia nec:•••ary 
to ao down the liat only •• far u tbe'wornen•s and gbla clothing• 
aector whi~h hae a divortibility index of 13 .. s. U the entbe increase 
in the aectora Uete4 down to thia one are diverted. 1f tho divened 
percentage ia doubled to ZO. o. howev-er. it i• aeceeory to go down 
aa far •• the '"boot and aboe factories' aet:tor which baa a Giveriibility 
index of ""· 9, more than three time• aa large •• that of •women' • anci 
girl'• clothinJ'• Aa the diverted percentage inc::reuea by half from 
20. 0 to 30 .. 0 th divertibllity index almoat double• from 44. 9 to s•. 9. 
Thue th• divcrtibility index (which ia directly related to the marginal 
exceaa private co•t• o£ diveraion) ri•e• quite rapidly as tho diverted 
percent..ge ot employm~nt ia inereased. 
Div-..rting employme11t in th clothmg incbuJtry is a very much 
eaaier propo•ition than in the boot and shoe m.anufa.ctu.ring iruiutttry, 
and the c~ce•• private c:osta of diverting all additional employment in 
th latter would doubtleas be very con~~i«ic)rablo in baolute terms • 
.. able 34 a.bowa tba.t th~ marginal exce•• private coat.t of diverting 
employmeat in the boot and shoe seetor are three time• as great aa 
in tho women's ancl airl's clothing •ector. To reach a diverted p r• 
centage of 50. 0 a good proportion of the luge 'all other metl&l protluc:ta • 
a ctor would have to be divert•~ 1 even il all additional employment in 
all the indue triea listed above 'all other m•tal products' were diverted 
as well. Toe r:na.rg!na.l exc:eaa private cost of reaching thi• level would, 
therefore. probably oo Yery large in absolute term• and i• CC\rt&inly 
much higher than at a l<.vel at which it is atill poasible to C!<mccmtratc 
to a great extent on diver~ing employment in varioua branchea of thti 
.clothing uci textile• indu..triea. ror inatanc if 10 per cent of ad-
t.Utioual employment w re diverted thia could. under our p.roaeot as· 
•umptione, be achieved almoat ntirely by divel'ting employment in th 
1. '.fha can be- seen by e~mining Table 3l. 
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cl~thing induatry aa Table 33 ahowa. The next 10 per cent of 
diverted employment 'Would incorporate additional branchoa of tb 
clothing industry, but other aectora. apart from clothing. wo\lld alao 
have to be div rted so that exceaa coste would begin to riae fairly 
atceply .. 
Tincler tbe uawnptions we have made then the graph and Tables 
33 and .34 may be regarded aa showing the 'supply achedul4;;.' wtdch 
faced tJ:ae rje:rmanent Committee in ita capacity as a 'buyer' of border 
area.a employment in the. period. 1959-60 to 1965-66. Table 34, for 
instance. show. that if they had diverted SO. 0 per cent or the average 
a.~ual increaee in tot4ll manufacturing -employment be.twe n 1959-60 
and 1965-66 the index of marginal excess private costa (divertibility 
mdez) would have be n alm.o8t 10 times a.e gr at as m the 'women's 
and airl's clothing• intiuatry, and that at this r~lative cost the average 
&1'\ftUal volum of div.-rted mploymcnt would have been 16, 516. 
'l'berc are. however, certain roaaoa• to believe that the graph 
and tab!ea 3.3 and lot con.aiderably underatat tllc n-.arginal ex<:eae 
private coats invc.lved in diverting lillY particular percentage of the 
il.u:rease in total rna..-.ufa.cturing employanent. ·. b·•tly. our list in-
cludes in fairly favovable poaitions sectors like 1saltworka1 and. 
tdiatUleriea and wineries', which ~aped elimination in the pr ceding 
section but which are el arly complet~ly placebound. Also. though 
n ... ,.t aa stronaly tied to particular natuzol re.ourc:ea. the e.lficiency o£ a 
aC"ctor lik~ 'optical aad photographic goods' would obviously he rioua-
ly in'lpair d if diverted from the rnajoz market centl'es. 'lhea~ are 
obvious case• but others like 'el ctdcal macltinery and motors'. and 
a. we have already note<.\, 'all other met&l pt"Gducta1 ~ also to 
great extent tied to the m:Ajor ma.rl~cta. 
Secondly. our aasu.-nption that the marg!nal excess private c:oata 
in ea.ch •ector arc c:onatant. •o that we would divert the whole of the 
annual employment increase in the industry at dK top of &he list in 
'!'able 33. then one below it, and eo on. olwiou.aly understates tb~;. rate 
at which excess. c:oata rise as tba percentage of diverted employment 
incrt:a.aea. It is etear .. for instance, that the entire $m1ual increase 
in c.:.mplo-yment in the textUee induetry could not be diverted unl. as all 
the expanding textilee firms already established outside the border 
areae either shifted lock stocl~ and barrel to the border areast or 
establi$hed branch plants in those areas. In fact, then, efforttl to 
divert employment would have to be confined. in the main. t~new 
I 
firms. and since the additional employment generated by these is 
only part of the total increase. it would probably be an extremely 
difficult task to divert sn per cent of thifl total increase. l Thus, to 
have diverted 50.0 per cent of 33,051 additional jobs. that ie 16, 526 
jobs. we should probably have bad to go considerably further down the 
list of industries, intervening in more and more unsuitable industries . 
than the estimate based on our assumptions suggests.. Thou~h we do 
not possess adequate data about the absolute s ize of marginal excess 
private costs:. it appears from the sort of industries further down the 
list suggests that the costa would probably be extremely bigb. 
Furthermore. it hould be noted that some increase in border 
areas employment takes plnee without Government intervention and, 
as our discuSJsion in chapter 4 showed~ the bol'der areas employed 12. 2 
per cent of the industrial labour force in 1959-6(). The diversion of 
industries involves persuading firms to establish themselves in the 
border areas when they would not otherwise have done so. That 
employment in each sector which would have arisen spontaneously in 
the border areas ist therefore, by definition not divertibley so that to 
divert any particular percentage of the total average annual increase 
in manufacturing employment involves bringing within the scope of 
planned decentralisation etillless suitable industl'ie.e than Table 33 
suggeots .. 
Thirdly, it seems that the beaviel' industries. appearing lower 
down t.he list of secto1·s in Table 33. are growing more rapidly than 
those higher up the list. Table 35 below gives the percentage incre•ue 
in employment between 1956-57 and 1962.-63 in industries grouped 
according to the value of their c.Hvertibility indexes. 
1. See chapter 10 below for a fuller discussion of this issue. 
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Table 35 
T"lercentaae Increas e in Employment between 
1956-57 and 1962-63 in Manufacturing Industries Classified 
According to Divertibility Index 
Divertibility: 
index 
"':roportionate 
Contribution of Industries 
in Group to ·rota! 
P ercentage increase 
ia Bmployment 
1956 ... 57 to 1962-63 
8. 1 - 44.9 
49. n. 111.7 
114. 9 ·~ 152.0 
152. z .. 300.1) 
Manufacturina Employment 
in l%fl-61 
20.4 
19.5 
20 .. 2 
20.2 
20.7 
za.s 
29.2 
20.9 
3tH. Z -3472.4 19. 7 27.9 
The figure& in this table relate to all tl:le tJectoro listed 
in Table 33 excluding the widely dispers ed ones which 
appear in parenthesis. The percentage increases in 
employment are derived f!"om figures in Industrial Cens u s 
1956-57 (Special Report No. 240) and Statis tical Year Book 
1966, pp. M-30 to M-37. 
The s ectors with diver tibility indexes between 114. 9 and 3472. 4 
(tha t i s the less easily divertible indus tries), which contributed 60 . 1 
per cent of employment in the manufacturing s ectors under consideration 
in 1960-61, g r ew more rapidly than the industries with divertibility 
indexe below 114. 9 (that i s the industries involving smaller margina l 
exceeA coa t s of divel'sion). It appears, therefor e , that the ase;umption 
made above that incr e aae e in employment between 1959- 6" a nd 1965-66 
wer e dis tributed between individual s ectors in exactly the s ame pro-
portions as wae total employment in 1960-61 , understates the marginal 
excess private cost~ of diverting any p rticular per centage of the 
averaqe annual increase in manufacturing employment. 
T he tendency for the less e asily divertible industrie& t o g row more 
r apidly than the others is evident alao from s tatistics on the rate of 
growth in industr ial production between 1957 and 1965 a s given in T a ble 36. 
Table Jb. 
lnde-'C of the Phyaieal Volume of Industri,al Production 1965. 
and the Divertibility of Certain Major Industrial Sectors 
Name of Sector Inde;< v, eight Divert1bill!;y !ndelf 
(1956-57= 100) 0965). o£ .lajor Parts o! Sector 
Productt of petroleum 
and coal 311.0 2.40 3 7?,..4 
Transport equipment l58. 1 4.SO Not available 
Textiles 250. 1 5.00 32. 9, 88. 4, lZ8. 4 
Miscellaneous ll8.6 2.40 •• 
T'ulp, paper and paperboard 264.6 2.46 1044.9 
P rinting 210.2 4.00 Not div~rtible 
Electrical machinery 202.7 4.70 118.0 
Bate metals 199.8 8.70 1103. 2 
Metal products 187.7 9.60 131.6 
Machinery 184.0 5. 40 211.& 
Chemical& 179.4 9.10 147. 9, 261. 5 
408.2,613.5 
l\on-motaUic mineral products 177. 9 s. 90 1597. 6 and not divertible 
Wood products 1. 6.3 Z.?.O l\ot divertible 
Clothing 144.4 8.30 13. Z and 13. 8 
Food 142~ 0 14.30 Wide range 
rtubber 137.5 2.60 177.3 
F urniture 134. 1 1. 90 Not divc rtible 
Leathor 118.9 • 5{) 192.! 
Souree: Baae d on information contained in Statistical Year Book, pp. l' 1·49 and M-50. 
w 
·~ 0" 
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'l:hese sectors, which in 196S had a combined weight of 93. 96, 
are arranged in descending order of the rate of growth of industrial 
production. It is worth noting that generally the most rapidly growing 
sectors are the least easily divertible, that is, have the highest dive:r-
tibility indexes. "l'be clothing industry, the largest of the relatively 
easily divertible industries, baa in recent years been the slowest growing 
of all the significant manufacturing sectors apart from food. (. £ the 
ligbtish industries only the rate of growth of textiles compares favour-
ably with that of the fat:Jtest growing sectors. h t even within this 
•ector only the hosiery and other knitted clothing branch had a par-
ticularly low divertibility hide" (3l. 9) and the largest sector 'spinning 
weaving and finishing of other woollen products' bad a divertibility 
index ( 128. 4) which was high relative to clothing. The textiles industry 
is by no means completely footloose. For the rest the most significant 
of the fast growing sectors like products of petroleum and coal. pulp 
and paper, base metals electrical machirtery, machinery, and chemicals 
have high divertibility indexes, which suggests that the costs of diverting 
them would be extremely high. The same probably holds for the trans-
par t equipment industry, though the writer bas not been able to obtain 
the information necessary to calculate the dive rtibUity index for this 
industry. 
Changes in the divertibility of manufacturi.l).g industry as a whole 
clearly depends on the relative rates of growth of ir1dustries with 
favourable and unfavourable div rtibility uuiexes. 'l'hc. figures give 1 
in Tables 35 and 36. and our diacusaion of them. suggest that th.o diver-
tibility of manufacturing industry as a whole is tending to decrease, 
and that the ability of the Government to divert any particular volume 
of additional industrial production is not improving with tll.e passage of 
time. 
Generally. th n. the assumpti(.ms made in deriving the graphical 
relationship between the d ivertibility of industries and the percentage 
of total employment divertc•d, and in compiling Table 34, seern to put 
the prospecta for government intervention in a considerably more favour-
able light than is actually warranted. Gnce they are removed, as we 
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have seen. the gen ral impression gained from the at:.a.l} .. eis that the 
marginal axc"os private cost of div~rt.Wg industries ria s steeply. 
is reinforced r4ther than weaken d. 'fhe '•upply curve' dCJpicted in 
our graph tend$ to understate the marginal xcc58 private coet o( 
div~rting any particular percentage of increased manufacturing em• 
ploym.ent:. 
In this connection too. there is the fact noted eadier that the exceas 
co•to in11olved in divertiug iradustrieo depend on the particular location 
cboeen by the Government. 'l'b• excess costa of diverting industri 
from Pretori to l.,oaslyn or fron1 !'ur ban to ,.am.rna.radale ar lik ly 
tQ be rel.ativ ly •mall. ""t h~ divcrei•'>n of indu.otri a from any of the 
ajor induatrial areas to border areas in thE ~isk1o.1i. which are le • 
wdt Gituated in rel-ation to tbe larger market concentratiOl\e a.: d to 9U.ppli s 
of primary r aw .tr.ateri ls. is likely to be rather n•ore coatly. Thu.e the 
greater th proportion of e ployment dh•cned to centres mor remote 
from the metropolitan are~s. th . lT'ore stee{'ly will our 'supply curve • 
rise. Any tendency to cone ntrate to a greater d¢gr<:;~ o:a ~h ar~as in 
tbt;; futur~. therefore. will tend to 111aqnify the coste of plaJ.mc<l dece -
tralieation. 
rinally, it must be vn)phnaicec1. that the relationship eat blisbed 
above between the diverted perecntag of ~ddition~..l l.ldustr.ial cm-
ploy-ln(lnt ref -rs only to eett&in manufacturir'g sectors. Aa waa men• 
tioned it "«:lude all the rc::•identi ry and wid•ly di&Pf:r& d activiti...:s 
liatod in ') .\lhl< 31. all bl" ncb s of the motor 'Vtt-bicl induatry d th 
peraon.al •ervicBB sector. 11~ n1arginal ex~ •• private coats of divor-
ting a ,certain percentage of tDtal manu£ cturing etr1ployment ia, thereforf!, 
gr ter &ban that of div rting thE- sam~ pere.ntage of cmploym .nt in tbe 
h.du•tri ·a included in our calculation .. rurthern'Ore. if v.re were c:on• 
cerned with tho diver ion of a particular percentage of all secondary 
industry the construction and cl ctricity sectors have to be included. GUd 
th ae sectors an not d.ivertlb~e. 
lnter•induatrx J elation•hip& and t!te I iv~rti.bility of Industries. 
1'he interdepend nee between activities may tend either to increas 
or de.creaa th~ costa of div rting variou indu•tri a to tu border areas. 
lt is possible that th ranking giveu abov.::, whlch is vosentially derived 
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fron1 a ae.ri-C;a of rather abbreviated industry by induatry comparative 
coat atudiea would be altered if inter-indu•try rela.tionabipe were 
taken into account .. 
ln some caaea a common location with plants within the oamc 
induatry is fo\lnd to be most ec:onondeal bee us~ of. for inatance, apec:ial 
fac:ilitiea aud services, i."lcludi11g a..ltillod labour, and advice shared 
in commGn. 'Theee induatdea. the~e!ore. tend to be highly loc:aliat:d.t 
and are often charac:teris d by high localiaation coeffic:ien.ta. 
U an .i.ltduat.ry is hiahly localised at prcaent because of atrong 
interdependence between firma within it hha.t ia, becau&<e of aignitlcan.t 
external economiee) it may therefere be diUicult to induce sinal• new 
plants to establieh in areaa outside of thoe-o in which the main concen-
tration already exi&te. In auch 'a• s if dt:contraliaation ie to succeed 
a draatic: wholeaal traneference o:f a nu:m~r of oxiating planu in the 
industry tnay be nece•eary, eo that the industry remain• highly localie(;c4 
but in a difierent region. 
In tb.e highly industrialised countries of the world thcrt: are aeveral 
striking example; a of extremely localiaed induatriea e. g. the textileo 
ia.duatry of Lancas ire and Chesbir.e~ the m tal industries of Birmingham 
il\ tbo United } .. ingdom and the manufacturing belt of the l;nited States, 
tb clothing induatry oft· w York. L01adon and Paris, the footwear in• 
duatry ot t .. ew naland, and the chemicala induatdea o! ~ w York and 
other ~dddle Atlantic State& of tho tJnit«d .;tates • 
... I'bus in the South t'drict&n c:lothing industry, which ia apparently 
one of tb<l moet eaaUy divertiblc. manufacturing indu tries • gav. ed in 
terms of lightnesa. labour iutensity and type of labour, tl1ero aeem to 
have been certain irnl'OrJant advantage• .in beiDg concentrated in one or 
two large centres. 'l'be a.gglom ration •conomies which r e•ult in the 
marked r•gional coucentration of the clothing ind.uetry, tend at leaet in 
part to offaet the advantages of cb.eap labour in the J:Ur&l a.r•••· 
r:.xternal ecot\Omios, however. n1ay alao play <l. part in industries 
for which the localisation coefficient is relatively small. Apart from 
planta within th~ aa..mo industry tendiDg to ae k a commot~ location due 
to the external economies this re&ultG in. plants in out... inGuatry may oo 
atrongl y Hnktz.d to producers in othc·r induatrica. Thu.e evttn induatriea 
which appear to be easily divertible in t rms of the criteria uaed in the 
::so 
previous section. may be prevented £ro.rD developing in tbe border 
areas bec:auae of strong linkage to produc~r• in the other inuustriea. 
and the latter may be tied to markets or matet>ial• m the mtotropolitan 
area e. 
It ia poaaible then, that in some cues in&.letry by industry com• 
parative coat atudiea which do not take into account inter-in.duatry re-
lationship• \Uldcratate the marginal exceaa private coats of diversion. 
On the other band. aa we showed in chapter s. tl1e:te aro some inciuat:rlea 
which may eeem unsuitable for eatabHalunent in the borde:r area.e when 
considered individually, but which, wb combined with other activities 
may appear to be suitable. Incorporation of inter- indwttry nlationabips 
into the analyaia may, therefore, tend -rither to increaae or d c reaae. 
the tnarginal xceaa private coats of diverting a particular industry, •• 
compared •Hh calculations which neglect the• relationabipa.. But 
there does not •• m to be any way of telUne whether the bu:orporatiou 
of iote1'•indu•try relationvhip• tends •yate.matically to raiae or lower 
the cedta of diverting manufact\lring industries. Thue we cannot eay 
wh ther the curve tlepicting the relation•hip between the diverted per• 
c:e&tage oi additional 4\tnployment ie raind or lo\Yered, made ate per 
or flatter wher-e inter-induetry r~lation8hlpe are taken into account. 
lhere does not. however. appear to be aay na~n wby it should sys• 
tematically hav one elfec:t or another on the mar&inal e.•c:e•• coat• 
of diVerting any particular percentage of additional employment. 
~arg~al t xcese boeial Costs. 
Because of our inability to quantify extern-al eUecta the diacu•sion 
of this ehapteJ' haa been concentrated on the private rather than social 
n)a:r-ginal excess costs o~ diverting manufacturing employment. 1n 
terms of the diagram presented in chapter 6 we have attempted to 
develop an index of the disparity between PS 1, and SS rather than 
lw!tweeu F'Sr and ST. e::xcept thAt in the graph given in this chapter. 
employment ia measured on the horizontal axis rather than ir~duetri41 
production. '!he p riva.te excess marginal coats may exceed the social 
351 
costa if there are poaitive external eff~cta a.aaoeiated with border 
a.reaa induatrial p.:·t>duction. 1-.ow much lower or higher the curve of 
marginal social exceaa costa will be we cannot say until the external 
effects have been isolated and measured. but aa w have emphaaiaed there 
ia no clear evidence that the disparity between private and soci&l excess 
coats is significant. hateve:r the caae may be in this regarcl. how-
ver. a ate•ply rising marginal exceaa private coat curve implies a 
corrcapondingly ate~ply rising exceas aocial coat curve. I: or. there 
ia no rea~n to believe that the net external conomiea as.aciate.d with 
incluatrialiaation in the border areas ar proportio.natDly greater per 
unit of employment in thos industries in which the exceaa private coats 
of diveraion are great than in those in which they are &mall. Thus our 
present analyaia euggeata that the marginal cxcesa social costa of diver-
ting :rnploym~nt &lao rise sharply as the volume of diverted ~mploy.D"ent 
increaaee. 
~clu~ r~epnarka. 
1'he r~aults obtain d provide .additional aupport for the following 
viewJ stated by Hutch.ieon: 
"It se•m• uncertain juet how far there ia diminishing social 
utility or welfare from the intensive fulfillment of the varioua obj~ctivea 
of polic:iea. But there are dearly~ over certain relevant rang a, in· 
creasing opportunity coats - in terms of foregoing other objf"Ctives -
of fulfilling one particular objtt(:tive more intensively. At lower levels 
of fulfillment objectives may be compatible or complementary. "3ut 
1 
opportunity costa oft n eeem to riae eha-rply at th-e higher 1 velan. 
It cannot be expected that the ranking of indu•tri~• givon in 
Table 33 will reflect p«.rfectly the correct ordering o! aector& in terms 
of the ease or difficulty with which they may be tiivet'ted. D.termina.tion 
of the oxac:t order a.waita a l•ngthy serie• of d~taU d comparative coat 
studic e of individual industries, a task which req~i'reo manpower Gnd 
financial resource• on a seal~ poseeaeed only hy the Government in this 
1. .9P~ ci~. , p. 181. 
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country. 
I! a broad view of the problem is to be obtained, however, 
simplifying assumptions of the sort which have been made in this 
chapter are indispensable. It ia suggested that the procedureft 
adopted provide an ordering of induatries which b in fact roughly what 
one would have expected on the basi of what is genernlly known about 
the locational characteristics of different industries. Apart from 
giving an indicAtion of the relationship between the rate at which the 
co ts of diveraion inereaae as the volume of diverted employment 
increasee, it may be seen a a guide to thooe industries upon which 
attention should be concentrated if any given employment goal is to be 
reached at the loweet coat~ and for which more detailed individu~ com-
parative cost studies might be required. 
The need for auch individual con1parative studies, and perhaps 
also of "induatrial complexe$", in view of the phenomena discus .. ed in 
chapter 5. i.e: obvioua if a full appreciation o£ the absolute ma1"ginal 
coets , as distinct from the marginal co "'ts of divertina employment 
in one industry Telative to thot of another, la to be obtained. Con-
sidering the apparently •ubstantial &cale of induced decentralisation 
in South Africa the amount of work of this sort which bas been under-
taken i grossly inadequate. The T:')ermanent Committee and the 
Industrial Development Corporation have undoubtedly gained some 
experience of the magnitude of the coate of decentralisation in the 
course of implementinR Government PQlicy. But. aa is ahown in the 
following chapter~ the number and variety of industries :1saisted Po 
far and their quantitative significance meaaured by the additional 
employment generated, has been r ela tively emall, compared with 
what seems to be contemplated. 
The following remarket by Gavin Mac l'one are of some Interest 
in thi8 collllection: 
"An easential part of :regional policy, however, must be to 
determine the costs of interfering with the natur.U pattern of growth 
by regions and if possible to indicate what :regional distribution of 
353 
growth would give minimum co•t•. lt is obviously not adequate to 
leave the deciaione on the lGi:ation of conomic: activity entirely to 
businessmen. since their actions will naturally be ba.eed on the indus-
trial coats which affect them.. If th• state intervenca in auch decieions. 
ita case for doing so is that it Cll!l take into account all th~ oth r aapecu 
of cost both economic and •ocial which do not affect tb firm. aut this 
intervention may do h'lore harn1 than good i{ the state has no analysie of 
cost• tc show the effect of diverting growth to a vari ty of dilf rent 
location•,... 1 
Finally. it is extreM ly important to ni:rte that even if, aa our 
nnalysis nuggeats~ there is relatively littlo scapc for diverting industries 
without .illc:urring C:'{C • ss private and social costs, and the ~cea• costa 
of diversion rise steeply ·with the volume of diverted employxn nt. the 
poa•ibility of a Tapid rate of growth in the bord r ar .. as is not n c sa.arUy 
ruled out. For as was shown abnve. ~crtaill heavy induatriea. highly 
unsuitable for diveraion to the borde r area&, have foat\t.rcd prominently in 
the industrial devolopn"lont of tho border areas in the paet d. cado and 
<:v n earlier. Sotne of theae such as paper and paper boar-d.. sugar 
mill•• condeneed milk and milk powder. and tanning extract app ar 
near tho bottom of Tabla 33 and have very unfavourable divertibUity 
indexes. Certain br4.nch~as of th~ fertilizers. iron and steel and toth~r 
basic industrial chcmic.als1 sectora, which arc in the dozen l"'ast easily 
divertible industries, are alao reported to have good pot~ntial for future 
~xpanaion in th~ boruor ar~.as. If eith•r then c:eaoary mark-ts or 
mat rials or both are found in the bo.rder a.reaa there is no re· sou why 
heavy. capital intenaiv~ industries •hould not operate successfully there. 
rl h.c div rsion of induatri a, as baa bo~n stressed repe tfedly. refers 
to int~rvcntlon by th Guvernm~r.t ilim d at ir.tduci..."'lg firm to establish 
th msel ;,res in th<: border areas when thoy would otherwise ha v choson 
locationo elsowhcre.. ""\.low overall dlv0rt:lhUlty of manufacturing em-
ploynu .. nt is. ther•foro, pud ctly conai5taut with rapid border ar~a.s 
1. 'l'q~::;t Steps in Kcgionul f'la."Ul.Lag' • .in ·r. ;, Uso1i ( Lditor), :f-·ap~ra 
on l<.cgional r:evelopment. (Basil Blackwell, (\xford), 1965, pp. 
1Z6-1Z7 .. 
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development. l..ow divertibUity is. indeed, perfectly consistent 
with a apontan~oua tendency for the degree of regional concentration 
oi manufacturing industry to tall, that i• {or the proportionat+on-
tribution of the lees industrialised areas to manufacturing employment 
and output to increase. 
lt is clear, howc~er, that if a substantial increaae in the pro-
portionate contribution of border areas to manufactul"ing employment 
ia to take place. e ith r a substantial proportion of additional manuf'ac• 
turing emplr;yment must be diverted, or there must be a aubatantial 
oponta.neous tendency towarda decentralisation. or the combined effect 
of tbese two procesaea must be sufficient to achieve the desired result. 
The question of what might be expected to happen to the regional con-
e ntration in the absence o£ Government intervention is, therefore, 
crucial. It was with this queation that w~ were mainly concerned in 
chapter'• 3 and 4 above. If the Schumann Comnuttee'a prediction that 
'
1the present tendtmey to centralise will continue unlea• positive steps 
are taken to promote sound. economic decentralisation • ia accurate, 
the burden of bringing about a suktantia.l increase in the proportionate 
share of the border areas in the eo\Ultry'e manufacturing etnployment, 
fall• JJqua.rely on Governmental meaaurea to divert to ndJI generally. 
induce indu.atrial expansion in the border areaa.. (>I) the evidence examined 
in cbapt•r 1 too. tber• did ot seem to be any reason to expect a substan-
tial, rapid chanse in th€: locational pattern. without government intervention. 
ln the ligb.t of tbia , and conaidering the scale of decentrali.ation apparent• 
ly de a-ir d by the Government. the asseasment of th ~ <.fiecta of Govcrn-
m nt intervention in tho location of industry ia a problem of som im-
portance. Thus while the emphaaia in chapter• S to C of this study has 
been on the apparently narrow queation of the diversion of industries 
thrc.Lgh Go·vernment interve11tion, when tllo findings in this regard are 
considered in conjunction with those of chapter• 3 and 4. the. perspective 
of th study is broadened considerably. 
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CHAPTER 9 
STATE INTERVENTION 1960- 1967. 
The analysis contained in the foregoing eight chapters of this 
study provides a basis for the following assessment of decentralisation 
policy in the period 1960 - 1967. This period begins with the announce-
ment by the Government in mid-1960 of its approval of certain 'positive' 
measures for encouraging border in dustries, together with an assurance 
that "no corrJ>ul.sory rreasures will be applied to force industrialists to 
establish themselves in Border Areas", and ends shortly before the 
Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act No. 88 of 1967 had 
been written into the r·tatute books. The principal task of this chapter is 
to trace out the events which lie between these two inportant milestones 
in the evolution of Government policy relating to the location of industry. 
The implications of the system of industrial licensing introduced by the 
P hysical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act are exarrined in the 
next chapter. 
'Positive Measures' for Induotrial Decentralisation. 
The preference for intervention via the market rrechanism, 
rather than by rrec..ns of physical controls, which is reilected in the 
Governm:mts policy statetmnts of mid-1960, was also expressed by 
both the Toniinson and Viljoen Commissions. The Toniinson Cornn-
ission laid down the principle that uin a policy of decentralisation to 
promote industrialisation of the Bantu areas, the aim should not be to 
force industrialists to move into the Reserves but to attract them volun-
t a rily by providing facilities such as transport. power, water and urban 
developmentH. 1 The Commission felt that the application of a policy 
of licensing night ttgive rise to all sorts of undesirable repercussions ... 
and it. therefore, declared itself "unable to support itu. 2 
1. Toniinson (SutrJTB.ry). p. 136. 
2 . ibid, p. 139. 
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Instead, the Tomlinson Commission recommended a number of 
positive measures, which, in view of subsequent experience of attempts 
to decentralize industry, there is some point in noting. The measures 
recommended were the creation of social overhead capital, loans to pros-
pective industrialists, direct participation by the Gove~nment in certain 
cases, the establishment of industrial estates, the dissemination of 
information relating to the opportunities and facilities available, and the 
promotion of "co-operative action in industry" by means of a Bureau 
for Small Business. The provision of social overhead facilities, they 
argued, "must not await the establishment of industries but ••• at least 
some of them should precede industrial development and • •• timely 
planning of these facilities should be undertakenu. 1 The commission, 
however, explicitly rejected the use of tariff policy to foster industries 
in Bantu Areas, and was also oppoaed to the payment of direct subsidies 
to "individual enterprises situated in specific areas" since it might 
"lead to all sorts of adverse repercussions in regard to those enterprises 
which are not subsidised". 2 Indeed it appears that they were opposed to 
any form of preferential treatment for industries in the Bantu areas. 3 
The Commission, therefore, seems to have believed that it was merely 
~he lack of social overhead capital, factory buildings and credit facilit-
ies which stood in the way of large scale industrialisation of the Reserves. 
There is little doubt that the Tomlinson Commission seriously 
underestimated the difficulty of decentralizing manufacturing production. 
They appear to have thought that the manufacturing sector consisted 
very largely of extremely 'mobile' or 'footloose' activities, operating so 
close to the margin of transference that virtually only the provision of 
basic facilities was necessary to persuade a significant number of enter-
prises to exploit the potential, but unutilized, natural advantages of the 
1. op. cit. , p. 138. 
2. ibid. , p. 139 
3. ibid. , P• 139 
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Reserves. Whatever their actual views may have been in this regard, 
experience in the 1960's, when substantially stronger inducements were 
being offered to border industries, suggests that the Commission' s re-
commended measureswere no match at all for the ambitious goals which 
they sought to attain. This is especially so in view o£ the· fact that the 
Commissions majority report visualised development inside the Bantu 
areas rather than in the somewhat better placed border areas. 
The Viljoen Commission, too, recommended that only 'positive 
measures' be used to encourage the establishment of factories in the 
border areas, and listed five ways in which a g reater deg ree of decentral-
isation might be achieved. 1 These proposed measures resemble those 
suggested by the Tomlinson Commission in that they do not ' really in-
volve preferential treatment for border industries. The provision of 
social overhead capital, the maintenance of the existing locational 
advantages of the border areas, the dissemination of information, and the 
elimination of unwarranted discrimination against border areas in the 
railway rating structure, are the sum and essence o£ the Viljoen Comm-
issions proposals. 
This Commission, unlike the Tomlinson Commission, did not 
establish any clear cut employment target, but it seems that it envisaged 
a substantial programme of border areas industrialisation. Underlying 
their reasoning too, therefore~ there is the apparent belief that the 
location of industry is within fairly broad limits an arbitrary process, 
so that relatively mild forms of intervention can produce significant 
results. The Viljoen Commission' s optimism regarding the respons-
iveness of manufacturing activities to their proposals is further em-
phasised by the condition which they laid down, that these positive 
measures should be used to foster industries only 11a.s long as these do 
;> 
not involve uneconomic considerations". '"' 
As we have noted already, the Government in mid-1960 still 
adhered to the principle, laid down in the reports of the two commissions 
1. Commission of Enquiry into Policy Relating to the Protection o.f 
Industries, U . G. 36/1958, p . 55, para. 459. 
2. cp cit. , p . 55, para. 454. 
. I 
referred to, explicitly stating that no 'compulsory measures' would 
be employed. It added that "there can be no question of a large 
scale shifting of existing factories to Border Areas; which would dis-
rupt the countrys economy". 1 Nevertheless the positive ~asures 
announced in 1960 went very much farther than those proposed by 
the Tomlinson and Viljoen Commissions, and in effect involved a 
system of subsidies to specific firms in the border areas. 
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But· even the measures of 1960, after about three years of experience 
on the part of the Permanent Committee, came to be regarded by the 
Government as inadequate for the task in hand. Observer• who expressed 
doubts about the effectiveness of border industries policy in the early 
stages of the Permanent Committees activities, had been told that the 
lack of bouyancy in the economy as a whole was hampering the Govern-
ments efforts, that it takes a coneider"lble time to get a project to 
the production stage from the moment it fi rst appears on the drawin.g 
boards, and that a certain amount of time is necessary before a pro-
gramme of decentralisation gains momentum. l Thus immediate 
success could not be expected. Nevertheless, by mid-1963 the Govern-
ment itself had come to the conclusion that "more persuasive measures11 
wer~ needed, and accordingly these were announced in Mayl96~. 
Though these "more persuasive measures" involved more generous 
allowances, the types of'' incentives involved were essentially the same 
aa those introduced in 1960. It is noteworthy that even at the end of 
1963 the Government still felt itself to be in a position to declare that 
no form of compulsion was contemplated. 
The inducements approved in 1960 together with the changes 
made in 1964, may be conveniently listed under .five separate headings 
1. 
? 
.. 
Contained in the statement by the Prime Minister arisine from the 
meeting of the Economic Advisory Council, July 26-27, 1960. 
See, for instance, the Permanent Committee report, dated 25 
October 1962, on progress made in the border areas development 
programme. 
:,;':.J'j 
as follows: 
1. Social Overhead Capital. 
The actual provision of public services is an essential prerequisite 
for industrial development, and indeed of economic develop~:rent of any sort. 
Without adequate facilities of this kind it would be impossible for indus-
tries to establish themselves in border areas, even if the latter were in 
other respects the most suitable locations. Desirable structural changes 
in the geographical distribution of manufacturing industry would thus 
beconE impossible. Investment in social overhead capital, to provide 
the necessary public services is, therefore, a well accepted function of 
the govern.rnmt, the provincial administrations and local authorities. 
The rrere fulfillment of this function, however, does not necessarily 
confer any special advantages on the areas in which such investment is 
undertaken, and cannot be regarded as necessarily involving a special 
incentive to border area industrial development. Under this head.L"'lg of 
social overhead capital, the refore, we are interested only in the Govern-
ments attempts to give border areas preferential treatment, to supply them 
with public services on particularly favourable terms by means of subsidies 
of one form or another. In this connection the following measures are 
relevant: 
a) It was announced in 1964 that the Treasury was prepared to grant 
loans at low rates of interest to local authorities to assist them in pro -
viding shunting yards and rail way sidings at "certain selecte d points of 
growth". Since this reduces the armunt of revenue which rmst be raised 
from local rates in order to pay for these facilitieso it represeuts a 
form of indirect subsidy to border industries. 
b ) It was also announced in 1964 that the Department of Water Affairs 
would eupply water to municipalities in border areas a t a price not includ-
ing the c~pital costs of providing the water. This rreasure in effect 
makes water available to border industries on the same terms as those 
a pplying to farrrers. 
c ) Where necessary, water is supplied by the Department of Water 
36) 
Affairs directly to large consun2rs at special tariffs. For exarq:>le, 
at Harnnarsdale water is made available from local sources and ul-
ti!llltely from the Midrnar Dam at 15 cents per 1, 000 gallons. This 
charge includes reception, treatrnmt and disposal of all factory 
effluents. 
The I -'errmnent Committee will apparently also negotiate with 
the Electricity Supply Commission for the provision of power to indus-
trial undertakings on a subsidised basis in exceptional cases. 
d) Financial assistance up to RIO, 000 per property may be extended to 
industrialists h'l the provision of houses for Key White personnel em-
ployed in border h1dustries. 
2 . Tax Concessions. 
a) Increased investment allowances in respect of depreciation on machin-
ery plant and buildings. 
Provision was nade in the Consolidated Income Tax Act zNo. 58 
of 1962 for the granting of the following investment allowances to rn:mu-
facturing concerns in border areas: (i) A maxirrum of 30 per cent on 
new or unused machinery and plant, conpared with the tn1xinnm of 
20 per cent applicable to firms in other areas. This allowance could 
also be granted on used rrachinery, exceJt that the cost of such used 
tn1chinery might not be greater than the original cost of the machinery 
or plant, when new, less depreciation alrea dy written off in previous years 
in terms of the Income Tax Act. (ii) A rnuc:inun1 of 20 per cent on 
factory buildings, compared with the ma.xinum of 10 per cent applicable 
to firms in other areas. 
In :May 1964 the maxinum investtn!nt allowances on machinery and 
plant on the one hand, and factory buildings on the other hand, allowable 
to manufacturing concerns in the border areas, were raised to 35 and 
25 per cent respectively. An investment allowance of 35 per cent on 
machinery, for instance, rreans that a firm can write off 35 per cent of 
the cost of machinery in the year in which it comes int o use, in addition 
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to the depreciation allowance permitted in that year in terms of the 
income tax code for normal wear and tear, without any reduction in the 
percentage allowances permitted in succeeding years. Thus an in-
vestment allowance of 35 per cent in the year of acquisition represents 
a n et addition to the total allowanc e g ranted over the life of the equip-
ment. The total depreciation allowances permitted for tax purposes 
over the lifespan of the equipment taking into account both the invest-
ment allowance and the normal wear and tear allowances, is thus 
135 per cent. 
Before March 1966, firms outside the border areas were 
entitled to an investment allowanc e of 20 per cent on machinery and plant. 
Thus between May 1964 and W arch 1966 the additional investment allow-
ance on machinery ru1d plant which might be g ranted t o border industries 
was 15 per cent. After March 1966, however, the investrnmt allowance 
on machinery and plant in firms outside the border areas was abolished, 
so that the net advantage of border industries in this respect became the full 
35 per c e nt allowed to them . 
L ikewise since March 1966 firms outside the border a reas have 
not been entitled to the investment allowance of 10 per cent on factory 
buildings. Thus the additional investment allowance currently availa ble 
to border industries is equal to the full 25 per cent mentioned above. 
b) Initial allowance in respect of used machinery and plant. 
The Consolidated Income Tax A ct No. 58 of 1962 also makes 
provision for an initial allowance of 15 per cent in respect of used 
machinery and plant, subject to certain conditions laid down in the Act. 
P rior to this the initial allowance was given only on unused machinery 
and pla.."1t. In 1964 this initial allowance was increased from 15 to 
30 per cent. This means that a firm can write off 30 per c ent of the 
cost of machinery in the year of acquisition , in a ddition to any invest-
ment allowance and the allowance for normal wear and tear l a id down 
in the Act. Unlike an investment allowance, however, the initial 
allowance in the f irst year is offset by smaller allowances in succeeding 
yea rs, so that no m o re than the original cost is written off over the life of 
theequiprnent. N evertheless, an initia l allowance, by permitting a firm 
to write off its fixed capital more quickly than it would otherwise be 
able to do for tax purposes, increases the present value of the firms 
net earnings. It should be noted, however, that this can confer a 
significant advantage on the firm only if it succeeds in making profits 
in the early years of its operations in border areas. 
c) Allowance in respect of costs of power, water and transport. 
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Both newly established firms and expanding ones in the border 
areas may be permitted to deduct a maximum additional amount equal 
to 10 per cent of the cost of power, water (unless supplied direct by 
the Department of Water Affairs) and transport, for a minimum period 
of five years. 
d) Allowances in respect of the costs of moving from other areas to 
border areas. 
Another measure introduced in 1964 provides that firms moving 
to the border areas from other centres may be allowed to write off, at 
double the actual amount, the extra administration and manufacturing 
costs incurred as a result of the move. That is, the firm may be allow-
ed to write off the administration and manufacturing costs incurred at 
the old site, plus an amount equal to twice the excess of these costs in 
the border areas site over those incurred in the original location. The 
tax rebate related to this excess, the size of the excess being determined 
by the Permanent Committee, applies to each of the first five years of 
operating in the border areas. 
e) Allowance in respect of firm's expenditure on employee's housing. 
Industrialists in border areas who incur expenses in connection 
with the erection of hou~ing for their employees, or in assisting em-
ployees with the purchase of housing for their occupation, may be allowed 
to deduct 35 per cent of such expenses iu. the first year in which the 
ho~ses were completed or acquired, and 10 per cent of such expenses in 
each of the nine years of assessment after that. Industrialists in other 
areas may only deduct 25 per cent of such expenses for the year in which 
the expenses were actually incurred, and none thereafter. It appears 
though that unless the Act is amended, tax allowances in respect of these 
expenses apply only in respect of housing erected or purchased before 
31st December, 1968. 
3 . Financial Assistance. 
a) Leasing of fully serviced factory premises. 
The Industrial Development Corporation is prepared to erect 
factory buildings to the specifications o£ individual firms, and to under-
take the provision of all services, including fencing , effluent pre-treat-
men t works, on-site roads, loading bays, parking areas, transformers, 
electrical distribution, and air conditioning . Lease a g reements run 
initially for 15 years and give the lessee the option to renew or purchase 
the premises outright at any time during the currency of the agreement. 
The rent payable is: 
(i) for industries other than textile industries: 
6 o/o per annum on the cost of land and levelling; 
8o/o per annum on the cost of the buildings, and 
13% per annum on the cost of services; 
(ii) for teXtile industries: 
in certain circumstances for the first five years limited to: 
2 o/o per annum on the cost of the buildings; and 
7-i% per annum on the cost of the services; 
thereafter as in (i} above. 
The purchase price, if the option ~o purchase is exercised, is 
determined as follows: 
(i) during the first 15 years - original cost, plus the cost of replacement 
and renewal work less depreciation c alculated at 2 per cent per annum 
on the cost of building s, plus 7~ 'l')er cent per annum on the cost of 
services. 
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(ii) after 15 years - market value, or the cost applicable if the option 
is exercised immediately prior to the expiration of the 15 year lease, 
whichever is the higher. 
In addition to factories built to the specifications of individual 
concerns the Industrial Development Corporation may undertake the 
construction of general purpose factory buildings in advance of re-
quirements and the provision of the necessary facilities such as roads, 
rail sidings etc. ;; in areas outside municipal boundaries. Two of the 
most noteworthy projects of this sort have been carried out at Rosslyn 
and Hammarsdale, where industrial estates have been established by 
the I. D. C. 
b) Equity and loan capital. 
Manufacturing concerns in the border areas may obtain long 
term loans at a rate of interest of 6 per cent per annum from the Ind-
ustrial Development Corporation, whereas in other parts of the country 
the charges on loans from this source are somewhat higher. In addit-
ion the Industrial Development Corporation is entitled to purchase shares 
in border area undertakings, and has used this power to a considerable 
extent. 
4. Labour Concessions. 
a) As we noted in Chapter 7 above, the Government has pledged itself 
to maintain the principle of wage ~rentiation in favour of border areas, 
in so far as this can be justified on grounds of lower productivity and 
lower costs of living. But it is doubtful whether adherence to this 
principle can be regarded aa constituting preferential treatment for 
border industries. Indeed as we suggested earlier, in Chapter 7, 
when setting minimum wages in the border areas there is a good case 
for taking into account not only productivity and cost of living, but the 
mobility of workers as well. N evertheless, it may be noted that the 
Government is prepared to grant industries in border areas an exemption 
from Wage Determinations and Industrial Council Agreements. 
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b) Another advantage under this heading which we also remarked upon 
in Cltapter 7, is that the legal and conventional restrictions on the use 
of Btintu labour in the border areas in skilled jobs are likely to be sub-
stantially less stringent than they are in other parts of the country. 
Here again, however, it would be rather extraordinary to regard this 
as a special incentive conferring preferential treatment on the border 
areas, since all it means is that there are to be fewer legal and con- . 
ventional obstacles to the efficient use of labour in the border areas than 
there are elsewhere in the country-
c) The government has al,s.o .;ommitted itself to the task of raising the 
productivity of Bantu labour by means of trade schools in border and 
Bantu areas. In 1964 it was announ ced that much more attention would 
be given to the setting up of technical and vocational schools for Bantu 
workers. who may even receive a subsistence allowance during the 
period of training. It appears that the training of workers in the border 
and Bantu areas is seen not only as a device for stimulating border areas 
development, as such, but also as an important way of coping with the 
country's skilled labour shortage and helping to maintain the rate of 
. h 1 econom1.c growt • 
5. Transportation. 
a) A committee drawn from the South African Railways and Harbours 
administration and the Permanent Committee was established in 1964 
to make recommendations regarding exemptions from certain provisions 
of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, 1930. to enable firms in the 
border areas to use motor transport more freely than is permitted in 
other regions. 
1. See, for instance. Department of Pl~"'lning. Economic Development 
"Programme for the Republic of South Africa 1964 - 69. Governrr.ent 
Printer, Pretoria, pp. 77-78 
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b) Certain concessions in respect of railage rates have been given on 
an ad hoc basis to a few individual firms. The most sigmficant step 
taken under this heading, however, was the announcement in April 1964, 
that all industrial products manufactured in the Transkei and Ciskei 
border areas and consigned to other parts of the country would qualify 
for a 10 per cent rebate on railage and on South African Railways road 
transportation rates. The cost of this rebate is borne by the Treasury, 
as it has apparently been agreed that the Railways will not grant special 
raila ge rates unless they are reimbursed by the Treasury. 
6. Custotr6 Tariff Protection. 
Where prospective industries for establishment in border areas 
consider it essential to obtain customs tariff protection for their pro-
ducts, or remissions of customs duty on imported raw materials, they 
rm.y negotiate with the Board of Trade and Industries for such protection 
or remissions even before they commence production. 
The measures li&ted above, with the exception of those relating 
to regional wag e differentiation, the relaxation of the industrial colour bar, 
and tariff protection, comprise an assortment of indirect subsidies which 
are granted "on a selective" basis to individual regions or firms. They 
are indirect subsidies in the sense that they take the form of remissions 
of tax revenue by the State, the provision by some Government departments 
of a basic service at sub-economic rates to either private enterprise {as 
in the case of water and rail transport) or to local authorities (as in the 
case of low interest loans for the construction of rail sidings and water 
schemes), or the renission of revenue by a Government agency like the 
Industrial Development Corporation (as in the case of low rentals and 
interest rates). In the case of the reduced transport charges, the 
Treasury makes good the revenue foregone by the South African Railways. 
With the· exception of measures l(a). l(b), 4(b), 4(c) and 5(a), 
assistance is given non a selective basis" to specific firms establishing 
themselves in the border areas for the first time, or carrying out ex-
tensions to existing plant. That is the concessions which may be given 
to individual firms are not granted automatically to all firtnJ investing 
in the border areas. In other words, in the case of such concessions, 
they are granted or refused only after consideration of the special 
circumstances of each individual applicant. While we are told that con-
cessions are given "on a selective basis", however, it is not clear 
what the basis of aelection is, or whether there ie an attenpt to apply 
in a consistent way a clearly defined set of criteria. The anonalies 
and problen:., including wastage of resources, which might arise in 
this connection are touched on later in this chapter after we have con-
sidered in turn, in the following three sections, the irrpact of Govern-
ment intervention on border areas employnent, the actual scale of 
assistance to border industries in the first 6} years of the Pernanent 
Comnittee's existence, and the efficacy of the present set of positive 
inducements. 
The Irrpact of Government Intervention 1960-66. 
In considering the irrpact of Government intervention on the 
rate of industrialisation in the border areas between 1960 and 1966, 
we shall focus attention exclusively on err.ployrrent statistics, rather 
than on gross output, net output or capital fornution. Apart from 
the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently reliable information about the other 
variables, the rate of increase of employn-ent in the border areas is 
the rmst relevant consideration, in view of the orientation of the policy. 
According to the report of the Pernenent Co:rnnittee for 1966, 
the increase in manufactu~ing enployment in the border areas between 
June 1960 and December 1966 was 57, 100 of whom 44, 600 were Bantu. 
That is, in these 6t years manufacturing enployment in the border 
areas increased by an average annual amount of 8, 784. Since the 
nurrber exrployed in nunufacturing industry in the country as a whole 
increased by an average annual amount of about 46, 483 between 1960 
and 1966, 1 it appears that son:e 18. 9 per cent of the national increase 
in manufacturing employment took place in the border areas in the 
period under consideration. 
Table 37, which has been compiled from infor:mltion contained 
in the Permanent Committee's annual progress reports, shows the 
volume of additional employment in the border areas at various stages 
since June 1960. Where available, increased employment in firms 
actually assisted by the Permanent Cornnittee is given separately 
from the corresponding figures for unassisted firl'l"J3. According to 
the Permanent Corrnittee 1 s figures, in the period June 1960 to Decerri>er 
1964 erq>loyment in assisted firms increased by 24,000 which was 57. 1 
per cent of the total increase of 42., 000. A sirrilar breakdown of ad-
ditional enployment is not available for the whole 6~ year period, but 
if we assunE that the proportionate contribution of assisted firms was 
the same in the period June 1960 to December 1966 as the Committee's 
figures indicate it was for the period June 1960 to December 1964, this 
would mean that the increase in employ~nt in assisted firrm in the full 
6t year period was about 32, 604 out of a total of 57, 100. On this basis, 
then, it seems that the average annual increase in employment in assisted 
industries in the period June 1960 to Decerri>er 1966 would have been 
approximately 5, 016 out of a total increase of 8 , 784. 
Can the whole of the increase in employn1:mt in assisted firms 
be reasonably regarded as additional to the increase in employrrent 
which would have taken place in those firms had they not been assisted? 
In its report for 1966 the Permanent Connittee makes the following 
claim: uover the past 6! years Governnent assistance in one form or 
another has led to the establishment of 98 new industries. The corres-
ponding figure for expansions of existing undertakings in border areas 
1. See the calculations in Chapter 8 above. 
Additional Employment and Direct Investment in Border Areas 
Manufacturing Industry from June 1960 to Dec. 1966 
Additional Additional 
P eriod Em.ployment Direct 
Investment 
Bantu White Coloured+ Total 
Asiatic (R millions} 
1) Assisted June 1960 to Dec. 1961 1,239 72 .. .. 3.08 
firms only .. June 1960 to Dec. 1962 1, 850 .. 
new plus .. .. . . 
expansions June 1960 to Dec. 1964 19,000 .. .. 24,000 65.0 
2) Unassisted 
firms only June 1960 to Dec. 1964 14,000 .. .  18, 600 35. () + 
-new plus 
expansions 
3) Assisted June 1960 to Dec. 1964 33,000 42,000 100. 0 + plus un- .. .. 
assisted Jan. 1960 to Dec. 1965 41,000 .. .. 52,000 177.0 
firms -new June 1960 to Dec. 1966 44,600 57, 100 220.0 plus expan~ .. .. 
eions 
Source: Compiled from information contained in the annual P rogress R eports of the 
P ermanent Committee for the Location of Industry and the Development of Border Areas. 
----=· ~-------------------------------------------------------------===----------------~----
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is 6111 • 1 Since 98 and 61 was, according to ~e report, the total number 
of new and expanding firm; respectively, assisted by the Perm:ment 
Cornnittee, the statement quoted i rrplies that the whole of the increase 
in errployment in assisted firms should be attributed to Government 
assistance, and would not have occurred without it. 
H we accept this implication of the Permment Comnittee's 
claim as a true reflection of what actually occurred. it would mean 
that Government intervention was responsible for an average of about 
5, 016 additional jobs per annum in manufacturing industry in the border 
areas between June 1960 and December 1966. In other wo:. ds, it would 
imply that about 10, 8 per cent of the increase in manufacturing em-
ployment in the country as a whole .in this period occurred in tne border 
areas because of Government intervention. Since the inc rease in 
assisted and unassisted border areas manufacturing errployment together 
appears, as we noted above, to have been about 18. 9 per cent of the 
national increase, it would then follow that only about 7. 1 per cent of 
the national increase in rmnufacturing would have taken place ill the border 
areas without governrmnt intervention. 
· There are, however, reasons for doubting whether Govern~nt 
intervention could in fact have accounted in so large a ~asure, and 
spontaneous development in so small a measure, for the increase in 
manufacturing enploy~nt which occurred in the border areas between 
1960 and 1966. In the writer's view. it would be rn>st surprising if 
no increase at all in enployrrent would have taken place in the aasisted 
firms if they had received no help from the GoverP . .ment. W bile the 
rermanent Committee's claim implies that only about 7. 1 per cent 
of the country's increase in manufacturing errployment would have 
occurred in the border areas without Government intervention, the 
conbined proportionate contribution of the border and Bantu areas 
to total manufacturing enplo~nt in 1.956-7, was 11. 7 per cent 
according to our estimates of Chapter 4, and in 1959-60 was 12. 2 
1. Italics not in the original. 
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per cent. These figures suggest that the proportion of manufacturing 
errployme:r.t occurring in the border and Bantu areas together was 
tending, if anything, to increase even before the establishment of the 
Perrmnent Committee. It seems not unreasonable, therefore, to 
assurr:e that at least 12. 2 per cent of the national increase in manu-
facturing ernploy~nt would have accrued to the border and Bantu are as 
together between June 1960 and December 1966, even without the use of 
special incentives. 
As we noted earlier, however, Jnlnufacturing employment within 
the Bantu areas thermelves in 1960, was a negligible proportion of the 
total, and it appears that increases in rnmufacturing enployrrent in those 
areas since 1960 have also been extremely small. Thus our asaurrption, 
which appears to be a very reasonable one on the basis of past perforrra.nce, 
that 12. 2 per cent of the national increase in employrrent would have occ-
urred spontaneously in border and Bantu areas together between 1960 and 
1966, implies that a proportion not nuch lower than 12. 2 per cent would 
have occurred spontaneously in the border areas alone in the same period. 
Let us, therefore, assume that if 12. 2 per cent of the national increase in 
manufacturing employment occurs in the border and Bantu areas together 
without assistance, the corresponding proportion for the border areas alone 
is 11 .. e per cent. 
Given the latter figure and ou1· earlier calculation (based on the 
Perrrnnent Committee's estimates of border areas employment, and 
information published by the Bureau of Statistics on manufacturing 
en:ployn:ent in the country as a whole), that assisted increase in employ-
rr:ent in the border areas amounted to 18. 9 per cent of the total increase, it is 
unlikely that more than 7. 9 per cent of the national increase would have 
occurred in the border areas alone as a result of Government inter-
vention, compared with the proportion of about 1.1. 8 per cent implied 
by the Permanent Committee 1 s reports. In absolute terms this amounts 
to an average annual volume of induced border areas employment between 
June 1960 and Decenber 1966 of 3, 672 (i. e. 7. 9 per cent of 46, 483), 
3 ...... · ~ 
compared with the figure of approximately 5, 016 implied by the Perm-
anent Committee's inforrmtion. 
We should consider the possibility that the Permanent Comm-
ittee's figures underestimate the amount of additional employment which 
occurred spontaneously in unassisted border industries in the period 
under consideration. While the Permanent Corrrnittee reported giving 
assistance to 98 new undertakings and 61 expanding ones, during the 
6~ year period, and stated that it was "aware of a further 90 new under-
takings and expansions of existing undertakings which had been launched 
in the border areas without assistance", it emphasised that it was not 
aware of all new industries and expansions which had taken place in the 
border areas. But it seems highly improbable that the border areas 
could have obtained significantly more than an 18. 9 per cent share of the 
increase in rmnufacturing employment between 1960 and 1966. A Bureau 
of Statistics bulletin dated 15th February, 1967 shows that between the end 
of Septerrber 1961 and the end of June 1964, manufacturing employrrent 
increased by 145, 510 of which 124, 914 or 85. 8 per cent of the total 
occurred in the 10 'economic regions' 1 comprising the country's four 
main industrial areas. 
~ 
Whatever the precise volume of Government induced border areas 
errployrrent nay have been between 1960 and 1966, the Permanent Cornn-
ittee reports make no attempt whatsoever to demonstrate the basis of 
their assumption that the entire increase in employment in assisted firms 
was due to Government assistance. Since it would be rmst extraordinary 
if their assurrption was in fact an accurate description of the facts, it 
clearly requires some justification. 2 In the absence of any convincing 
1. The code numbers of the 10 economic regions are 01, 02, 03, 08, 
30, 40, 42, 43, 44. 
z. To take just one example of factors casting doubt on the Cornnittee's 
assurr.ption, it is reported that East London firms, with the exception 
of the Wilson Rowntree factory, maintain that the special concessions 
had little or no bearing on expansion decisions. See the South African 
Financial lv1ail, October 13, 1967, pp. 107-109. 
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attempt to justify the assurrJ>tion, it is clearly much rmre reasonable 
to take it that the actual volume of additional employment attributable 
to Government assistance in the period June 1960 to Decenber 1966 
was less than the approximately 5, 016 implied by the Committee's 
assertion. Our analysis suggests that the actual figure was probably 
closer to 3, 000 than to 5, OOC, and is based essentially on the assum-
ption, which appears to be much more reasonable than the Committee's, 
that the border areas would have secured a proportion of total additional 
employment a t least as great as that attained in the past even without 
special help from the Government. This question, regarding the impact 
of Governmellt intervention in the first 6·! years, has a bearing on the 
prospects for large scale industrial decentralisation in the future, as 
we shall note in the next section. and it is unfortunate that the P ermanent 
Cornnittee' s reports treat it so cavalierly • 
. / It is interesting to note that not only does the Perznment Comnittee 
seem to claim that all the additional employrrent in assisted firms was 
in fact due to the assistance received by the firms, but their report for 
1966 seexn; t o inply that Government intervention was responsible to a 
significant degree for additional enyloyment in unassisted firm>. For 
immediately after stating that 90 new undertakings and expansions of 
existing undertaldngs were launched in the border areas without assistance, 
the report asserts: "It is clear that having created confidence in the 
border areas, Gover1unent expenditure and other assistance have resulted 
in considerable investment by the private sector in those areas. 11 How-
ever, if a significant proportion of the increased errployment in unassisted firms 
and the whole increase in assisted firms was due to Government interven-
tion, the ·inplication is that without such intervention still less than 7 . 1 
per cent of the total increase in n:anufacturing employment would have taken 
place in the border areas. In the light of our earlier remarks, how-
ever, it is clear that this is highly irr.probable. 
In view of the iiYJlortance of its irrplications, yet another remark 
by the Perrranent Cornrittee, in its report for 1966, warrants attention. 
They say: "There are indications that the climate for the establishment 
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of industries in the border areas has improved considerably, particularly 
since 1964. 11 It is not clear upon what this assertion is based, but it 
does seem to suggest that some sort of 'take off' point had been reached 
and that in future the stinulation of border areas industrialisation would 
be easier and hence less costly. Is there any sign that the inproved 
climate to which they refer manifested itself in an actual increase in 
the nu:rr.ber of new establishments and expansions or in the rate of in-
crenae of employment? 
The nun:ber of assisted and unassisted new and expanding firrn; 
in the border areas is given below: 
June 1960 to June 1960 to 
December 1964. Decerrber 1966. 
New undertakings established 
with assistance 60 98 
Expansions carried out with 
assistance 33 61 
New undertakings established 
and expansions 28 90 
These figures , which are derived from the Pernru'lent Connittee's 
own reports, indicate that in the first 4-l years of its existence the Comm-
ittee assisted 60 new undertakings, and in the next two years 38 under-
takings, so that the average nurrber per annum was 13. 3 in the forrrer 
period and 19 in the latter. The corresponding average a.tmual figures 
for assisted expansions were 7. 3 and 14. The increase in the number 
of unassisted new akld expanding firrn:J after 1964 was still greater than 
this, being 6 per annum in the first 4i years of the period under con-
sideration and 3 1 in the last two. 
These figures seem to bear out the Permanent Corrrnittee' s con-
tention, but they nust obviously be interpreted with care. Firstly the 
number of new undertakings plus expansions is an extremely rough in-
dicator of the rragnitude of progress in terms of output or employment 
in the border areas. Secondly, even if changes in the number of un-
assisted new establishments and expansions were a reliable indicator 
of real growth, it is by 11.0 means clear that this is due to a long term 
improvement in the climate of confidence in the border areas, as the 
Perll'llnent Committees statement implies it is, rather than to cyclical 
forces. 
Consider the way in which employmmt increased over the. 6! 
year period. In the first 4i years, that is to the end of 1964, manufac-
turing employrrent increased by 42, 000 or an average arrount of 9, 333 
per annum whereas in the next two years together it increased by 
15. 100 which gives an average of 7, 550 per annum. Thus it appears 
from the Perrranent Committee's own figures that the average rate of 
growth was faster before the end of 1964 than after. Indeed it appears 
that the largest increase for any one year occurred in 1964 itself, and 
that growth was particularly rapid in 1he second half of 1964. 
The Permanent Committee' s own figures, therefore, do not 
suggest that the climate for the establishment of industries in the border area 
actually produced a rate of g rowth greater than in the period June 1960 
to December 1964, even if certain unrevealed criteria permit one to 
say that this clirm.te improved c onsiderably after 1964. Indeed, the 
evidence seens n:ore consistent with the possibility that variations in 
the rate of i_ndustrial expansion in the border areas have been determined 
to a greater extent by cyclical move:rYEnts in manufacturing employment 
in the country as a whole than by increased incentives, or by an irnprove-
:rnmt in the climate for investment in the border areas, which abruptly 
increased the readiness of busi~essmen to invest in the latter r a ther 
than elsewhere. 
TABLE 38 
Manufacturing Employrrent in South Africa 1959-60 to 1965-66 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
Nurrber 
Employed 
636,530 
657, 129 
678,304 
755,807 
845,800 
929,500 
963,800 
Percentage 
Increase 
3. 2 
3. 2 
11. 4 
11. 9 
9. 9 
3. 7 
Source: 1959-60 to 1964-65: Statistical Year Book 1966, pp. H-33 and 
H-38; 1965-66 figure Bulletin of Statistics, Quarter Ending 
SP.ntP.rnhP.r tq£,7. TAble B-7. n. 20. 
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The variations in the rate of increase in manufacturing en:ploy-
ment in the country as a whole, shown in Table 38 above, conform 
closely with the way in which erq:>loyment increased in the border areas 
over the same period. The rate of increase in manufacturing enploy-
Jnent appears to have been greatest between 1962-63 and 1963-64. 
Likewise. the evidence does not show that there was a long term im-
provement in the confid e nee of the private sector in those areas after 
1964, since border areas employment increased much more slowly in 
1966 than in 1965, and this decline, as the table shows, coincides with 
a marked reduction in the rate of increase in manufacturing employment 
in the country as a whole. Cyclical variations in general business con-
ditions, therefore seem to have been the. predominant influence on varia-
tions in the rate of industrialisation of the border areas. 
The most important conclusions which :rray be drawn from the 
analysis of this section are: ( 1) that though the precise amount of add-
itional en:ployment attri but able to Government assistance in the period 
June 1960 to December 1966 is uncertain, it i s al:rmst certainly lower 
than the figure of approximately 5, 472 which is implied by the Permanent 
Comnittee ' s remarks, and the actual nu:rrber attributable to this factor 
is probably closer to 3, 000; (2) that the overall rate of expansion of 
enployment in border areas, though apparently a larger proportion of 
the total increase than before, was small in absolute terms and does 
not seem to have been anything like as high as that required by the 
Governnent to achieve its social objectives. In the latter connection 
it is interesting to note the following relnlrks from the Pern:anent 
Connittee ' s report for the period June 1960 to June 1965; "As indicated• 
border industries succeeded in employing 8, ZOO Bantu per year over the 
past five years. When conpared with the average annual entry of 41, 000 
Bantu into secondary industry for the years 1961/62 to 1963/64, this 
figure is still too low." (3) that the evidence for the period 1960-66 
does not indicate that a sort of 'take off' point has been reached, or that 
we should,. therefore, expect private enterprise to become rmre respon-
sive to special incentives in future with a consequent reduction in the 
difficulty of inducing border areas employrrent, or that there are signs 
of a spontaneous tendency for a significantly greater proportion of add-
itional manufacturing eirJ>loyment to o.ccur in border areas in future 
than occurred in the past. 
The significance of these conclusions is discussed further in 
the following section. 
A Note on the Costs of Border Industries 1960-1966. 
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The task of determining the costs to the country of each additional 
industrial job actually induced by the Government in the border areas 
between 1960 and 1966 is an :extrerru~ly difficult one. Indeed, it appears 
that, given the sources of information available to the present writer, 
primarily the annual progress reports of the Permanent Conmittee, it 
is not possible to calculate these costs sufficiently accur ately for the 
results to be of any real value in this study. Quite apart from the pro-
blem of determining the volume of additional border areas eirJ>loyment, 
attributable to Government intervention, which we encount~red in the 
previous section, a fairly definite money value can be attached to the 
assistance given to border industries in the case of only a few of the 
positive measures listed earlier. However, as we shall see, the precise costs 
of induced erq:>loyment in the period 1960- 1966 turn out to be largely 
irrelev;;mt to rnmy of the more significant of the questions with which we 
are concerned in this study. Nevertheless, before returning to the latter 
point later in this section, we shall consider the extent to which the costs 
incurred in the 6-i year period under review can actually be measured, 
given the information a--:railable to the writer. 
Table 39 summarises the arrount of assistance actually given to 
firtns in the border areas in the form of tax allowances, subsidiaed rentals 
and loans, and direct investment by the Industrial Development Corporation, 
in the period June 1960 to December 1966. Let us first consider the value 
to border industries of tax allowances since, as we shall see, it i s rather 
easier t o attach a definite value to these than to other forms of a s s i stance. 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
TABLE 39 
Summary of Financial Assistance to Border Industries, June 1960 to December 1966 
(R thousands ) 
June 1960 to 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Dec . 1961 
V a1ue of loans, share capital and fa ctory 
buildings contributed by the I. D. C. 850 5,000 3,640 13,000 11, BOO 7,400 
Value of investment i n land and buildings 
on which tax concessions were granted 875 1,500 27 , 000 5,900 35,700 
Value of tax concessions g rante d o n 
land a nd buildings. 26 45 800 J ] 2' 200 187 
Value of tax concessions on cost of power, 
water and transport 
Investment by Government in Housing for 
White p ersonn el. 202 138 
Cost of housing for White personnel 
provided by industrial concerns. 
Tax allowance in respec t of housing for 
White personnel. 324 
Loans to local authorities at 2 per cent 
for 2.0 years. 125 125 
10 per cent railage rebate on goods 
produced in the Ciskei and Transkei 
border areas. 90 
Source: Annual progress reports of the Permanent Committee for the Location of 
Industry and the Development of Borde r areas. 
June 1960 to 
Dec. 1964 
22, 500 
29,700 
858 
735 
June 1960 to June 1960 to 
Dec. 1965 Dec . 1966 
34,800 41, 700 
35,600 71, 300 
J 1. 027 J 3,200 
890 2,200 
1' 100 
695 
385 
(May 1965 to 
Dec. 1966) 
310 527 
The value of investment in land and buildings on which tax con 
ceasio.ns were granted amounted to R 71. 3 million over the whole 6~ 
year neriod, as Table 39 shows. All but RZ. 375 million of this total 
relates to the last three years of the period under consideration, the 
greatest amount in a.n.y single year taking place in 1966. The actual 
value of the tax concessions, themselves, based on these investments 
in land and buildings was R858 thousand in the first 4! years of the 
programme. A separate figure for tax allowances on investment in 
land and buildings is not available for subsequent years, but as the table 
shows, such concessions, plus the value to i ndustrialists of the tax rebate 
resulting from the deduction of 10 per cent of the cost of water, power and 
transport amounted to R3. 2. million over the whole 6~ year period. In 
addition tax concessions valued at R695 thousand over the whole period 
were g ranted in respect of the cost of housing fo r white personnel pro~ 
vided by industrialists themselves. The total value of tax concessions 
to the end of 19A6, therefore, was R3. 895 million, all but R800 thousand 
of which relates to the last two years. It should be noted, however, 
that this does not mean that industrial profits were increased by the full 
amount of R3. 895 million in the period being examined, since the value 
of investment allowances is spread over a number of years, depending 
largely on the time pattern oi profits earned before tax, and the value of 
the tax rebate on white housing is spread over a period of ten years in the 
manner described earlier. The amount of R3. 895 million, therefore, 
overstates the discounted present value of the cost of these types of in -
ducements . 
Table 3Cf, it may also be noted, does not reflect the full amount of 
the tax allowance in respec t of investment in land and buildings, but only 
that portion which is due to the enhanced investment and initial allowances 
given to border industries. It appears that in the period 19f,0-64 these 
additional tax allowances on land and building s comprised some :. . 9 per 
c en t of the value of investment in l and and building s on which tax concessions 
380 
were granted. Over the whole 6! year period the additional tax all 
owance s on land and buildings plus the tax allowance on the cost of 
water, power and transport comprised 4. 5 per cent of the value of in 
vestment in land and buildings on which the enhanced tax concessions 
were g ranted. All types of tax allowances together then should enhance 
profit earning s by the firms receiving them by an amount o:f about 
R3. 895, over a period of a number of years. 
Apart from these tax concessions, the only other form of ass-
istance to which it is possible at attach a fairly definite value so far as 
the writer can see, is the reduction of railage charges on goods railed 
from the Ciskei and Transkei. The Permanent Committee in its pro-
gress report for 1966 states that the estimated cost to the Treasury of 
the 1.0 per cent railway rebate on industrial products for the Transkei/ 
Ciskei area, which came into operation on 1st May 1964, was R5 2 7, 000 
for the period ended 31 st December 1966. 
The value of loans, share capital and factory buildings contributed 
by the Industrial Development Corporation amounted to R34. 2 million 
between June 1960, when the Permanent Committee was established, and 
December 1966. By the latter date a further R7. 5 million had been 
committed by the I. D. C. but had not yet been taken up. Of the total 
amount of R 34. l million, only R 9. 49 million relates to the f irst 3! years 
of the life of the Permanent Committee, as compared with R24. 710 
million in the three year period 1964··66. The annual rate of assistance 
in this form thus increased considerably after 1963 with the maximum 
amount for any one year occurring in 1964. But apart from this fact, 
that the annual rate of assistance in the form of share capital, subsidised 
rentals, and loans increased sharply in the last 3 years compared with 
the first 3·} years, we are unable to gleam anything of real interest from 
these statistics. There appears to be no way of calculating the monetary 
value of the element of indirect subsidisation involved in these forms of 
assistance. A major obstacle to such calculation is the fact that the 
Permanent Comrrittee reports do not indicate to what extent the total 
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capital assistance of R 34. 2 mUli.on provided by the I. D. c. consisted of 
each of the three components, share capital, loans, and investment in 
factory buildings. Clearly direct investment by the I. D. C. in border 
industries need not involve any significant elermnt of subsidisation 
at all, since it will not necessarily obtain a lower rate of return on 
such investment in border areas than it does on a similar type of invest-
ment elsewhere, By contrast~ s ince the low interest loans and sub-
sidised rentals presunably do yield a lower return than the highest 
otherwise obtainable, these sorts of assistance do involve a cost to the 
corrrnunity. It is therefore, necessary to obtain a breakdown of the cap-
ital assistance given to border industries into its three categories if a 
reliable estimate of the costs of such assistance is to be made. 
In addition to the capital assistance provided directly to firm; in 
the border areas by the Industrial Developrmnt Corporation, low interest 
loans were made to local authorities for the construction of shunting yards 
and railway sidings. Up to the end of 1946, loans totalling R 385 thousand 
repayable over 20 years at an interest rate of 2 per cent, had been nade 
to local authorities for this purpose. The cost of this assistance could 
be calculated by taking an interest r ate which reflects the full economic 
value of such loans, but since the a.tn>unt involved is so small relative to 
the assistance given directly to firms by the I. D. C. the calculation is 
hardly worth making. 
Furthermore, the Government has also undertaken considerable 
expenditures on social overhead capital. This expenditure. unlike the 
specific inducements rmntioned above, which are given to specific individ-
ual manufacturing concerns, contribute in a general way to the improvement 
of the environm:mt for private industrial development in the border areas. 
It involves the provision of water, sewerage, electricity. housing for 
both whites and Bantu, recreational facilities, schools, public buildings, 
dame etc. It is extrezmly difficult to obtain from the Pern:anent Comm-
ittee' s reports a figure representing the total amount of expenditure by the 
Government on social overhead capital in the border areas. But the 
Minister of Economic Affairs is reported 1 to have said in April 1968 
that the Government had spent R86 million in the border areas, and 
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that this amount was distributed as follows: N atal R2. 8 million, Eastern 
Cape R46. 0 million, the rest of the Cape RO. 4 million, the O r ange 
Free State RO. 8 million, and the Transvaal R36. l million. In addition 
the Electricity Supply Commission had invested R45 million. The 
Industrial Development Corporation also contributed to the building up 
of social overhead capital by providing capital for investment in hous-
ing for white personnel and by developing the i11dustrial township at 
Hammar sdale, but this expenditure apparently cannot be determined 
separately as it is included in a total amount of Rs -~ . 4 which also covers 
• h d . . /an loans to and share cap1tal pure ase 1n pnvate concerns, plus amount 
spent on the provision of factory buildings by the I. nc. 
All of the expenditure on social overhead capital is presumably 
an attempt to generate in the border areas those external economies, the 
lack of which is said to be a major impediment to g rowth. But neither 
these g lobal figures, nor, fo-r that matter, a detailed catalogue of public 
-projects undertaken in the border areas since 1960, would tell us very 
much about the profit increasing effects of such expenditure or about the 
monetary value to industrial establishments of this form of assistance. 
Nor can these expenditures be regarded as representing the opportunity 
costs of industrial decentralisation. It is not possible to tell whether, 
or to what extent, the return on public investment projects in the border 
areas is likely to be lower than the return on similar investments else -
where in the country. It should be noted, too, that the services pener-
ated by this investment, benefits not only border industries but other 
users including farmers, commerce etc. and cannot be debited entirely 
1. The I'~atal Mercury, April 2 7, 1968 . 
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to the account of decentralisation policy. Also, since comparable in-
formation for the years prior to 1960 is not available, it is not dear whether 
or to what extent investment h1. social overhead capital in the border 
areas has increased as a proportion of the total social overhead invest-
ment in the country as a whole. We should, in any case, expect a cer ~ 
tain amount of investment in social overhead capital in the border areas 
due to the natural economic growth of those areas. Finally, while the 
total amount of R4~8 million which is reported to have been invested in 
the border areas by the Government, the I. D . C. ESCOM, and private 
rm.nufacturing industry together, may seem a "stagg ering amount" it 
represents only 3. 5 per cent of the g ross domestic fixed investment. 
1 
of the country as a whole between 1960 and 196 7. 
Thus it appears tha t on the basis of the information considered, 
the total costs of the measures adopted by the Government to assist ind-
ustries in the 1960 and 1966 period cannot be estimated with any sort of 
precision. If these costs could be calculated and if the additional em-
ployment attributable to Government assistance alone could also be fairly 
precisely determined, we should then be able to estimate the costs per 
additional job of Government intervention during the period under con-
sideration. For instance if Jllight turn out that Government intervention 
alone had been responsible for, say, 3, 67~ jobs per annum during the 
6! year period and that the costs to the community per job had been, 
say, R300. The latter figure is assumed purely for illustrative purpos-
es. Whatever the usefuh1ess of this sort of information might be, it 
is clear that it cannot be applied in any straightforward way to determine 
what the total costs would have been had a greater volume of employment 
been diverted to the border areas by means of Government assistance. 
For instance, it cannot be argued that since, say, 3, 672 induced jobs 
cost R300 each or a total amount of R ' , 101, 600 that five times as many 
1. See South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin_, No. 87, March 
1968, p. S-67. 
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Government induced jobs. that is 18, 360, would have cost R5, 508, 000. 
For, as the functional relationship developed in Chapter 8 shows, the 
g reater the percentage of the country a additional manufacturing employ-
ment which is diverted to the border areas, the greater is the marginal 
excess private and social cost of diversion, and hence the total cost of 
induced border areas employment increases more than in proportion 
to the volume of induced employment. 
It seems clear that industrial decentralisation policy between 
1960 and · 966 did not impose a significant strain on the country's re-
sources, and that if did not hamper economic growth to any significant 
extent. But this does not mean that if the volume of diverted employment 
had been multiplied five times that it would have been possible to say 
the same. As the volume of diverted employment was increased, total 
costs would have risen, both because even at a constant average cost the 
total cost would have risen five fold, and because in fact average costs 
would have risen. 
A rough ideo. o£ the relationship between total costs and the volume 
of diverted employment may be obtained as follows: As we showed in 
Chapter 8 the average annual increase in employment in all manufacturing 
industries was about 4f, 483 between ~ 960 and 1966, and the corresponding 
figure after deducting non··divertible residentiary and ubiquitous activit-
ies was 33, 051. The functional relationship developed then was based 
on the latter figure. An average annual volume of 3, 67!.. Government in · 
duced jobs in the border areas is 11. l per cent of the total number of 
n on - residentiary activitie s of 33, 051, and the 'divertibility index' or 
index of excess private marginal cost for this percentage is 13. 8. A 
five fold increase in the volume of Government induced jobs, that is, 
to 18, 360 or a diverted percentage of 55. 5 per cent, however, raises 
the index or excess private marginal cost to 131. 6. Assuming, as we 
did above for illustrative purposes, that 3, 672 induced jobs cost R300 
each, the total cost if the volume of diverted employrrent had been increased 
five fold in the manner described, would have been approximately: 
Rands [ 18360 x 300 x 1 i~: ~ ] which is equal to R49, 572, 000, com ·· 
pared with a total cost of R 1 , 10 1, 600 for 3, 672 jobs. Thus a five 
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fold increase in the scale of induced decentralisation would have mula 
tip lied costs not five times but forty five times. It is of course obvious 
that if the averag e cost of 3, 672 units had been greater than R300, the 
absolute size of the costs of assistance would have been greater for 
both 3, 6 72 and 18, 360 units than our calculations suggest. 
This purely illustrative exa.n1ple of the relation between the total 
costs of generalising the approximately 3, 6 72 jobs, which we have es-
timated actually resulted from Government intervention between 1960 
and 1966, with the total costs which would have been incurred if 18, 360 
had actually been attributable to Government assistance, probably over -
states the rate at which the total costs of assistance rise as the diverted 
percentage increases. For we h ave implicitly assumed that the value 
of assistance given on each unit or induced employment would be equal 
to the marginal excess private costs of the total volume of induced em-
ployment. That is we have assumed that just as the buyer of a pro 
duct in a competitive rrarket pays a price equal to the marginal cost of 
producing the whole output, so the Government as a 'buyer' of bo1·der 
industries employment pays a p rice (subsidy) per unit equal to the mar -
ginal excess costs of the whole volume of employment diverted. But of 
course the Government is n ot in the position of a comp etitive buyer. 
By giving assistanc e 'on a selective basis', it is in effect pra cticing a 
form of price discrimination, and the closer this approximates to pe rfect 
p rice discrimination, so that each border industry receives a s ubsidy 
on each additional unit of employment no greater than is just sufficient 
to induce it to provide that additional unit, the more closely will the 
total subsidy cost be approximated by the sum of the marginal excess 
private costs of- border areas employment, and the less closely by the 
Jrlarginal excess private cost of the unit with the highe st transfer cost 
multip lied by the total number of units. 
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But the question is whether the Government has the information 
necessary to keep total subsidy payments down to this absolute minimum 
level by practicing perfect price discriminations. The greater the 
number of jobs it seeks to induce, over and above those arising spon-
taneously in the border areas, and hence the greater the number of 
applications for assistance it has to process, the less likely will it be 
that the Government will be able to keep costs down to this absolute 
minimum level. Already, even with the relatively small scale of 
effective decentralisation of the first 61 years, we observe that assis· 
tance in the :form of a 10 per cent railage rebate is given to all firms in 
the Ciskei border areas, without any detailed consideration of the 
relationship between the value of assistance received by each Ciskei 
firm and the nurrber of additional jobs, if any, provided by each firm 
as a result of it. As we noted earlier it has been reported that nx>st 
industrialists in the East London area maintained that the concessionF. 
which they re;:eived had had little or no effect on their expansion de-
cisions. If this is true it rreans that the form of discrirr.i.nation nec-
essary to minimise subsidy costs (both direct and indirect) is not being 
rigidly applied. 
FirrnJ naturally would like the largest concessions which they 
can obtain from the Government, whether these concessions have a 
bearing on their locational and expansion decisions or not, and by 
skilfull bargaining they may be able to obtain concessions in excess 
of the ninimum necessary to induce them to provide the volume of add-
itional employrmnt which the Government desires they should. Only 
if it could acquire detailed comparative cost information about the 
production activities of each and every firm assisted, could it avoid 
granting assistance which is excessive in the sense just stated. but 
this would have required a very large staff if applications giving 
18, 360 new jobs had had to be processed between 1960 and 1966. 
When the voluJTE of induced decentralisation is relatively small, a& it 
was in the period considered, the granting of such excess assistance 
may matter little so far as the total subsidy costs are concerned. 
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At higher levels of induced decentralisation, however, when the strain 
on the countrys resources is g reater, such 'wastage' may be extremely 
burdensome. 
It was argued i n Chapter 8 that there is no evidence that the 
curve relating the diverted percentage of employment to the index of 
marg inal excess private costs was changing its shape in a .fashion 
favourable to the location of industry, as a resul t of changes in the com · 
position of industrial production. Nevertheless, as the size of the nat -
ional increase in manufacturing employment increases the costs per 
unit of inducing, say, 3, 672 jobs per annum in the border areas will 
probably fall, since this number will be a lower percentage of the 
national increase in manufacturing employment. For instanc e with 
a national increase f ive times g reater than that of 196G -66 the costs 
per unit of diverting 18, 360 jobs may be much the same as the average 
cost applying to 3, f72. jobs in the 6~ y-~ar period considered. Thus it 
will become easier over time to divert any particular absolute volume of 
additional manufactu1·in~ employment. But, it is clear from the whole 
orientation of border industries policy in South Africa, that it is the 
proportion. of the national increase which is the focus of the Governments 
attention, and not any particular average annual increase in border 
areas employment measured in absolute terms. And there is no doubt 
that the p1·oportion of the national increase which occurred in the border 
areas in the first 6-l years is regarded as completely inadequate relative 
to the Governments objectives. 
This proportion, as we noted at the end of Chapter 8 may be 
increased in one of two ways, that is, either by a spontaneous tendency 
.for decentralisation to occur as a result of the operation of ordinary 
market forces, or as a result of a greater proportion of Government 
induced border areas employment. As we noted, however, the 
Schumann Committee was pessimistic about the :former possibility, 
and there did not seem to be any good reason, on the basis of the 
evidence for the period up to 1960, to believe that a substantial tendency 
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towards decentralisation would occur without Government intervention. 
Furthermore, the Bureau of Statistics data, mentioned in the previous 
section, for the period 1961/62 to 1963/64 indicated that, whether 
the proportion of the national employment increase occurring spon -
taneously in the border areas actually increased or not, the percentage 
contribution of the country's four largest industrial areas to the country's 
manufacturL"1.g employment actually rose. Thus the overall degree of 
industrial concentration showed no signs of falling even by mid 1964. 
In view of this, it appears that if there is to be a really sub 
stantial increase in the proportion of manufacturing employment occurring 
in the border areas in the near future, and not merely an increase of a 
few per cent, it would be unsafe to assume that a spontaneous tendency 
towards industrial decentralisation could be relied upon. A substantial 
increase in the proportioll of additional manufa.:.:turing employment in 
the border arer.s almost certainly requires a substantial increase in the 
diverted percentage of manufacturing employment. And this w1.question~ 
ably will require significantly larger inducements for border industries, 
a fact which the Permanent Committee itself apparently appreciates. 
For, reporting on the progress made to the middle of 1 965, the Comm-
ittee says: 
"Durhq the past five years good progress has been made with 
the development of border areas. By far the greatest industrial 
growth rate is, nevertheless, still within the metropolitan areas. 
In persuan.::e of the Government's polky to accelerate the develop ~ 
ment of retarded areas in the country, the existing measures to 
attract industries to the decentralised areas will have to be in tensi 
fied." 
The remarks quoted, then, implicitly recogrisc both that an 
increase in the \1roportion of manufacturing employment going to the 
border areas depends on Government action. and that it will involve a 
larger cost for each additional job than was the case in the first five 
years. The less significant the increase in this proportion which is 
contemplated, the smaller the ~ost increase required and the more 
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elevant would be the cost experience of the first 6i years, if it could be 
:>roperly assessed. If, however, a significant increase in the proportion 
.s desired, a correspondingly significant increase in the costs of each 
1dditional job will be necessary, and the relevance o:f the cost experience 
) f the first 6~ years would be reduced accordingly. Since, as our dis-
;:ussion in the concluding chapter of this study shows, the increase in 
the scale of industrial decentralisation required, compared with the very 
limited amount achieved ill the first 6~ years, is large, the probable cost 
of such an increase can only be meaningfully discussed in the light o:f a 
functional relationship , such as that developed in Chapter 8 above, between 
the diverted percentage of manufacturing , employment and the marginal 
excess private costs of diversion. 
Finally, it should be noted, the relevance of past costs is still 
further reduced if, apart from its size, the geographical distribution of 
induced employment in the past is regarded as unsatisfactory, and if great-
er emphasis i e to be p,iven to less favourably placed border areas in future. 
A s was mentioned earlier, any tendency to concentrate to a g reater extent 
on more remote areas like the Ciskei border areas, in future, and to lesser 
extent on better situated centres like Rosslyn and Hammarsdale, will tend to 
raise the costs of planned decentralisation. It is, therefore, of some int~ 
erest to note the following, contained in the Permanent Committee Report 
for 1966: 
"As both the Transkei and Ciskei are dependent for the border areas, 
on townn in the region from East London to Queensto\vn, it has become 
necessary to create opportunities for employment on a larg e scale 
in that region in order to provide :for the substantial population pressure 
experienced from the nearby Bantu homelands. The Department of 
P lanning is at present taking steps to investigate the possibilities of an 
industrial area at Berlin where land is readily available. 11 
In the first 6~ years, by contrast, the Permanent Committee's 
!£forts were concentrated in large measure on development of centres like 
~osslyn and Hammarsdale which are close to existing industrial areas. 
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Of the border areas further away from the four major industrial areas, 
those in Central Natal, with their better geographical position and 
richer natural resource endownEnt, conJ>ared with centres close to the 
lllljor Bantu areas of the Transvaal and Cape, have rrade the most rapid 
progress in the past. The proposed attempt to alter the distribution of 
the additional border areas employrnmt in favour of the problem areas 
of the Transvaal and Cape, may, therefore, be expected to reinforce 
the tendency for costs to rise as the overall scale of decentralisation 
is stepped up. 
The Efficacy of the Special Incentives. 
The desired result of border industries policy is an accelerated 
rate of expansion of manufacturing employment in the border areas. The 
efficacy of the present system of inducements, and the criteria applied 
in deciding whether and to what extent particular projects should be assis-
ted, rmet therefore be judged in the light of this objective. This i8 clear-
ly a question of some importance, since the better adapted are the in-
ducerrents to this purpose the lower will be the costs of attaining the 
objectives of the policy at any particular level. 
Ackley and Dini 1 have attenpted to assess the impact of the in-
centives offered to firms in Southern Italy by taking a number of hypo-
thetical firms, tnlldng assumptions about their capital structure, turn-
over etc. , and on this basis calculating the difference which each of the 
1. G. Ackley and L . Dini, "Tax and Credit Aids to Industrial Development 
in Southern Italy. 11 Banca Nasionale del Lavora. - Quarterly Review, 
Deceni>er 1959, pp. 339 - 68. 
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incentives makes to the costs of a firm in the South compared with a 
similar firm in the North. Adopting this procedure they come to the 
conclusion that "assuming equal operating costs and returns - when full 
advantage is taken of the agevolazioni [facilities or special aids] , they 
could increase a 'normal' 6 to 9 per cent profit rate before taxes by a 
further 5 to 6 per cent. For highly profitable enterprises - profit 
rates of 15 to 20 per cent before taxes ·· the agevolazioni would appear 
to add another 7 t o 9 per cent before taxes. After taxes, the effect is 
still more striking". 1 
The inducements which Ackley and Dini take into account in 
making their calculations are the following: 2 (1) Reduction of registration 
fees and mortgage taxes on deeds relating to the first transfer of ownership 
of land and buildings required for the new or additional investment. 
(2) Exemption from payment of customs duties on imports of machinery 
and building materials for new or expanded plants. (3) Reduction by 
50 per cent of the turnover tax on machinery, building materials and 
other goods required for new or additional investment in the South. 
(4) Direct investment subsidies which may be g ranted to new or expan-
ded small and medium - sized enterprises (i. e. those employing 500 or 
fewer workers) located in communities in the South in which population 
is less than 200, 000 and in which there is a deficiency of industrial ac-
tivity. These subsidies consist of : (a) Up to 20 per cent of the cost of 
buildings and of works necessary to connect them with il:>ads and rail 
ways, water supply. sewers, electricity and gas etc. (b) Up to 20 per 
cent of the cost of acquisition and installation of machinery, where 
1. op. cit. • p. 359. 
2. op. cit. , pp. 342 · 345. 
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advantage is not taken of the exemption from customs duties. (5) Exemp 
tion from income tax of up to 50 per cent of profits declared by enter · 
prises and invested in new and additional facilities in Southern Italy. 
This exemption is available for up to 50 per cent of the cost of the new 
or. additional investment. The income tax rate is normally 18 per cent 
so that invest:rr:ent in the South may include "Free" capital to the extent 
of 9 per cent of the amount invested, when it is made by a profitable 
Italian enterprise. (6) Medium term loans at special interest rates for 
up to 70 per cent of the cost of new investment by small and medium 
sized enterprises. (7) Exemption from income tax or profits earned on 
the new investment for a period of 10 years. As noted above the normal 
central Government rate was 18 per cent. 
Two other forms of assistance which they mention but do not 
include in their calculations, perhaps because of the difficulty of attach· 
ing a value to them, are (a) reductions of freight rates of up to 50 per 
cent for the transportation of machinery, materials, and supplies for 
the construction or expansion of plant and equipment, or their removal 
to Southern Italy, and {b) participation of the Sicilian Regional Administrat· 
ion in the equ,ity capital of enterprises, up to a limit of 25 per cent. 
By contrast, the principal incentives given directly to border 
industries in South Africaa-e the various tax allowances listed earlier, 
subsidised rentals on land and buildings, and low interest loans, the 
railage rebate for Ciskei :firms and the contribution of ~quity capital by 
the I. D. C. The latter two will be left out of consideration for the same 
reasons which presumably led Ackley and Dini to neelect the similar 
Italian inducements. What must be obvious then is that the remaining 
three border industries incentives, tax rebates, subsidised rentals and 
low interest loans are a much less potent combination than the seven mea-
sures taken into account by Ackley and Dini in making their calculations. 
The total exemption from income taxes for a period of ten years in South· 
ern Italy is a much strongel." inducement than all the border areas tax 
allowances together, and low interest loans are common to reg ional 
development policy in both Italy and South Africa. In addition, however, 
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the Southern Italian inducements include what is p robably the most sig 
nifi cant inducement of all those listed, the direct i nvestment subsidies. 
We should, therefore, expect the profit increasin:r effect of the subsidies 
available directly to border industries to be considerably smaller than 
the profit increasing effect cal culated by Ackley and D i n i and mentioned 
above. 
The writer has taken orLe of the hypothetical examples used by 
Ackley and Dini, in whh:h the.y make the following assumptions: a basic 
capital cost of 1000, sales of 1250, gross profit of ~50, half the 
f ixed capital of 750. 00 is borrowed at a rate o: interest of 8 per cent 
in the North and 3 per cent in the South. So as to facilitate the com 
parison whi.:.:h it is desired to make, it is assumed here that 8 per cent 
and 3 per cent are the interest rates applying to non border aud border 
areas respectively, though this overstates the benefit received by border 
industries i n this respect. Following the procedure used by Ackley and 
Dini, the writer Iinds that the rate of profit on capital before tax is only 
1. ~ per cent higher in the border areas than for similar plants elsewhere. 
This compares with a 5 per cent increase in the profit rate before tax 
in Southern Italy on the basis of the same lly-pothetical example. The 
beneficial effect on the border industries profit rate would be increased 
by taking into account the subsidised rentals, but since the investment 
i n land and buildings in the example used by Ackley and Dini is only about 
a quarter of total investment i n fixed capital, the overall picture would 
not be c hanged si1nificantly by incorporating subsidised rentals into the 
calculation. Thus the beneficial effect on profits before taxes of induce · 
ments available to border industries is significantly smaller than those 
applying to Southern Italy. 
The results obtained by Ackley and D i n i obviously do not mean 
that the rate of prolit on capital will be increased by between 5 and 9 
per cent ii a particular new plant is established in the South rather than 
in the North. As they point out, their estimates were made on the 
assumption that costs and sales would be the same Ll"l the two regions. 
But this of course is hardly likely to be the case. Unless non profit, 
that is, psychological and social, factors play a decisive part in a 
significant number of locational decisions and tend systematic ally 
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to favour location in the Italian North (a possibility discussed at some 
length in Chapter 5 above and for which there appeared to be no evidence) 
we may take it that the need to g rant ;>'l,ssistance to Southern industries 
indicates that entreprineurs expect their costs to be higher there than else · 
where. Ackley and Dini, thus, adopt an alternative approach, and 
seek to determine how large a percentage excess of production costs 
in the South over those in the North can be offset by the agevolazioni. 
They find that in the case of a firm with a given capital invest 
ment, and sales of 1 ~5t: in both North and South, and production 
costs of 1000 in the North, production costs could have been 9. 0 per 
cent higher in the South without giving the Souther~ firm a lower rate of 
profit after tax. Alternatively assuming sales of 2500 in both N orth 
and South and costs of 2;!.50 in the N orth, production costs in the South 
could be ~ per c ent higher than in the North, and yet either location would 
yield the same rate of profit. The permissible proportionate excess 
cost is lower in the latter than in the former bec ause of the tendency of 
the inducements to :favour c apital intensive activities. As we saw above 
the beneficial effects of inducements on the profit rate before tax was 
several times higher in Italy than in South Africa. Despite the higher 
tax rate in South Mrica which tends to increase the importance o£ tax 
con.cef"sions i n South Africa, compared with Italy, the total exemption 
from taxes in Southern Italy, as against the investment and initial allow · 
ances in South A frica, results in a g reater tax saving for the Southern 
Italian .firm compared with a firm in the border areas. Thus, whereas 
the permissible cost excess calculated by Ackley and Dini amount to 
9 per cent and 4 per c ent respectively in the two cases they have chosen, 
the corresponding percentages fur South Africa, are substantially 
lower. 
It appears then from these and our earlier calculations that the 
Italian incentives are some three or four times as strong as those which 
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we have considered in making the calculations for South Africa. If 
all the incentives had been inc orporated into our calculations the 
profit increasing effect of the assistance available to border indus · 
tries would doubtless have been g reater. But even without a measure 
of the full benefit available to border industries it is clear that it is 
significantly smaller than that conferred on f irms in Southern Italy 
by the inducements applying to them. 
Despite this fact, attempts to divert industrial capacity from 
the North to the South in Italy have not met with notable sucess. l 
It is therefore, not surprising that the results achieved in South Africa 
have been as meagre as we have shown them to be. Even allowing for 
possible differences in the functional relationship between marginal 
excess private costs and the diverted percentage of additional rr:a.nufac-
turing employment in Italian, compared with South Africa, it is clear 
that the level of the incentives offered to border industries will have to be 
increased considerably if a significant proportion of industrial employ· 
ment is to be diverted to border areas. As we have stressed repeatedly, 
the greater the deg ree of industrial decentralisation sought, the greater 
will have to be the increase in the inducements to border industries 
above their present level. 
Precisely how much g reater the assistance offered to border 
industries must be in order to increase the scale of industrial decent · 
r a lisation to any particular desired level we cannot say on the basis 
oi the available information. The problem might possibly be approached 
by trying to determine how many of those plants which would establish 
themselves in border area s without intervention, would incur additional 
total costs, processing and transport costs together, not exceeding the 
1. See Vera Lutz, op. cit., p. 1Z2 ·129. 
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approximately three to four per cent, which our calculations above 
suggest is the maximum permitted by the present inducements, if the 
rate of profit in the border areas is not to fall below that obtainable in 
the best alternative site. We could then attempt to assess the number 
and significance of such firms whose additional costs in border areas 
would not exceed a higher proportion of, say, six to eight per cent 
permitted by a doubling of the general level of the incentives, and so 
on. 
The level of the assistance required, however, obviously 
depends on the nature of the incentives used. As we observed at the 
beginning of this sec tion, the better adapted are the inducements to 
this purpose the lower will be the costs of attaining the objectives of the 
policy at any particular level. To put the same thing in a different 
way, the more appropriate the measures adopted, the g reater will be 
the results achieved at any particular total cost to the community. 
In the light o£ this, two features of the pre sent set of induce~ 
rnents are especially noteworthy. F irstly, so far as the assistance 
g iven directly to border industries is concerned there is a heavy em-
phasis on tax rebates. Ackley and Dini' s investigations showed tha t 
the most important incentives available to the South were the direct 
subsidies on machinery and plant, the customs exemption, the loans 
at special interest rates, and the tax exemptions on reinvested profits . 
They stated: "The exemption from income tax of pro.fits earned in 
new Southern ent~rprises is of lesser importance, ext...ept where the 
Southern enterprise is a lready p ro.fitable. We question the effective -
ness of this particular provision except on psychological grounds, 
1 
an argument often advanced". 
1. op. cit., p p . 364-5. 
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This is a point of some significance. It means that if a firm 
would not have made a profit in the border areas before tax (after 
taking the other inducerrents into account) the profits tax exemption 
does nothing to increase the profitability of the enterprise and there-
fore has no irrpact on the location of industry. Thus the profits tax 
rebate can provide an effective incentive only in the case of those 
investments which would make a profit before tax, that is on those firms 
whose additional total costs in the border areas would not exceed by 
more than one or two per cent the total costs which would have been 
incurred in the best alternative site. ThiEl clearly linits the effective-
ness of the measure to the most mobile or footloose industries, which 
are capable of operating more or less equally successfully in either 
a border area or one of the larger industrial areas. This helps 
further to explain why no conspicuous success has been achieved yet 
and why, as the Permanent Committee clearly appreciates, it will 
be necessary to raise the amount of assistance if the proportion of 
additional manufacturing employrmnt occurring in the border areas is 
to increase in future. I£ industry is to be decentralised on such a 
scale that activities which would make losses without Government in-
tervention have to be diverted, it is necessary that inducerrents other 
than tax rebates be utilized more fully. At present, the inducements 
affecting profits before tax appear to be very small, and are unlikely 
to have a decisive bearbg on the location of a large volume of activit-
ies. 
The other noteworthy feature of the present set of inducements 
is that the majority of them are dependent in some way or another upo11. 
the uoe of capital. Low interest loans, subsidised rentals, and all 
the tax allowances, with the exception of those relating to the cost of 
water, power and transport and the concession given only to firms 
rmving to border areas from other areas, tend to encourage the use 
of capital. The more capital intensive the industry and the production 
technique it uses, the greater is likely to be the size of the assistance 
received relative to total costs of production. Thus, in general, the 
proportionate cost reducing effect of the incentives per unit of output, 
tends to be greater the grea ter the degree of capital intensity. 
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The types of subsidies used can only be regarded as appropriate 
or inappropriate in rela tion to some given end. It was for this reason 
that we took some trouble earlier on, in Chapters 5 and 6, to establish 
the precise nature of the objective of border industries policy. If 
the objective had been found to be an increase in economic efficiency, 
then as we argued, we should have required a complex array of subtle 
measures designed to correct for those exteraal affects relevant to 
locational decisions. Maximisation of output on the other hand would 
have required that assistance to :firms be proportional to their output. 
As it happens, however the objective of border industries policy is 
to increase the amount of employment, in particular Bantu employmf,:!nt, 
in the border areas. 
In Chapter 6, we considered the effect of relating the subsidy 
payment to output. If this was done then, it was noted, the greater 
the labour coefficient of an industry, the smaller would be the subsidy 
per worker represented by a given subsidy per unit, and, therefore, 
other things being equal, the lower would be the marginal cost per 
unit of employment in the border areas. Thus, other things being equal, 
industries with a higher labour coefficient should be paid a large r sub· 
sidy per unit of output, if the marginal cost of induced employment in 
the border areas is to be made equal for all industries, and hence the 
total cost of any amount of induced border areas employment minimised. 
Subject to this r ule, the op timum level of subsidy, is given by the 
equality of the values of the marginal social utilities derived from em-
ployment in all industries with the marginal social costs of employment 
i."l all industires.. Since it js specifically Bantu employment with which 
the policy is concerned, the rule should be amended to take this into 
accou..."lt: Other things being equal, industries with a higher Bantu 
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labour coefficient should be paid a higher subsidy per unit of output than 
those with a lower coefficient, if the marginal cost of induced employment 
in the border areas is to be made ~qual for all industries, and hence the 
total cost of any particular amount of border areas employment minim i sed. 
In short, other things being equal, when an output subsidy is err.ployed 
greater preferential treatment should be given to Bantu labour intensive 
industries. 
In fact, however, an output subsidy is not included among the 
border industries inducements. We assumed in Chapter 6 that the only 
form of inducement to border industries was an output subsidy, simply 
in order to provide a preliminary general criterion for granting assistance 
to individual industries. It was also desirable to avoid becoming involved 
in the question of the optimum subsidy types prematurely, or to assume 
what we had not yet firmly established, narrely, that it is Bantu employment 
as such for which the Government is prepared to pay a price. 
But the rule devised above is an extrerrely useful basis of com-
p a rison. For, by contrast, the effect of the types o£ measures actually 
used is that heavy users of capital will receive the largest inducements 
in absolute terms, those with the highest capital/labour ratio will receive 
the largest subsidy per unit of labour, and those with the highest capital/ 
output ratio the largest subsidy per unit of out'pur, if the same induce-
zrents are given to every assisted industry. It is not lo£;ically necessary 
for the indust ry with the highest capital/labour ratio also to have the 
highest capital/ output ratio, since it is possible for capital in such an 
industry to be so hig hly productive that its capital/output ratio is lower than 
in another industry in which the capital/labour ratio is lower. As a matter 
of fact, however, there is a high direct correlation between these two 
ratios, and, t herefore, a high inverse corre lation between the capital/ 
labour ratio and the labour/ output r a tio. Thus the effect of applying the 
present inducements in the same way to all industries is that, other thing s 
being equal, industries receiving a large subsidy per unit of output will 
tend to have a correspondingly low labour coefficient. This result is 
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the very opposite of that required by the marginal rule stated above, and 
consequently, instead of leading to a least cost situation tends to generate 
any given amount of employment at the maximum cost. 
It must be stressed, however, that this conclusion holds with 
certainty only if the present inducements are applied in the same way 
to all assisted industries, that is, if all borrowed the same proportion 
of their total capital from the I. D. C. at the same rate of interest, if 
all received the same tax rebates etc. Is it possible that without 
abandoning the heavy emphasis on allowances related to capital usage, 
a more satisfactory result can be achieved by varying the percentage 
applicable to different industries? In principle this could be done by 
giving larger percentage allowances to the more labour intensive ind-
ustries. 
For instance in Britain, where as Thomas Wilson points out, 
industrial location policy also relies mainly on forms of assistance 
which are related primarily to capital expenditure, the criterion for 
determining the eligibility of firms for such assistance "is still the 
possibility of expanding employment. The development districts are 
chosen w ith regard to the number out of work (initially 4i per cent 
or more). The assistance provided to a particular firm within one of 
these areas roughly depends in turn on the number of jobs it is expected 
1 
to offer. 11 
It appears, too, that the Italian government in granting indust-
rial credits to firms in the South ha,s used additional employment as 
one of its criteria. Vera Lutz informs us that ISVEIMER, the major 
credit institute for the Southern Italian Mainland; "reports having 
given specially favourable consideration, among applicants of other --
wise equal merit, to those submitting projects which were expected 
to g ive much employment, or which were to be located in particularly 
poor industrially backward areas, and so on". 2 
1. Thomas Wilson, P la:;:ming and Growth, (lvlacmillan; London, 1964) 
p. 130. 
V. Lutz. op.cit., p. 117. 
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It is by no means clear; however, that this form of discrimin-
ation between industries overcomes the fundamental problem, unless 
labour coefficients are not influenced significantly by the relative 
prices of labour and capital. For if the capital related allowances 
were applied more intensively to industries with a high labour co-
efficient, the tendency to substitute capital for labour in these indus-
tries would still be present. lt may well be that in the labour inten-
sive industries, the scope for an economic substitution of capital for 
labour in response to a fall in the price of capital, is greater than 
in Jl'Dre capital industries. Thus, this tendency to e11courage the 
use of capital, which tends to raise the costs of any particular anx>unt 
of additional employment. is not elininated. Apart from this difficulty 
discrimination between industries in respect of the percentage capital 
allowances given, is a cumbersome procedure, requiring an increase 
in the discretionary power of a Government department and, there fore, 
involving an intensification of the problems associated with discretion-
ary control in the econonic sphere. As the scale of the decentralisation 
prograrnne is increased, the difficulty of exercising this discretion in 
a consistent way will be magnified. 
It is not being argued that concessions related to capita l ex-
penditure do not tend to encourage errployrrent in the border areas. 
Rather, the point is that the use of capital allowances has certain un-
desirable effects and that we should, therefore, at least consider 
whether there are nDre appropriate practicable types of inducerrents 
available. If only a small degree of decen tralisation were required by 
the Government, the wastaRe resulting from the use of inefficient in-
struments might be neglig ibl e . But it appears, decentralisation is 
required on such a large Bcal~ that even if the most efficient ~thods 
are used the burden on the community will be considerable. Under 
these circumstances it is clearly worthwhile taking so~ trouble to 
avoid any unnecessary addition to the burden. 
4.0Z 
So far as a profits tax rebate is concerned. it seems preferable 
to allow a straightforward reduction. in the rate of taxation on pr':lfits 
or a complete tax holiday for a specified nur.llber of years in border areas, 
as is done in Southern Italy, rather than to use investment and initial 
allowances. A. R. Prest writes as follows: "The cheapening of the 
cost of capital implied in accelerated depreciation, etc., produces 
both a bias in favour of capitalistic methods of production inside any one 
firm and relatively greater encouragement to those industries which are 
more than normally capital intensive. This is obviously a point of 
great importance for employment and output levels in countries which 
are relatively poorly endowed with capital and relatively well endowed 
with labour. " 1 A straight profits tax concession is at least neutral 
with respect .to the capital intensity of different industries and the type 
of technique used, and so avoids the undesirable effects mentioned by 
Prest. 
Preferable even to such neutral inducements. however, are 
ones biased in the right direction from the point of view of the benefits 
sought from the border industries policy. Vera Lut~, noting the un-
desirable tendency for the Italian inducements to encourage capital 
intensity says: "If a larger employment effect had been desired, part 
at least of the weight of the subsidies would have had to fall on labour 
costs. One possibility here would ha.ve been to relieve the Southern 
employer from contributions to the Family Allowance Fund, and to 
place this burden., instead of some other, on the national exchequer. 
In 1958 farrily allowances cost Southern industry and other non-agricul-
tural activities - in spite of a sizeable subsidy from Northern firrile -
some 60 million lire. 112 
1. 
? 
~· 
Fiscal Survey of the British Caribbean, (H. M. S. 0 ., 1957), pp. 27-28. 
op. cit. , p . 121. 
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Since the opportunity to provide a similar form of relief to 
border industries does not exist, it may be worthwhile considering the 
possibility of a subsidy proportional to labour costs. A subsidy of 
this sort was suggested by A. R . P rest1for use in the British Caribbean. 
and subsequently by J. E. W.,eade 2 for Mauritius. In the context of re-
3 gional development poliey. Colin Clark has recently suggested the 
use of a system of regional.pay-roll taxes and rebates to encourage the 
decentralisation of industry in Britain. Given the fact that Governments 
prefer, for political reasons, t o provide assistance by foregoing revenue 
rather than by direct payments to fir:rna, it may very well be more feas-
ible for this reanon to introduce a system of tax rebates related to the 
size of the wage bill rather than a dh:ect subsidy calculated on the same 
basio. 
It may be that because of the tertnJ of our treaty arrangements 
with GATT, or for other political or administrative reasons, schemes 
involving direct subsidies or tax rebates related to the wage bill, 
cannot be seriously considered by the Government. The purpose of 
our discussion of the efficiency of the present set of inducements has 
simply been to suggest that considerations be given to the possibility 
of devising practicable alternative measures of a more neutral sort, 
which do not exert the capital using biaa of most of those currently in 
use. Whatever the degree of industrial decentralisation the Govern-
ment may have decided to bring about, it is clearly desirable that it 
should be done by inflicting as little dan:age on the comnu.."'lity ae possible. 
The more arrbitious their aims, the more necessary is it to seek the 
instrurrents most appropriate to the task. 
I. Prest, op. cit. • p. 102. 
2. Mauritius: a caee study in Malthusian Economy", Economic Journal, 
September, 1961. 
3. Indilstrial Location and Economic Potential. Lloyds Bank Review, 
October, 1966, pp. 1-16. 
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)me Other Sources of Difficulty. 
The Permanent Committee grants or refuses assistance to 
ndividual firms on a selective basis. that is, in the light of each appli-
:ants particular circumstances. In order to avoid inconsistancy and 
l rbitrarieness, however. it is clearly necessary that applications be 
considered in the context of a fairly sharply defined set of .rules and 
criteria. In this regard there are several issues which seem to call 
for attention and which we shall now touch on very briefly. 
Firstly there is the question whether a definite time limit should 
be set on the receipt of assistance by each individual concern, so that 
only firms considered capable of making a profit without the Govern-
trent's help, after a specified number of years, be assisted. Thomas 
Wilson makes the following interesting observation: 
"In Great Britain the assistance offered relates in the main to 
capital expenditure rather than running costs. The principle behind 
this seems to be that firms assisted should be able to carry on with-
out Government help. More generally this assumption is necessary 
if the policy is to be justified by the severe teet of its effect on total 
national output. It ie necessary to believe that help of this kind 
will finally permit a breakthrough in the regions that have benefited. 
Indeed it is necessary to go further and to auppose that expansion 
in these areas will ultimately be more promising than expansion in 
1 
what are now the more prosperous areas. " 
Wilson' s view seems to be perfectly sound except in one respec~ 
As we showed in Chapter 5. if external effects are present it may be 
possible for the Government to increase economic efficiency by taking 
various steps, including the subsidisation of border industries, to 
'correct' for these external effects. Some of these external effects 
;. P lanning and Growth {Macmillan. London, 1964). p . 132. 
nay be of a purely temporary sort, like those associated with the 
infant indust ry argument, and hence, on e conomic grounds, assi stance' 
related to such ef&!cte can be just ified for only a limited period. 
lndeed as we noted in Chapter 5, and as Wilson ' s remarks confi rm, 
it is necessary that infant indt:stries of this sort tend with the passage 
of time to become more efficient in border areas than they would have 
been if s i ted elaewhere. But there may be divergences between social 
and private cost of & more lasting sort, and economic efficency will 
it seems be enhanced by continuing assistance related to these diver-
gences for as l ong as they persist. 
It is n vertheless true, that unless assisted industries a.re 
within a reasonable period bf time able to earn satisfactory profits 
without aid, the total size of the assistance given each year would 
grow cumulatively as more and more new firms were assisted. 
Unless the amount of assistance which can be justified on the basis of 
external effects of a durable sort i s significant, the burden of the total 
assistance given will increase steadily. In fact, however, as we noted 
in Chapter 5, there is no evidence whatsoever th t the number and sig-
nificance of such external effects is great enough to support a substantial 
programme of indust rial decentralisation. Thus from an economic view• 
point it is necessary that the great bulk of assistance given be designed 
so that it either Wls away automatically or is deliberately withdrawn after 
a reasonabl e period of t ime. 
Thh, however. would limit the effectiveness of the inducements 
to fi rms likely to suffer only temporary cost disadvantages in border 
areas, and which will ultimately be able to stand on their own feet. 
To insist on continuing assi stance to such cases, howev r, may render 
i t impossible to achieve that degree of industrial decentralisation which 
the Government regards as optimal from a social point of view. Just 
a.s sorre writers in the field of international trade theory doubt that a 
;igni ficant proportion of tariff protection can be just ified by the infant 
ndustry argument . so should we be sceptical of similar arguments in 
1 the context of regional development policy. As Wilson's comments 
IUggest the te st of economic efficiency is a severe one. It is virtually 
:ertain that the cost of decentralisation cannot be prevented from be-
:oming cumulative if a large scale programme is undertaken. It 
:ollows that it might defeat the purposes of the border industries policy 
lf the Permanent Committee were to accept as one of its rules that 
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all recipients of aid should be able to earn satisfactory profits without 
b.elp after a reasonable period of time, or, what is essentially the same 
thing, that assistance always be 'justified by the severe test of its effect 
on total national output' . 
A second issue involves the attitude of the Government to the 
granting of assistance to firma already established in the border areas, 
as distinct from new border industries. As was noted above, the Govern-
rnmt has granted concessions to a significant number of established 
industries. And, indeed, there is much to be said for this, since many 
of these older firms suffer f rom precisely the same sort of difficulties 
as the new firrrB, and it may be argued. assistance which prevents the 
closing down or contraction of an old plant, or enables it to expand when 
it might not otherwise have done so, may have as beneficial an effect on 
employment relative to cost, as assistance provided to a firm establish-
ing itself in the border areas for the first time. Nevertheless the grant-
ing of assistance indiacrininately to old firma in the border areas would 
raise the costs of decentralisation unnecesaarily, and in order to avoid 
this the marginal rule developed in the last section should be adhered to 
as closely as possible. 
Thirdly, there is the problem of "unfair competition" between 
assisted firms in the border areas and those operating elsewhere. 
tn his statement of June 2, 1960, the Prime Minister said: "The Union 
>f South Africa forms a single common market in which competition is 
he spur to efficiency, progress and a rising standard of living. It 
s to be expected that during the process of economic development the 
arne type of industry would in the course of years show a different 
tte of growth in the different regions, and that some measure of 
eadjustment would have to take place in some industries in certain 
1reas. It is the natural traditional and worldwide means of selection 
•f industrial locations. 11 
This appears to have been a warning to existing firms that 
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hey should be prepared to face competition from.border industries . 
)ubsequently, however, in one of the PC!rrnanent Committee ' s progress 
reports, the following remark was made: "It is the policy of the 
::iovernment and of the Permanent Committee, as far al!l possible to 
encourag e industrial decentralisation in the bo1•der areas on a com-
plementa ry and not on a competitive basis." 
The Government appears in fact to have been careful about 
the effects of competition from border industries on firms elsewhere. 
For instance, the Government has shown considerable reticence about 
providing assistance to firms in the clothing industry, perhaps because 
of the latter1s strong opposition even to the Governments policy of regional 
wage differentiation. But this sort of consideration, if persisted with, 
will clearly serioual.y restrict the scope for successful Government 
intervention in the location of industry. The clothing industry, though 
a relatively Blow growing sector now, is easily the most significant of 
the more easily divertit.le industries, as we say in Chapter 8, and f ailure 
to exploit fully the scope for decentralisation in thia, and othel(mobile 
industries strongly concentrated in the metropolitan areas will tend to 
increaoe the costs of the whole scheme, and drastically diminish the 
prospects of diverting a significant proportion of additional manufacturing 
employment. The problem of inter-regional competition will probably 
tend to be magnified as the rate of decentrali zation is increased. 
CHAPTER 10 
THE ADVENT OF INDUSTRIAL LICENSING 
traduction. 
Almost exactly seven years after the Governrrent had given 
ae assurance that ttno compulsory measures will be applied to force 
1dustrialists to establish th2mselves in Border Areastt, the Physical 
•tanning and Utilization of Resources Act No. 88 of 1967 became law. 
~s we suggested early in the last chapter, there has been a consistent 
endency for South African opinion to underestinate the difficulty, and 
1ence the costs, of inducing industrial decentralisation on a large scale. 
on the light of experience during the sixties it is now clear that the 
a2asures proposed by the Toniinson and Viljoen Connissions were 
hopelessly inadequate to the task. Even the ~asures introduced in 
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1960, though significantly stronger than those proposed by the two comm-
issions mentioned, were soon seen to be much too nild, and were super-
seded by the "r:rore persuasive measures" of May 1964. Little more 
than a year later we find in a report of the Permanent Committee the 
statement that "the existing incentive measures to attract industries to 
the decentralised areas will have to be intensified", since, though "border 
industries succeeded in employing 8, ZOO Bantu per year over the past 
five years," "this figure waa considered to be too low "compared with the 
average annual entry of 41, 300 Bantu into secondary industry for the 
years 1961/62 to 1963/64". 
Experience, it appears, was gradually forcing the Governln!nt 
to the conclusion that their earlier estimates of the costa, and hence 
of the level of assistance required for a significant programme of 
industrial decentralisation were much too low, and that considerably 
more drastic measures were needed. In the Permanent Cotnnittee 
report covering progress made up to June 1965 we already find the 
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foll~wiL1g hint of what i s to come: "Accorditig to the DepartrrJent r esponsible 
for the implementation of decentrali zatiou. in England, the n e;tative meas-
ures applicable in the larY,e cities, aupplementary to the incentive meaa · 
ures ia underdevel oped areas, are essenti.a.i. for effective de<;euh·alisation. " 
It is especially noteworthy, however, that the lhysical 1-'lannin.g Act (as 
we shall call it henceforth), pnssed in mid··l967, was not accompanied by 
any i ncrease in the size of the inducements offered to border industries. 
Whatever else may be said about the !•hysical Planning Act, it 
can no longer be argued that the power• which it confers on the ~dnister 
of Planuine- are insuffi cient to check the further expansion of manufa(:t-
uring industry in the major industrial areas. But it is still necessary 
to consider the probable effects of using these powers to prevent ind-
ustri al concerns from becoming established or expanding in ~ertain 
proclai med areas. And the possibility remains that the costs of bring-
ing about "decongestion" or udece,ttralisation", whether by this rnear'• or 
any other, are still being underestimated by the authorities. For one 
thine is clear about a system of industri al licensing o! thi s sort, and it 
is that while physical controls may alter the incidence of the costs of 
decentraliaation, thay cannot avoid them. 
The most significant provi&ion of the Physical f•lanning Act is 
that enabling the Minister of Planninr to prohibit the establhhment or 
expansion of any factory in any area proclaimed a 'controlled area' in 
terms of the Act. Factories may be established or extended in such 
areas only with the prior written approval of the Minister of F-lanning. 
The only factories exempted from the need to obtain a permit to estab-
lish themselves in controlled areas, are those which do not employ 
Bantu labour. In all areas, whether declared .:ontrolled areas or l'lot, 
permission is required to establish factories on land whi ch has not yet 
been zoned for industrial purposes under a town plannin~ scheme or 
proclaimed an industrial township. 
The definition &;iven in the Act of an extension of a factory is 
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particularly note'WOrthy and is crucial to a11. understanding of the effects 
of using the provisions of the Act to curb "congestion". It is simply 
11any increase in the number of Bantu employees in su<:h factory". 
The purpose of the Act, therefore, is prin:arily to reduce the rate of 
inflow of Bantu into certain of the country's larger cities. The Government 
is apparently not opposed to the continued growth of the controlled areas, 
despite the congestion costs which are said to accompany such g rowth, 
provided it can be achieved without an increase in the number of Bantu 
workers. Indeed, industrialists are frequently exhorted to expand in 
metropolitan areas by the introduction of more capital intensive techni-
ques, so as to eliminate the need to take on additional Bantu labour. 
With effect from 19th January 1968, thirty seven magisterial 
districts were declared controlled areas. The districts concerned in the 
Cape are Port E lizabeth- llitenhage, and those comprising the Western 
Cape industrial area as defil'led in Chapter 3. In the Transvaal all 
the magisterial districts comprising the Southern Transvaal industrial 
area, plus a number of other districts contiguous to this area, including 
some quite significant ones like Klerkskorp. Potchefstroom and Sasolburg 
are controlled areas. It is of considerable interest to note, however, 
that the important industrial centres o£ Durban and P inetown are not 
amongst these 37 controlled areas. The Government apparently, now 
regards virtually the whole of Natal, including Durban and Pinetown as a 
1 border area. The fact that this legislation was felt to be necessary 
suggests that an attempt will be made to curb the industrial expansion 
of the metropolitan areas more drastically than it has been possible 
to do in the past. But it is of course still too early to say exactly 
how extensively the Minister will use the powers which the Act gives him. 
We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to consideration of the probable 
1. See the remarks by the Minister of Plcuming, reported i n the Daily 
News, Durban, on January 27, 1968. 
effects of applying these treasures with various assurred degrees of 
severity. 
First, it should be noted that the objective of checking the 
expansion of the larger industrial areas is logically distinct from that 
of increasing the rate of growth of industrial employment in the border 
areas. An increased readiness to give effect to the former objective, 
does not necessarily irq>ly a correspondingly increased readiness to 
ensure that alternative employment opportunities are available in the 
latter. For, as we shall show, there is no economic mechanism 
which automatically ensures that whenever plans to increase Bantu 
enploynent in the rretropolitan areas are upset by the Physical 
Planning act, an equal additional nurrber of enployment opportunities 
for Bantu arises in the border areas instead .. 
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It is, indeed. possible that the Physical P lanning Act s ignifies a 
shift of errphasis in Government policy from the objective of providing 
increased industrial employment in the border areas, to that of merely 
ensuring that Bantu employment does not increase in the cities, and that the 
Government is prepared to allow a significant imbalance to arise between 
the nuni>er of Bantu employees denied employment in industry in the 
controlled areas, as a result of the licensing system e.nd the number of 
additional workers who can be employed in manufacturing industry in the 
border and Bantu areas. But this would inply that the Government was 
prepared to contemplate a long term cun:ulative increase in the nun:bere 
oi Bantu forced. to seek employrrent in manufacturing industry in the border 
and Bantu areas, because of the application of the Act, relative to the 
number of employ~nt opportunities arising in those areas. For both 
political and economic reasons it seerro unlikely to the present writer that 
this prospect will be acceptable to the Governrrent, and we shall, there-
fore. assuriE initially that the Government's intention is that any loss of 
employrrent opportunities for Bantu in the controlled areas, resulting 
from physical controls. should be In:lde good by a corresponding increase 
in suitable enployzrent opportunities in manufacturing industry in the 
border and Bantu areas. 
In considering the effects of physic~ controls on the rate of 
industrial expans ion in the border areas6 and in the country as a 
whole, it is convenient to consider the effect of prohibitions on the 
establishment of new plants in controlled areas separately from the 
effects of prohibitions on the expansion of existing plant s . 
Restrictions on new Establishments. 
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As we noted in Chapter 5, in the case of locational decisions for 
new plant£ in which non-pecuniary considerations are decisive. or where 
ignorance and carelessness lead to the selection of non-optimal locations, 
prohibitions on the establishment of plants in the sites preferred by 
private enterprise may very well lead to their establishment in border 
areas, and in the process both increase the firms' rate ofprofit and 
the country's rate of economic growth. In such cases then prohibitions 
do not reduce the rate of growth and the reduction in pot~ntial manufac~ 
turing employment in the controlled areas is compensated for by an 
equal (or perhaps even greater) amount of additional Bantu employ-
ment in border areas. A system of licensing then may gerve a useful 
purpose in this respect, by forcing those firms giving undue weight 
to non-pecuniary factors or :making haphasard comparative cost studies, 
to consider their locational decisions more carefully. Without re-
peating our fuller discussion of Chapter 5, we nay recall. however, 
that there was no evidence that the number of such cases was significant, 
or that non-profit factors and locational mistakes tended to favour ind-
ustrial concentration in any systematic way. Indeed, if they were 
numerous, we should have expected relatively small inducements to 
bring about a significant degree of industrial decentralisation. In fact as 
we have seen little was achieved in the first 6! years. and the Permanent 
Committee in arguing the case for greater incentives in recent years has 
itself begun to stress the greater difficulties of decentralising industry 
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in South Africa than elsewhere. They say, for instance: 11lt appears 
however, to be a much easier task to create favourable conditions for 
development in Shannon in Ireland for instance, than to bring about 
similar ch·cumstances in certain remote areas of the Republic of South 
Africa with its lone distances and very little in between. 111 Thus if, 
as Andrews and Brunner2 believe, non-pecuniary factors and locational 
errors exert a negligible influence on the overall locational pattern in 
Britain, where industrial decentralisation often means shifting industries 
mere tens of milea, how much more negligible must they be in South 
Africa. 
1n all other cases, we may expect that firms debarred from es-
tablishing in controlled areas will make smaller profits in border areas, 
or in an unproclaimed non-border area, than they would have nade in 
their preferred location in a controlled area. Let us take it that of 
all the sub-optional locations, one in a border area involves the smallest 
increase in costs compared with the preferred location. Will the firm, 
debarred from a controlled area, then establish itself in the border area 
or not? This clearly depends on how much lower the profit rate is ex· 
pected to be in a border area. Though smaller than it was expected to 
have been in the preferred controlled area, the rate of profit may yet be 
sufficient to induce the firm to establish itself in a border area rather 
than not establish at all. The rate of profit will presumably be sufficient 
to induce establishment in border area if, allowing for differences in 
risk, it is expected to be greater than the return obtainable on other in-
vestments in South Africa or abroad. In any event it is obvious that 
there is :for each manufacturing activity a minimum expected rate of re-
turn necessary if entrepreneurs are to have sufficient incentive to hl.Vest. 
Provided the expected profit rate in border areas is not less than this 
1. P rogress report covering the period July 1960 to June 1963. 
2 . Seep. 148 , Chapter 5 above. 
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ninimum level, the firm may still establish itself there, and provide as 
much employment, or perhaps not much less, than it would have done 
in the controlled area which it would have chosen in the absence of 
Government intervention. 
There may, thus, be a number of potential new plants which 
would maximise profits in a controlled area. but which could earn in 
a border area a rate of profit in excess o£ the minimum rate required to 
induce investment in the plant rather than not to establish it at all. Even 
without incentives, therefore, prohibitions on the establishment of such 
plants in controlled area8 would not inhibit establishment altogether. 
But it is certain that the volume of industrial investment in this category 
is not unlimited. No matter how carefully 4elected prohibited firms 
were, the greater the number of plants per period of time refused per-
mission to establish themselves in controlled areas, the greater will 
be the difference between the profitability of the least mobile of these in 
the preferred controlled area, and profitability in the best border area 
site. This follows simply from the fact, demonstrated in Chapter 8, 
that the marginal excess private coats of diverting industries to the 
border areas rises with the proportion of production or employment 
diverted. 
Used in moderation (and with great skill), therefore, the powers 
contained in the Physical P lanning Act may not actually inhibit the es-
tablishment of the plants affected, even if these are not given any induce-
ments. But used more extensively than this, it will become necessary 
to include plants wbieh will not expect to earn a rate of return sufficient 
to ir1.duce investment. That is, it will become n ecessary to include 
firms which, faced with the choice of establishing themselves in the border 
areas without assistance and not establishing at all, will opt for the 
latter. By means of a similar argument it can be shown that if unitially 
financial inducements of a certain level are being used on their own, 
the introduction of a skillfully used system of physical controls might 
be able to increase the proportion of output sited in the border areas, 
conpared with the proportion which would have been sited in border 
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areas if positive inducements of the initial size had been employed alone. 
But, as in the case assumed above, in which no assistance is given, it can 
also be shown that the increase in the proportion of divert ed production 
or employment which can be contributed simply by the introduction 
of physical controls, without increasing the size of the acc ompanying 
positive inducements, is not unlimited. If, with any given size of 
positive inducements, these limits are exceeded, the only results will 
be that the rate of industrial growth of the country will be retarded, and 
there will be a tendency for the number of Bantu workers denied em-
ployment in the border areas as a result of the physical controls, to 
exceed the increased demand for Bantu labour in the border areas. 
In g~neral, theu, the g reater the percentage of the national increase 
in employment it is wished to divert to the border areas (that is,not 
merely prevent taking place in controlled areas) the gre<\ter must be 
the level of the subsidies offered. 
The above argument and much of the discussion which follows 
can be usefully illustrated in the accompanying diagram. 
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The labelling of the axes is precisely the same as hi the 
diagram presented in Chapter 6 above, and the mear,in& *'f the ::..:: 
curve h predsely the same as it wae there. It shows the average 
annual addition to induetri al production which will be generated in 
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the border areas at variou& r.•rices, where the latter are all expressed 
as a proportio1~ of OJ , the pri ce either actually prevailing, or which 
would actually prevail in the least cost location in other parts of South 
Africa. For instance, a~ before, the price OF exceeds 01- in the 
proportion PF/OJ', and since OJ' is e1_ual to unity, the proportional 
me1rrd.ital excess private c~~- of 0~.·1 uuits of additional border areas 
outnut over the mc:~r·~iual cost of n-roduction bl the rest of the country 
is simply P F. 
QM is the average annual increase i tl border areas industrial 
production whi~h will take place spontaneously without a.ay aubsidisation 
by the GoverAment. As we showed ii1 Chapter 6, a proportional subt: idy 
equal to l'F per unit of output will lower the whole supply curve SS 
sufficiently to i.~1duce an average annual increase in b~rder areas indus-
trial production equal to W l\.; 1 W.'lits, which is additiomtl to the increase 
oi v:M units which would have o;;.curred spo.t.\ta.J .. eously. The total amount 
of subsidies given would then have been represented by the area PCEF, 
of which r A:E:F is simply 0:111 income distribution effect and AC r--· the 
produc..:er ~ost. The sa.me volume. tvltv. 1, of h1duced border areas in.du~trial 
production ·~ould have been achieved by n1cans of subsidies totallir,g 
.Acr •• if instead of -payinr.; a pro-portio;;.a.l subsidy of f·F per unit, only 
the MM.1 sub - mar,,inal units had been subsidieed and then orlly to the extent 
llecessary to induce their production in the border areas. Thi s is 
presumably what the Gtlvernmeut attempts to do whe11 it ._,ra.Ll.ts assis-
tance to border industries 'on a selective baF.is. ' The subsidy bill would 
thus have been smaller but the private producer cost would have been 
unchatt!~ed. As we pointed out in the last chapter, however. it is hi~hly 
impr•,bab~e that the Goverumel·-.t will possess the inbrmation ue(;essary 
to keep the total valu!! of subsidies down to the mhdmum level, such as 
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ACE. for MM 1 units of in duced border areas industrial production. 
It is much more likely that the actual value of a ssistance necessary to 
induce Y.M 1 units of production will lie between ACE and P C E F . The 
Government has, it appears, not even been able to avoid assisting some 
of the intra-marginal OM w1its since, as noted earlier, it is hard to 
believe that no additional employment would have been offered by those 
firms which were actually assisted, if they had not received any assistance 
at all. 
Let us take it, however, that the Government is able to keep the 
costa of assistance down to the minimum necessary .for any particular 
volume of induced border areas industrial production. And let us say 
that the size of the inducements currently offered to border areas are such 
that they can cover a proportional marginal excess private cost in border 
area& industrial production as high as C E , but no higher. Then, by' 
discriminating in the way described above, giving assistance equal to 
the marginal excess private cost of every unit in excess of OM units, 
and so rendering the production of each of these units just as profitable 
in border areas as in the best alternative location, a maximum of lV.i.M 1 
units of border areas industrial production would be induced in border 
areas. The SS curve depicted, clearly refers to some specific period 
of time, since as the economy as a whole g rows, it would tend to shift to 
the right. That is, with general economic g rowth the averat,.e annual 
increase in border areas industrial production, expressed in absolute 
terms, which would take place spontaneously, would naturally increase 
even if it did not htcrease ae a proportion of the additional industrial 
productio11 taking place in the country as a whole. L et us say, therefore, 
that the SS curve depicted ~efers to the ten year period beginning in Jan-
uary 1968, when the first 37 controlled areas were proclaimed, and 
that over this period the present set of inducements is sufficient to increase 
the average annual addition to border areas industrial production by 
MM 1 units over and above the addition. of OM units taking place spontan-· 
eously. 
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Associated with the MM1 units of production diverted to the 
border areas, there is a certain amoun t of d iverted employment, which 
may be expressed as a proportion of the national increase in manufac-
turing employment. Say the Government regards the latter proportion 
as inadequate, as it seems to believe the proportion actually achieved in 
the period June 1960 to December 1966 to have been. It might then 
attempt to induce a greater average annual increase in border areas 
industrial production than MM 1, by introducing a system of industrial 
licensing like that provided for in the Physical Pla.."llling Act, while 
leaving the size of the special inducements available to individual border 
industries unchanged. 
Without the Physical Planning Act and without any increase in 
the size of the inducements the whole average annual increase in the 
country's industrial production, other than the OM 1 un its, would take place 
outside of the border areas, since for units in excess of OM1 the marginal 
excess private co.st is greater than the maximum subsidy CE available 
at present. This difference, which we may call the marginal uncompen-
sated excess private cost, on units of border areas industrial pro-
duction greater than OM 1, is the vertical distance between the portion 
of SS to the right of E , namely ES, and the horizontal line ED. The 
positive inducements thus divert MM 1 units of industrial production to 
the border areas, and the marginal uncompensated excess private cost 
on each of these units is equal to zero. The Government, however, 
now prohibits the establishment of certain new plant• in the controlled 
areas, and the marginal uncompensated excess private cost on these 
units is positive. If these units are produced in border areas, there-
fore, the rate of profit will be lower than it would have been if the 
plant • had been allowed to establish themselves in the preferred controlled 
areae. However, if the firms whoee establishment in controlled areas 
is prohibited are very carefully selected, the marginal uncompensated 
excess p rivate cost will be very small at firs~. and may not reduce 
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the rate of profit below the minimum level referred to above. It 
is clear, however, given the positive slope of the SS curve, which we 
established in Chapter 8, that if the volume of production in prohibited 
expansions is pushed beyond a certain level, the marginal uncompensated 
excess private cost will become so large that it will swallow up the 
firms profits and so inhibit its establishment altogether. 
Say that the maximum volume of production which can be pro-
hibited in controlled areas by prohibiting the establishment of new plants, 
without inhibiting the establishment of these plants altogether, is M1~. 
That is, M 1M 2 units of industrial production can actually be diverted to 
the border areas by means of direct controls. The marginal uncompen-
sated cost on this volume of prohibited production is FGE and the total 
uncompensated cost is EGH. That is, profits on the MW'2 diverted units 
are lower by an amount EFH than they would have been without physical 
controls. A point which we might note here, then, though we shall 
return to it later, is that the cost of d iversion by means of physical 
controls falls more heavily on manufacturing industry itself than in the 
case of diversion by means of special inducements since the latter are 
borne by taxpayers as a whole. The disincentive effect on industrial 
production is, therefore, greater in the former case than in the latter. 
If plants which together have a potential productive capacity 
in excess of M 1M2 units are debarred from establishing in the border 
areas, industrial production equal to this excess will be lost to the 
economy because the marginal uncompensated excess costs on these 
units will reduce the rate of profit below the minimum necessary to in-
duce investment. Say, for instance, that new plants which together 
have a productive capacity of M 1M 3 are refused permission to establish 
themselves in the border areas. A volume of production in new plants, 
equal to M2M 3 will, therefore, not take place at all, since the uncompen-
sated marginal excess private costs on these unite will reduce the rate 
of profit to too great an extent. The essential point at this stage, 
however, is that with positive inducements of a given size, such as 
those available to border industries at present, the additional amount 
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of induced border areas industrial production which can be contributed 
by di-rect controls is not unlimited. 
With the present maximum proportional subsidy, represented 
by CE in the diagram, the n , the difference made by direct controls is 
represented by M 1M 2• We have deliberately made M 1M 2 small in 
relation to the volume of industrial production which would take place 
in the border areas without direct controls, on the basis of spontaneous 
growth and g rowth induced by subsidies alone. For one thing, as we 
saw in Chapter 8 above, the tndex of marginal excess private costs 
of diverting production and employm~nt to the border areas tends to 
rise steeply even at a relatively low level of diverted production. 
With a given level of inducements, therefore, the uncompensated mar-
ginal excess private costs of production in the border areas will also 
rise steeply, and the rate of profit on additional units of border areas 
industrial production will fall correspondingly sharply. Thus it seems 
uhlikely that the mere addition of physical controls could make a sub-
stantial contribution to the volume of production, and hence of employment, 
which can be diverted to the border areas. That is, it is unlikely that 
a substantial increase in induced border areas industrial production can 
be achieved, without a correspondingly substantial increase in the size of 
the inducements offered to border industries. 
It is of some interest in this connection to recall the fact, noted 
earlier, that the percentage excess of costs in Southern Italy over those 
in the North, permitted by the inducements offered to firms in the South, 
is considerably greater than that permissible between sites in the border 
areas and sites elsewhere, given the inducements offered to firms in 
the border areae. Yet, as we noted, the results achieved by even 
these larger inducements in Italy have been extremely meagre. This 
auggests that in the case of the vast majority of significant firma in 
Italy the rate of profit would be more than just a few percent lower in the 
South than in the North without inducements. If the same is true of 
South Africa. the application of physical controls is soon likely to affect 
plants on which the rate of profit in border areas is less than the 
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minimum level necessary to induce investment. 
If the scope for increasing the amount of industrial production 
diverted to backward areas like Southern Italy or South African border 
areas by means of physical controls, without increasing the size of the 
inducements offered to firms in those areas, were really substantial, 
then there would be no need to be unduly concerned about the possible 
adverse effects of such controls. But it appears that W. A. Lewis, for 
one, is sceptical about the scope for using restrictions in congested 
areas to persuade firms to establish in backward or depressed areas, 
when, g iven the prevailing size of the special inducements, these firms 
do not freely choose to s ite themselvea in the latter areas. For he says: 
" When areas are scheduled for restriction, it is important to 
restrict only the mobile. industries, which will not be gravely 
handicapped if they locate elsewhere; other indust ries should 
have freedom to locate where they please. And when we are 
seeking to develop particular regions it is bette.r to proceed 
by inducement than b-, direction. We have rightly decided that 
the best way to encourage new ittdustries is to provide the basic 
services that they require, especially using the happy invention 
of the trading estate, and to subsidise such services if necessary. 
If industry will not come to an area even when special efforts are 
rm.de to reduce the coat of working there, it is dangerous to 
direct it there. for there must be something baaically wrong with 
the area. " 1 
Thus. if sufficient industries will not rrove to border areas, g iven 
the size of the present inducements, the only way to ensure that they 
do is to raise the level of the inducements. In South Africa, the Govern-
ment is not i n a position to plan by direction, that is, to compel a f irm 
to establish itself in a border area unlesa perhaps, the firm is controlled 
by a Government agency like the Induatrial Development Corporation. 
1. The Principles of Economic P lanning, p. 79. 
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At the most it can prevent the firm from establishing in particular 
"congested" areas. If, however, as the Barlow Cornmission1 observed, 
"the employer is to be asked to submit to anything like control or direc-
tion fu his choice of location" this carries with it the possible consequence 
that if "for any reason due to location or not, the venture turns out badly, 
there is a risk that claims !or conpensation may be put £orward11 a risk 
which would have to be foreseen and steps taken against it". 
Restrictions on Expanding Firms. 
In the foregoing analysis of the effects of direct controls on the 
rate of industrialisation in the border areasg we have deliberately 
spoken as if these controls applied only to plants wishing to establish 
theinJelves in a particular controlled area for the first time. For 
there are a number of special features connected with prohibitions on 
the expansion of existing plants which do not arise in the case of new 
plants, and which make it impossible to treat the two cases in precisely 
the same way. 
The special features referred to stem partly from the fact that 
the Physical Planning Act defines an extension of a factory as "any in-
crease in the number of Bantu errployees employed in such factory. 11 
In view of this definition there seem to be four alternatives open to a 
firm which is refused pernission to extend its factory in a controlled 
area. It rmy either (a) increase production in the existing factory, 
solely by increasing its usage of factors o£ production other than Bantu 
labour (b) locate the entire plant in a border area (c) establish a 
branch plant in a border area (d) not increase production at all. 
As we noted earlier, members of the Governnent have on 
numerous occasions stated that in order to reduce the rate of growth 
of the Bantu population of the larger cities, errployers would have to 
rm.ke less use of Bantu labour and more use of ~chanisation and auto-
mation. hJ.dustrialists, then. are encouraged to increase their output 
by adopting the first of the !our alternatives. If a particular firm in a 
1. op. cit. , p. 193. 
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controlled area is refused permission to take on more Bantu labou1·, 
it will indeed have an incentive to substitute other factors of production 
for Bantu labour. But the marginal cost of increasing production in 
this way will exceed the marginal cost of incrcasiug productiou wheu the 
firm is free to employ more Bantu labour. This need not be true if 
employers habitually employ Bantu labour wastefully, in the sense that 
they would make larger profits if they used less labour of this sort. 
There is, however, no more evidence to show that this is a widespread 
feature of manufacturing industt-y, than there is to show that industrialists 
habitually make excessive use of capital, white workers or any other 
factor of production. Until such evidence is produced, there is an over-
whelming casefor presuming that restrictions on the use of Bantu labour 
will increase the costs of expanding in a }:.articular site. 
The size of the excess of the marginal costs of expanding output 
without increasing the number of Bantu workers, over the coats of 
expandin0 output with the help of additional Bantu labour depends eeaen-
tially on two things: (a) the elasticity of aubetitution of other factors of 
production for Bantu labour, and {b) the size of the increase in produc-
tion which is undertaken. For an expansion i11 output o• any particular size, 
the exceas referred to will be smaller, the greater the elasticity of aub-
stitution of other factors for Bantu labour. And, given the size of tho 
elasticity of substitution the e:xceso will be &tmaller, the amaller the 
amount by which output is increased in the existing factory. Thua the 
greater the eize of the increased output which would have taken place in 
the absence of restrictions on the use of Bantu labour, the great r the 
increase in costs which will result if it is carried out without additional 
Bantu labour. It followss therefore, that even if at first, .....hen the 
planned increase in output is small, the firm succeeds in realising its 
plans without an increase in Bantu labour, it will not be able to continue 
expanding indefinitely in this way. Eventually the costs of increasing 
output in the present site muat exceed those of producing in another area 
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where there are no restrictions on the use of Bantu labour. And even 
before that point is reached costs will be higher, and hence either 
profits will be lower, or prices higher, or both, and the increase in 
output, therefore, smaller than it would otherwise have been. If re-
strictions on the ·use of Bantu labour actually stimulate the rate of 
tedt..1.ical progress, that is if~ technical knowledge results from 
these restriction& t hen the cost raising effect of the restrictions will 
be mitigated to some extent. But since we do not have convincing 
scientific evidence to this. effect, it is clearly safer not to depe.nd on 
this possibility. 
The Government, when it appeals to firms in the controlled 
areas to mecbanise, presumably does so becau&e it fears that the costs 
of expanding by relocation or by the e.stabliehment of branch plants will 
be still greater than the costs of expansion in controlled areas without 
e'f.tra Bantu labour. And, as we shall see shortly, there is good reason 
to expect that thi s will be so in the case of a significant number of ea-
pansions. Thus, owing to restrictions on the use of Bantu labour, 
expansion in the exiGting site will involve greater production costs, but 
industrialists may nevertheless find this alternative preferable t o re-
location. establishment of branch plants, or not expanding at all. In-
deed, it is probable that when faced with restrictions on the use of B antu 
labour, many firms will expand in their existing sites, even though they 
are unlikely to expand by as much a e they would have done had the restric-
tions not applied. 
This has an extremely important implication for Government 
policy. Whenever, the firm' s profits are maximised by expanding 
without increasing its Bantu labour force, rather than by relocating or 
establishing a branch plant, this results in a net loss of etq3loyment 
opportunities for Bantu workers. The more successful are industrial-
ists in substituting other factors of production for Bantu labour in the 
controlled areas, the more acute will be the problem of finding employment 
for Bantu workers in border areas. That i s , since in this case direct 
controls do not result in the diversion of manufacturing employment 
to the border areas, as relocations or branch plant extabliahments 
would tend to do, an imbalance ariaes between the number o£ Bantu 
workers denied enployment in the controlled areas and the number 
compelled to seek work in bo:tder areas. Thie imbalance can be 
avoided only if, as a result of the direct controls, the country's rate 
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of econorri.c growth increases, and with it the demand for labour in the 
border areas, but for, the l'easons mentioned above, the rate. of growth 
is more likely to be reduced than increased by direct controls. While 
the substitution of other factors for Bantu labour tends to mitigate the 
adveree effects of direct controls on the rate of economic growth, there-
fore, it does not solve the other fundamental problem of providing em-
ployment for the Bantu la~our :force. 
This is the first reason, then why the imposition of direct con-
trols on the expansion of plants already established in controlled areas 
is likely to make only a very small contribution to industrial development 
in the border areas. 
As we noted above, the greater the size of the increased output 
which would have taken place if there had been no restrictions on the 
use of Bantu labour) the greater the increase in costs which will result 
if this increase is brought about without any additional Bantu labour. 
This means that it will become increasingly difficult for factor sub-
stitution to mitigate the adverse growth effects of direct controls. 
If alternative (a) were the only one available, therefore, the larger 
the planned additional output from existing plants affected by d i rec t 
con trols in any particular period of time, say a year, the g reater 
would be the amount of this planned increaae which would be inhibited. 
That is to say, the additional costs involved would eventually swallow 
up profits to such an extent that industrialists would not find it worth-
while to bring about more thall a small part of the increased output 
that would have taken place in the absence of restrictions. The 
marginal rate of profit will f all below the level which would otherwise 
have prevailed, and which would h a ve been sufficient to induce ex-
pansion , and u n its of produc tion which might otherwise have been 
realised. will be lost. 
There are, of course, two possible ways in which these 
adverse effects on economic growth can be avoided or at least re-
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duced, namely, by relocation of the plants to which the restrictions apply 
or the establishment of branch plants in the border areas. There appear 
however, to be two conditions which must be satisfied if either one of 
these two alternatives is to be chosen by firms which are refused per-
mission to expand in their existing sites. Firstly, the revenue expec-
ted from the extra production (i. e . production over and above that 
carried out on the old site) must yield a rate of return on the additional 
capital necessary to produce the increase in output. in excess of the 
mini mum obtainable in other f ields of investment. Secondly, the former 
rate of return must exceed the return obtainable on the additional capital 
required to expand in the original s ite without any increase. in Bantu 
labour. The latter condition, it seems, in effect means that the mar~ 
gina! costs of expanding by relocation or by establishing a branch plant 
in a border area must not exceed the marginal costs of expanding in the 
old site without any increase in Bantu labour. There is the distinct 
daneer, however, that neither of these two conditions will be met, or that 
though the second i s satisfied, the first is not. 
First, consider the possibility of transferring the entire plant 
from a controlled area to a new site in the border areas. The entre-
preneur must obviously compare the costs and returns of making this 
transfer. If the plant is moved three main types of costs may be 
incurred: (a) capital losses (b) costs of actually transporting equip-
ment to the new site (c) higher production costs. Factory buildings 
and certain types of equipment are not movable and would have to be 
sold at their market value in the old location. If the latter is less than 
the operating v alue of this part of fixed capital, which is the present 
value of the net income stream expected from using it in the existing 
location, there is a loss of capital equal to the difference between the 
two sorts of valuation. The more specialised the factory building s and 
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equipment, the greater will this loss be. For if the firm in question 
is considering moving, because of the difficulties confronting it, it is 
unlikely that it will be purchased by a firm producing the same product. 
The cost of ac~ually transporting the movable equipment, plus stores 
etc. , and of installing it in the new location is also in the nature of a 
capital ~ost, but it i s likely to be small relative to the capital loss re-
sulting from the sale o£ immovable f ixed capital. F inally, there is 
the possibility that production coste, that is processing plus transport 
costs, will be higher in the new location. Unlike a new firm, a f irm 
relocating its plant in a border area will lose part of the capital value 
of the inve strnent in the training of a labour force which it has under-
taken, and of the capital value of the contacts with suppliers and custom-
ers which it has built up over a period of time in the old site. The pre-
sence of these customers and suppliers may have been amongst the ad-
vantages to the i irm of establishing in the controlled area in the first 
place, or some of them may have been drawn to the area because of 
the presence there of the firm i n question . E ither way it is clear that 
the loss of these contactswill involve a greater los• to an established 
firm if it shifts, than they would to a firm which has not yet built up 
these contacts but which is refused admission to a controlled area. 
Because of these relocation costs it is likely to be significantly 
more difficult to induce an eetablished plant of a particular sort, wishing 
to produce an output (initial plus increase) of a particular size, to 
transfer its whole operation to a border area, than it ie to induce a potential 
new plant of exactly the same sort. wishing to produce an output of exac-
tly the same size~ to site itself in a border area. Thus, with induce-
ments of a g iven size, the uncompensated excess marginal costs of 
producing output of any particular sort and size in the border areas in 
a relocated plant, are considerably g reater than they would be in the 
case of a plant which was not previously extablished in a controlled 
area. If prohibitions are applied to the expansion of existing phmts 
then, and the firm can choose only between alternatives (a) and (b), the 
chances of g rowth being stifled are considerably g reater than when 
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11.ew plants of the same sort are refused permission to site themselves 
in controlled areas. 
Again we m ay visualise a spectrum of cost conditions, with 
the marg inal excess private costs of expanding by relocation rising as 
the volume of relocated production increases. Some firms, like a 
clothing firm in the Natal midlands and a textiles firm in Umtata, have 
transferred their plants from larg er industrial areas, even without 
physical controls. Relocations of this sort contribute to the g rowth 
of industrial production in the border areas, and this contribution is 
reflected in the averag e annual increase of OM 1 units which, in our 
diagram, would take place at the present level of inducements, with-
out any restrictions on the use of Bantu labour. And others, in 
industries like ladies handbags, for instance, which are very light, 
and have high labour ~ost and non-white labour ratios, must be very 
close to the margin of transference. 
Still other plants might actually be able to achieve a saving 
in production costs by transferring to border areas, but may be 
deterred from doing so by the costs of relocation. Indeed, as we 
noted earlier, some firms in E ast London believe that though their 
location may have beet'\ optimal initially, it is no longer optimal and that, 
but for location costs, they would establish themselves in the Southern 
Transvaal. These relocation costs are very real ones, and it is 
wrong to believe that we can drastically remodel the Jreographical dis-
tribution of manufacturing industry because the present distribution 
tris due to fortuitous historical curcumatances". 1 In matters of lo-
cation as in all other aspects of economic life. the decisions of the 
1. In the light of the discussion in Chapter 3 above, it ia, in any case, 
highly questionable whether "fortuitous historical circumstances., 
(unless one regards the discovery of gold as falling under this 
heading) have had a significant bearing on the overalllocational 
pattern. The g rowth of firms established by chance in bad locat-
ion s tends to be impeded by comp etition from plants which are 
better situated. 
past have helped determine the data of the present. However regrettable 
it may be, we never have the opportunity of undoing the decisions of the 
past and starting with a clean slate. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that a significant number of the firms at present in controlled areas 
feel that they are wrongly located, and that, but for relocation costs, 
it would be advantageous for them to shift to border areas. It appears, 
then, that the marginal excess costs of expansion by relocation are 
likely to be particularly high. Other things being equal, the more 
favourable the divertibility index of an industry as calculated in Chapter 
8 above, the smaller will be the excess marginal coats of expansion by 
relocating in a border area. 
As in the case of new plants, then, the more favourable the 
divertibility of an industry, as calculated in Chapter 8 above, the smaller 
will be the marginal exes& costs of expansion by relocation in a border 
area. But the fact remains that the marginal excess costs of trans-
ferring an already established plant to the border areas, will be g reater 
than the costs of establishing a new plant of exactly the same sort and 
size in the border areas in those cases in which a location in a controlled 
area is optimal. Thus, while restrictions on the use of Bantu labour 
can check the rate of expansion of firms in controlled areas, they are 
most unlikely to induce a significant number of firms to transfer plants 
to the border areas, unless they are supported by a sharp increase in 
the assistance offered by the Government. 
Let us now consider the possibility that restrictions on the use 
of Bantu labour by expanding firma will lead to the establishment of 
branch plants in border areas, and so avoid, or at least mitigate, the 
problems of maintaining the rate of growth and providin g employment for 
!:3.antu workers. It follows from our analysis of Chapter 8 , that the 
lighter the industry, and the higher the labour cost and non-white labour 
ratios, the smaller, other things being equal, will be the n:arginal 
excess costs of establishing a branch plant in the border a1·eas. In 
this respect there is a similarity between the problem of diverting the 
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additional output of an expanding firm and diverting a new plant. But 
there is an important difficulty which is peculiar to the former and does 
not arise in the case of new plants. 
The difficulty in question is that the size of the planned increase 
in output, may be small in relation to the optimum scale of production 
for this product. If the increase in demand giving rise to the c;lesire to 
expand output is only marginal, in comparison with the output produced 
in the present location, the chances of a branch plant being established 
will probably be slight. Other things being equal, the greater is the 
optimum scale of production for the commodity, the less profitable is i t 
likely to be to expand output by establishing a branch plant in a border 
area. 
It appears from an examination of Table 33 above, that those 
industries with extremely unfavourable divertibility indexes, that is 
those near the bottom of the list, tend to be operated on a very large 
scale compared with other industries. Generally, there seems to be 
a positive correlation between the scale of production and the size of the 
divertibility index, 1 the latter taking into account the weight of the 
industry, and the labour cost and non-white labour ratios. Broadly 
speaking, then, the more capital intensive the industry, the greater 
tends to be the optimum scale of production. Thus if a particular 
industry appears to be difficult to divert because of an unfavourable 
divertibility index, this difficulty tends to be reinforced in the case of 
branch plant extablishments by a large optimum scale of production. 
As economic development takes place, and the size of individual 
regional markets grows, there is a natural tendency for more and more 
branch plants to be established in the less advanced al.'eas,. But we are 
here concerned with the effects of attempts to accelerate thia process 
1. The writer has not been able to calculate plant size for each of the 
industries listed in Table 33. Sargant Florence, in The L~gic of British 
and American Industry, p. 69 finds a very high correlation between 
the degree of mechanisation (measured by horse-power per man) and 
size of plant. Since in our analysis the divertibility index is positively 
correlated with horse-power per worker, the former will also be 
positively correlated with the size of plant. 
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by means of restrictions on the use of Bantuh labour in plants already 
establiehed in controlled areas. It appears from the remarks above, 
that all the difficulties of diverting new plants from their preferred 
sites in controlled areas to border areas, by means of physical con-
trols alone, without any increase in the size of the inducements offered, 
apply in the same if not i n fuller measure to the use of such controls 
to induce firms to expand through the establishment of branch plants 
in border areas, rather than to expand in their present s ites. Aa 
in the case of new plant&t the immediate effect of applying the restric-
tions to expanding firms, unless this is done on a small scale, is more 
likely to be a stifling of growth than the establishment of branch plants. 
We should also note a particular characteristic of investment 
which tends to reinforce our conclusion that the immediate effect of 
t-estrictions on the expansion of existing firms will be to cause a loss 
of potential industrial output. It is that entrepreneurs will not normally 
undertake an investment until they feel reasonably confident that the 
dernmd which this investment is designed to satisfy will be sufficiently 
enduring to warrant it. Let us say that there is an increase in demand 
for the firms product and the firm strongly believee the increase to 
be a permanent one. In this case, provided the firms existing plant 
is being utilized at the optimum level, it may undertake additional 
investment in fixed capital. But if there is any doubt about the per-
manence of the increase in demand the firm will prefer to increase 
its output to meet the demand simply by intensifying the degree oi 
utilization of the existing equipment. If for this purpose it wishes 
to use more Bantu labour, but is not permitted to do ao, expansion will 
not take place in the existing site, or will not take place on the scale 
it would have done without restrictions. In view of the uncertainty 
assumed, the firm will clearly not relocate the plant or establish a 
branch plant, and there will be an irrevocable ~oss of industrial pro-
duction. 
Alternatively" let us assume that the increase in demand which 
occurs is permanent and that the firm confidently believes it to be so, 
but that the increase tal(e·s place unexpectedly. There will, therefore, 
be a time lag between the increase in demand and conpletion of the 
investment which the firm might undertake. In these circumstances, 
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if the firm is not permitted to increase the degree of utilization of existing 
plant to the extent desired, by taking on additional Bantu labour, there 
will also be a loss of il'ldustrial production. Even if', perchance, the 
firm felt it would be more profitable to make the investrrent in a branch 
plant in a border area rather than expand its old plant, without additional 
Bantu workers, it could not do so immediately. Indeed the tir-"ls lag referred to 
is likely to be even longer in the case o£ the estnblishr.rent of a branch plant 
than in the case of extensions in an existing site. 
Finally, there is the fact that purely terrporary increases in 
dermnd vJhich are believed to be temporary will not lead to additional 
fixed invesbrent, and wUl normally be met by increasing the size of 
the labour force. Production for such purposes will obviously be 
hanpered if the firm is refused permission to employ more Bantu 
labour. This last difficulty may possibly be overcome by introducing 
a system allowing for terrporary increases in the size of the Bantu 
labour force, with the_ understandi.l'lg that the firm will revert to its 
original size within so:rre specified period of time. But it wUl be 
by no means easy to determine whether a particular increase in demand 
is tenporary or not. While the output of some industries is subject 
to a. highly predictable seasonal fluctuation in demand, this is not true 
of rmst industries, and in addition there is the fact that seasonal fluc-
tuations generally take place about an upward trend in demand. 
It appears, then, that because of the possibility of adopting 
alternative (a) (the substitution of other factors for Bantu l abour) and 
the impediments to relocation and branch plant production, the scope 
) 
for actually diverting the planned additional output and employment of 
expanding firms to border areas by means of direct controls alo11e, 
without larger inducements is proportionately lesa even than in the 
case of plants seeking to establish themselves in controlled areas for 
the first time. It ia therefore, of aome interest to note that, whereas 
manufacturing employment increased by 28. 1 per cent between 1959 I 60 
and J 963/64, the number of industrial census returns received by the 
Bureau of Statistics increased by only 10. 5 per cent. 1 This latter 
percentage may be taken as an indicator of the percentage increase in 
the number of manufacturing establishments. If. the size distribution 
of new establishments takiug pl ace between 1959/60 and 1963/64 was 
approximately the 8ame as the size distribution of. establishments 
existing at the beginnli1g of the period. these figures would seem to 
suggest that additional employment resulting from the expansion of 
existing plants was nearly twice as great as that resulting from the 
e s tablishment of new ones. More specifically, the figures suggest 
that the expansion of existing plants a c cOunted for something like 
63. 5 per cent of the income in manufacturing employment between 
19S9/60 and 1963/64. 
Thia has some rather interesting implications. Firstly, it 
means that a decentralisation policy aimed at diverting new plants 
only. is bound to be very restricted in scope relative to the total 
volume of additional production and employment. Efforts to induce 
decentralisation would in that case be confined to establishments 
providing only a third of the additional employment, and even these 
would be subject to the rising marginal excess costs which were 
shown in Chapter 8 to be associated with diversion. Furthermore, one 
part of this additional employment in new :firms can ... "lot be diverted 
because it relates to residentiary activities, and another part cannot 
be diverted, in the sense in which we have used the term, because 
it would have taken place in the border areas in any case, even 
1. Bureau of Statistics, news release dated 15th February, 1967. 
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without Government intervention. Secondly, the fact that expansion of 
existing plants apparently contributes such a large proportion of the 
total increase iu manufacturing employment, means that the task of di-
verting any particular proportion of the total increase in manufacturing 
enployment, taking old and new together is an extremely difficult one. 
For as we have already emphasised the possibility of substituting other 
factors of production for Bantu labour in the existing site, and the hn-
pediments to relocation and the establishment of branch plants, reduce 
the lil~elihood that direct controls will result in the diversion of employ• 
ment to border areas. unless the level of inducements is raised con-
siderably. To put it differently, the marginal excess private costs 
of diverting any particular proportion of the planned increase in pro-
duction and employment in existing plants to controlled areas, are 
likely to be significantly greater than the marginal excess private costs 
of diverting the satre proportion of the output and employn:ent of plants 
wishing to establish in controlled areas for the first time. Thus the 
size of the financial inducements needed to achieve the forrrer is likely 
to be considerably greater than that needed for the latter purpose. 
Sorre Long Run Considerations. 
The conclusions drawn from the analysis, which was carried out 
before we took into account the special features connected with the 
application of restrictions on the use of Bantu labour to expanding 
firms, are, therefore, reinforced by the subsequent analysis. But 
we should note two factors which will tend to rrake the SS curve shift 
to the right over tim:, as a result of the application of direct controls, 
and which, therefore, tend to raise the average annual increase in 
border areas industrial production which will take place over a specific 
period of titre, without any increase in the size of the inducerrents 
offered .. 
Firstly, there is the fact that with th~ general econonic 
development of a country the demand for a particular product will 
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tend to increase. Thus, even though the short run effect of restric-
tions on the expansion of a particular plant may have been to inhibit 
expansion altogether or to a significant degree, the increase in de:rnmd 
which takes place subsequently as the country develops economically, 
Will tend gradually to inprove the profitability of establishing a branch 
plant. Sinilarly, a firm which was refused permission to establish 
a plant L"l a controlled area for the first titrl'!, and which as a result 
did not establish itself at all, would subsequently find the border areas 
appearing less and less unprofitable than they seeiYEd before. In the 
case of the branch plant, this occurs partly because a growing demand 
eventually overcomes any difficulties of establishrrent whi ch were due 
to significant internal economies of scale in production. But for all 
firms affected by physical controls, the border areas becoiYE :rrore 
attractive as detmnd increases, since these controls themselves will 
in effect have given firms in the border areas a monopoly of the increase 
in output in certain industries. Thus they will be able to raise prices 
without fear of co:rrpetition fromnon-border areas, and with the grow-
ing pres sure of demmd they will eventually be able to sell a sufficiently 
larger output to make production worthwhile, despite the fact that 
production costs and hence selling prices will be higher in the border 
areas than they would have been in the controlled areas had physical 
controls not been applied. In effect what tends to happen is that the 
costs of production in border areas, though greater in absolute terms, 
fall relative to the costs of expanding in controlled areas, given the 
restrictions on the use of additional Bantu labour, so that the SS curve 
rroves to the right. 
Secondly, in the diagrammatic analysis above, we assu~d that 
M1Mz represented the actual additional number of units of production 
which can be diverted to border areas sinply by the introduction of 
direct controls, without raising the size of the inducements offered 
above the level of CE per unit of output in border areas. If pro-
hibitions were inposed on :rrvre units than these, then, as we argued, 
1 
----
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the result would not be the diversion of employment to the border 
areas but a loss of employment opportunities for Bantu workers. 
These displaced workers would thus become dependant upon the 
border and Bantu areas for employment. The greater is the number 
of units in exces& of M 1M z to which the restrictions are applied, the 
greater will be the imbalance between the number of B antu workers 
unable to obtain employment in controlled areas because of the re· 
strictions, and the number of additional industrial jobs offered to 
Bantu in the border areas. 
The effect of this imbalance, will be to depress the wage rate 
in the border areas relative to other parts of the country. The wage 
rate in border areas will clearly not be able to rise as rapidly as in 
the controlled areas·, owing to the fact that in the border areas the 
supply of Bantu labour will be increasing faster than demand whereas 
the opposite will hold true in controlled areas. If the imbalance 
referred to becomes sufficiently large per period of time, due to very 
severe application of restrictiot1s on the location of industry in controlled 
areas, the wage rate in border areas could even fall in absolute terms. 
The ~ssential point, however, is that the wage rate will fall in border 
areas relative to the controlled areas. 
The effect of this decline in relative wages will tend to be to 
shift the SS curve towards the right. As was explained in Chapter 6, 
any particular SS curve relates to a given set of factor prices. A 
fall in the price of any one of these factors. therefore, will lower the 
curve, and as a result the average annual increase in border areas 
industrial production. attainable with inducements of any particular 
size, will tend to increase. Other methods of reducing the rate at 
whi ch B antu mig rate to controlled areas, whether they take the form 
of the more conventional type of iru'l.ux control or the recently announ-
ced scheme of efflux control, will tend to have precisely the same effect. 
Thus there are these two major factors tending to shift the SS 
curve to the right over time and so to increase the average annual 
addition to border area s industrial production . It may be then that 
l 
without any increase in inducements, the introduction of restrictions 
on the location of industry will contribute a larger increase than 
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M 1M 2 to average annual volume of induced border areas industrial 
production. In effect it appears that it might be possible to divert 
more than M 1M 2 units of industrial production to the border areas 
per annum on average, and hence to divert more job opportunities for 
Bantu than those associated with M 1M 2 units of industrial production. 
It is clear, however, that shifts in the SS curve resulting from 
the operation of the forces described, cannot be regarded as an un-
mixed blessing. In the first place, as we have noted, the shift in SS 
takes place partly at the expense of a decline in the wage rate in border 
areas relative to the rate applying in controlled areas. We should 
rr:ake a clear distinction here between two types of Bantu workers 
whose living standards are affected by the restrictions on the location 
of industry. First, there are those who would not have migrated 
to controlled areas even in the absence of the restrictions, but would 
have sought and ob.-ained employment in the border areas. If in the 
new conditions they are able to obtain employment they could be 
worse off in absolute terms than they would otherwise have been. 
But they will almost certainly find that owing to keener competition 
for jobs their wage rates will not rise as fast as they would have 
done, and that they will be lower relative to the wages paid in the 
controlled areas. 
Secondly, there are those who would have migrated to the con-
trolled areas even at the earlier, smaller regional wage differential. 
In line with our argument of Chapter 2, there is a strong presumption 
that these workers would have been economically better off had they in 
fact migrated. With the application of direct controls, they will be 
deprived of the opportunity of migrating to metropolitan areaa and 
they will undoubtedly be worse off in absolute terms than they would 
have been in the absence of the restriction•. The fact that the wag e 
differential between border areas and controlled areas will tend to 
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be larger than the differential which would have been sufficient to induce 
them to migrate, simply adds to their loss. 
The extent to which wages will fall in border areas relative to 
those applying in controlled areas, depends partly on how sharply the 
growth of Bantu employment in the controlled areas is reduced as a 
result of the restrictions, and partly on the elasticity of demand for 
Bantu labour in the border areas. Because of the restrictions on the 
use of Bantu labour in the controlled areas. it may, for instance. be 
necessary for the average annual increase in border areas industrial 
production to rise to OM3 if all the displaced Bantu workers are to be 
employed in the border areas. If the maxinum size of the inducements 
offered is left unchanged at CE per unit of output, this will require the 
SS curve to shift towards the right till it passes through J. If, say, 
O M 1 is the average annual increase in border areas industrial produc-
tion which would have taken place if the present inducements alone had 
been used, and O:M.3 represents an increase twice as great as OMl' the 
fall in wage rates necessary to employ all those workers kept out of the 
controlled areas by the pro.visions of the Physical Planning Act will 
probably be very considerable. 
In fact. however. the wage rate in border areas is likely to be 
fairly inflexible in a downward direction in the short run, and the decline 
in this rate relative to the rate applying in the controlled areas is likely 
to result. rather, from a slower increase in the wage rate in border 
areas compared with the controlled areas. It will obviously take some 
time for changes in the regional wage differential to take place in tbia 
way in response to changing supply and demand conditions in different 
parts of the country. Thus even if there is some positive border areas 
wage rate which would ensure that all workers denied employment in 
the cont. r olled areas are employed in the border areas instead, it is 
never likely to be reached. As a result, unless the size of the in-
ducements offered to border industries can be raised to the level re-
quired to induce an average annual increase in border areas industrial 
production of OM3 restrictions on the use of Bantu labour in the cont rolled 
areas will sirrply raise the volume of unemployment amongst Bantu 
workers. In addition as we noted above. even those diaplaced work-
ers who manage to obtain employment in the border areas will be 
worse off in absolute terms. 
In the last few pages we have mentioned two types of forces 
which will tend to shift the SS curve towards the right. It is no less 
important to note. however, that there will be powerful forces Wc;Jrk-
ing against this tendency. For several fairly obvious reasons the 
country's rate of economic growth will tend to fall, and this fall will 
be greater the more stringently are the restrictions under consideration 
applied. If somehow the Government succeeded in diverting MM3 units 
of industrial production per annum to the border areaa the total excess 
costs of producing theee units in the border areas would be equal to AKL. 
That i• to say, costs of production and hence prices will be higher than 
they would have been in the absence of restrictions on the growth of the 
controlled areas, and consequently the rate of industrial expansion will 
be reduced. This latter reault also follows simply from the fact that 
the available resources will not be allocated as efficiently, and hence 
total output will be lower than it might have been. Ab important 
factor limiting the ability of firms to raise prices in an attempt to 
protect their profit margins is competition with foreign producers in 
both domestic and e:aport markets. 
Unless the eize of the inducements can be raised to the required 
level, therefore, there will be a reduction in the rate of industrial ex-
pansion in the country as a whole if the application of restrictions on 
the growth of the controlled areas exceeds the limits stated above. 
Hence our earlier conclusion remains unchanged: It may be possible 
to increase the amount of industrial production diverted to the border 
areas merely by introducing a system of industrial licensing, that is, 
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without any increase in the size of the inducements offered to border 
industries. but the scope for diversions of this sort is snail in relation 
to the national increase in industrial production. 
Financial Inducements vs. Direct Controls. 
By using direct controls, the Government can reduce the total 
volurre of financial assistance necessary to reduce the rate of increase 
of the Bantu population of the controlled areas by any particular arn:>unt. 
This seems to be the main advantage which can accrue to the Government 
from the relevant provisions of the Physical Planning Act. For it i 
clear that the real costs of reducing the inflow of Bantu workers cannot 
be reduced in this way, and in fact it is likely that these costs will 
be increased. The rn>st the authorities can hope to achieve is to shift 
the incidence of the cost in such a way as to make it rn:>re acceptable 
to the electorate. 
This point may be usefully illustrated by reference to the diagram 
presented in this chapter. MM1 is the average annual increase in border 
areas industrial production which is induced by positive treasures, and the 
total nininurn subsidy cost required for this purpose is represented by 
the area ACE. To induce a further M 1Mz units by means of positive 
incentives alone would raise the subsidy cost of AFH. As we have 
suggested, however, it might be possible by means of direct controls, 
to increase the diverted amount of industrial production from O:M1 to 
OMz. without raising the Inl.ximum subsidy per unit of border areas 
output above CE. If this were done, the total nini:rrnm subsidy cost 
would rise to only AFGE instead of to the larger amount of AFH. 
Thus there is a saving in subsidy costs equal to EFH as a result of the 
use of direct controls. 
The total real cost of diverting this additional aiTDunt of indust-
rial production to the border areas, however, is not reduced and is 
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equal to AFH. All that has happened is that the amount EGH is borne 
by the factors of production used by the firms affected by physical 
controls. In particular the rate of profit and the wage rate will be 
adversely affected. When positive inducements alone are used, the 
burden falls on taxpayers ao a whole, and nanufacturing industry bears 
the cost only in so far as it contributes to tax revenue. When direct 
controls are used to obtain the additional M 1M2 units of border areas 
industrial production, however, the cost falls more heavily on manufac-
turing profits, and the disincentive effect on industrial production is 
greater than when positive inducements alone are enployed .. 
If restrictions are applied in excess of the limits envisaged in 
the preceding two paragraphs the shift in the incidence of the cost is 
still more marked than before. Say the Government wishes to keep 
out of the controlled areas a certain number of Bantu workers and that 
this could be done if a further M2M3 units of industrial production were 
diverted to the border areas. To divert this arrount of production by 
means of positive inducements alone, however, would require addition-
al subsidies totalling at least an amount represented by the area FKLH. 
It may be that the Govern:ment for some reason or other, cannot increase 
the size of the inducements offered to border industries, but that it 
neverthelees uses the provisions of the Physical Planning Act to keep 
out of the controlled areas the 11umber of Bantu workers mentioned. 
Since the result is mainly a stifling of growth in the controlled areas, 
the total subsidy cost increases hardly at all above AFGE . Thus 
taxpayers, as such,do not bear the cost of keeping the specified num-
ber of Bantu workers out of the urban areas. Instead it takes the form 
of a strong disincentive effect on industrial production. The impact 
of such measures on Bantu wages rates and employment were discribed 
above. It is true that other members of the public will not escape 
unharmed, since there will be a reduction in the country's rate of 
growth and a tendency for the prices of manufactured goods to rise. 
But the proportion of the burden falling on industrialists and Bantu 
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workers is clearly greater than it would have bee11 if the rate of 
expansion of the controlled areas had instead been reduced by divert-
ing industrial production to the border areas. For in the latter case 
it would have been necessary to increase the inducements, and tax-
payers, as such, would have paid a much larger proportion of the cost. 
The fact remains that there may be a certain amount of scope 
for increasing the amount of industrial production actually diverted to 
the border areas without raising the level of the inducements. But 
it may be noted, in order to realise this potential the authorities would 
have to be extremely skilfull in applying the provisions of the !-'hysical 
Planning Act. It would have to assess the probable consequences of 
refusing permission to establish or expand in a controlled area, and if 
this is to be done in a consistent way it would need to analyse in detail 
the locational characteristics of each applicant.. Will the Government 
be able to acquire the information necessary for this purpose? Clear-
ly the task ie not an easy one, and will become more difficult the greater 
the number of applications which it is required to process. The more 
applications there are, the greater are the chances of inconsistent an.d 
incorrect decisions being made, and the qreater will tend to be the delay 
in replying to each applicant. Given the shortage of persons with the 
qualifications necessary to perform the task of selection properly, 
it will be both difficult and costly for the Department of P lanning to 
process the number of applications likely to be received in very active 
business conditions. 
The potential referred to can only be exploited i£ the Minister 
discriminates carefully between individual firms. If, however, local 
authorities are prevented from creating new industrial zones then it is 
inevitable that some highly immobile industries will also be restricted. 
P ermission has already been refused the :f-ort E lizabeth Municipality 
to establish an industrial township at f··erserverance in the Swartkops 
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Valley between Port ~lizabeth and Uitenhage. 1 When a deputation 
representing P ort E liz abeth interests met with the Minister to appeal 
a gainst hie decision, it appears that certain methods of mitig ating 
the effects of the refusal were discussed. 2 One of these was the 
possibility of transferrJt lg Coloured persons from the Transkei to 
P ort E lizabeth and the greater use of Coloured labour ge11.erally. 
Another was the possibility of using Africans from the Ciskei who it 
was suggested would be able to return to their .families at weekends. 
Considering that King Williams Town, the heart of the Ciskei is 150 
miles from Port E lizabeth by road, however, it appears that the latter 
proposal is hardly likely to be a practicable solution to the problem. 
It is worth noting , too, that if an industrialist is refused per-
nission to establish or expand a plant in a controlled area, his bargain-
ing power in n e gotiating for assistance tends to be increased. If he 
is prohibited from establishing or expanding in a controlled area, and 
the Government wishes him to shift to a border area instead, he will 
be in a position to argue that the Government must take the respon sibil-
ity of e n suring that his venture in the border a reas does not fall. As 
the Barlow Commission has pointed out, if "for any reason due to lo-
cation or not, the venture turns out badly, there is a risk that claims 
for compensation may be put forward, a risk which would have to be 
foreseen and steps taken a gainst it". 3 The position is obviously quite 
different if the Government would be quite content to prevent the es, ablish-
ment or expansion of a firm in a controlled area, regardless of whether 
the firm actually shifts to a border area or not. The consequences of 
such an attitude have been outlined above. 
By contrast, when positive inducements alone are used the 
decision whether to accept the assistance offered and produce in a 
border area, or to site the factory elsewhere without assistance, 
1. 
? 
.... 
3. 
R eported in The Natal Mercury, Durban, February 19, 1968. 
R eported in The N atal M ercury, Durban, February 20. 1968. 
op. cit. , p . 193. 
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belongs to the industrialists alone and consequently the responsibility 
is entirely his. It is true that even where positive inducements alone 
are used, and a particular venture turns out badly, the Government may 
feel it necessary to provide additional assistance, especially if for 
political reasons it has come to identify the firms interests with its 
own. But where direct controls are used the firms position in negotiat-
ing for assistance is strengthened right from the start. Furthermore, 
where positive incentives alone are used, and the firm chooses a site 
in the border areas, it does so presumably because it believes that 
this will maximise profits. Because of the difficulties involved in 
selecting the firms to which direct controls are to be applied, and the 
consequent danger of bad decisions by Government officials, economists 
g enerally favour leaving the process of selection to the market mechan-
ism. It is virtually impossible for a Government department to know 
as much about each and every manufacturing activity as the industrialists 
concerned do themselves. It is well to bear in mind, too, that the pro-
duction function is not an objective fact but is clouded in a great deal 
of uncertainty. 
Professor Lewis, in a book which makes a very strong case 
for planning, comes out firmly in favour of using the market mechanism 
rather than direct controls. During an examinationoof the pros and cons 
of planning by direction, he says: 
"There is nothing in the case for planning which requires the 
choice of methods that put industrial managers in a straight jacket. 111 
And further on he writes: 
nThe obvious moral of all this is that our aim should be to preserve 
free markets wherever possible. The m .anager of an industrial 
establishment, whether private or public, should be left free to 
adjust his concern to market conditions, and to make it with what-
ever combination of resources he can most cheaply buy. This does 
1. op. cit., p. 16. 
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not mean that he will be free of control, on the contrary, he is the 
serva.nt of the market which controls everything he does. Neither 
does it limit the Rcope for planning. For the state can do all the 
planning it wants by controlling in its turn the market which controls 
the entrepreneur. The state can plan as much as it wants, but it 
should plan not by direction but by manipulating the market. " 1 
The difficulty in some situations, however, may very well be 
that the state cannot in fact do "all the planning it wants by controlling 
in its turn the market which controls the entrepreneur. tt It would be 
possible for the state to do all the planning it wants, entirely through 
the market mechanism, only if the subsidies required for this purpose 
do not exceed the amount that tax payers can be persuaded to contribute. 
If the state wants to plan more tt,an this. the alternative of planning by 
direction, which shifts the costs of the planning objective from tax-
payers to others, may be more attractive. 
In Search of a P olicy Qbiective. 
We have argued above that it will not be possible to divert a 
significantly greater proportion of additional manufacturing employment 
to the border areas without an increase in the size of the inducements 
offered. If an attempt is made to reduce sharply the rate of growth of 
the Bantu industrial labour force in controlled areas, without increasing 
the s ize of the inducements, the country's industrial {>rogress will be 
severely hampered and the problem of unemployment amongst Bantu 
workers will be intensified. It is evident from the P ermanent Committee's 
report for 1965 that the Government was not at that stage satisfied with 
the increase in employment in the border areas, and a oignificantly fas ter 
rate of increase was required. The P ermanent Committee itself recognised 
1. ~· . p. 20. 
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that if this was to be achieved, "the existing measures to attract industries 
to the de centralised areas will have to be intensified". 
In fact, however, no increase in the size of the inducements 
offered has taken place. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the total amount 
set aside in the budget estimates for the fiscal year 1968-69, has not 
increased compared with the amount for 1967-68. This is so despite 
the fact that the Government apparently still seeks to increase the rate 
of progress in the border areas, and it is especially clear that it wishes 
to bring about a sharp reduction in the g rowth of the Bantu industrial 
labour force in the Western Cape, Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage and the 
Southern Transvaal complex. 
Does this mean then that the Government intends pursuing its 
objectives simply by means of direct controls, without any increase in 
the size of the inducements offered? Are we in the situation mentioned 
above in which the state wants to do more planning than can be done 
through the market mechanism, given the limitations on the tax resources 
available for this purpose? Is the Government therefore, prepared to 
give priority to the objective of reducing the expansion of the Bantu 
industrial labour force of the controlled areas, irrespective of whether 
or not tbe manufacturing concerns affected establish plants in the border 
areas instead? If this were so, it would imply that the degree o.f territ-
orial separation of the races which the Government is prepared to bring 
about depends not simply on the cost to the country, but also, in an im-
portant way, on the incidence of these costs. For as we have noted, 
the use o£ direct controls, rather than positive inducements alone, does 
not avoid the coste of keeping Bantu out. of the controlled areas, but 
rrerely alters the incidence of these coats. Or does the Government 
simply fail to appreciate both the need for larger inducements if restric-
ted firms are actually to establish or expand in the border areas instead, 
and the probable consequences of pursuing its objectives by means of 
direct controls, without any change in the level of inducements? 
A difficulty with which we have been faced throughout this study is the 
absence of any clear indication from the Government of the degree of ind-
ustrial decentralisation which it actually intends bringing about . 
We have therefore couched the discussion in general terms, in an 
attenpt to cover various possible alternative degrees of industrial 
decentralisation. It night be useful in concluding this chapter, however, 
to consider briefly the irrplications of one or two official staterrents 
regarding the Governxnmts intentions. 
According to a recent press report, the Permanent Conrnittee 
has estimated the increase in the employment of Bantu rn:1les between 
1960 and the end of 1967 in manufacturing industry in the border areas 
to have been abo-ut' 5, 000 per annum. The Conrnittee, however, states 
that about· double this nuni>er was necessary simply in order to cope with 
the number of Bantu rren from the reserves coning on to the labour 
rm.rket. This was apparently based on the Con:rnittee' s estimate that 
the nunber of Bantu men from the reserves coning on to the labour mar-
ket in the period 1960 to 1967 was 35,000 per annum and the assumption 
that, since only one quarter of the Bantu tnan in the economy as a whole 
a.re employed in secondary industry, three quarters of the 35,000 males 
would have obtained employment in non-industrial activities if one quarter 
had been en:ploycd in manufacturing industry. Thus they say it would 
have been necessary to provide employrrent for at least an additional 
9, 000 African males per annum to keep pace with the increase in the 
labour force of the reserves. 
The procedure adopted by the Permanent Connittee in cal-
culating the a:nnunt of industrial errployment needed to contain the pop-
ulation of the reserves is highly questionable. But let us take i t that 
they would have been satisfied with 9. 000 additional industrial jobs 
per annum for Bantu males in the period 1960 to 1967. This number 
is so~ 80 per cent higher than the increase of 5, 000 per annum which 
l 
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they estimate was actually achieved. As we noted in Chapter 9, the 
average annual increase in employment in the border areas in the period 
1960 to 1966, taking all races and including both male and female Bantu, 
was about 8, 784. It appears then that it would have been necessary to 
raise the total average annual increase to something like 15, 731 in order 
to provide employment for 9, 000 additional Bantu males per annum. 
As we estimated in Chapter 9, it seezn; reasonable to take it 
that something like 5, 112 jobs per annum arose spontaneously in the 
border areas in the period 1960 to 1966. To achieve an increase of 
about 15,731 per annum~> therefore, it appears that it would have been 
necessary to divert about 10,619 jobs from other areas to the border are as, 
compared with the approximately 3, 672. which we estimated were actually 
diverted in the period under consideration. In Chapter 8, we estimated 
that the average annual increase in employment in non-residentiary 
r:mnufacturing industries in the country as a whole was 33,051. It appears 
then that if would have been encessary to divert about 32. 1 per cent 
of the latter to the border areas, compared with the approximately 11. 1 
per cent which we estimated was actually achieved. 
This means that in order to provide 9, 000 additional jobs per 
annum for Bantu males in the border areas between 1960 and 1966, it 
would have .been ae~essary to divert an amount of employ~rent approx-
imately equal to the national increase in employment in all the non-
residentiary activities from that at the top of the list in Table 33 above 
down to the 'blankets' sector. For the reasons mentioned in Chapter 8, 
in order to divert any particular percentage of the additional employment 
in non-residentiary activities, it would be necessary to include in the 
decentralisation programme a considerably greater number of sectors 
than Table 33 ouggests. As was also argued in Chapter 8, the marginal 
excess eoots of diversion increase significantly as the diverted percent-
age o£ non-residentiary activities increasea. Had an attempt been 
made to divert 32. 1 per cent of the increase in employment in non-
residentiary activities, which the Perrranent Committee's estimates seem 
449 
to impy was necessary in order to stop migration from the reserves • 
the volume of financial assistance required would have been substantially 
greater than that which was actually necessary in view of the relatively 
small number of jobs which seems to have been diverted to border 
areas between 1960 and 1966. 
Despite the heavy cost, however, it is quite possible that the 
country would have been able, and perhaps quite willing, to provide 
larger inducements, to a larger number of firms, than they were actually 
called upon to do·. But even if an average am1.ual increase of 15, 731 
in manufacturing industry in the border areas would have been oufficient 
to contain the population of the reserves (which is subject to serious 
doubt), it would have been quite consistent with the continued expansion 
on a fairly substantial scale of the Bantu labour force in the metropolitan 
areas.. Since the national increase in employment in residentiary and 
non-residentiary manufacturing activities per annum was about 46, 843 
between 1959-60 and 1965-66, employment in non-border areas includ-
ing controlled areas could still have increased by 31 , 112 per annum, 
assuming that the use of positive inducements alone would not have 
had a significant adverse effect o~'l the overall :rate of growth. 
By contrast with the Permanent Committee's relatively modest 
objectives, we find the statement by the Minister of Planning that he is 
11not prepared to grant permission [in terms of the Physical Planning 
Act] west of a line between Colesberg and Humansdorp if this means 
the employment of Bantu labour". 1 Subsequently, 2 without reference 
to any specific region, he stated that "no permission ·.r.rill be granted to 
any industrialist if there i.s any increase in the Bantu labourn. and 
"we must see to it that the number of Bantu employed in the n1etropolitan 
areas is pegged at the figure of today and is reduced in years to come". 
1. The Natal Mercury:. Durban, October 13. 1967. 
2.. The Daily News, Durban, January 27, 1968. 
Can these renarks be taken to mean that all Bantu workers who would 
have been employed in the metropolitan areas, excluding Durban (where 
the restrictive measures do not apply to land which has already been 
zoned for industrial use) will in future be employed in border areas? 
It appears from figures published by the Bureau of Statistics. 1 
that between 1961/62 and 1963/64, about 71. 1 per cent of the natio:otal 
increase in manufacturing employment took place in the Western Cape, 
Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage and the Southern Transvaal. If, over the 
whole period 1960-66 they received more or less the same proportion, 
the average annual increase in employment in these areas would have 
been about 33,790. If none of the jobs for Bantu workers, included in 
this total, had been permitted to arise in the three areas mentioned, and 
if instead they were to have been employed in border areas, it would 
have been necessary to divert virtually the whole of the 33, 790 jobs to 
manufacturing industry in the border areas. For Bantu labour in the 
present conditions must be complemented by other types of labour 
if it is to be employable. But 33, 790 is greater than the national increase 
o£ 33, 051 in non-residentiary rmnufacturing industries, so that it would 
clearly have been very difficult, probably physically impossible, to 
actually divert the whole of the increase in manufacturing employment in 
the three majc-r industrial a r eas mentioned, to the border areas. The 
reason for thisp of course, is that the estimated annual inc~ase of 
33, 790 took place in residentiary as well as non-residentiary activities 
and the former cannot be diverted. 
Residentiary activities contributed about 27. 3 per cent of the 
total manufacturing employment in 1960-61. L et us say, so as to be 
on the conservative side, that such activities contributed only 15 per 
cent of the increase in manufacturing employment in the We stern Cape, 
1. Statistical News Release dated 15th February, 1967. 
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Port F~lizabeth/TJitenhage and the Southern Transvaal between 1960-66. 
Thus out of a total estimated increase of 33, 790 per annum in these 
three areas together, . at least 5, 068 would have been in residentiary 
activities. . If no additional Bantu employment had been permitted in 
the latter the amount of employment available to Bantu in the country as 
a whole would have been reduced.. At the most only the difference 
between 33, 790 and 5, 068 jobs, that is 28, 722, could have been con-
sidered for diversion to the border areas. But clearly the task of ac-
tually diverting all of these would have been an extraordinarily difficult 
one. It would have meant diverting all the additional employment in 
all manufacturing industries in these areas from the most mobile to the 
heaviest and most capital intensive ones. 
For instance, if all Bantu labour is to be kept out of the con~ 
trolled areas, and is actually to be employed in manufacturing industry 
in the border areas, it would be necessary to divert all the additional 
employment in industries such as iron and steel, cement, pulp and paper, 
explosives, Sasolburg, and also in all activities which, though not of 
a residentiary nature, are strongly oriented to the large markets offered 
by the major industrial areas. The additional employment in the latter 
industries is probably very substantial, for as we noted in Chapter .2, 
the market has been the predominant factor determining the locational 
pattern of manufacturing industry in Fouth Africa. The costs of divert-
ing za. 72.2 jobs per annum are prohibitive, and any attempt to do it 
would seriously disrupt the whole economy. As we noted above it 
requires positive inducements to divert industries. as distinct from 
merely s tifling them, but the amount of tax revenue required to divert 
employment o.n this scale is probably beyond the capacity of the country. 
Indeed. as we noted above, the diversion of even the 19,619 employment 
opportunities, which we estimated would have been necessary to achieve 
the r ermanent Committees relatively modest aims, would have required 
substantial increases in financial assistance to border industries, and 
as experience has shown, could not be achieved with the present in-
ducements. 
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Since it would have beer1 impossible to divert all additional 
manufacturing employmen t to the border areas, it follows that if a t otal 
embargo had been placed on the employment of more Bantu workers, this 
would have dislocated economic life in South Africa and have led to large 
scale unemployment. Even if the s i ze of the inducements had been in-
creased this could not have been. avoided, but if such an embargo had 
been introduced while leaving the inducements unchanged the effect on 
manufacturing industry would have been s till more devastating . Con-
fronted with such an embargo most industries, especially those mentioned 
specifically in the last parag raph, would not have established branch 
plants in or transferred their factories to border areas. 
Indeed, a total embargo would cause so much damage to the 
economy and to the living standards of Ba11tu that the possibility of it 
being imposed would not deserve serious consideration but for the re-
rnu-ks, quoted above, by the Mini ster responsible for implementin g 
the provisions of the P hysical P lanning Act. Also it appears that equally 
drastic measures have been con templated in Italy. Writing of the s it-
uation in Italy in the early 1960 ' s Vera Lutz comm en ts as follows: 
11The armoury of instrument s was now n early full. It looked as 
though Parliament had provided for almost every stimulus to 
private industry in the South - other than unlimited gifts - that 
could be devised. One very extreme measure, it is true had been 
avoided. A proposal was being voiced in influential circles in 1956 
that a law should be passed pl acing a ban - for private and public 
enterprises alike - on the establishmet'lt of n ew industrial plants, 
and the expansion of oldoones, in the North u.1til a 6Ufficient 
amount of industry had been developed in the South. This counsel 
of despair was .fortunately set aside before it· could give rise to 
action. ul 
Apart f rom the difficulties mentioned, there are other r eason s 
:for doubting whether the remarks of the Minister of Planning which we 
1. Op . d~. , P • 1 ZO. 
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quoted above should be taken at their face value. For instance the 
Minister hinl3elf has :r:mre recently adopted a rather less uncomprom-
isinr position~ in making the following remarks: 11This is· an invitat-
ion .n!o industrialists] to have a talk with us, not as enemies, but 
helpful ftiends, who will do everything possible to advise them ••• 
Naturally, rmny of them will be industries which cannot be established 
in border areas~ and there we will be only too happy to direct them to 
metropolitan areas. " 1 In additio'l, there is the fact that since the 
relevant provisions o£ the Physical Planning Act carne into effect on 
January 19, 19.68 the number of firms actually refused permission to 
establish or exp~J.d in controlled areas has been fewer than industrialists 
.... 
feared, in view of the Ministers earlier statements. He is reported" 
to have said that on 22 February there were 94 applications "under 
consideration". By 10 May, 84 of these had been finalised, permission 
being granted in 59 cases and refused in 13. Twelve applicants were 
told that they had applied for exemption unnecessarily, and in the case 
of the other ten "further particulars called for were being awaited". 
Between 22 February and 10 :May the Minister received a further 433 
applications, 168 of which were granted and 28 refused. Forty five 
applicants were told that they need not have applied, while 193 were still 
being co~sidered. 
The situation described, clearly contains certain unsatisfactory 
features. The possibility of costly delays, referred to earlier, is in 
evidence and it appears that there was a build up of applications "under 
consideratio11." but unfinalised, between 22 February a.."'l.d 10 May. 
Furthermore, 41 out of the 268 finalised applications, which were ac-
tually necessary in terms o£ the Act, were refused. This proportion, 
though it falls well short of a complete embargo, is not insignificant 
1. The Daily News, Durban, lv1arch 21, 1968. 
2. The South African Financial Mail, May 17, 1968, p. 602. 
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and. depending on the type and size of the establishments or expansions 
refused. the costs to industrialists night have been quite substantial. 
Unfortunately we do not as yet know anything about the nature of the 
:firms affected. The fact that the criteria used by the Minister in 
deciding whether to grant or refuse permission are not known also 
has serious disadvantages, and must introduce a most undesirable 
element of uncertainty into business planning. 
Despite these unsatisfactory features, the fact remains that 
the number of refusals is considerably less than the Minister ' s earlier 
statements might have led one to expect. Does this mean that the 
Government does not really mean to place anything like a total ban on 
the employment of additional Bantu workers in controlled areas, despite 
repeated statements to the contrary? Whatever the answer to this 
question may be. it seems clear that the size of the reduction in the 
growth of the Bantu indust rial l abour force in the controlled areas which 
is required by the Government, is significantly greater than that ac-
tually contri buted by border industries policy between 1960 and 1967. 
and is also greater than that which would have been achieved if the 
9, 000 jobs per annum, which the Permanent Committee estimates 
would have stopped the flow from the reserves, had been provided in 
the border for Bantu males over thi s period. We must also note that 
as yet there has been no significant increase in the size of the induce-
ments available to border industries. In the light of these facts it 
seems that we cannot completely discount the possibility that the Govern-
rmnt will act in a way which will have the effect of shifting the costs 
of its policies on to industrialists and Bantu workers, whether it 
intends its actions to have this effect or not. 
It would be of great value if a realistic target were to be 
selected on the basis of a careful assessment of the facts~ and if it 
were made known to the country' s industrialists. The uncertainty 
caused by contradictory official statements of the Govern~nts 
intentions is not conducive to sound long term p l anning by manufac-
turing concerns. It may be that an initial approach to this problem 
could be made along the lines suggested by our analysis in Chapter 8 
above. The statistics included in Table 33, a11d the subsequent 
analysis based on the table, relate to manufacturing industry in the 
country as a whole. In view of the recent atmouncement of specific 
controlled areas, however, it would be useful to construct a s imilar 
table relating only to the controlled areas. I£ industrial statistics 
for each magisterial district and for each of the 130 odd manufacturing 
sectors were available for a recent year, it would be possible to 
analyse the composition of the increase in employment in the controlled 
areas between, say, 1959-60 and 1966-67. By separating residentiary 
:from non-residentiary activities, and ranking the sectors in terms of 
mobility or divertibility, it would then be possible to make a detailed 
analysis of what might have happened if the increase in Bantu employ-
ment in the controlled areas had fcil.len short, by various assumed 
am:>unts, of the increase that actually took place in the period 1960-67. 
It seems that some such exercise as this must be performed if a full 
understanding is to be obtained of the probable consequences of using 
the restrictive provisions of the :Physical Planning Act to bring about 
a reduction of any particular size in the rate of growth of the Bantu 
industrial labour force in controlled areas. In the light of such an 
analysis, it would be easier for the Government to make a realistic 
decision regarding the optimum reduction in the rate of expansion of 
the controlled areas, and whether it was desirable to increase the size 
of the inducements offered to border industries. 
As we observed at the beginning of this chapter, there has 
been a consistent tendency to underestimate the incude~.rtts necessary 
to bring about larg e scale industrial decentralisation. The restrictive 
provisions of the Physical Planning Act are certainly adequate to the 
task of checking the further expansion of industry in the controlled 
areas. But there is still the danger that the costs of bringing about 
decentralisation in this way are not fully appreciated. 
1 
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Chapter ll. 
"WHAT PRICE ECONOMIC GROWTH? 11 l 
Before 1929, price stability held pride of place amongst the 
objectives of economic policy in capitalist societies. The Great 
Depression and the Keynesian Revolution in economic thinking, how-
ever, shifted the emphasis to another objective, the maintenance of 
a high and stable level of employment, which often conflicts with that 
of price stability.. After the Second World War, probably l argely due 
to the cold war between East and West, a third objective carne to be em-
phasised in both rich and poor countries, a rapid rate of economic growth. 
This ~mphasi s on economic growth has aroused a good deal of 
criticism. Perhaps the most celebrated of the protests against ex-
cessive preoccupation with growth in Professor J. K. Galbraith's ~ 
Affluent Societl which attacks the 'conventional wisdom' of continuing 
to stress economic growth in a society as affluent as that of the United 
States. The essence of his argument seems to be that a greater part 
of the country's resources must be devoted to improving the quality of 
life and less to increasing the quantity of goods and services available 
to an already affluent society. 
More recently E . J. Mishan 3 has strongly condemned what he 
calls "growth.mania11 which he alleges is so prevalent in the West, and 
1. Title of a book edited by Klaus Knorr and William J . Baumol, 
(Prentice-Hall, 1961). 
2. The Affluent Society, (Houghton Mifflen Co. J Boston, 1958). 
3. op. cit. 
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has seriously questioned the value of greater m~terial prosperity 
when it takes the form very largely of television sets an.d 4l1l unnec-
esoarily large aasortment of automobiles. and when it is accompanied 
by the 'ugliness of the irresistible eproad of steel and concrete' and 
an 'increasingly complex, frantic and wearing' way of life. 1 Miahan 
argues that in Britain much more empbasi• must be given to the costs 
of economic growth. 
\lhatever relevance these attacks on growthmania may ba'\re 
for countries like the United States and Britain, they obviously do n.~t 
apply with anything like the same force to the poorer countries of the 
world where the major obctaclc to a~i improvement in the quality of 
life is the $hortage of conoumption goods. ~iishr-n, for one, ie appar-
ently perfectly well aware that for moa.;t of the woddJ commodities like 
bread, rice and mielie•. and even the moat elementary forma of 
educ~tion are mueb more relevant benefits of economic growth tban 
are olectric toothbrushes and television sets. He. th refore. qualifies 
his argument with the following comment: 
nane may concede the import::mce of economic growth in an 
indigent society. in a country with an outsize popult~tion wherein 
the mass of people atruggle for bare uubsi tence. But despite 
ministerial twaddle about the efforts we must make to 'survive 
bl a competitive world', Brit in is just not that aort o£ country. 
Irrespective of ito 'd.bappoirt.ting' r'"'te of growt~ or tbe present 
position of the gold reser'\rea, it may be reasonably regarded, in 
view o£ ita p roductive capacity and skillB, a• one of the more 
a!flucnt societies of tho West, a country with a wide margin of 
choice in ita policy objectiveeu. Z 
In short then the 'marginal benefit' of economic growth hi higher 
in poor countries, simply on account of their lower pe:r capita ince>mes. 
Given the fact that South Africa•s per capita income is less than two 
1.. op. cit. , p .. x. 
~. op. <;it. , pp. 4-5. 
fifths that of the United Kingdom, it would seem that the benefit& of 
economi c growth are considerably greater in this country, and that 
the margin of choice in its policy objectives is not nearly as wide as it 
i s in the more affluent countries. 
Faster growth naturally means a greater rate of increase in the 
living standards of all sections of the population. This may matter 
little to the white population which already enjoys a living standard 
surpassed only by that of the two or three most prosperous countries.~ 
but some would be inclined to attach a very high value to an improvement 
in the living standards of non-whites, in v i ew of their present relatively 
low level. For non-whites, especially the inhabitants of the Bantu areas, 
the improved health and better education which economic growth can 
make possible are obviously important benefits . But let us put aside 
all the considerations which make an improvement in living etandards a 
desirable end in itself. It i s not that these considerati ons do not matter, 
and indeed even the prosperous white population clearly wants a still 
higher standard of living for i ts own sake. Rather we shall put such 
considerations aside simply in order to emphasi se that there are sufficiently 
good reasons apart from this why the white electorate, with whom the 
choice between growth and other possi ble conflicting objectives lies, 
might in their own interests attach a high value to the benefits of economi c 
growth. 
The choice between economic growth and conflicting political 
objectives is not simply a choice between "economic" and .. non-econ-
omic" objectives. While economic growth in the sense of an increase 
in the country's capacity to produce goods and services may conflict 
with. some goals of society, the attainment of certain other gca.ls, even 
those which would normally be regarded as eseentially 11poliHcal" i~ 
nature, is not merely consistent with, but actually requires, economic 
growth~ In great measure, economic growth is not desired simply for 
the rising living standards which it brings, as an end in itself, but as 
a means of attaining certain "political" objectives. To this extent 
growth is iteslf a political goal and the real clash is between those 
political objectives which require economic growth and those which 
conflict with it. To say that economic growth must be sacrificed for 
social or political reasons is, therefore, simply to say that social and 
political objectives which require growth must be sacrificed for those 
which conflict with it. Let us consider briefly two important political 
objectives of the former sort, which may be regarded as amongst the 
benefits of economic growth. 
Firstly, though not necessarily in order of importance, there 
is the effect of growth on the strength of the state in its external re-
l ations. In this connection it is worth noting that even in the United 
States, notwithstanding the strictures of the "anti-growth" school, 
the .need to achieve a high rate of growth for this purpose is regarded 
by some observers as sufficiently urgent to warrant a delil»erate effort 
to improve the performance of the United States in this respect. 
As Klaus Knorr has pointed out, the rate of growth of the real 
G. N. P . in the Soviet Union is estimated to have been more than twice 
as great as in the U. S. A . in the 1950's. 1 This together with the fact that 
the U. S.S.R. , with a national income only about half the size, in 1960 
had a military output which approximated that of the U. S. in absolute 
terms, 2 is regarded by Knorr and other writers in the same book, as 
a serious threat to the long term security o:£ the U. s . and hence to the 
West as a whole. Two other related benefits of rapid economic growth 
are what Knorr calls "system reputation", that is "the image of the 
performance of the American economy (and indirectly, of the American 
political, social and cultural arrangements) as evaluated in the minds 
1. Knorr and Baumol, op. cit., p . 4 . 
2 . ~·I PP· 8-9. 
of fo.ret .-er• in term• of their own v luea, ,. 1 and tb~ c~ma~ity to pro• 
Y'id.e foreir.n economic aieL They therefore prc.poae v l'i\)UB :r.'len.auros 
for inereaamg the rate of economic .. rowtb in tbe U ... ;. • even thou _ h 
tbt• would Involve c•rt:d!l otheT socinl and p1.1Utical c oato. 
Ci.rcumatancee. nd beo.~e th• o~tlmum rat~ of growth obviuus-
ly Y ry a l"eat deal from country to country. South Afric:a duea not 
bea:.r the burden of bavlng to delend the 'eat. Nor !or that matt 1' 
doe• Brit in bave aa large a role to rlay ~• the U. s. in tbia ~eapr;ct, 
and •be mny the.refol"e be able to afford the luxury (neeeeaity?) of 
"littl Englat.~diam".. But in vi w of the bo•tUe ttitude of the l"ellt of 
the world t~ al'da Seuth Afrlc~t, the United N tion•' emb r n() on tho 
wpply of arms. the 1 ~g term lf cot lmmedi te po stbillty of a aubatan• 
tlal military threat to the wbitE>-contr~Ued •tat>es of ~outbora. Afdca, 
aad the f)otontiaUy impq.rtact pblitkal role u! foreign ec0!1..)mie aid to 
nei h'bourln. black state• aDd even t"' tboae further north~ ia -:.1ot ~;.;m .. 
dnued rapid co lOmlc gt- wtb d. "the utmost import ce to the aec\ll'ity 
ef S th Afdc-? How much value doe• the white elector at• attach to 
rowth to,.. the ·s e pu:rpoaee ? 'l.f1ould the loae of th« JX)teutial be efit 
.rekted to her e¥ternal security, wbieh would lxt involved iD r t" <:tiou 
in the rate ill growth of the G. D. P . fl'om a maximum lon3 term l"ate of 
5 .. 5 per c t to a rate of, eay, 4. 5. ~r cut be cot'l.•lde.red. worthw4ile, 
tar~na iuto aceount the alternAtive objective• that euch l'edueUon might 
on ble tbe eoUDtry to •atiafy? Would a reduction to l. 5 per cent be 
worthwhile? 
Secondly, th re are the poselblct beneficial effects of ee mlc 
growth on race .relatiooa within South Mrit:a. As we noted iu Cha ter 
6, there lo a tendency fo~ economic growth t.:> epontan oualy rf!duee the 
degree of ino'lttality in the di t~ibudu of i.n.com • This of eourae i8 
a gr dl.tal "'~e••, end Ia likely to be po.rtic;:ularly slow in the early 
stft{!ea of development when thoro ia a large amount of underemployed, 
1 w 'lrade labour tu draw U~'"\. Several eoneider~ti.Hlaa &ucb as t.he 
1.. !!!i:!J·. p. 9. 
The maximum potential t-"'lfe estimated. i.n tM F.c..:>numic Development 
.Programme for the Republic of -..~:Nth Afric:a !966-1971. 
marked decline in the proportion of Africans resident in the Bantu 
areas,. 
1 
the shortage of sldlled labour which has become acute in 
recent years, and the tendency, which we noted in (;hapter 2, for 
the average earnings of non-whites to rise more rapidly .since the 
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late 1950's, seem to suggest that the rate at which the degree of 
inequality in the distribution of income declines with economic g rowth, 
may become more pronounced in future. 
Thus we should expect the differences between the incomes of 
the .,haves" and the "have-nots" to decline at least in relative terms, 
and this may well have the effect of lessening racial tensions. Indeed, 
some writers believe that there is a very close relationship between 
the stage of economic development and the conditions necessary for 
? 
successful political democracy. Van den Bogaerde- finds that in 
the case of the existing democratic countries, there is a close relation-
ship between the timing of the introduction of the universal franchise 
and the stage of economic development which they bad reached, since, 
he seems to argueJ class conflict is only reduced sufficiently to make a 
universal franchise w::>rkable when certain institutions, characteristic 
only of industrialised societies, have been developed, and people have 
acqtuired a common interest in political stability and the maintenance o! 
law and order. Whatever doubts one may have about the validity of 
the more deterministic feat\lres o! aucb stages-of-economic-and-political-
development theories. it may nevertheless be true that a reduction in 
the degree of income inequality does contribute to a lessening of social 
tensions, and this requires economic growth. 
In the short~. however, economic growth cannot be expected 
to make any significant impact on thE. e.quality of income distribution 
1. About 39.0 per cent in 1960 compared with 78.0 per cent in 1911. 
2. F . van den Bogaerde, Suid Afrika in die Politiek-Ekonorniese Proses 
(Van Schaik, Pretoria 1966). 
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even if the l ong term tendency discussed above is in operation. 
Nevertheless greater affluence i tself, as Professor Galbraith has 
suggested, 1 may take a good deal of the sting out of inequality. 
Are a high level of employment and a rapidly rising standard of 
living conducive to racial peace? To what extent are the apparently 
calmer conditions of recent years in South Africa compared with 
the early 1960's due to the boom which began in late 1961, and to 
what extent to other factors? One astute observer of the South African 
scene has told the writer that he believes the racial peace of recent 
years can be attributed entirely to the country's prosperity. P erhaps 
this is too simple a view oi the situation, but it is surely true that 
economic strength is one of the Governments greatest assets and that 
a 5 . 5 per cent rate of growth is, therefore, better from this point of 
view than 4. 5 per cent and that 4 . 5 per cent is better than 3. 5 per 
cent. This is particularly clear when one takes into account the rapid 
increase of South Africa's populatio~ and that a growth rate of 5. 5 per 
cent over the period 1966-1971 was expected to give an increase of 2 . 7 
' per cent per annum in income per head. '"' The rate of increase of per 
capita income would, therefore, fall to under two per cent with a rate of 
gro'\vth of the G. N. P . of 4. 5 per cent, and to under 1 per cent with a 
growth rate of 3. 5 per cent. What would the effect of such reductions 
be on the political situation in South Africa? 
On political grounds alone, then, it appears that the white pop-
ulation might want to attach a high value to the 'marginal benefits' of 
economic growth.. Economic growth, however, also has its costs, and 
it may be that these costs are reckoned to be so high in South Africa that 
1. op. cit. , Chapter XXIU 
z. Economic Development Programme for the Republic of South 
Africa 1966-1971, p. 13. 
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even though the marginal benefits of growth are higher than in the more 
affluent and politically less isolated countries of Europe,. the optimum 
rate of growth is no higher here. and perhaps even lower . For inst-
ance~ we may be prepared to leave ourselves a little more rather a 
little less vulnerable to external threats if the costs of avoiding thi s 
are sufficiently great. 
Economic growth in South Africa requires a continued increase 
in the Af·rican population of the more dynamic parts of the country~ 
namely the present major industrial regions. That is~ up to a certain 
point, the greater is the desired rate of growth, the greater is the pro-
portion of additio11sl industrial capacity and hence of all sections of the 
population which must be situated in those areas. That this is ao, 
follows from the argument of this study that the greater the proportion 
of the additional induatr~al employment which is diverted to the border 
and Bantu areas, the greater the marginal costs in terms of a loss of 
productive capacity. Hence, taking the viewpoint of the Government) 
a cost of having a little more economic growth, rather than a little 
less, is that a larger porportion of the additional employment of Bantu 
in industry must occur in the 'congested' areas. Or, to lool<: at it f rom 
the point of view adopted in earlier chapters; the cost of diverting in-
dustries to border areas for the purpose of bringing about separate 
development is a reduction in the maximum potential rate of growth. 
The benefit derived !rom doing this is that discussed in Chapters 1 
and 6 above, and the demand for this benefit is reflected in the curve 
GG in the Diagram of Chapter 6. This curve, however, tends to be 
lowered by the benefits of growth which we discussed above. 
That a diversion of industries involves a cost in terms of growth 
was argued in detail above. It is also accepted by a number of lead-
in!: authorities 1 in the field7 that unless state intervention in the location 
1. Including a number who a.re for various reasons in favour of attempts 
to decentralise industry e. g. ThQ .mas Wilso~ Planning and Growth, 
pp. 125-128; M. C. MacLennan, "Regionnl Planning in Francen, 
in Thomas Wilson (editor), Papers on Regional Development, (Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford 1965}, p . 75, the Barlow Commission op. cit., 
W. A. Lewis, Principles of Economic Planning; Vera Lutz, op. cit. 
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of industry is confined to a limited number of carefully selected ind· 
ustries economic growth will be seriously impaired. Yet there are 
some commentators in South Africa who appear to doubt it, and this 
seems to be due to a misunderstanding of what the sort of argument we 
have presented means or, rather, does not mean. 
It is, of course, true that continued economic growth and state 
intervention in the location of industry are compatible with one another. 
We have not argued that such state intervention will stop growth enti rely, 
let alone cause an absolute decline in the national income. Continued 
economic growth is probably even compatible with a fairly high degree 
of forced industrial decentralisation. We have simply been saying 
tl:aat the greater is the proportion of additional manufacturing capacity 
which is diverted to the border and Bantu areas, the greater will be 
the loss of potential productive capacity, and hence the lower will 
be the rate of economic growth. Furthermore, we are not even saying 
that a "rapid" rate of economic growth is incompatible with the diver-
sion of industries to border and Bantu areas, if by ttrapid" growth we 
mean one close to the maximum potential rate of 5. 5 per cent growth 
in the G. D. P •• estimated by the Department of Pla:ming for the period 
1966-1971. For if diversion is carried on on a small scale it need 
not have a significant adverse effect on economic growth, as the ex• 
perience of the past few years shows. 
Whether rapid gro".Nth is compatible with "separate development", 
however, iG a rather different matter. It depends obviously on what 
is meant by "separate development". If it simply means continued 
attempts to foster growth in the border and Bantu areas in order to 
reduce the rate of Bantu migration to the metropolitan areas, then of 
course a high rate of growth is compatible with separate development 
for the reasons given in the last paragraph. But if it means Govern-
ment intervention in the geographical distribution of economic activities 
on a sca.l!sufficient to reduce the black/white population ratio to !:1 in 
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the Southern Transvaal industrial complex, or t o bring to an end the 
expansion of the Bantu industrial labour force in that region, or some 
similarly ambitious scheme, the compatibility of rapid economic 
growth with separate development is much more doubtful. Indeed 
a s we sugge~ted in the last chapter the attainment' of such goals, if not 
actually impossible (which they probably are)J ·would gravely hampe.r 
the country• s economic expansion. The ambitious goals mentioned 
above are in fact those normally associated with the concept of separate 
development. 
Some may be inclined to deny the conflict between growth and 
Government intervention in the location of industry on the basis of 
histo1·ical experience. For instance, there is the case of the United 
States where, despite the increasing proportion· of the country's nat-
ional income taking the form o£ public expenditure, and the great 
extension of government control and regulation in m any spheres of 
economic life, growth has continued (though of course at a relatively 
slow rate) and per capita incomes have risen steadily. Three important 
points which this sort of argument seems to overlook may be stated 
briefly aa· follows: 
(a) State intervention is not a homogeneous thing, and there are a 
great variety of forms which it can take. It is, for instance, obviouely 
nonsense to put state intervention to establish the Iron and Steel Cor-
poration of South Africa, the increasing number of South African ind-
ustrial concerns controlled and run by the L.'ldustrial Development 
Corporation, and state control of electricity supply and the railways, 
on the same footing as intervention in the location of industry by 
application of. the provisions of the Physical Planning Act. Not all 
state intervention is necessarily economically harmful in the sense 
that it involves a deviation from the optimum allocation of resources. 
If this were not the case we should expect the most highly socialised 
countries to be the least efficient. In fact the. arguments c4Jaiust 
1 
·1'::6 
socialism are not primarily economic, but political, and even those 
economies which come closest to being 100% state owned know that 
they cannot shift industry from optimum to non-optimum locations 
without causing an adverse effect on production. And even in those 
countries most firmly committed to private enterprise it is of course 
recognised that there are some functions which can only be efficiently 
performed by the state. Finally, in those cases where state inter-
vention does shift resources from their moe t productive uses, some 
types of intervention are more damaging in this respect than others. 
(b) A small degree of intervention ol the non-optimum sort, in each of 
a wide variety of different aspects of economic life i s not as damaging 
economically as large scale intervention in one field, such as industrial 
location, for the simple reason, mentioned near the end of Chapter 8 
above, that whereas "at lower levels of fulfillment objectives may be 
compatible or complementary", at the higher levels "opportunity costs 
seem to rise sharply". 
(c) Increasing government intervention, as in the United State~ i:8 often 
the result of economic prosperity. Progressive taxation alone tends 
automatically to increase the share of the country's resources in the 
hands of the public sector. Also as countries grow richer they seem 
to want, and are able to pay for, more and more things of a sort which 
are often best provided by government action e. g . education, social 
programmes like the U. s. anti-poverty campaign, urban renewal schemes, 
space research etc. 
There seems to be only one thing whi ch might enable forced 
decentralisation to take place on a significant scale without reducing 
the rate of growth below its long term maximum level, and that is a 
reduction in the ratio of private consumption to the national income by 
means of increased taxation. In this case the proportion of the national 
income available for productive investment by the Govermnent and 
private individuals might be unaffected and the additional tax revenue 
could be used to subsidise border industries so as to leave them with 
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the same costs as they would have had in their optimum locations, 
and hence with the same incentives to produce. How much addit -
ional tax revenue would have to be raised would depend on the deg ree 
of industrial decentralisation envisaged, and it must be remembered, 
as we noted earlier, that these costs of subsidisation would tend to 
become cumulative. We cannot say exactly how much additional tax 
revenue would be necessary for various degrees of i ndustri a l decen-
tralisation, but the relatively insignificant results achieved with the 
existing measures suggest that it would have to be very large indeed 
to divert a substantially greater proportion of additional manufact-
urintt capacity. 
The question, then, is whether the South African electorate 
can be made to feel that the n eed for substantial industrial decentral-
isation i s sufficiently ur(Yent to i.rtduce them to accept higher taxes. 
Is i t within thei r capacity to cut consumption sufficiently to achieve 
the more ambitious targets without a fall in the rate of growth? If 
they believe that these ambitkus targets cannot be reached, will they 
feel that significant decentralisation short of those targets is worth 
paying for? Will they not instead look fo r alternative approaches to the 
political problems which decentralisation is desitmed to solve? Is the 
failure to increase the size of the subsidies to bel'der industries, and 
resort to physical controls a sign that the Government believes the 
electorate will not bear the cost? 
Historical experien ce, therefore, does not conflict with the 
finding in this study that forced i ndustrial decentralisation involves 
a cost which rises more than in proportion to the percentag e of add-
i tional capacity which is diverted. Indeed as we noted briefly earlier 
there is one aspect of the situation which tends to raise the g rowth 
costs of diverting any particular proportion of manufacturing industry, 
compared with countries like Great Britain and Ireland, and consequent-
ly tends to raise the optimum rate of growth. The following comments 
by Vera Lutz1 on the situation in Italy, apply equally well to South 
Africa: 
"Some of the current notions about the possibilities of 
diverting future industrial expansion from Northern to South-
ern locations are inspired by recent English practice in 
controlling the geographical distribution of industry. It is 
doubtful, however, whether the policy actually followed by 
the Board of Trade in the case of the United Kingdom has 
involved diverting industry away from the optimum or pre-
ferred locations in anything like the degree that would be 
necessary in order to reach that distribution between South-
ern and Northern Italy which is at present regarded as 
desirable by much of Italian opinion. Displacements of a 
few tens of miles are likely to be a very different thing from 
displacements of several hundred. The distance between the 
plain of Lombardy and the Ionic seaboard, for instance, is 
600 miles." 
It is true that some border areas are relatively close to 
the major industrial areas and in fact it appears that for the time 
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being at least Durban and Pinetown have virtually acquired border areas 
status. But the exemption of Durban and Pinetown from certain pro-
visiot"ts of the Physical Planni ng Act and the proximity of certain 
border areas to major industrial areas, does not overcome the problem 
of achieving a geographical distribution o£ additional border areas em-
ployment which is in keeping with the aims of the policy, which arises 
from the fact that the distances over which industry must be diverted 
to achieve this, especially in the case of the Transkei and Ciskei 
border areas, are very considerable. 
l. op. cit., pp. 143-144. 
There seems to be at least one basis on which it may be 
argued that the costs of pla1med industrial decentralisation, as set 
out in this study so far, are overstated. Firstly, i t may be argued 
that while the short-term effect of attempts to decentralise industry 
will be to slow down the rate of growth, if we take into account the 
possibility of political upheaval if industrial decentralisation is not 
achieved, this policy may actually result in a faster r a te of growth 
in the long run than would take place without it. Put this way, the 
argument for industrial decentralisation may in a sense be seen as 
an econowic one. There i~ no way of testing the va idity of this 
sort of prediction, but if industrial decentralisation on a large scale 
is required for this purpose. we shall almost certainly have to 
accept a considerable reduction in the rate oi economic growth, 
with all the political difficulties that this would bring. Those who 
insist on the absolute necessity of large scale decentralisation for 
the pr.evention of political catastrophe, therefore, seem to present 
us with an extremely gloomy view of South Mrica'a future. 
In this chapter we have simply tried to show the nature of 
the choice between economic growth and industrial decentralisation, 
which the country has to make. The considerations mentioned do 
not, of course, represent anything like a.n exhaustive list of the costs 
and benefits of economic growth. But they are. perhaps, sufficient to 
show that statements by people in responsible positions to the effect 
that "the economy must be changed, bent or even broken to ensure 
something so vital as the survi~al of the nation" are nonsensical 
and dangerous. A bl'oken economy can hardly ensure the usurvival 
of the nation" and is much more likely to hasten its collapse. If 
growth and industrial decentralisation both contribute towards the 
"survival of the nation" then, since they conflict with one another, 
the problem is to select that blend of economic growth and industrial 
decentralisation which, of all the attainable blends, is best suited to 
the task. 
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What are the government's present intentions in this re-
gard? Does it seek to achieve the spectacular sort of industri al 
decentralisation implied by numerous statements made by the Deputy 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development during 1967? 
Does it intend applying the Physical Planning Act in the extremely 
severe way promised by the Minister of Planning in his statements 
of October 1967 and January 1968. quoted in the last chapter? Or 
is the address by the Minister of Bantu Admin~stration and Develop-
ment, at Potchefstroorn in March 1968, in which he stated that the 
crux of government policy lay no~ in "the spectacular removal of 
people to their various homelands" but rather in nthe process of 
freeing the Bantu people from guardianship and anchodng them to 
their homelands traditionally. spiritually and politically", 1 a 
tru~r reflection of the Government's thinking at present? 
D.oes Mr. Botha's statement mean that we should now regard 
the more spectacular forms of industrial decentralisation in the same 
light as Schum:peter sees Disraeli's particular brand of imperialism? 
Schump~ter says: 
1. 
uwe ean see that Beaconsfield was quite right in n.ot taking 
a single practical step in the direction of practical imperialism 
and that his policy was based on good sense. The masses of 
the British electorate would never have sanctioned an imperialist 
policy, would never have made sacrifices for it. 
a political arabesque, they accepted imperialism, 
. d . . u 2 as no one tr1e 1t m earnest. 
As a toy, as 
just as long 
Reported in The NatallYiercury, Durban, Ma1•ch 2lst7 1968. 
J.; A. Schurnpeter, nlmperialiam as a Soc.ial Atavism", in 
Harrison M. Wright (e ditor}7 The ''New Imperialism". 
D. C. Heath and C o1npany, Boston, (1961), p. 50. 
Whatever the case may be, it is a matter of the greatest 
importance to the country that a realistic target for industrial decen-
tralisation should be established on the basis of a thorough examination 
of the facts, and that industrialists should be informed both of the 
volume of industrial decentralisation envis-aged and the criteria to 
be used in implementing the policy. Quite apart from the effects 
of actually implementing the border industries policy, the present 
state of confusion may itself seriously hamper industrial expaa~ion. 
No country as dependent as South Africa is on manufacturing industry 
for its future economic growth can afford to take this risk. 
APPENDIX A 
A Classification of Industries According to Type 
of Raw Materials and Market 
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Table A-1 provides an analysis of the intermediate inputs of each of 
the forty manufacturing sectors included in the input-output table for South 
Africa for 1956-57. 1 The primary, manufactured and service industry 
inputs of each of the forty sectors were first expressed as percentages of 
the sectors total intermediate inputs. Those sectors which were found to 
have a very high proportion of primary inputs relative to manufactured 
inputs were classified as first stage resource users. 
Of the remaining sectors the following two types were classified· as 
second stage resource users : (a) industries which obtained a relatively 
large proportion of their material inputs from the first atage resource 
user manufacturing industries e. g. bakeries (70. 2 per cent of inputs 
from 1st stage resource users), confectioners (Z6. 6 per cent) and furniture 
manufacturers (13. 87 per cent); (b) industries whoee intermediate inputs 
consisted to a significant degree of primary inputs even though their 
manufactured inputs were not obtained predominantly from first stage 
resource users e. g. iron and steel basic industries (19. 8 per cent), basic 
industrial chemicals (15. 8 per cent), and pulp, paper and paperboard 
(14. 3 per cent). 
All sectors, which were overwhelmingly dependent on industries 
other than first stage resource users and primary industries, were 
classified as third stage resource users. 
Using the information contained in Table A-1 as a guide, each of the 
1Z9 sub-groups given in the industrial census for 1959-60 was then classi-
fied as either a first, second or third stage resource user. It was on the 
1. See D. c. Krogh, "An Input-Output Analysis of the South African 
Economy- 1956-57", S. A . J . E., December 1961. 
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TAIJLE A-1 
Classification of Forty M·wufacturing ~ectors According t o Predomi nant Type of Raw Mater i a.l 11 
(1) (2) (J) (5) 
from lst 
Primary Resource Manufactured I Servi ce .1 Purchases Total Inter- stage re-
Description of Industry Inputs Inputs Industr; me<l i ate 
Inputs Inputs 
P.m. "' Rm. % lim. 'f. Rm. ·  
Slaughtering an<l meat products 109.84 51.7 15.02 7. 0 6/ . 78 41.3 212. 64 
Dairy Product s 2f' .08 56. 4 9.'>0 19.3 12.12 24 .3 
I 
49. 80 
Fruit and veget able product s 10. 72 27 .0 1e.3o 4'>.1 
I 
10 .68 26. 9 39. 70 
Fish and other sea products 
I 
4. 24 35 . 6 3.16 18.1 8 .14 I.'S.) 17 .56 
Grain mill products 110.6(, 76 .1 f>. 72 4. 1, 28.04 19.3 145.42 
Bakery product s 1.08 2. 5 32.70 75 . 9 9. 30 21.6 43.08 
Sugar factories and refineries 2e. 92 /.) . J 113 . 50 27 . 7 19.40 29. 0 66 .82 
Chocolate and sugar confectionery 1.42 6 .1 12. ;L 0,3.0 9. 5L 40 .9 I 23 . 30 
Miscellaneous f ood preparat ions 35 .02 14 . 1' r .:1:- ~O. J 22 .68 23 .9 I 95 . 02 Distilleries and wineries 4.46 7 . 5 21. )/, '3b . O 33. t.e 56.5 59.28 
Breweries and soft drink i ndustry 4. 70 19. 2 9.02 36. 9 10.74 43.9 I 24.46 Tobacco manufacturers 16 . 02 34. 8 7 .76 16. 9 22. 20 48.3 45. 98 Soinni ng, weaving & finishing of text i les 13.80 17.1 29. 50 36. 4 37 .62 46. 5 80. 92 
Kni tting mills 0.04 .02 10.72 41.5 15 . 20 58 . 5 25 .96 
Cordage, rope , t wine n.e. c. 2 .76 23. 2 4.76 40.0 4.38 J6. a 11.90 
Footwear, except rubber foortwear .02 . 04 25. 66 56. 2 20.02 43.8 45 . 70 
Clothing and other wearing apparel 0 .04 . OJ 32.86 56.6 63 .66 43 .4 11.6 . 56 
Made-up textile goods except 22 10.10 44 . 6 12.54 55 . 4 22. 64 
Wood and cork except 25 13 . 52 29. 2 19 .44 41.9 13 .38 28. 9 /,6 . 34 
Furniture and fixtures .32 .05 26 .46 45 . 6 31. 92 54 .t. 58 . 70 
Pulp. paper and paperboard mills 3.00 14.3 7. 96 J7. 8 10.06 47. 9 21.02 
Articles of pulp, paper and paperboard 0 . 06 .16 29. 00 79.6 7.44 20 . 1. 36. 50 
Printing, publishing and allied industri es 23. 72 50.1 23. 62 49. 9 47.34 
Tanneries and l eather product s 0. 04 . 4 11.82 82.1 2. 60 17. 9 14 . 48 
Rubber product s 10. 56 22. 3 21.!!4 47.0 14.34 30.7 46. 74 
Basic industri al chemicals 1 5.34 15.8 48.62 50.2 32. 96 34.0 96. 92 
Miscellaneous chemical products 10.84 9.7 56.06 so.c 45.16 40 .3 112.06 
Products of petroleum and coal 20.30 15. 3 1 ') . ).:: 14 . 5 93 . 20 70. 2 132. 82 
Structural clay products, pottery, china 
and eart henware 4 .12 20.1 /, . t.p 23.0 11.64 54.9 20. 44 
Glass and gl ass products 1.08 6 .2 9.02 51.6 7 . 38 42.2 17 .4!! 
Cement 1, . 86 28.6 4 . 80 20.1 12. 28 51.3 23.94 
Non-metallic mineral products n . e . c. 8 .42 30. 7 10. 76 39.2 8. 28 30.1 27 .46 
Iron and steel basic industries l4 . 4f- 19.8 36 .18 49.6 22.30 30. 6 72. 94 
Non-ferrous metal basi c industries • 56 1.5 27 . 58 77.0 7. 72 21. 5 35 . 84 
Metal products except 41, 43 and 44 . 56 .4 112. 96 75. 3 37. 24 24 .7 150.76 
Machinery except 42 .64 • 5 4!!.0 37. 0 81.62 62. 6 130. 26 
Elect rical marhinery, apparatus & suppli es . 08 I,O .O(, 54. 2 50 . 8(., 45 .8 111.00 
Transport equipment except 44 .08 19.0 67. 7 9.12 32. 3 28. 20 
Motor vehicles and repair . 02 106 .76 55. 3 86. 42 44 . 7 193 . 20 
Mi scellaneous manufact uring industries 17.62 25.2 12.24 17 . 5 40. 06 57 . 3 69. 92 
+As in the inout-output tabl e for 1956-57. 
* Percentage figures show purchases i n each category as a pe rcentage of t otal i ntermediate i nputs . 
Source: Based on D. C. Krogh ' s "An Input-output Analysis of t he S.A . Economy - 1956- 57", 
South African Jour~al of Economics, December 1961. Table I . 
source 
user manu-
{,acturing 
rnrlnRt.rli'R 
~ 
70.2 
26 . 6 
.4 
.54 
. 84 
1.88 
1.77 
1.15 
13 .87 
4. 3 
.82 
1. 52 
53. 04 
.68 
8.87 
5.85 
J .4J 
7 . 73 
. 78 
2.41 
2.39 
2.39 
2. 76 
.41 
5.03 
(6) 
Purchases 
from 2nd 
sta)!le r e- Stage of 
source Pro-
user manu- duction fact uring 
i ndustries 
"' 
.., l st s t age 
l st 
l st 
1st 
I lst 5. 7 2nd 
ls t 
26.4 2nd 
l st 
lst 
l st 
l s t 
36.0 2nd 
41.0 ) rd 
39. 2 2nd 
54 .3 3rd 
54 .8 3rd 
43 . 4 J rd 
l st 
31.7 2nd 
33 . 5 2nd 
78 . 8 )rd 
l.ll . 6 3rd 
29.1 2nd 
46 .3 3rd 
41.3 2nd 
44.1 J rd 
lst 
lst 
48. 2 2nd 
l st 
lst 
41.9 2nd 
76 . 22 2nd 
72.9 J rd 
35.0 J rd 
51.8 3rd 
64 . 9 ) rd 
54 . 9 3rd 
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basis of this classification and unpublished regional statistics supplied by 
the Bureau of Statistics that Table 6 in Chapter 3 above was compiled. 
Industries may also be classified as either "final" or "non-final" 
depending upon the nature of their market. Whether an industry was 
designated as "final" or "non-final" was determined by the volume of 
intermediate demand relative to total supply. For this purpose capital 
formation was treated as part of intermediate demand, contrary to usual 
practice. Thus the detnand of households, public authorities and exports 
together, as a percentage of total supply, was the deciding factor. 
Professor Krogh's input-output analysis formed the basis of this classi-
fication too. 
Taking into account the nature of both raw materials and market, the 
following schedule has been compiled. 
1st stage resource users: non-final markets 
Flour and grain mills 
Balanced animal feeds 
Chaff cutting,, compressed fodder, and lucerne milling 
Bone:mllling and blood meal 
Woolscouring 
Cotton ginning, fibre working, dyeing of wool etc. 
Sawmills 
Coke and by-products 
Brieks and tiles, earthenware and pottery 
Glass, bottles, containers, sheet glass, glass bevilling, etc. 
Cement 
Plaster and other composite boards 
Modelling in cement 
Lime works 
Marble, stone, slate etc . 
Crushed stone 
Other non-metallic products 
Tanneries 
Fellmongering 
1st stage resource users: final markets 
Canned and preserved meat and meat extract 
Bacon, ham, polonies and sausages 
Sausage casings, tallow, dripping and lard 
Butter and cheese 
Condensed milk, milk powder and other edible milk products 
Ice cream a!':ld ices 
Jam, canned, preserved and dried fruit and vegetables etc. 
Pickles, sauces and condiments 
Crayfish canning, fish preserving and other fish products 
Sugar mills and refineries 
Sweets and chocolates 
Peanut roasting 
Compound cooking fats, margarine and edible fats 
Flavouring essences 
Vinegar 
Jelly, custard and pudding powder 
Coffee roasting and chicory grinding 
Tea blending and packing 
Saltworks 
Yeast 
Other food industries 
Distilleries and wineries 
Breweries and malt 
Aerated waters 
Tobacco 
Motor and other spirits 
2nd stage resource users: non-final markets 
Spinning, weaving and finishing of other products 
Spinning, weaving and knitting of other cotton, rayon, etc. 
Rope, cordage, twine, fish and other nets 
Felt, padding, wadding, etc. 
Plywood, including laminated boards 
Wood carving, wood turning and similar wooden articles 
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Preservation of timber 
Other wooden products 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 
Fertilisers 
Tanning extract 
Explosives and carbide 
Other basic industrial chemicals 
Crude oil cake, and meal 
Paints, varnishe&, lacquers, and distempers 
Lubricating oils and greases 
Iron and steel basic industriea 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 
Znd stage resource usera: final markets 
Bakeries 
Blankets 
Boot and shoe factories 
Boot and shoe repairs 
Picture frames 
Coffins 
Furniture and fixtures 
Harness and saddlery 
Travel goods 
General and small leather goods 
3rd stage resource users: non-final markets 
Paper bags, cardboard boxes and mounts 
Stationery 
Other paper products 
Printing, bookbinding, engraving etc . 
Disinfectants, insecticides etc. 
Agricultural machinery emplements and parts 
Office machinery 
Industrial, mining and construction machinery 
All other machinery (n. e. c.) 
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Metal pipes and fittings 
Headed and threaded articles, including washers 
Sheet metal products 
Cables, fencing wire and wire products 
All other metal products n . e. c . 
Electrical machinery and motors 
Insulated cables and wire 
Electrical contracting and all other electrical repairs 
All other electrical apparatus 
Ship and boat building and repairs 
Manufacture and repair of railroad equipment 
Manufacture and repair of aircraft 
Blacksmithing 
Rubber products 
3rd stage resource users: final markets 
Hosiery and other knitted clothing 
Other knitting mills 
Mens and boys cloth ing 
Mens and boys hats and caps 
Ties 
Bespoke tailoring 
W omens and girls clothing 
Furriers 
Ladies handbags 
Millinery 
Other clothing factories 
Soft furnishings 
Bags and sacks 
Tents, tarpaulins, sails and other canvas goods 
Soaps and candles 
Pharmaceuticals 
Blacking, polishes, blanco, whiting etc. 
Other chemical industries 
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Tinware 
Manufacture, assembly, and repair of bicycles 
Meter vehicles 
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What is the significance of the classification from a locational point 
of view? First stage resource users, as we noted in Chapter 3, tend to 
be closely tied to raw material supplies, for two reasons (a) basic raw 
materials tend to be more heavily weight losing tha n intermediate manu-
factured goods (b) firms p r ocessing primary inputs tend to have a smaller 
range of inputs than those usin g manufactured intermediates. On the 
other hand, as we also noted, industries using partly manufactured goods 
tend to use many different materia ls and are therefore rarely located with 
special reference to any particular material. These industries tend to 
settle close to the markets they are to serve especially in the larger 
centres which offer advantages both for the assembly of the raw materials 
and the distribution of the product. 
If, as the Schumann Committee report suggests has been the case, 
manufacturing indus tries using basic and semi-processed raw materials 
and producing for non-final use are increasing in importance relative to 
total industrial output, does this provide any ground for expecting a 
spontaneous tendency toward decentralisation? We argued in Chapter 3 
that it did not except in so far as the less industrialised areas contained 
the major sources of supply oft he materials required by industries pro-
ducing intermediate products from basic raw materials. P roducers of 
intermediate goods from semi-manufa ctured materials (second and third 
stage resource users p roducing for non · final markets) would tend to be 
attracted to less industrialised a reas only if there was an adequate market 
t here. 
While it is not clear why the s ort of structural c hange r eferred to 
should lead to spon taneous decentralisation, s ome writers do feel that it 
renders industry more "shiftable"· For instance Greenh ut says "that 
the comapny which first fabricates the crude material. or the company 
which fabricates th e goods for the consumer market, cannot regard the 
source of supply or the consumer market as shiftable. This company' s 
479 
location is,therefore, adopted with the knowledge that it cannot cause the 
material source or the consumer site to move towards its site ...•. As 
soon as several stages of production are considered, the location of the 
semi-finished material becomes shiftable, and a cross interdependence 
arises between the initial processors, the intermediate processors, and 
the fabricators of the finished consumer goods . .,I 
Thus, while consumer markets change only slowly, intermediate 
goods markets can be shifted within a much shorter period of time through 
coordinated action, due to the interdependence of activities. It is claimed 
that the present concentration of industry in the four major centres is one 
of the chief forces making for further concentration. The border areas 
it is argued suffer from the fact that they lack markets for intermediate 
inputs and hence lack producers of manufactured intermediates. If 
industrial growth is a function of the degree of industrialisation already 
achieved in an area then industrialisation appears to be a precondition 
for further industrialisation. This, according to one school of thought, 
is the impasse in which many underdeveloped countries and regions find 
themselves The solution seems to be the coordinated establishment of 
users and producers of intermediate goods so that sources of supply and 
demand are created simultaneously. This of course is the essence of the 
idea discussed in Chapter 5 in the sections headed "The Interdependence 
of Investment Decisions", and "Infant Areas". It may well be that a 
growing relative importance of intermediate manufactured goods increases 
the scope for the successful coor2ination of investment decisions to bring 
about industrial decentralisation! 
1. M . L. Greenhut, Plant Location in Theory and in Practice (Chapel Hill 
1956), pp. 108-109. 
l. This, indeed, seems to be the Schumann Committee's view. See, for 
instance, Report of the Committee on Railway Rating Policy and Indus-
trial Location in South Africa, p. 73, para. 295. 
Appendix B. 
Magisterial Districts Comprising "Border and 
C APE PROVll',;'CE 
Barkly-East 
Cathcart 
East L ondon 
Elliot 
F ort Beaufort 
Glen Grey 
Her~chel 
Indwe 
Bantu A reas" in this Study 
Komga 
King William's Town 
Kuru man 
L ady Grey 
M aclea.r 
Mafeking 
Middledrift 
P eddie 
Queenstown 
Sterkstroom 
Stockenstrom 
Stutterheim 
Taung 
Victoria-E ast 
'W arrenton 
T R M S.KEI (included in the Cape border and Bantu areas in the analysis) 
Matatiele 
M ount .A.yliff 
Mount Currie 
M ount F letcher 
M ount F rere 
Qumbu 
T solo 
trrnzimkulu 
P utterwo rth 
1'ATAL 
Alfred 
Baba nango 
.Bergville 
Camperdown 
Dundee 
.Estcourt 
Impendle 
Inauda 
Ixopo 
Kliprivier 
Kranskop 
Lionsrivier 
L ower T ugela 
Mapumulo 
Idutywa 
~entani 
N gamakwe 
T somo 
Willowvale 
E lliotdale 
M qua nduli 
Umtata 
Bizana 
lvlsinga 
Ndwedwe 
:t-~ ewcastle 
I\ ew Hanover 
:N gots he 
.n aulpietersburg 
-.ietermaritzburg 
P o lela 
P ort Shepstone 
Rich mond 
Umlazi 
Umvoti 
Umzinto 
Underberg 
L ibode 
L u s ik isiki 
Ngqeleni 
·~ort St. Johns 
E n gcobo 
St. :M:arks 
Xal anga 
F lagstaff 
T abankulu 
Utrecht 
Vryheid 
Weenen 
E showe 
~Uabisa 
Ingwavuma 
L o wer Umfolozi 
M ahalabatini 
Mtanjanani 
lvltunzi.ni 
'Nkandla 
l\:ongoma 
~:qutu 
Umbombo 
TRANSVAAL 
Barbe1·ton 
Brits 
L etaba 
Lydenhurg 
Marico 
ORANGE FREF STATE 
Harris mith 
Zastron 
Nelspruit 
Pieters burg 
Piet R etief 
P ilgrims rust 
P otgi.eter s rust 
Rustenburg 
Sibasa 
Soutpans her g 
VVarrnbad 
Waterberg 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 8 
Statistical Indicators of the 1~ivertibility 1 of South African Manufacturing Industries to Cheap Labour Areas* 
INDUSTRY 
FOOD (except beverages) 
1 . Preparation and preserving of meat 
2. Sausage casings 
3. Butter and cheese 
4. Condensed milk and milk powder 
5. Ice cream and ices 
5. Jam, canned, preserved and dried fruit, etc. 
7. Pi ckles, sauces and condiments 
B. Rock lobster, fish preserving and other fish products 
9. Flour and grain mills, including macaroni, etc. 
10. Bakeries 
11. Sugar mills and refineries (including syrup) 
12. Sweets and chocolates 
13. Peanut roasting 
14. Balanced animal feeds 
15. Chaff cutting, compressed fodder, lucerne, meal milling 
1'>. Bonemilling and bloodmeal 
17. Compound cooking fats 
18. Flavouring essences 
19. Vinegar 
20. Jelly, custard and pudding powder 
21. Coffee roasting and chicory grinding 
22. Tea blending and packing 
23. Saltworks (including saltpans) 
24. Yeast 
25. Other food industries 
BEVERAGE INDUSTRIES 
26. Distilling and wineries 
27. Beer, Nati ve beer and malt 
28. Aerated waters and soft drinks 
TOBACCO 
29. 
TEXTILES 
30. Woolscouring 
31. Cotten ginning, fibre working, dyeing of wool, etc. 
32. Blankets 
33. Spinning, weaving and finishing of other woollen products 
34. Spinning, weaving and finishing of other cotton products 
35. Hosiery and other knitted clothing 
36. other knitting mills 
37. Ropes , cordage, twine, fish and other nets 
38. Felt, padding, wadding, etc. 
FOOTWEAR, OTHER WEARING APPAREL & HADE-UP TEXTILE GOODS 
39. Boot and shoe factories 
40. Boot and shoe repairs 
41. Mens and boys cl othing 
42. Mens and boys hats and caps 
43. Ties 
44. Bespoke Tailoring 
45. Womens and girls clothing 
46. Furriers 
47. Ladies handbags 
48. Millinery 
49. Other clothing 
50, Soft furnishings 
51. Bags and sacks 
52. Tents, tarpaulins, sails and other canvas goods 
WOOD 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57 . 
58. 
59. 
60. 
AND CORK (except furniture) 
Sawmills, carpentry and joinery 
Plywood, including laminated boards 
Wood carving, wood turning, etc. 
Preservation of timber 
Picture frames 
Coffins 
other wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 
61. Paper and paperboard 
62. Paper bags, ca rdboard boxes and mounts 
63 . Stationery 
64. Other paper products 
65. Printing, publishing and allied industries 
Salaries 
& Wages 
as a 
percentage 
of net 
output 
(1) 
58 
48 
28 
20 
47 
42 
35 
29 
38 
55 
25 
47 
47 
35 
23 
61 
36 
18 
72 
34 
31 
22 
38 
31 
34 
28 
44 
21 
47 
37 
45 
39 
36 
49 
33 
43 
47 
63 
46 
58 
58 
41 
52 
55 
52 
57 
54 
30 
50 
47 
75 
58 
71 
46 
42 
57 
63 
51 
57 
30 
49 
75 
40 
61 
Non-White 
employees 
as a per-
centage of 
all employees 
(2) 
77 
93 
72 
73 
70 
85 
85 
87 
82 
82 
88 
70 
8') 
80 
89 
80 
72 
63 
86 
75 
53 
70 
91 
73 
70 
77 
77 
71 
89 
92 
85 
88 
91 
82 
84 
90 
84 
75 
81 
85 
73 
63 
73 
81 
36 
89 
69 
84 
77 
94 
64 
88 
86 
80 
91 
74 
55 
F3 
77 
74 
75 
51 
78 
37 
Horse-power 
per worker 
(3) 
3.3 
.2 
4 . 5 
5.0 
2.5 
1.8 
2.0 
5.7 
5.0 
. 9 
16.8 
1.9 
.5 
4.6 
13.6 
9.3 
5.4 
2.0 
.7 
1.1 
2.0 
.5 
1.6 
8.9 
5.2 
2. 0 
).0 
1.1 
1.1 
2.4 
4 .2 
1 . 9 
1.9 
2.8 
.7 
2. 5 
2.8 
3.4 
.8 
.5 
. 3 
1.0 
.3 
,J 
. J 
. 1 
. 2 
.2 
.4 
. 8 
. 3 
3. 9 
1.9 
6.0 
2.7 
.4 
2.0 
3. 0 
2. 2 
18. '> 
1. 5 
1.2 
2 ,0 
1.5 
Divertibility 
Index Based on 
Potential Labour 
Cost Savings** 
(4) 
212 
234 
172 
166 
187 
212 
205 
203 
202 
219 
201 
187 
219 
195 
201 
221 
180 
144 
244 
184 
157 
162 
220 
177 
174 
182 
198 
163 
225 
221 
215 
215 
218 
213 
201 
223 
215 
178 
208 
228 
204 
167 
198 
217 
124 
235 
192 
198 
204 
235 
203 
234 
243 
206 
224 
205 
173 
217 
211 
17F 
199 
177 
196 
135 
I N D U S T R Y 
LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 
66. Tanneries and fellmongering 
1)7. Harness and saddlery 
68. Travel goods etc, 
69. General and small leather goods 
RUBBER PRODUCTS 
. 70. 
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 
71. Fertilisers 
72. Tanning extract 
73 . Explosives and carbide 
74. Other basic industrial chemicals 
75. Crude oil-cake and meal, etc. 
76. Soap and candles 
77. Paints, varnishes, lacquers and distemper 
78. · Drugs and pharmaceutical preparations 
79. Disinfectants, insecticides, etc. 
80. Blacking, polishes, blanco, whiting, etc. 
81. other industries, etc. 
PRODUCTS OF PETROLEUM AND COAL 
82. Motor and other spirits or fuel, lubricating oils and greases 
83. Coke (including coal gas) bituminous and allied emulsions 
NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 
84. Bricks and tiles (clay), earthenware and pottery 
85. Glass making, bottle making, glass bevelling, silvering, etc. 
86 . Cement 
87. Plaster and other composite boards 
88. Modelling in cement, etc, 
89. Lime works 
90. Marble, 5tone, slate, etc, 
91. Crushed 5tone 
92. Other industries 
BASIC METAL INDUSTRIES 
93. Iron and 5teel, etc. 
94. Smelting and refining of non-ferrous metals 
METAL PRODUCTS (Except machinery and transport equipment) 
95. Metal pipes 
96. Headed and threaded articles 
97. Sheet metal products 
98. Tinware 
99. Cables, fencing wire and wire products 
100. All other metal products 
MACH][ERY (except electrical machinery) 
101. Agricultural machinery 
102. Office machinery 
103. Industrial, mining and construction machinery 
104. All other machinery 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, APPARATUS AND SUPPLIES 
105. Electrical machinery and motor5 
106. Insulated cables and wires 
107. Electrical contracting 
108. All other 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
109. Ship and boat building and repairs 
110. Railroad equipment 
111. Manufacture, assembling and repair of bicycles 
112, Assembly and repair of aircraft 
113. Black5mithing 
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
114. Professional, scientific and controlling instruments 
115. Optical and photographic goods 
116. Manufacture and repair of watches and clocks 
117. Jewellery and related articles 
118. Imitation Jewellery 
119. Diamond cutting and polishing 
120. Electroplating 
121. Musical instruments 
122. Toys, sporting accessories, novelties, etc. 
123. Brushes and brooms 
124. Rubber stamps 
125. Buttons, buckles, etc. 
126. other plastic products 
127. Signwriting, posters and showcards 
128. Wattle bark grinding 
129. other industries 
Salaries 
& Wages 
as a 
percentage 
of net 
outyut (1 
53 
73 
55 
54 
45 
36 
20 
51 
33 
39 
33 
34 
32 
45 
22 
45 
31 
20 
55 
47 
18 
52 
53 
40 
57 
35 
43 
41 
50 
61 
47 
54 
46 
50 
58 
57 
43 
62 
47 
61 
49 
66 
47 
69 
53 
45 
79 
46 
68 
65 
50 
55 
53 
68 
61 
23 
47 
51 
54 
55 
47 
63 
26 
51 
Non-White 
employees 
as a per-
centage of 
all erloyees (2 
88 
83 
83 
83 
79 
80 
89 
72 
65 
84 
68 
66 
50 
69 
61 
63 
48 
86 
91 
73 
73 
80 
87 
88 
66 
86 
72 
57 
70 
70 
72 
82 
79 
81 
66 
60 
42 
54 
50 
50 
71 
48 
62 
64 
64 
83 
36 
70 
61 
52 
37 
63 
74 
12 
85 
71 
85 
88 
51 
84 
75 
62 
<;0 
7S 
Horse-power 
per worker (3) 
4.4 
1.7 
• 5 
.4 
3.6 
8.0 
5.0 
5.1 
10.0 
5.3 
2.5 
2.5 
1.0 
4.4 
1.0 
2.6 
44.1 
7 . 6 
3.3 
2.0 
26.2 
2.9 
1.7 
3.6 
2.7 
11.3 
).8 
17.1 
6.3 
4.7 
3 . 8 
1.8 
1.9 
3.9 
2.5 
3.3 
.4 
3.5 
1.8 
1.9 
4.7 
.2 
1.6 
1.1 
3 . 5 
3. 4 
.4 
3.1 
2.0 
.6 
.3 
. 5 
.2 
1.4 
1.9 
2.3 
.a 
1.2 
.3 
1.1 
2.2 
.3 
4.7 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 8 
Continued 
Divertibility 
Index Based on 
Potential Labour 
Cost Savfngs (4 
229 
239 
221 
220 
203 
196 
198 
195 
163 
207 
169 
166 
132 
183 
144 
171 
127 
192 
237 
193 
164 
212 
227 
215 
189 
207 
187 
155 
190 
201 
191 
218 
204 
212 
190 
177 
127 
170 
147 
161 
191 
162 
171 
197 
181 
211 
151 
186 
190 
169 
124 
181 
201 
92 
231 
165 
217 
227 
156 
223 
197 
187 
206 
203 
*Based on Industrial Census 1959-60, Special Report No . 250. **For each industr;: this inciex equals perc~:1tage in Col.2 multipl ied b~· 2 
pl us pc :·cent age :.:1 , .. .... ~ . 
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